Inspectors conduct UN-mandated searches for contraband in containers in February 2003.
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INTERNATIONAL SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS

4

INTRODUCTION

In late 2003, human rights organizations brought a case against the British government's arms sales (including small arms sales) to Indonesia. They argued that these exports violated the UK export criteria, as there was a 'patent' risk that the weapons would be used for internal repression (Norton-Taylor and Agionby, 2003). This incident illustrates that much controversy still surrounds the issue of arms sales to countries where serious human rights violations take place, something that this chapter also shows.

Previous editions of the *Small Arms Survey* tried to identify main exporters and importers of small arms,[1] to examine the level of transparency in the small arms trade,[2] and to explore the links between legal and illicit arms transfers. This chapter continues to follow developments in the small arms and light weapons trade and state transparency. However, it does so in a slightly different way than in previous years. For the first time, it contains extensive listings of both main importers and exporters, with their most important trading partners and principal categories of weapons traded. The section on main exporters also systematically compares data from different sources (customs data and national reports on exports of military goods). The comparison shows that we are still far from a clear and coherent picture of the authorized trade in small arms. This is an important reason for introducing a second novelty: the **Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer.** The barometer assesses the transparency of the main exporting states on a 20-point scale. It will be a recurrent feature of the *Small Arms Survey*. In subsequent editions, it should thus be possible to assess to what extent individual states are becoming more or less transparent over time, and hence whether we are moving towards a clearer picture of the authorized trade. As noted in previous editions of the *Small Arms Survey*, a good understanding of the legal (or authorized) trade is crucial for understanding the illicit market.

It is with a view to better comprehend the authorized trade that the chapter also sets out to examine the relationship between production and trade for the first time. The goal is to assess to what extent the small arms industry is dependent on trade for survival. Future editions of the *Survey* will deal with the other main source of small arms transfers, namely pre-existing state stockpiles.[3]

Lastly, in line with the theme of the 2004 edition of the *Small Arms Survey*, the chapter also examines the links between human rights violations and small arms transfers. Here, the goal is to detail small arms transfers to states where serious violations of human rights take place. In fact, there are surprisingly many such transfers.

The chapter seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the recent trends in the authorized international small arms trade?
- Who are the leading international exporters and importers of small arms?
- How transparent is the authorized trade in SALW?
- How export-dependent are small arms producers?
- What are the links between the small arms trade and human rights violations?

A number of issues pertaining to transfers will remain unexplored. Some of these are discussed elsewhere in this volume, such as questions related to the illicit trade in small arms (BROKERING), and the trade in MANPADS (MANPADS). The main findings of the chapter include the following:

- The largest small arms exporters by value, according to the latest available data as well as estimates, are the US, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil, and China.
- The largest known small arms importers by value are the US, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Canada.
- According to the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, the most transparent states *among the larger exporters of small arms and light weapons* are the United States, Germany, and France. However, even they are not fully transparent.
- Despite the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) moratorium on small arms, states in the region import significant amounts of firearms from Western and other sources.
- Small arms manufacturers of large producer countries, such as Brazil, Germany, and (to a lesser extent) Russia, are dependent on exports for their survival. US manufacturers, in contrast, produce mainly for domestic consumption.
- European exporters of civilian small arms are heavily dependent on the US market.
- The ability of states classed as having serious human rights problems to import arms is quite uneven. At one extreme, Russia—although involved in a war marred by human rights violations in Chechnya—has unlimited access to small arms of all types and from almost all states; at the other, no transfer of small arms was recorded to Iraq while it was embargoed under Saddam Hussein.

THE AUTHORIZED GLOBAL SMALL ARMS TRADE: ANNUAL UPDATE

This section provides an update and new information on the authorized global small arms trade. It focuses on the largest exporters and importers globally, their trading partners, and main products traded. It includes information on parts, whenever available, as well as on small arms ammunition, but does not cover grenades and mines. Moreover, it should be noted that, given gaps in the current data on light weapons ammunition, trade in ammunition is almost certainly underestimated (see Box 4.1 for details of an effort to circumvent this problem). The same is true of the trade in military small arms and light weapons, due to limited transparency on the part of many states.

The largest exporters of small arms by value in 2001 were the United States, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil, and China.

The value of exports of small arms for 2001 documented in international customs data is approximately USD 2.4 billion.[4] This is slightly more than for 2000, when documented exports amounted to USD 2.1 billion (Small Arms Survey, 2003, p. 97), at least partly because, in a departure from previous practice, small arms parts are included in the calculations. There are therefore no reasons to modify the estimated total value of the authorized trade in small arms, namely USD 4 billion a year. The largest exporters by value in 2001 were the United States, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil, and China. The largest importers in 2001 were the United States, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Canada.

As always, the data presented in tabular form in this section should be interpreted with caution. Information (customs data and national export reports) is available from the most transparent states; the exports and imports of less

transparent states are most likely underestimated. Our attempts to circumvent this problem with estimation techniques for states thought to be important in the global trade clearly cannot solve the problem of a lack of transparency.

Small arms exports

Of several sources of information on small arms exports, the two most important are national reports on exports of military goods and international customs data (as reported to UN Comtrade).[5] Here, we have attempted to systematically compare data from these two sources; where available, both sets are presented in Table 4.1. The comparison reveals that international customs data and export reports usually diverge significantly. Some of the possible reasons for this have been detailed in the 'remarks' column of Table 4.1. The most important reasons are: unequal reporting (a state might publish a rather detailed export report, but not report all its customs statistics internationally); different definitions of small arms and light weapons in the two sources; and the fact that some transfers do not go through customs (direct state-to-state transfers) and hence appear only in national export reports. Other possible reasons are that transfers to peacekeeping operations abroad sometimes go through customs but would not appear in export reports, and customs data at times includes guns returned to producers for repairs and refitting or servicing. The comparison suggests an urgent need for international standardization of national export reports. It is paradoxical that national export reports, which are published mainly for reasons of transparency, are at times less transparent on the small arms trade than international customs data, which were not designed as an arms trade transparency device.

It is paradoxical that national export reports, which are published for reasons of transparency, are less transparent than international customs data, which were not designed as an arms trade transparency device.

The comparison also shows that, unless all states report their authorized imports and exports through customs and publish export reports, only a partial understanding of the trade can be obtained. Romania illustrates this point. Romania published a first export report in 2002 (see Box 4.3 and Table 4.5), in which it lists its main trading partners for arms generally: US, Israel, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. Small arms (including small arms ammunition) form a large part of total Romanian arms exports (about 63 per cent of the total or USD 15.4 million in 2001). As Romania has not provided its customs data for 2001 to international customs databases, we rely on importers' customs reports on their small arms trade with Romania (a total of USD 4.2 million only). While the US still is the largest customer, Switzerland comes second, followed by Senegal, Italy, and the Czech Republic. It is quite possible that an accurate list would include Israel, India, Pakistan, or Turkey, but among these countries only Turkey provides detailed import data to international customs databases. Hence, if we have to rely on importers' reports of their small arms trade with Romania, we are left with only a partial understanding of Romanian trade, in which the role of transparent states, such as Switzerland, Senegal, Italy, and the Czech Republic, probably is overstated.

To begin circumventing problems such as these, our data on exports, for the first time, makes use of estimates for China, a major producer of small arms (PRODUCERS), which provides very limited information on its exports.[6] The estimation technique is simple, and is based on other states' ratios of small arms exports to total arms exports. Details on the estimation technique are given in Annex 4.I, available on the Small Arms Survey Web site.[7]

To make full use of international customs data, we have used both exporters' reports on their exports, and so-called mirror data, i.e. importer's declarations on the same transactions (the two should in principle be identical). As is evident in Table 4.1, mirror data is particularly important for determining exports of non-reporting countries.

Our analysis shows that, globally, the US, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil, and China were the top exporters of small arms and light weapons in terms of value in 2001. Other important exporters were Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Japan (non-military small arms only), and Spain. Countries that are known to be medium producers of small

Countries that are known to be medium producers of small arms, but about whose exports very little is known, include Iran, Pakistan, and Singapore.

arms (Small Arms Survey 2003, Table 3.1), but about whose exports very little is known, include Iran, Pakistan, and Singapore. Some countries, such as Pakistan, are making strong efforts to increase their arms exports, including of small arms, although it is unclear whether they have been successful to date (Siddiqa-Agha, 2002).



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A Canadian crew in Pakistan loads a consignment of machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades with ammunition into a plane destined for Afghanistan in February 2003.

Some points emerging from the table are worthy of particular mention. Saudi Arabia is a very large recipient of small arms from countries such as Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, France, Spain, the UK, and the US. In 2003, there were news reports of leakages of small arms from Saudi stocks to terrorist organizations, in particular al Qaeda (STOCKPILES). Given the closed nature of the Saudi regime, it is possible to assume that such reports might constitute only the tip of an iceberg.

Exports from the Czech Republic to Yemen have been substantial for several years, and have been criticized for almost as long. Yemen is a particularly sensitive destination given its role as a regional hub in small arms trafficking. In a recent UN Security Council report on violations of the arms embargo against Somalia (a country experiencing a protracted civil war), Yemen is labelled 'Somalia's arms supermarket' (UNSC, 2003b, p. 19). Yemen is also allegedly a source of weapons for terrorists operating in Saudi Arabia. According to Saudi authorities, the weapons and explosives used in the 12 May 2003 bombings of housing compounds in Riyadh, which killed 35 people, were smuggled in from Yemen (*Al Jazeerah*, 2003). Since then, border control between the two countries has been substantially reinforced.

Another point worthy of mention is Brazilian and Russian exports of small arms to Algeria (see Table 4.13 for further exports, including by other countries, to Algeria over the past years), whose human rights situation is one of the worst in the world, and where both government-controlled and Islamist forces are accused of grave violations. Moreover, small arms are often directly involved in these human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2003b).

As noted above regarding medium producers such as Iran, Pakistan, and Singapore, some countries are noteworthy for the lack of information on exports. Examples of less important producers include Serbia and Montenegro and Moldova/Transdniestria. Serbia is home to the well-known Zastava Arms Company. Even considering that the industry is in crisis, Serbian officially declared exports are conspicuously small. At the same time, reports of Serbian firearms ending up in war zones have started to emerge: a Belgrade arms broker recently diverted Serbian-made assault rifles (manufactured in 2001 and 2002) to Liberia. The Serbian authorities withdrew the broker's licence when confronted with the evidence gathered by UN experts investigating violations of the arms embargo against Liberia (UNSC, 2003a; Vines, 2003). Moldova, in particular the breakaway Transdniestria area, is a 'black hole', with large known arsenals and very little transparency. In a recent report, Associated Press claimed to have obtained a copy of a confidential 1998 agreement, in which 'Russia and Trans-Dniester would share profits from the sale of 40,000 tons of "unnecessary" arms and ammunition stored in an arms depot in the breakaway region'. Until December 2003, the depot also contained hundreds of portable surface-to-air missiles, which Russia now claims have been withdrawn because of concerns that they could end up in terrorists' hands (Jahn, 2004; for similar stories relating to both surplus stocks of arms and production, see BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2003). The same could in principle be true for other smaller producers with few known exports, even though fewer reports exist on dubious weapons exports from these countries.

