In April 2014, someone discovered a ‘gift from God’ in northern Niger: large quantities of gold, easily accessible using basic equipment. The gold rush began, and with it came a transformation of the security, political, and socio-economic dynamics in this vast and sensitive region. The population suddenly increased fifty-fold, and the number of vehicles circulating in the region grew even more than that.
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Ubari, an oasis town in southern Libya’s Fezzan region, is home to members of both the Tuareg and Tubu tribes. These two tribes dominate this corner of Libya and contiguous desert regions in neighbouring countries. For over a century, relations between these tribes were peaceful, governed by an 1893 treaty known as the ‘Midi Midi’. The 2011 revolution in Libya did more than simply bring down the Qaddafi regime; it also brought down the intricately structured relationships of patronage and power that had kept the region firmly under central government control.
In February 2007 at least a dozen people, including an 11-year-old boy, were killed during a land dispute between tribesmen from al-Baydha and Sanhan that erupted in a southern suburb of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a. A sheikh from Sanhan kidnapped the son of a sheikh from al-Baydha to pressure him into renouncing ownership of a large plot of land. The youth reportedly fought back, injuring his kidnapper, and was then killed. The boy’s family rejected mediation and a gun battle erupted, with further killings apparently occurring when injured fighters were taken to hospital.
Commentary on the Draft Arms Law in Timor-Leste, by Sarah Parker, 2008. East Timor Law Journal
The use of arms by private security personnel poses special challenges for Timor-Leste, where government capacity to appropriately regulate, monitor, and enforce weapons possession laws remains in question. If the Timorese government does proceed to adopt legislation allowing private security personnel to carry and use firearms, strong regulations should be carefully considered, such as strict restrictions on carrying and a prohibition on storing guns at home after hours.
On 11 February 2008 Major Alfredo Reinado and a group of ex-F-FDTL1 soldiers known as the Petitioners, accompanied by allied ex-PNTL2 members, attacked the residence of President Jose Ramos Horta in Dili. The president, returning home from jogging, was shot and seriously wounded; security offi cers killed Reinado and one of his men. Less than two hours later, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão’s motorcade came under fi re from a group led by Petitioner leader Lieutenant Gastão Salsinha.
When one thinks of arms traffickers, the image that often comes to mind is of the stereotypical ‘Merchant of Death’ – ambitious, well-connected, globetrotting entrepreneurs who single-handedly arm warlords and insurgents across the world. While there is some truth to the stereotype, most illicit arms traffickers do not fit this profile.
The Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR)—including its armed wing, the Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (Abacunguzi Fighting Forces, FOCA)—is among the most enduring armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Several members of the group’s top leadership are suspected of involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, making the FDLR’s continued presence in the DRC a recurring point of contention between Kinshasa and Kigali and a source of tensions for the Great Lakes region as a whole.
The conflict in Syria has become a rallying point for jihadists from around the world. More than 20,000 foreign fighters are fighting or have fought in Syria, and most are part of jihadist groups, including Jubhat al Nusra (JAN) and Islamic State (IS). North Africa has provided a large portion of these foreign fighters, from countries as diverse as Morocco and Libya. Who are these North African fighters, and why are they going to Syria? What do they hope to accomplish there, and do they want to return to their home countries?