Since 1970, armed groups have hit dozens of civilian aircraft with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), killing more than 1,000 civilians. The international community has taken numerous steps to reduce illicit proliferation, but armed groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continue to acquire and use these systems.
Once a hotbed of pro-Qaddafi resistance, Abu Salim is now a stronghold dominated by Abdelghani al-Kikli (widely known as ‘Ghaniwa’) and his Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). Ghaniwa has consolidated power over Abu Salim—the main southern gateway into the Libyan capital of Tripoli—through violence.
Since 2015, the coastal city of Zawiya has witnessed endemic violence, but never an all-out war between its main forces. Due to this, the city has become emblematic of Libya’s power struggles. Despite its significance, however, no in-depth studies exist on its armed groups and their evolution.
The increasingly sophisticated arsenals of guided light weapons held by non-state actors pose an international security threat. These include man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs)—systems operable by a single user or a small crew, where the weapons’ missiles are either manually targeted or self-guided after launch. Such systems have been used by armed groups to attack commercial airlines, military aircraft, and governmental targets, as well as to degrade military and peacekeeping operations.
A Widening War around Sudan: the Proliferation of Armed Groups in the Central African Republic examines the origins and diffusion of armed groups in northern CAR and emerging responses to instability in the border areas with Sudan and Chad.
In 2018, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoSS), the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). As part of the transitional security arrangements within the R-ARCSS framework, all warring parties agreed to assemble combatants in designated cantonment sites to facilitate their training, and later, integration into a new ‘unity’ army or other national security services.
Darfur’s fade-out from international headlines and Western interests over the past several years has fostered a false narrative that the conflict there is over, despite stark evidence to the contrary. Linked to this narrative, the paralysis of internal and international engagement on Darfur has compelled Darfurians—civilians and combatants alike—to increase their outward mobility in search of safety and livelihood opportunities in neighbouring African countries or further afield into Europe.
Southern Libya after the fall of Qaddafi has become synonymous with lawlessness. For centuries, the area has been home to a shifting sea of ethnic groups who see the border as an imposition but not a barrier. The Tubu (or Teda) are one such group, whose presence stretches across southern Libya, Chad, and Niger.
The history of Tripoli after the fall of Qaddafi is one of conflict, shifting control, fractured alliances, and the quest for power and influence. Central among the players in this quest have been the militias controlling the capital’s territory. In the past two years, that control has consolidated into the hands of a cartel: four militias whose military dominance, influence in government, and power over the resources of the state is unprecedented.
An unprecedented and complex Islamist insurgency has raged in Egypt since the 2013 military coup that overthrew the government formed by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Salafi-Jihadi attacks of Islamic State – Sinai Province (IS-SP) are well known. But another strain of pro-violence Islamist armed action aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has recently evolved in the Nile Valley, home of 97 per-cent of the country’s population. This new strand of Jihadi belief represents what can perhaps best be described as a type of MB-Jihadism, or Ikhwani-Jihadism.