Table 4.1 Annual authorized small arms exports of the most important known exporters, 2001 (most recent complete yearly data available)

Country	USD value customs data (Comtrade)*/ Export report[x] (2001 if not otherwise stated)	Main known recipients (listed in order of importance)	Main known types of SALW exported	Remarks
Australia	11.3m*	UK, US, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand*	Ammunition, pistols/ revolvers, shotguns, sporting/hunting rifles*	Publishes an export report, but does not detail the SALW share of arms exports.
Austria	At least 77.7m*	US, Germany, Sweden, Venezuela, Canada*	Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, parts pistols/revolvers, sporting/hunting rifles, parts sporting/hunting weapons*	Reports its trade neither in military weapons nor in pistols and revolvers to Comtrade. Hence the value for these categories (based on importers' reports) is likely to be underestimated.
Belgium	234.0m* EUR 82.0m (USD 73.5m)[x]	Saudi Arabia, US, France, Portugal, UK*	Military weapons, shotguns, parts sporting/hunting weapons, ammunition, sporting/ hunting rifles*	The discrepancy between customs and export report data is difficult to explain. It could be partly because the customs data includes repairs and refurbishing. Export report does not detail recipients of small arms.
Brazil	At least 99.1m*	US, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, Algeria*	Sporting/hunting rifles, pistols/revolvers, ammunition, shotguns*	Does not report trade in military weapons, pistols, parts of revolvers and pistols, parts of military weapons, or small arms ammunition to Comtrade. Hence the value is likely to be underestimated.[8]
Bulgaria	At least 17.1m*	Saudi Arabia, Macedonia, US, Austria, Italy*	Ammunition, parts sporting/hunting weapons, military weapons, shotguns*	Does not report on its SALW trade at all to Comtrade. Figures are based on importers' reports. Hence the value is likely to be underestimated.

Table 4.1 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms exports of the most important known exporters, 2001 (most recent complete yearly data available)

Country	USD value customs data (Comtrade)*/ Export report (2001 if not otherwise stated)	Main known recipients (listed in order of importance)	Main known types of SALW exported	Remarks
Canada	53.6m* CAD 25.8m (USD 16.7m)[x]	US, Denmark, Netherlands, UK, France* Denmark, UK, Netherlands, Germany, Thailand[x]	Military weapons, ammunition, sporting/ hunting rifles, pistols/ revolvers*	International customs data and the national report diverge largely because the latter does not take into account exports to the US, which according to the export report are 'estimated to account for over half of Canada's exports of military goods' (Canada, 2002, p.8).
China	9.0m* SAS estimate: USD 100m	US, Bangladesh, Iran, Germany, Canada*	Sporting/hunting rifles, shotguns, pistols/ revolvers, parts sporting/ hunting weapons, ammunition*	International customs data probably underestimate actual exports, as China does not report on many of its exports, and hence figures are based on importers' reporting.
Czech Republic	52.3m*	US, Germany, Yemen, France, Slovakia*	Ammunition, pistols/ revolvers, sporting/ hunting rifles, parts pistols/revolvers*	
Finland	30.7m* EUR 2.9m (USD 2.6m)[x]	US, Sweden, Germany, UK, Italy* Sweden, Italy, Germany, US, New Zealand[x]	Ammunition, sporting/ hunting rifles, shotguns, parts sporting/hunting weapons, military weapons*	Customs and export report data diverge probably largely because civilian weapons are excluded from the export report.
France	At least 33.7m* EUR 18.5m (USD 16.6m)[x]	Saudi Arabia, US, Norway, Portugal, Russia* Romania, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Malaysia, US[x]	Military weapons, ammunition, parts sporting/hunting weapons, sporting/ hunting rifles*	The discrepancy between customs and export report data is difficult to explain. Does not report trade in military weapons, pistols, parts of revolvers and pistols to Comtrade. Hence the value is likely to be underestimated. The export report data excludes ammunition and parts, but includes some non-SALW because certain categories do not contain purely SALW.
Germany	At least 156.7m*	US, Switzerland, France, Spain, Austria*	Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, sporting/ hunting rifles, parts sporting/hunting weapons, parts pistols/ revolvers*	Does not report trade in military weapons to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to be underestimated. Publishes an export report, but it includes information on granted export licences, not actual deliveries of SALW.
Iran	*Medium producer, but little is known about its exports*			
Israel	At least 23.2m*	US, Botswana, Brazil, Guatemala, Germany*	Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, military weapons, parts pistols/ revolvers, parts sporting/ hunting weapons*	International customs data probably underestimates actual exports, as Israel does not report most of its exports, and hence figures are based on importers' reports.
Italy	At least 298.7m*	US, Belgium, France, Germany, UK*	Shotguns, ammunition, pistols/revolvers, parts sporting/hunting weapons*	Does not report trade in military weapons to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to be underestimated. Publishes an export report, but it includes information on licences, not deliveries of SALW.

Table 4.1 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms exports of the most important known exporters, 2001 (most recent complete yearly data available)

Country	USD value customs data (Comtrade)*/ Export report (2001 if not otherwise stated)	Main known recipients (listed in order of importance)	Main known types of SALW exported	Remarks
Japan	70.3m*	US, Belgium, France, Germany, Canada*	Sporting/hunting rifles, parts sporting/hunting weapons, shotguns, shotgun barrels, ammunition*	Produces only non-military firearms.
Mexico	At least 14.2m*	US, Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay, France*	Parts sporting/hunting weapons, shotgun barrels, ammunition, shotguns*	Does not report trade in military weapons, pistols, and some parts to Comtrade. Hence the value is likely to be underestimated.
Norway	13.7m* NOK 0.5m (USD 60,000)[x]	Switzerland, US, Italy, Sweden, Finland*	Ammunition, military weapons, shotguns, pistols/revolvers*	Customs and export report data diverge probably largely because it is difficult to fully distinguish SALW from non-SALW (especially ammunition) in the export report.
Pakistan	*Medium producer, but little is known about its exports*			
Portugal	At least 44.8m*	US, Belgium, Spain, Italy Greece*	Sporting/hunting rifles, parts sporting/hunting weapons, shotguns, shotgun barrels, ammunition*	Does not report trade in military weapons to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to be underestimated. Publishes an export report, but it does not detail the SALW share of arms exports.
Romania	At least 4.2m* 15.4 m[x]	US, Switzerland, Senegal, Italy, Czech Republic*	Sporting/hunting rifles, military weapons, ammunition, parts sporting/hunting weapons, pistols/revolvers*	The export report figure and the Comtrade figure diverge because Romania does not report its customs data to Comtrade, and hence figures are based on importers' reporting.
Russia	At least 42.2m* Estimate based on official information: no more than 130m (Pyadushkin, 2003, p. 24).	US, Cyprus, Algeria, Germany, Lebanon* Vietnam, Malaysia, Bhutan, Indonesia, Afghanistan (Northern Alliance), Ethiopia (Pyadushkin, 2003, p.24)	Shotguns, ammunition, sporting/hunting rifles, pistols/revolvers*	International customs data probably underestimate actual exports, as Russia does not report its exports, and hence figures are based on importers' reporting. This explains the large discrepancy between the customs data figure and the figure obtained through exporting companies.
Saudi Arabia	13.2m*	Germany, France, US, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait*	Parts sporting/hunting weapons, shotguns, ammunition, military weapons, shotgun barrels*	Does not produce large quantities of weapons. Much of the apparent exports are probably transfers due to servicing and repairs. Some might also be re-export or transit.
Singapore	*Medium producer, but little is known about its exports*			
South Africa	At least 12.5m* ZAR 81m (USD 9.5m)[x]	US, Colombia, Germany, India, Mexico*	Ammunition, military weapons, pistols/ revolvers, sporting/ hunting rifles*	The discrepancy between customs and export report data is difficult to explain. Does not report customs data to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to be under-estimated.

Table 4.1 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms exports of the most important known exporters, 2001 (most recent complete yearly data available)

Country	USD value customs data (Comtrade)*/ Export report (2001 if not otherwise stated)	Main known recipients (listed in order of importance)	Main known types of SALW exported	Remarks
South Korea	29.7m*	Venezuela, US, Ethiopia, Australia, Turkey*	Ammunition, military weapons, parts pistols/ revolvers, parts sporting/ hunting weapons, pistols/ revolvers*	
Spain	At least 65.3m* EUR 42.9m (USD 38.5m)[x]	Saudi Arabia, US, Portugal, UK, France*	Ammunition, shotguns, parts pistols/revolvers, pistols/revolvers*	Does not report trade in military weapons to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to be underestimated. The discrepancy between the export report figure and the Comtrade figure is most likely due to differing definitions of SALW.
Sweden	At least 24.1 m* SEK 5m (USD 0.5m)[x]	US, Norway, Austria, Denmark, Finland*	Ammunition, military weapons, parts sporting/ hunting weapons, sporting/hunting rifles*	Does not report trade in military weapons to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to be underestimated. Discrepancies probably arise because Sweden uses a restrictive definition of SALW in its export report (excluding light weapons), and does not separate small arms ammunition from other types of ammunition.
Switzerland	48.1m* CHF 11.7m (USD 6.9m)[x]	Germany, Singapore, Romania, US, Canada* Germany, US, Malaysia, Italy, France[x]	Ammunition, parts sporting/hunting weapons, pistols/ revolvers, military weapons, sporting/ hunting rifles*	Discrepancies in total amounts of SALW exports and main destinations may arise because SALW ammunition cannot be distinguished from other types of ammunition in the export report, and is therefore not included in the export report numbers.
Turkey	21.4m*	US, Italy, Germany, Lebanon, France*	Shotguns, parts sporting/hunting weapons, ammunition, sporting/hunting rifles, military weapons*	
UK	44.8m*	US, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Denmark, Belgium*	Military weapons, ammunition, shotguns, sporting/hunting rifles*	Publishes an export report, but does not detail the value of SALW exports. Instead it provides numbers of certain types of SALW exported.
US	741.4m*	Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Italy*	Military weapons, ammunition, pistols/ revolvers, sporting/ hunting rifles*	Publishes an export report, but it includes information on granted export licences, not actual deliveries of SALW.

Notes: Only countries with known or estimated yearly sales of more than USD 10 million have been included in the listing.

* UN Comtrade, 2001 figures (the latest available), customs codes 930100 (military weapons), 930200 (revolvers and pistols), 930320 (shotguns), 930330 (sporting and hunting rifles), 930510 (parts and accessories of revolvers and pistols), 930521 (shotgun barrels), 930529 (parts and accessories of shotguns or rifles), 930590 (parts and accessories of military weapons), 930621 (shotgun cartridges), 930630 (small arms ammunition).

[x] Export report

Source: NISAT (2003)

Box 4.1 Defining and counting SALW: A proposal for a new approach

Cased, palletized, or containerized, SALW are routinely forwarded by commercial carriers, along with (and sometimes inside) cargoes of other more innocent goods coming either from the more than 90 countries where their main manufacturers are located (PRODUCERS) or from second-hand markets. In previous research on the logistics of arms transfers and the transport companies servicing the arms trade,[9] we attempted to evaluate the market size of SALW transport and developed a database on SALW flows and trade lanes for 1994–2001. We based the flow-charts on the records in UN Comtrade, according to a methodology based on the cross-analysis of importer and exporter declarations.[10]

In this box we present some of our findings and, in particular, data on trends and flows of (a) goods under those customs categories that mostly include SALW and related ammunition (here referred to as the A9 Group[11]); (b) goods under those customs categories that include SALW among other items (B2 Group[12]); and (c) goods under those customs categories for which we believe there is a SALW association even though they are not usually considered as such (C2[13]).

The overall size of SALW trade obviously depends on how they are defined but, given the total value of A9 and C2 Groups and part of B2's, its value could be said to range, in annual average, between USD 5 billion and 7 billion, similar to the trade, for example, in sports footwear (USD 5 billion–6 billion) or frozen fish (USD 7 billion–8 billion).

Our findings show that, in 1994–2001 and in constant 2001 terms,[14] transfers of SALW of the A9 Group totalled USD 24.9 billion, with an annual average of USD 3.1 billion. In the same period, transfers of weapons of the B2 Group reached USD 37.4 billion, at an annual average of USD 4.7 billion. Transfers of C2 Group totalled USD 3.1 billion, at an annual average of USD 385 million. The A9 Group is most similar to the definition of SALW used elsewhere in this chapter. The difference in value (2.4 billion versus 2.8 billion) is mainly due to the fact that the two include slightly different categories of SALW.

Table 4.2 A9/B2/C2 Groups: value of transfers 1994–2001, in constant 2001 USD millions

Group	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Average
A9	3,477	3,515	3,409	2,344	3,097	2,857	2,827	2,839	**24,365**	3,046
B2	4,787	4,207	4,516	5,175	5,532	4,749	4,935	3,482	**37,383**	4,673
C2	599	566	804	178	253	209	227	248	**3,084**	386
Total	**8,863**	**8,288**	**8,729**	**7,697**	**8,882**	**7,815**	**7,989**	**6,569**	**64,832**	**8,104**

Source: Authors' database; see fn. 10

Within the A9 Group, transfers of parts and accessories account for nearly 27 per cent of the total; non-military firearms for 21 per cent; cartridges and parts thereof for nearly 20 per cent; and military revolvers and pistols account for an additional 12 per cent. The United States, Italy, and Germany ranked in the first positions as exporters, with USD 6.7 billion, 3 billion, and 2 billion, respectively, in sales during 1994–2001. In the first ten positions ranked also the United Kingdom, Belgium–Luxembourg (reporting jointly), Brazil, France, Austria, Switzerland, and Japan, together accounting for more than 70 per cent of the trade.

The B2 Group is composed of military weapons and munitions, which include SALW items such as machine guns, military rifles, rocket and grenade launchers, mines, mortars, and man-portable guided missiles[15] and their ammunition. It also includes howitzers, aircraft bombs, anti-tank air-to-air missiles, anti-submarine torpedoes, parts, and munitions, which obviously cannot be considered SALW. It is not possible to know the SALW proportion in the B2 Group for the relevant years, but in the only separate account that exists, for 2002,[16] out of an overall total of USD 525.6 million, transfers of self- and non-self-propelled artillery were worth USD 175.7 millions; transfers of rocket and grenade launchers, torpedo tubes, and similar items reached USD 159.6 million; and items such as military rifles, shotguns, and machine guns totalled USD 190.3 million. Failing to consider at least part of B2 Group transfers as SALW trade leads to a severe underestimation of the value of SALW and renders items included in the UN definition of SALW unaccounted for. The United States (USD 17 billion) and United Kingdom (USD 5.2 billion) ranked in the first two positions, accounting for nearly 60 per cent of the trade.

The C2 Group combines swords, bayonets, and so forth, with air guns, rifles, pistols, and truncheons. The former are considered 'arms of war', the latter non-military arms. Neither comes under the UN definition.[17] Nevertheless, knives and bayonets are standard complements of many assault rifles and are widely used by special forces and insurgents,[18] while machetes have found tragic use in civil wars in countries such as Algeria, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, to name just a few. Airguns, rifles, and pistols not only could be as lethal as firearms over a certain energy level,[19] but are regularly used for military and law-enforcement training[20] in addition to being a fast-growing 'introductory' market for prominent SALW manufacturers.[21]

Box 4.1 (cont.) Defining and counting SALW—a proposal for a new approach

It seems unlikely that, between 1994 and 2001, countries such as Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka, all involved in bloody civil wars, bought millions of dollars of cutlasses and bayonets for peaceful purposes, and air guns and pistols for the enjoyment of their youth. Imports of swords and bayonets reached USD 1.6 million in Algeria (1.2 million from China in 1998) and USD 14.2 million in Sri Lanka (13.7 million from Iran in 2000), while imports of airguns totalled USD 2.3 million in Algeria (1.8 million from Belarus in 1998), USD 4.5 million in Angola (3.9 million from Belarus in 1998), USD 9.3 million in Indonesia (mostly from the Republic of Korea), USD 5.3 million in Sri Lanka (3.8 million from Czech Republic between 1997 and 1998). Finally, a testimony of the worrisome side of C2 Group trade is that in 1994–2001 the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom, among others, classified hundreds of millions of dollars of imports and exports of these items. Between 1994 and 1998, in particular, the Netherlands kept the origin of USD 633 million of imports and the destinations of USD 732 million of exports classified.

Written by Sergio Finardi and Carlo Tombola

Small arms imports

The largest importers by value in 2001 were the United States, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Canada.

It is even more difficult to give a complete picture of imports than of exports, for several reasons. First, estimates such as that made for China above cannot easily be made for imports, as demand is harder to model than supply. Modelling demand would require thorough knowledge of the procurement levels of civilians, armed forces, and law enforcement agencies worldwide. Second, although arms export reports are becoming increasingly common, they only very rarely detail arms imports (although this may be about to change).[22] Reliable sources are hence fewer. In Table 4.3, therefore, we rely on international customs data only. Such data do not record all state-to-state transfers since these do not always pass through customs. Similarly to the export data presented above, the picture of imports is incomplete also because some states do not report imports at all, and some under-report them (that is, report only on certain categories of small arms). Again, we have relied on mirror data to complement deficient import reports.

Table 4.3 shows that the largest importer of small arms by value in 2001 was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the US. It was followed by Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Canada. The structure of imports for these countries varied substantially: while in Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan, and South Korea military weapons were the most important import category, US imports were topped by shotguns, and Germany and Canada imported mostly small arms ammunition.

Of these importers, Cyprus is perhaps the most astonishing, given the small size of the island. The value of the guns is simply too large to be explained by local demand or international peacekeeping operations—1,248 men in 2003 (IISS, 2003)—but probably reflects an important, though opaque, transit trade. As noted in Small Arms Survey (2003, p. 105), Cyprus is a problematic destination for small arms transfers, not only because of the unsettled status of the island, but also as it is very unclear what happens to the large quantities of weapons that enter it every year. Russia, Italy, and Spain are important exporters to this country. As noted in the previous section, Saudi Arabia is a prominent importer, even though some of the small arms imports recorded in the customs data might have gone to US troops stationed in the country until recently.

Among medium-sized importers, Colombia, Israel, Lebanon, and Venezuela are problematic because of their internal situations. In a press release from August 2003, the Latin American organization Desarme (2003) strongly criticized European exports to Venezuela under the title 'European Firearms in Venezuela: No Code, No Conduct'. The organization claims that exports from EU countries such as Austria and Belgium violate the EU Code of Conduct (EU, 1998), given that firearms owned by state structures often end up in the hands of the pro-President Hugo Chávez Círculos Bolivarianos, the recently created Frente Bolivariano de Liberación, and the Colombian guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia (FARC). The widespread civilian unrest in the country should also lead to restraint in small arms exports, Desarme argues.

Other possibly large importers on which little data is available, and whose imports are likely illicit rather than authorized (and which do not figure in Table 4.3) are those states involved in (internal or international) conflict, such as Liberia, Ivory Coast, Russia (Chechnya), Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Burundi, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. Details of exports to some of these countries and insurgent groups are found in the section on small arms transfers and human rights below.

Table 4.3 Annual authorized small arms imports, by country with most recent yearly data available (2001)

Country	USD value	Main known suppliers (top five)	Main known types of SALW imported	Remarks
Argentina	13.8m	US, Brazil, Italy, Switzerland, Spain	Ammunition, pistols/ revolvers, hunting/sporting rifles, shotguns	
Australia	62.8m	US, Belgium, Italy, UK, Germany	Ammunition, military weapons, shotguns, pistols/ revolvers, hunting/sporting rifles	
Austria	22.9m	Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland	Ammunition, shotguns, hunting/sporting rifles, parts of hunting/sporting rifles, military weapons	Does not report on its imports of military weapons and pistols/revolvers through international customs data. Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Belgium	64.3m	Italy, Portugal, US, Japan, Germany	Shotguns, ammunition, hunting/sporting rifles, pistols/revolvers	Does not report on its imports of military weapons and pistols/revolvers through international customs data. Hence the value is possibly underestimated. Parts of imports might actually be returns for repairs.
Brazil	11.3m	US, Israel, Chile, Italy, France	Military weapons, ammunition, shotguns, hunting/sporting rifles, parts pistols/revolvers	Does not report on its imports of military weapons through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Canada	99.9m	US, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Germany	Ammunition, parts sporting/ hunting weapons, hunting/ sporting rifles, pistols/ revolvers	
Colombia	21.6m	US, Brazil, Italy, South Africa, Czech Republic	Military weapons, ammunition, pistols/revolvers, shotguns	Does not report on its imports of shotguns through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Cyprus	159.8m	Unspecified country, Russia, Italy, Spain, Japan	Military weapons, shotguns, ammunition, hunting/ sporting rifles	'Unspecified country' means that the exporter is kept classified.
Denmark	20.5m	Germany, Canada, UK, Sweden, Italy	Ammunition, parts sporting/ hunting weapons, shotguns, hunting/sporting rifles	
Finland	14.0m	Italy, Germany, Sweden, US, Norway	Ammunition, shotguns, parts of sporting/hunting weapons, hunting/sporting rifles	

Table 4.3 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms imports, by country with most recent yearly data available (2001)

Country	USD value	Main known suppliers (top five)	Main known types of SALW imported	Remarks
France	72.5m	Italy, Belgium, Germany, US, Saudi Arabia	Shotguns, hunting/sporting rifles, ammunition, parts sporting/hunting weapons	Does not report on its imports of military weapons and pistols/revolvers through international customs data. Hence the value is possibly underestimated. Saudi Arabia probably appears as supplier because of repairs/refitting.
Germany	104.2m	US, Italy, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Belgium	Ammunition, parts sporting/ hunting weapons, shotguns, pistols/revolvers, hunting/ sporting rifles	Does not report on its imports of military weapons and shotguns through international customs data. Hence the value is possibly underestimated. Saudi Arabia probably appears as supplier because of repairs/refitting.
Greece	48.2m	US, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain	Military weapons, shotguns, ammunition, pistols/ revolvers	Does not report on its imports of military weapons and pistols/revolvers through international customs data. Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Honduras	10.8m	Italy, US, Uruguay, Israel, Argentina	Military weapons, pistols/ revolvers, ammunition, hunting/sporting rifles	
Israel	18.7m	US, Italy, South Korea, Czech Republic, Spain	Military weapons, parts of sporting/hunting weapons, ammunition, parts pistols/ revolvers, pistols/revolvers	Does not report any imports through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is probably underestimated.
Italy	74.3m	US, Germany, Belgium, Turkey, Switzerland	Military weapons, ammunition, hunting/sporting rifles, parts hunting/sporting weapons, pistols/revolvers	Does not report on its imports of military weapons through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Japan	151.0m	US, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia	Military weapons, ammunition, shotguns, pistols/revolvers	
Kuwait	11.8 m	US, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Australia	Military weapons, ammunition, parts pistols/revolvers shotguns	Does not report any imports through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is probably underestimated.
Lebanon	12.3m	Italy, Cyprus, Russia, Turkey, France	Shotguns, hunting/sporting rifles, ammunition, parts sporting/hunting weapons	Does not report on its imports of military weapons through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Mexico	20.0m	US, Greece, Italy, Spain, Belgium	Ammunition, pistol/revolvers, military weapons, shotguns	
Netherlands	12.1m	US, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium	Ammunition, parts sporting/ hunting weapons, military weapons, shotguns	Does not report on its imports of military weapons and pistols/revolvers through international customs data. Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Norway	23.3m	Sweden, US, Germany, Italy, France	Ammunition, hunting/sporting rifles, shotguns, parts sporting/hunting weapons	
Portugal	33.6m	Belgium, Spain, Italy, US, Germany	Parts sporting/hunting weapons, shotguns, shotgun barrels, ammunition, hunting/ sporting rifles	

Table 4.3 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms imports, by country with most recent yearly data available (2001)

Country	USD value	Main known suppliers (top five)	Main known types of SALW imported	Remarks
Saudi Arabia	261.3m	Belgium, US, Spain, Bulgaria, France	Military weapons, ammunition, parts pistols/revolvers, shotguns	
South Korea	105.7m	US, Italy, Germany, Russia, Spain	Military weapons, ammunition, pistols/revolvers, shotguns	
Spain	36.7m	Italy, US, Germany, Belgium, Portugal	Shotguns, hunting/sporting rifles, pistols/revolvers, ammunition	Does not report on its imports of military weapons through international customs data. Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Sweden	22.2m	Finland, US, Germany, Austria, Italy	Ammunition, shotguns, hunting/sporting rifles, parts of sporting/hunting weapons, military weapons	Does not report on its imports of military weapons through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Switzerland	36.0m	Germany, Norway, US, Italy, Austria	Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, parts sporting/hunting weapons, military weapons, shotguns	
Taiwan	19.7m	US, South Korea, Italy, Spain, Germany	Military weapons, ammunition, shotguns, pistols/revolvers, parts pistols/revolvers	
Thailand	18.7m	US, Czech Republic, Germany, Singapore, Greece	Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, military weapons, shotguns	Does not report on its imports of military weapons through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Turkey	20.1m	Italy, Singapore, Poland, Slovakia, Spain	Military weapons, ammunition, pistols/revolvers, parts sporting/hunting weapons	
United Arab Emirates	32.4m	US, Switzerland, Germany, Brazil, Czech Republic	Military weapons, ammunition, pistols/revolvers hunting/ sporting rifles	Does not report any imports through international customs data (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is probably underestimated.
United Kingdom	78.3m	US, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Germany	Shotguns, military weapons, ammunition, hunting/ sporting rifles	
US	602.5m	Italy, Brazil, Japan, Austria, Germany	Shotguns, pistols/revolvers, hunting/sporting rifles, ammunition, parts sporting/ hunting weapons	
Venezuela	31.0m	South Korea, US, Austria, Italy, Spain	Ammunition, pistols/revolvers, shotguns, hunting/sporting rifles	

Source: NISAT (2003)

Box 4.2 Business as usual? The ECOWAS moratorium and authorized transfers

On 31 October 1998, the heads of state of ECOWAS proclaimed a moratorium on the import, export, and production of all small arms and light weapons within the region.[23] The moratorium, which originally ran for three years, was renewed for another three years in 2001, and it will be up for renewal yet again in the autumn of 2004. The ban is far-reaching: not only private companies but also ECOWAS governments that want to import small arms need an exemption in order to do so. The UN Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) is supposed to support the implementation of the moratorium. International support for the measure has been widespread, particularly at the outset. A number of EU governments (including France and the UK) as well as Canada have been among the financial supporters of the moratorium (Ogunbanwo, 2002). Support has also come from the UN and its various specialized agencies (UNSC, 2000b, p. 31).

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West African leaders stand as the ECOWAS anthem is played at a meeting in Ghana in September 2002.

The moratorium notwithstanding, officials in the region 'acknowledge the existence of a large, and largely uncontrolled informal weapons trade and outright illicit trafficking' going 'far beyond normal levels of informal trade' (quoted in UNSC, 2000b, p. 31). This illicit trade is probably best documented in a series of UN Security Council reports on embargo violations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola (UNSC 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002) as well as in reports by Global Witness (2001, 2003) and Human Rights Watch (2001a, 2003). These reports show that there are well-organized networks trading simultaneously in arms, diamonds, timber, and other commodities, and making use of the lax regulations in particular in transport systems surveillance. In March 2003, the UN Security Council expressed 'its profound concern at the impact of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as mercenary activities, on peace and security in West Africa' (UNSC, 2003c).

However, there is also an ongoing authorized trade between the countries under the ECOWAS moratorium and the outside world, which has not been mentioned in assessments of the moratorium such as by Ebo and Mazal (2003) and Ogunbanwo (2002). For a transfer to the region to be in agreement with the moratorium, the importer has to request an exemption from the moratorium from other ECOWAS governments before importing small arms. Some exporting countries have adopted a policy of seeking assurances that exemptions have been granted before authorizing exports to ECOWAS countries. Table 4.4 lists transfers to the ECOWAS region, reported in international customs data, which shows a rather substantial authorized trade in small arms and ammunition with ECOWAS states. The data on transfers does not square with publicly available information on exemptions granted (Ebo with Mazal, 2003, p. 20; Ogunbanwo 2002, p. 14).

It is unclear whether the moratorium has had any effects on authorized transfers in the ECOWAS region.

Table 4.4 is not meant to be exhaustive. The true extent of the authorized trade is in all likelihood greater, given that many ECOWAS states do not report their customs data internationally. Other sources, such as British and other export reports as well as, for example, Berman (2003), report on additional authorized transfers. It is therefore unclear what, if any, effects the moratorium has had on authorized transfers in the region.

Box 4.2 (cont.) Business as usual? The ECOWAS moratorium and authorized transfers

Table 4.4 Authorized imports of SALW to ECOWAS countries, 1999–2002

Importing ECOWAS country	Main exporting countries, value in USD, years	Comments (types of SALW traded, quantities/values)
Benin	Burkina Faso: 21,840 in 1999-2001 France: 10,900 in 1999-2001	Reported imports of mostly revolvers and pistols from Burkina Faso Revolvers and pistols, sporting rifles, and shotguns from France.
Burkina Faso	Italy: 856,315 for 1999-2002 Czech Republic: 155,384 for 1999-2001 France: 75,982 in 1999-2002 Spain: 66,645 in 1999-2001 Senegal: 55,394 in 2002	Italy reported exports of mainly cartridges, but also revolvers and pistols and sporting rifles.
Cap Verde	Czech Republic: 27,595 in 2001 Portugal: 13,101 in 1999-2001	Reported imports of revolvers and pistols.
Côte d'Ivoire	South Africa: 1,225,081 in 1999 Spain: 76,391 in 2001 Italy: 60,550 in 1999-2001 US: 48,889 in 1999-2001 Czech Republic: 38,051 in 2001-02 France: 27,886 in 1999-2001 Switzerland: 12,104 in 1999-2001	South Africa reported exports of mostly cartridges but also military weapons, revolvers/pistols, and shotguns. Spain and the Czech Republic reported exports of only cartridges. Revolvers/pistols and shotguns reported from Italy. Military weapons and cartridges reported from the US. France reported exports of mainly shotguns and Switzerland revolvers/pistols.
The Gambia	United Kingdom: 449,145 in 1999 Czech Republic: 120,961 in 1999-2002 Russia: 31,134 in 1999 Poland: 28,107 in 2000 Lebanon: 10,760 in 2001	UK reported exports of parts and accessories of military weapons, cartridges. Reported imports of cartridges from the Czech Republic, Russia, and Poland. Lebanon reported exports of sporting rifles.
Ghana	Spain: 7,249,315 for 1999-2001 US: 2,823,245 in 1999-2002 UK: 2,156,203 in 1999-2001 Cyprus: 2,093,385 in 1999-2001 South Africa: 1,473,985 in 1999 Germany: 131,099 in 1999-2000 France: 52,909 in 1999	Spain's and France's reported exports consist of cartridges, and the UK's of mainly cartridges. US reported exports mainly of shotguns, cartridges, and military weapons. Cyprus and Germany report exporting mainly shotguns. South Africa reports exports of cartridges, military weapons, and shotguns.
Guinea	France: 3,342,698 in 1999-2001 Spain: 1,563,183 in 1999-2001 United Kingdom: 325,601 in 1999 Croatia: 258,949 in 2000 Portugal: 231,845 in 1999-2001 Germany: 83,358 in 1999-2000 Brazil: 42,731 in 1999 Senegal: 20,580 in 2000 Czech Republic: 15,391 in 1999 Georgia: 12,000 in 2000	France exported cartridges, sporting rifles, military weapons, shotguns, and parts and accessories from France. Only cartridges from Spain and the UK. Croatia reported exporting military weapons. Portugal reported exporting cartridges and shotguns. Only shotguns from Germany. Only cartridges from Brazil and Senegal. Czech Republic reported exporting cartridges. Georgia reported exporting parts and accessories.
Guinea-Bissau	Portugal: 332,054 in 1999-2001 Spain: 168,912 in 2000-1 France: 104,620 in 1999-2002	Portugal reported exports of cartridges, shotguns, revolvers/pistols, and sporting rifles. Spain and France reported exports of cartridges.
Liberia	*Under UN embargo, no imports therefore authorized*	
Mali	France: 72,327 in 1999-2002	France reported exports of mainly parts and accessories.
Niger	South Korea: 492,500 in 1999 France: 92,134 in 1999-2002 Italy: 60,643 in 1999-2001	South Korea reported exports of military weapons. Reported imports of revolvers, shotguns, parts and accessories, and cartridges from France; France reported exporting sporting rifles, cartridges, and shotguns. Reported imports of shotguns from Italy; Italy reported exporting revolvers.

Table 4.4 (cont.) Authorized imports of SALW to ECOWAS countries, 1999–2002

Importing ECOWAS country	Main exporting countries, value in USD, years	Comments (types of SALW traded, quantities/values)
Nigeria	India: 2,799,653 in 2001 Israel: 2,385,595 in 1999 South Korea: 1,056,356 in 1999-2001 Indonesia: 597,500 in 1999 US: 246, 007 in 1999-2002 Brazil: 126,793 in 2000-01 UK: 90,953 in 1999-2002 Italy: 49,074 in 2001 Australia: 20,243 in 2001 Germany: 13,062 in 1999	India reported exporting cartridges. Reports imports of shotguns from Israel. Reports imports of military weapons and revolvers from South Korea; South Korea reports exports of military weapons. US reported exporting mainly cartridges. Germany and Indonesia reported exporting revolvers/pistols. Brazil reported exporting sporting rifles and cartridges. UK reported exporting shotguns, cartridges, and parts. Italy reported exporting revolvers and shotguns. Australia reported exporting only revolvers.
Senegal	France: 2,246,810 in 1999-2002 US: 959,420 for 1999-2002 Spain: 426,508 for 2000-2002 Italy: 232,992 for 1999-2002 Brazil: 203,754 for 1999-2002 Germany: 116,770 for 1999-2002 Czech Republic: 81,996 in 2001-02	Only cartridges from Spain. Mainly revolvers and cartridges from Germany. Diversified imports from France, US, Italy, and Brazil. Cartridges, revolvers/pistols and shotguns from the Czech Republic.
Sierra Leone (only rebels are under UN embargo)	Lebanon: 196,949 in 2001 US: 29,542 in 2001 Spain: 13,398 in 2001 UK: 10,139 in 2000	Lebanon reported exports of military weapons. The US reported exports of parts and accessories. Spain and the UK reported exports of cartridges.
Togo	Spain: 41,212 in 2000	Spain reported exporting cartridges.

Note: The figures are likely underestimates of the total trade, as some important exporters and some of the ECOWAS states do not report on their trade, and we have thus had to rely on mirror data. Cut-off point for inclusion in table: USD 10,000 over four-year period covered.

Source: UN Comtrade, download date: July–August 2003

DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSPARENCY: ANNUAL UPDATE

Transparency in the arms trade has three dimensions: intergovernmental transparency, parliamentary transparency, and public transparency (Bauer, 2003). Intergovernmental transparency consists of exchanges of information between governments, such as the information exchange on small arms and light weapons imports and exports among participating states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the exchange of information on various types of armaments within the Wassenaar Arrangement. Neither of these organizations makes public the information exchanged, even if individual states can choose to make their contributions to the exchange public (and have done so). Parliamentary transparency means that the government shares information on its export and import decisions with national parliamentarians. Both these forms of transparency can be combined with public transparency, meaning that information about arms transfers is released to the general public.

Transparency in the trade in small arms can constitute an important early-warning and confidence-building device, in particular in contexts where few major weapons are available (for example, in some parts of Africa and in many internal conflicts). It is important in enabling the general public to effectively monitor whether states follow international agreements and guidelines as well as their own laws and regulations on small arms exports and imports. Without transparency, citizens, parliamentarians, NGOs, and other governments cannot verify whether international commitments

are being met (Bauer, 2002), nor can they check whether arms transactions are free from corruption (Courtney, 2002).[24] More generally, without transparency, it is impossible to obtain an accurate picture of the small arms trade.[25]

Both the Wassenaar Arrangement and the UN Register of Conventional Arms introduced some type of information exchange on light weapons in 2003.

The importance of transparency in the small arms and light weapons trade is increasingly acknowledged in multilateral forums. In December 2003, the Wassenaar Arrangement participating states added small arms and light weapons, including MANPADS, to the list of strategic goods on which they exchange information (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2003).

There have also long been calls to include small arms into the UN Register of Conventional Arms, especially from the African continent, where these types of weapons are crucial tools of war. In summer 2003, a group of governmental experts from more than 20 countries charged with the periodic review of the functioning of the Register proposed that the large-calibre artillery category be expanded to include smaller artillery pieces equal to or above 75mm (such as the very common 81mm and 82mm mortars). The expert group also proposed that the missile/launcher category should encompass MANPADS. The proposal won the UN General Assembly's approval in December 2003 (UNGA, 2003a). This means that some light weapons are now included in the information exchange, while all small arms (as per the UN definition) remain outside its scope. However, the group of experts recommended a voluntary sharing of information through the UN on transfers of all small arms and light weapons 'made or modified to military specification and intended for military use' (UNGA, 2003b, para. 113(e)). The main argument underlying such efforts is that it is important to push transparency levels in the SALW trade to the same level as trade in major conventional weapon systems. This is already the case in some regional forums. As already noted, since 2002 the OSCE participating states have exchanged information yearly on a number of small arms issues, notably transfers.[26]

Here, key information on levels of transparency of the larger small arms exporters (hence not all states) has been assembled in a Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer (Table 4.5). A discussion on transparency on the small arms issue generally is found elsewhere in this volume (MEASURES).

The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer

Assessing and comparing countries' export reports is complicated, as their formats differ widely: from a few pages of statistics to several hundred pages of text and tables. The basic question around which the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer is constructed is: how useful is the export report for understanding a country's small arms exports? The barometer is divided into two main categories: *(a)* access, clarity, and comprehensiveness; and *(b)* information on granted and refused licences and on deliveries. The first category assesses how easy it is to obtain and understand the data provided by a state, and how comprehensive it is in general terms. The underlying assumption is that data which is difficult to access (because it is not available in any major language, not found on the Internet, and/or is not free of charge), difficult to decipher (because there is no methodology, no information on end-users, and it is impossible to distinguish small arms and small arms ammunition from other types of weapons and ammunition), or incomplete (because it does not cover all types of transactions, or all kinds of small arms and parts) is of limited use in understanding a country's small arms trade.

The second cluster of criteria relates to the detail of the data provided in a report on granted licences, denied licences, and actual deliveries. The analysis of granted and denied licences and deliveries is subdivided in the same way: values and volumes disaggregated by weapon type and by both country and weapon type. The data is disaggregated by weapon type if the share of arms exports of different categories of weapons is detailed (in the Romanian export report, for example, the breakdown of arms exports is shown: 15 per cent aircraft and related equipment, 13 per cent bombs, rockets, and

missiles, and so forth). The data is disaggregated both by country and by weapon if it is possible to read out the quantity/value of weapons of each category transferred to individual recipients (for example the Swiss report shows it exported CHF 880,000 (USD 570,000) of *small arms* to Egypt in 2002).[27] As a rule, one point is given to an export report for each criterion fulfilled.[28] A criterion that is only partly fulfilled is given half a point. For example, under the Wassenaar Arrangement's classification system, the first category of weapons consists purely of small arms, while the second category contains both small arms and light weapons and larger weapons systems. Hence, it is only partially possible to distinguish small arms and light weapons from other types of weapons, and only half a point is attributed on that particular criterion.

It is important to stress that the barometer evaluates the reporting, and cannot independently verify the veracity of the information given. In other words, the barometer assesses the quantity, precision, and usefulness of the data made public, but not its truthfulness.

The number of countries releasing some form of public data on their arms exports continues to increase. Countries that produce arms export reports generally provide the most comprehensive information, but some countries that do not (yet) publish such reports provide valuable information on small arms transactions through the international release of customs data. Although international customs data is not necessarily thought of as a transparency device, it provides important insights into trade, and is therefore included in the analysis on transparency in this section.

Customs data fills some of the gaps in many export reports, such as very general statistics that make no mention of small arms and that are not standardized. It has shortcomings of its own.[29] First, customs codes were obviously not designed with a definition of small arms and light weapons in mind, and some codes include both small and other (larger) arms (for example, the code 9301 includes both military small arms and items such as torpedo tubes and large mortars). Other small arms and light weapons, such as MANPADS, are not included in any category. However, most categories of firearms and ammunition are comparatively well covered by the customs codes (Marsh, 2003). Second, not all state-to-state transfers go through customs, which of course affects total numbers. Third, exporters and customs officials do not always interpret customs codes in the same way. For example, for the customs code 'pistols and revolvers', Brazil consistently reports 'nil', although import data from other countries suggests that it exports large quantities. The handguns must therefore be (mis-)classified under some other heading (Lessing, 2003). Notwithstanding such problems, customs data is probably the most important tool for arriving at a general picture of the small arms trade. This is why, in a departure from previous Small Arms Survey practice, this form of transparency, and not only export reports, is included in the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer.

The rather low average (8.5 out of 20) on the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer means that states still have some way to go before their reporting is fully transparent.

The barometer is thus based on *(a)* export reports and *(b)* international customs data. The full, disaggregated table is found in Annex 4.4, available on the Small Arms Survey web site. It is important to note that, because of its focus on small arms exports, the barometer cannot be used as a general measure of arms export transparency. It includes only those countries that are significant exporters of small arms and light weapons (see Table 4.1), and so excludes some rather transparent countries, such as, for example, Denmark and the Netherlands. This also necessarily means that the focus is mainly (although not only) on Western and Eastern European as well as North American states, given that it is mostly among their ranks that significant exporters are found. As is shown in the barometer, the most transparent among the main exporting countries are those states that both publish export reports and report their customs data internationally. Top of the list are the United States, Germany, and France. The average score (out of 20) is 8.5. This rather low average means that states generally, and even those countries ranking at the top of the barometer, still have some way to go before their reporting is fully transparent.[30]

Table 4.5 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, covering known or estimated top exporters, based on the latest export report made publicly available and on 2001 international customs data (UN Comtrade)[31]

Country and source(s) available (E = export report, C = customs data)	Total points (20 points max) Updated scores are followed by previous Barometer scores in parentheses[a]	Access[b] (2 points max)	Clarity[c] (4 points max)	Comprehensiveness[d] (4 points max)	Information on deliveries (disaggregated by weapons type, and by country and weapons type) Value of deliveries (V) Quantity of weapons (Q) (4 points max)	Information on licences granted (disaggregated by weapons type, and by country and weapons type) Value of licenses (V) Quantity of weapons (Q) (4 points max)	Information on licences refused (disaggregated by weapons type, and by country and weapons type) Value of licences (V) Quantity of weapons (Q) (2 points max)
Germany E C	**15.5 (13.5)**	2	3	4	2	4	0.5
United States E C	**14**	2	3	3	2	4	0
UK E C	**13.5 (13)**	2	3.5	4	4	0	0
France E C	**13**	2	3.5	3.5	4	0	0
Italy E C	**12**	2	3	3	2	2	0
Czech Rep. E C	**11.5**	2	2.5	4	3	0	0
Canada E C	**10.5**	2	3	3.5	2	0	0
Norway E C	**10.5 (9)**	2	3	3.5	2	0	0
Spain E C	**10.5**	2	3	3.5	2	0	0
Finland E C	**10**	2	3	3	2	0	0
Belgium E C	**9.5**	2	2.5	3	2	0	0
Sweden E C	**9.5 (8.5)**	2	2	3.5	2	0	0
Switzerland E C	**9 (8.5)**	2	2.5	2	2	0	0.5
Australia E C	**8.5**	2	2	2.5	2	0	0
Portugal E C	**7.5**	2	2	1.5	2	0	0
Turkey C	**7.5**	1.5	2	2	2	0	0
Romania E	**7**	2	1.5	2.5	1	0	0
Austria C	**6.5**	1.5	2	1	2	0	0
Brazil C	**6.5**	1.5	2	1	2	0	0
Japan C	**6.5**	1.5	2	1	2	0	0
Russian Federation C	**6.5**	1.5	2	1	2	0	0
South Korea C	**6.5**	1.5	2	2	1	0	0
China C	**6**	1.5	2	0.5	2	0	0
Mexico C	**6**	1.5	2	0.5	2	0	0
Israel C	**5.5**	1.5	2	0	2	0	0
South Africa E	**5 (5.5)**	2	1	0	2	0	0
Bulgaria	**0**	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sources: UN Comtrade, download date 31 Oct 2003, Australia (2003), Belgium (2003), Canada (2002), Czech Republic (2003), Finland (2002), France (2003), Germany (2002, 2003), Italy (2003), Norway (2003, 2004), Portugal (2002), Romania (2002, 2003), South Africa (2002), Spain (2003, 2004), Sweden (2003), Switzerland (2003, 2004), UK (2003, 2004), United States Department of State (2003)

Notes: Includes the following parameters:
(a) **Total points:** Updates reflect information contained in arms export reports made available since December 2003.
(b) **Access:** Information is: available on Internet (half point); available in a UN language (1 point); free of charge (half point).
(c) **Clarity:** The reporting includes methodology (1 point); small arms and light weapons distinguishable from other types of weapons (1 point); SALW ammunition distinguishable from other types of ammunition (1 point); reporting includes information on end-user categories (military; police; other security forces; civilians directly; civilian retailers) (1 point).
(d) **Comprehensiveness:** The reporting covers: government as well as industry-negotiated transactions (1 point); civilian as well as military SALW (1 point); information on SALW parts (1 point); summaries of export laws and regulations as well as international commitments (1 point).

Box 4.3 Transparency developing in leaps: Romanian arms export reporting



© Romanian National Agency for the Control of Strategic Exports and of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons/Image: Nicolae Grigorescu

Romania's first report on arms exports.

For the countries that entered the European Union on 1 May 2004,[32] export reports are few and far between, although some are quite generous in sharing their customs data.

In fact, to date, one of the most ambitious countries in this respect seems to be Romania, which is not scheduled to become a member of the Union until 2007 at the earliest. The Romanian export report was published for the first time in mid-2002 and is available in English online (Romania, 2002). Challenges facing the author are very frankly noted in the foreword to the report. In particular, there was a 'genuine "confrontation" between the necessity of transparency and the conservative approach of some senior Romanian experts' (Romania, 2002, p. iv).

The report covers both private and public sector exports. It lists the numbers of companies authorized to trade in various categories of weapons. The information provided on export licences is rather sparse. While total numbers of licence applications, denials, and approvals are noted and—unlike in most other export reports—values for all three categories are given, they are broken down only by region, not by country or weapon type. The part on licensing also quantifies permits issued for non-commercial operations. ML1, ML2, and ML3 are said to be among the main categories of these operations.

In fact, the report uses the weapons categories of the Wassenaar Arrangement. There, the first category, ML1, covers 'arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less and accessories... and specially designed components therefore'; and the second, ML2, 'armament or weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, projectors and accessories... and specially designed components therefore'. ML3 encompasses 'ammunition and specially designed components therefore, for the weapons controlled by ML1, ML2, or ML12'. In principle, ML1 is the only pure SALW category, with ML2 and ML3 containing important elements of non-SALW. However, the report states that 'in the structure of Romanian arms exports, the small calibre arms (ML1) represent the most important segment, [together with] light weapons (ML2) and the related munitions (ML3)' (Romania, 2002, p.35). This seems to indicate that, in the Romanian case, ML1, ML2, and ML3 contain only, or primarily, SALW.

The report notes that in 2000 ML1 and ML2 (presented together) accounted for 34 per cent of actual exports, whereas ML3 covered 36 per cent. Based on total arms exports (USD 37.8 million according to the report), ML1 and ML2 accounted for USD 12.85 million, and ML3 USD 13.61 million. Totals for 2001 were: ML1 and ML2 55 per cent, and ML3 only 8 per cent, which gives values of USD 13.48 million and USD 1.96 million (total exports were USD 24.5 million). The report does not detail shipments by country.

Although far from perfectly transparent, the report provides more SALW-relevant information than, say, the Australian or the Portuguese reports (Romania obtains a lower ranking on the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer than these two countries because it does not report customs data internationally).

Overall, the report is a positive example of an emerging export transparency measure, and significant efforts have been devoted to its preparation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the practice is sustained over time. The Czech Republic published a special report on small arms exports in 2001, in time for the UN Small Arms Conference (see Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 118), and has continued reporting since. Without sufficient political will, the same might not be true for Romania.

Source: Kytömäki (2003)

EXPORTING SMALL ARMS: A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL FOR PRODUCERS?

As many analysts have noted, arms production has been transformed in recent decades. It is no longer an industry catering largely to internal needs and exporting selectively (based on political considerations), but a for-profit, export-oriented industry like many others (Naylor, 1998). More wide-ranging exports are thought essential to maintaining a technological edge and economic viability. To what extent is this true for military (as well as non-military) small arms

and light weapons production? Does the fact that the US is the top exporter (see previous section) mean that its small arms industry is dependent on exports for its long-term viability? To answer questions such as these, exporting has to be seen in the context of production.

The top small arms producing countries have been listed in previous editions of the *Small Arms Survey*. Focusing on two of the three major producers (Russia and the US) as well as a few medium producers (Germany and Brazil), this section shows that the degree of export dependency varies among producing countries and firms.

US: limited dependence, but for military weapons [33]

In general, US small arms manufacturers are not very dependent on exports for their revenue—manufacturers export on average only about 5–6 per cent of total small arms production, according to the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) data (see Table 4.6).[34] Using customs data slightly increases this share, to 9.7 per cent of all small arms produced in 2001. However, there are problems with using data from two different sources, as methodologies differ. Whatever the sources used, the export dependency of the US small arms industry is less than 10 per cent.

Table 4.6 Total quantity of firearms produced and exported by US manufacturers, 1998–2001

Year	Quantity produced	Quantity exported	% exported
1998	3,724,546	215,873	5.8
1999	4,070,237	242,573	6.0
2000	3,840,941	184,346	4.8
2001	2,989,022	182,632	6.1
Total 1998-2001	**14,624,746**	**825,424**	**Average: 5.6**

Source: US, ATF (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001)

However, when one looks at specific years, companies, or types of weapons, the picture seems slightly different. In fact, there are significant variations in export dependency among companies. In 2001, the latest year for which data is available, pistol producer Davis Industries exported 100 per cent of its production, while a large producer of pistols such as Bryco Arms did not export any arms. Among the most important producers, Smith and Wesson was by far the most export dependent in 2001, exporting 15.5 per cent of pistols and 28.6 per cent of revolvers produced. Its competitor Sturm Ruger & Co, in contrast, exported between 1.5 per cent (pistols) and 3.8 per cent (rifles) of its total production in 2001 (for more details, see Annex 4.2 available on the Small Arms Survey Web site).

There are significant variations in export dependency among US companies.

In addition, certain types of small arms are exported to a larger extent than others. This is outlined in Figure 4.1 below. Machine guns, short-barreled rifles and shotguns, and 'miscellaneous firearms' (generally muzzle loading) are exported to a much higher degree than other types of small arms (pistols, revolvers, rifles, and shotguns), although data varies from year to year (exact percentages are presented in Annex 4.3 available on the Small Arms Survey Web site).

A close look at the data in Table 4.6 above reveals that US production and export levels have gone very largely hand in hand. Hence, in 1998, when 3.7 million weapons were produced, 0.22 million (5.8 per cent) were exported. Three years later, in 2001, production had decreased substantially, to 3.0 million weapons. Export numbers followed suit, to 0.18 million. The percentage share has remained more or less constant, at 6.1 per cent SALW exported in 2001

(the average for 1998–2001 is 5.6). Declines in recent years in US exports of both military and civilian small arms should therefore be interpreted in the context of declining total domestic production: declining exports in absolute numbers do not necessarily signify that the US is becoming less dependent on export markets.

Figure 4.1 Export dependence of US small arms manufacturers, by type of weapon, 1998–2001



Source: US, ATF (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001)

Although not particularly dependent on exports generally, US exporters tend to rely on a few markets only: of the 115,950 sporting shotguns and combination shotgun-rifles exported in 2002, 32 per cent were imported by the United Kingdom, 15 per cent by Spain, and 9 per cent by Canada; these top three importers thus accounted for 56 per cent of the US exports of these weapons (US, Department of Commerce, 2003). The United Kingdom was also the top importer of military shotguns, with 36 per cent of the market, followed by New Zealand with 23 per cent. As for military rifles, the US exported 73 per cent of these to Middle Eastern countries in 2002. Kuwait was the major destination with 35 per cent, followed by Israel with 21 per cent. Another significant importer was Nepal (10 per cent). The top destination of US machine guns was South Korea, which imported 48 per cent of the 21,465 total machine guns that were exported by the US in 2002. After South Korea come Colombia (23 per cent) and Malaysia (18 per cent) (US, Department of Commerce, 2003). US exports of pistols and revolvers (73,262 weapons exported in 2002) are less concentrated; however, the top five importers account for 50 per cent of the US export market. Belgium is at the top with 19 per cent, followed by Japan (12 per cent), Germany (8 per cent), Thailand (6 per cent), and Venezuela (5 per cent). As for hunting and sporting rifles of a value less than USD 50 each, the United Kingdom is the largest importer, importing 63 per cent of the 17,721 such weapons exported by the US in 2002. For hunting and sporting rifles valued at over USD 50, Canada is the top importer with 34 per cent of the 72,025 rifles exported globally (US, Department of Commerce, 2003).

As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, there are caveats to this data. It is not always clear when arms pass through customs whether they have actually arrived at their final destination. In some cases, weapons are sent back to the manufacturer for repair or refurbishing, and returned once the repairs are completed. This may explain why

Belgium has a high rate of imports, as it is a major exporter of handguns to the US. Also, sometimes weapons passing through customs may be used by military troops deployed abroad. It is possible that some of the weapons being sent to the Middle East are assigned to the US troops presently stationed there. Finally, the US and Canada jointly manufacture some types of small arms, and some of the US–Canada trade that appears in customs data could consist of weapons that are crossing the border to be finished in Canada.

Although US exports depend on single destinations, top customers seem to change over time. Table 4.7 shows sharp declines in exports of pistols and revolvers to Thailand and the Philippines since 1995. Similarly, the two countries made large purchases of military rifles in the late 1990s and, since then, imports have decreased dramatically. While Israel had seen a steady decline in imports of military rifles from the US over the past few years, 2002 goes against this trend.

Table 4.7 Emerging and declining customers for US exports (quantity of weapons exported), 1995–2003

Year	Thailand (pistols and revolvers)	Thailand (military rifles)	Philippines (pistols and revolvers)	Philippines (military rifles)	Israel (military rifles)	Nepal (military rifles)
1995	43,595	0	17,407	0	740	0
1996	20,362	510	18,860	0	62,277	0
1997	7,066	685	9,640	6,054	32,625	4,000
1998	7,962	10,100	2,817	20,256	40,350	0
1999	7,330	19,428	5,410	924	10,055	0
2000	6,003	16,645	50	0	2,843	0
2001	6,553	1	1,046	328	3,442	0
2002	4,230	0	1,883	76	6,375	3,000
2003*	1,437	102	788	184	40	3,400

* January–July

Source: US ATF, various years

Russia: important export share [35]

Since the early 1990s, Russian small arms manufacturers have substantially restructured their production (PRODUCERS). From the late 1980s and up until the last couple of years, the Russian armed forces basically did not acquire any new arms, and government orders for ammunition plummeted (Pyadushkin, 2003). At the same time, current Russian legal regulations make legal, large-scale sales of small arms to ordinary Russians impossible (Pyadushkin, 2003). Hence today most Russian small arms producing companies are not operating at their full capacity, and the serial production of military small arms has virtually stopped (Pyadushkin, 2003, p. 3). Moreover, companies have increasingly turned to production of cars, machine tools, instruments, and other purely civilian products.

All these problems with the internal market notwithstanding, Russia remains a top producer of small arms and light weapons, thanks in no small part to a successful turn to exporting them. Current knowledge about the Russian small arms industry suggests that approximately half of production is exported (Table 4.8; the main recipients are listed in Table 4.1). However, information is scarce about the two state-owned companies, KBP and Kolomna MBDB.

Table 4.8 Exports of civilian and combat SALW from Russia in 2002, by manufacturer

Company (products)	SALW sales/production volume, USD m	Export volume, USD m	Exports as % of total sales/production
Izhevsk Arms Factory (Izhmash) (automatic sniper rifles, hunting and sporting shotguns and rifles)	13.1	3.2	24
IMZ (hunting and sporting shotguns)	52	15.7	30.2
TOZ (handguns, automatic and sniper rifles, anti-tank guided missiles, hunting and sporting shotguns and rifles)	29.2*	1.2**	4 (most likely an underestimate)
Kovrov Mechanical Plant (machine guns, grenade launchers, ATGMs)	2.5	No data available	
V.A. Degtyaryov Plant (MANPADS, machine guns)	108.5	86.8***	80
Molot (ATGM, hunting weapons)	16.4	1.2	7.3
Total	**221.7**	**108.1**	

Note: As more detailed information is currently unavailable, export volumes may include other products besides SALW.
* Total sales, including combat and civilian SALW as well as civilian goods.
** Only civilian firearms.
*** Calculated on the basis of the correlation between different types of production in 2001. Military production: 50% of total, 80% of military production is exported. See Interfax (2003).

Source: CAST (2003)

Interestingly, Russian small arms producers are less export-dependent than was previously thought.

Interestingly, Russian small arms producers are less export-dependent than previously thought (Pyadushkin, 2003). Hunting and sporting rifles are finding domestic customers. For example, according to the (imperfect) figures currently available, 70 per cent of IMZ's civilian weapons are sold to Russian amateur hunters, most probably in the larger cities. The Izhevsk Arms Factory exported 24 per cent of its production of civilian firearms in 2002; the rest were sold domestically. The largest foreign customer was the US, which received about 23 per cent of the exports. Combat small arms also seem to have found domestic customers recently (in the form of the Russian Ministry of Defence). While Izhevsk Arms Factory exported 71.3 per cent of its production of combat small arms in 2000, and 88.3 per cent in 2001, the figure had fallen to 26.5 per cent in 2002. However, it is probably too early to speak of a trend towards production for domestic army consumption.

Table 4.9 Combat small arms export by Izhevsk Arms Factory, 2000–02

Year	2000	2001	2002
Value of exports (in USD millions)	3.4	1.7	0.85
% of total combat small arms production	**71.3**	**88.3**	**26.5**

Note: Calculated on the basis of the correlation between different types of production in 2001. Military production: 50 per cent of total, 80 per cent of military production is exported. See Interfax (2003).

Source: CAST (2003)

Some other large producers: the importance of being an exporter

As discussed in further detail elsewhere in this volume (PRODUCERS), *Brazil*[36] is the largest producer of small arms and light weapons (including ammunition) in Latin America, and its output is the most diversified in the entire hemisphere after the US. It is heavily dependent on exports. According to Brazilian government statistics for 2001, the total sales of nationally produced non-military firearms (including ammunition and parts) amounted to approximately USD 100.3 million (IBGE, 2002).[37] Total exports for the same year were USD 62.5 million, or 62.3 per cent of total sales.[38] The actual export share may be

even higher, given that the publicly available trade statistics do not include state-to-state transfers. Not all Brazilian companies are equally dependent on exports. For example, while for Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC, producing ammunition, shotguns, and rifles) exports amounted to approximately 34 per cent of total sales in 2002, Taurus, Brazil's largest exporter of guns and a major supplier of handguns to the United States, reported exports of USD 38.1 million in 2002, totalling 74 per cent of its sales. For Amadeo Rossi, a small producer (of shotguns and rifles), the share was 77 per cent.[39]

In 2000 and 2001, Brazilian exports to the United States accounted for about 55–60 per cent of its total small arms exports.

Brazil is heavily dependent on exports to one market: the US. In 2000 and 2001, exports to the US accounted for 54 per cent (USD 37.6 million) and 59 per cent (USD 37 million) of total small arms exports, respectively.[40] In 2002, exports to the US increased to USD 55.7 million. Presumably, this is not because the US was more important for Brazilian exporters but because of an overall increase in exports as a consequence of the devaluation of the Brazilian currency, the *real*. Other significant recipients of Brazilian weapons in the last years have been Algeria, Colombia, and Germany (see Table 4.10).

By comparison, Argentina, the only other Latin American producer and exporter of any significance (close to USD 6 million in exports in 2001 and 7 million in 2002), is equally dependent on exports to the United States for its survival. The two main privately owned small arms producing companies, Bersa S.A. and Lasserre S.A. (also known as Rexio), are highly dependent on exports of their products (mainly pistols). Bersa, for example, exported 70 per cent of its production in 2002, and the United States overshadows all other recipients by far.[41]

Table 4.10 Brazilian SALW-related commercial exports, top ten recipients, 1998–2002, in USD

1998		1999		2000		2001		2002	
US	27,621,389	US	36,258,797	US	37,645,729	US	36,959,632	US[42]	55,687,807
Belgium	3,380,755	Germany	2,677,782	United Arab Emirates	7,245,303	Colombia	3,858,170	Colombia	5,911,905
Argentina	3,128,677	Argentina	2,622,543	Argentina	2,662,638	Algeria	2,781,100	Germany	2,489,520
Peru	2,816,820	Peru	1,773,674	Venezuela	2,165,468	Germany	2,312,778	Algeria	2,486,360
Venezuela	2,611,164	Chile	1,397,566	Germany	2,077,718	Argentina	2,123,972	Singapore	2,107,306
Saudi Arabia	2,153,441	Angola	1,321,800	Angola	2,001,841	Belgium	1,864,062	Belgium	1,889,635
Germany	2,147,762	Philippines	977,809	Peru	1,919,267	United Arab Emirates	1,341,302	Pakistan	1,873,940
Colombia	2,128,483	Norway	889,069	Colombia	1,493,883	Yemen	1,096,240	Botswana	1,832,855
Paraguay	2,085,896	Paraguay	857,460	Chile	1,116,986	Angola	887,000	UK	1,758,934
South Africa	1,651,543	South Africa	704,627	New Zealand	1,010,384	Malaysia	816,312	Argentina	1,067,541

Source: SECEX (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior) database

Germany is one of the biggest European producers of small arms, and also one of the largest exporters. Its export share is even more impressive than that of Brazil: 92 per cent of all pistols and revolvers produced were exported in 2001; in 2002, 86 per cent of weapons in this category were sold abroad (see Table 4.12). For hunting and sporting rifles, export appear to be equally important for the industry.

German *imports* of pistols and revolvers are rather limited. In 2001, a little more than 35,000 pistols and revolvers were imported into Germany; in 2002, the figure was approximately 37,000. This means that, even if Germany put restrictions on imports, German companies could not continue producing at current levels. In contrast, import and export of hunting and sporting weapons reach similar levels. For hunting and sporting rifles, the import figures were a little more than 68,000 in 2001 and over 60,000 in 2002.

Box 4.4 European export dependency on US civilian markets

The American market for firearms is the largest in the world, and has been growing in recent years, from 754,102 firearms (handguns, rifles, and shotguns) in fiscal year 1980 and 843,809 in 1990, to 1,096,782 in 2000 and 1,957,563 in 2002. All categories of firearms imports have grown, most spectacularly imports of handguns (*International Firearms Trade,* 2003, pp. 2, 10).

An important share of these imports comes from the member states of the European Union (see also Table 4.3 above). For example, out of the roughly 950,000 handguns imported in 2002, some 470,000—or 50 per cent—came from the EU (US, Department of Commerce, 2003). Ironically, given a tendency of Europeans to disapprove of the permissive US gun policies and gun culture,[43] many European companies would in all likelihood have some difficulty surviving without the US civilian market. Table 4.11 shows that around half of all EU exports of handguns, rifles, and shotguns are destined for the US. While some of these—handguns in particular—undoubtedly go to US law enforcement agencies and armed forces, many probably go to the US civilian market. Of the top five EU exporters of firearms (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain), Austria is the most dependent on US markets (72 per cent of Austrian handguns, rifles, and shotguns go to the US). Italy comes second, with just over half of its total exports of these three categories of weapons going to the US. Belgium is least dependent on US markets, with only 19 per cent of weapons in the three categories exported to the US.

What is missing from this picture is, of course, total production (rather than exports) of handguns, rifles, and shotguns within the EU countries. Such figures would make it possible to determine the overall dependence of producers on exports to the US. Information on Germany presented above suggests that dependency on exports is high, but similar data is not readily available for other European countries. Also missing is the overseas production of European firms such as Heckler & Koch, and Beretta.

Table 4.11 Percentage of EU exports of non-military small arms (by value) destined for the US, 2001, ranked by total share of exports (three categories) going to the US

EU country	Pistols	Shotguns	Hunting rifles	All three weapons categories
Austria	78	21	6	72
United Kingdom	2 *	71	63	65
Italy	40	60	35	56
Sweden	65 *	29 *	32 *	41
Spain	68	34	44	41
Finland	4 *	0 *	43	40
Greece	0 *	44 *	0*	38*
Germany	44	25	16	34
Portugal	53	2	43	30
Netherlands	0 *	90 *	24 *	26*
Belgium	59	4	34	19
Denmark	90 *	0 *	1 *	14
France	12 *	2	4	4
Ireland	0 *	0 *	0 *	0*
Luxemburg	0 *	No exports in this category	0 *	0 *
Total	**58**	**48**	**31**	**48**

Note: * Total sales in this category amount to less than USD 1 million.

Source: NISAT 2003

Table 4.12 German production and exports of selected civilian weapons, 2001–02 (numbers of weapons)

	2001			2002		
	Production	Export	% exported	Production	Export	% exported
Pistols and revolvers	159,571	147,379	92	197,688	169,029	86
Hunting and sporting rifles	48,400*	43,751	90	52,300*	50,264	96

* Production volumes of one category of hunting and sporting weapons (out of four), 'other hunting and sporting guns', has been estimated from production values.

Source: Production figures from Statistisches Bundesamt (2003), trade figures from Verband der Hersteller von Jagd-, Sportwaffen und Munition, private communication (compiled from Statistisches Bundesamt)

SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION

A number of regional and multilateral agreements explicitly cite human rights[44] as a criterion when deciding whether to authorize arms exports. Although most of these, including the European Union *Code of Conduct on Arms Exports* (EU, 1998), the OSCE *Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers* (OSCE 1993), the OSCE *Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons* (OSCE, 2000), and the Wassenaar Arrangement's *Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)* (2002) are not legally binding, they are starting to generate legally binding commitments. For example, the rules included in the EU Code of Conduct have been integrated into Belgian law, so as to render it compulsory in Belgium (Belgium, 2003, p. 2).[45]

Some national legislation and regulations contain human rights criteria, such as for example the 'Leahy Law' in the United States and the Swedish guidelines for arms exports. Far from all do, however. Moreover, states interpret human rights criteria differently. A now almost classic example is the Belgian decision in 2002 to grant a licence for exports to Nepal, which had earlier been denied by Germany. The Belgian foreign minister found the sale 'eminently ethical' as it would help a weakened democracy fight terrorism (BICC, 2003, Box U.18).

International lawyers and activists argue that states are bound by existing international human rights law when deciding upon a transfer. A transferring state incurs derivative responsibility for violations of international law committed by the recipient, given that the transferring state is aware of the situation in the recipient state (see Gillard, 2000, and Small Arms Survey, 2003, pp. 224–5 for further details).

More specifically, there are at least two ways in which the human rights criterion can be interpreted with respect to transfers, which is illustrated in several of the above-mentioned documents. For example, the second criterion of the EU Code of Conduct states in its first paragraph that EU states will 'not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression'.[46] In the second paragraph, it is established that EU member states will 'exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe, or by the EU' (EU, 1998). The main principle is thus *not to deliver materiel which forseeably could be used in human rights violations.* However, the language also points to a second principle governing exports to human rights abusers, namely, that *all weapons exports to perpetrators of grave*

violations of human rights are to be conducted with a high degree of caution. These two criteria implicitly or explicitly underlie much of the general debate on weapons transfers and human rights violations.

In what follows, examples will be given of exports of small arms to those countries in which some of the world's most serious human rights violations have occurred; it will also examine the use of specific imported firearms in human rights violations.

Tracing weapons from provider to perpetrator: good progress

A number of attempts to trace the use of specific imported small arms in human rights abuses have been made. Recently, Jürgen Grässlin (2003) has traced in detail the role of German Heckler & Koch G-3 guns in the individual destinies of a woman in Somaliland and a Kurdish man in Turkey, destinies marked by human rights violations.

© Reuters/Darren Whiteside

Carrying her baby, an East Timorese woman points to exhibition photos of human rights violations committed by Indonesian forces in East Timor.

Amnesty International has highlighted a range of cases in which human rights have been violated with imported arms. One of the first cases reported concerned Finnish bullets used in East Timor. Following an attack by a para-military militia in the capital of East Timor, Dili, on 17 April 1999, Amnesty researchers collected the casings of bullets reportedly fired by the militia at the scene. Amnesty later found that the casings had been manufactured in Finland by Patria Lapua Oy. The story created a considerable stir in Finland (Amnesty International, 1999). Amnesty has since continued its work with tracing weapons used in human rights violations. It traced munitions used in the fighting between Ugandan and Rwandese forces over Kisangani in north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in 2000, in which many civilians died. Amnesty researchers collected, amongst other things, North Korean and Russian 14.5mm cartridges (for heavy machine guns), Chinese 12.7mm cartridges (also for heavy machine guns), Russian cartridges for Nagant revolvers, South African (Armscor) 7.62mm ammunition (possible date 1981), and a Chinese (Norinco) cartridge from 37mm ammunition for type 55 anti-aircraft weapon (Amnesty International, 2002; Amnesty International and Oxfam, 2003, p. 10). Similar cases have involved Austrian Glock pistols in East Timor and 9mm Browning handguns in Jamaica (Amnesty International, 2003c, 2003d).

Human Rights Watch has also documented the origin of weapons used in human rights violations in both conflict and non-conflict situations. In an incident of excessive use of police force in Zambia in 1997, the organization traced the bullet used to seriously injure opposition leader Rodger Chongwe back to the manufacturing country, the former Yugoslavia. The bullet had reportedly been fired without prior warning and as the opposition leader was leaving a peaceful rally that the police had disrupted (HRW, 1998a, pp. 12–13). In a more recent case, the organization traced the origin of remnants of mortar rounds found in Monrovia, Liberia, after the indiscriminate killing of civilians by rebels during the 2003 fighting. It found that the mortar rounds (81mm and 60mm, produced in 2001 and 2002) had been purchased by Guinea (which at the time had a seat on the UN Security Council) from Iran earlier the same year and transferred to Liberia, which was under a UN embargo (HRW, 2003). Other cases have involved, for example, detailing the arms inventories of Sudanese government forces (in its 1998 report, Human Rights Watch found that the small arms came from a large number of states, including China, France, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the former Yugoslavia) (HRW, 1998b), and the ammunition used in extrajudicial executions in Kosovo in 1998.

Similarly, in an investigative newspaper report, Paul Salopek of the *Chicago Tribune* first described the harsh living conditions of a Romanian employee of a Kalashnikov factory. He then went on to outline the activities of Grace Ikombi, a Congolese rebel who is responsible for human rights violations and owns one of the Romanian guns, an AKM-47, serial number DA0889 1995 (Salopek, 2001, p. 1).

To date, such efforts,[47] however revealing, have involved varying investigative techniques and standards of evidence. They have not yet led to a systematic understanding of which weapons (from which countries and companies) are used in human rights violations worldwide, although progress has clearly been made. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on small arms and human rights, Barbara Frey, has called upon investigators of human rights abuse to identify the tools by which such abuses are committed (Frey, 2002, para. 31–4). The human rights community seems to be heeding this call: more and more reports of the kind described above have appeared in the last years.

Small arms transfers to states where gross violations of human rights occur

Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Peace Information Service, NISAT, and the various UN expert panel investigations on violations of UN arms embargoes have for some years published detailed information on arms transfers to states where gross human rights violations occur. This also follows the logic of some exporters, which, as noted above, vow to restrict exports to countries with poor human rights records.

While isolated countries tend to import small arms from a limited number of states, others seem to import easily from a wide variety of sources.

Table 4.14 focuses on the most serious cases of human rights violations only, as measured on the Political Terror Scale (that is, those in which murders, disappearances, and torture are frequent). There are several rankings of human rights abuses, all of which are controversial, in part because ranking human suffering in this way is a debatable enterprise, and some rankings are perceived to be politically biased. The Political Terror Scale, updated yearly by an American scholar, uses Amnesty International reports and US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices as the basis for the ranking. Both sources are widely used in the human rights community. The rankings take into account the human rights situation in the country generally, not only abuses committed by governments.

Table 4.14 lists known exports to states (and non-state actors active in those states) where serious human rights violations are systematic. It shows that, while some of these states were fairly isolated and received weapons from a few states only, others seem able to import small arms, ammunition, and parts fairly easily from a wide variety of

sources. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Myanmar, and North Korea are good examples of the former, and Algeria, China, Colombia, Indonesia, and Russia are examples of the latter.

Only some of these states were actually under a mandatory UN embargo during the period covered (1998–2002, that is, the most recent five-year period for which data is available), namely, Afghanistan (the Taliban) from 1999, Angola (UNITA) 1993–2002, Ethiopia 2000–01, Iraq from 1990, Liberia from 1992, Rwanda (non-state armed groups) from 1994, Sierra Leone (non-state armed groups) from 1997, Somalia from 1992, and the former Yugoslavia 1998–2001. Others have been under EU embargo. China, for instance, has been under EU embargo since the suppression of the pro-democracy movement at Tiananmen Square in 1989. It might therefore seem surprising that Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK have all exported small arms to China. The reason for this apparent contradiction is that the EU did not originally define what would count as 'arms' under the embargo (SIPRI, no date). In December 1995, a common interpretation was issued which restricted the embargo to 'lethal weapons' (France, Ministère de la Défense, 2003, p. 72). Hence, the British explained their exports by stressing that 'the ammunition listed is in fact sporting gun ammunition (not covered by the UK's interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo) and the parts and accessories of military weapons refer to military firing sets for use in Explosive Ordnance Disposal work' (personal communication, 12 February 2004). Similar reasoning could lie behind the exports from Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

It should be noted that the discussion here is rather restrictive in its scope—only the countries with extremely serious human rights problems have been included. A country such as Saudi Arabia, for instance, is not covered although its record on human rights is rather bleak and it has an increasingly ambiguous image when it comes to combating international terrorism. Saudi Arabia is the single largest customer of major EU exporters such as Belgium, France, and Spain and on the top five recipients list of many other important producers-exporters, including the US. In fact, Saudi Arabia is one of the top five known importers of small arms worldwide.

As always, the data should be interpreted with caution. Customs data, which is used in Table 4.14, does not tell us the reason for export. German exports to DRC are quite likely to have been destined for the UN mission established after the peace accord in 2001. However, all recorded customs figures have been included in the table. It is also important to note that the table does not aim to be exhaustive. Instead, it should serve to illustrate that small arms exports—both authorized and illicit—to states where gross human rights violations take place are still common.

Table 4.13 Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998–2002[48]

Country	Exporters, years, and USD values
Afghanistan (Taliban government)	**Pakistan,**[49] **Saudi Arabia** provided funds for weapons purchases (public funds: after US protests, private funds only).[50]
Afghanistan (Northern Alliance)	**India,**[51] **Iran,**[52] **Russia,**[53] **US,**[54] non-state supplies from **Tajikistan**[55]
Algeria	**1998: China** (3.0m mainly hunting rifles), France (14,000 mainly shotguns), **Italy** (0.5m mainly handguns), **Russia** (3.5m shotguns), **UK** (0.2m ammunition) **1999: France** (18,000 mainly shotguns), **Italy** (0.5m mainly handguns), **Russia** (6.4m mainly shotguns and parts and accessories), **South Africa** 11.1m military weapons, **Switzerland** (28,000 handguns and parts and accessories) **2000: France** (29,000 mainly shotguns), **Russia** (0.6m mainly ammunition), **UK** (24,000 ammunition) **2001: Brazil** (2.8m ammunition), **France** (0.1m mainly shotguns), **Italy** (0.3m mainly handguns and shotguns), **Russia** (3.5m mainly shotguns) **2002: Brazil** (2.5m ammunition), **France** (0.9m mainly shotguns), **Italy** (USD 1.5m mainly handguns)

Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998–2002

Country	Exporters, years, and USD values
Angola	**1998: Portugal** (71,000 mainly shotguns) **1999: Brazil** (1.3m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Portugal** (16,000 mainly shotguns), **Slovakia** (0.5m mainly military weapons), **South Africa** (11,000 mainly military weapons) **2000: Brazil** (2m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Portugal** (50,000 mainly shotguns), **Russia** (2.4m ammunition), **Slovakia** (29,000 pistols and revolvers) **2001: Brazil** (0.9m shotgun cartridges), **Namibia** (16,000 mainly ammunition and hunting rifles), **Poland** (0.6m military weapons), **Portugal** (42,000 mainly pistols and revolvers) **2002: Portugal** (74,000 mainly shotgun cartridges, pistols and revolvers, and shotguns), **Spain** (49,000 ammunition), **France,**[56] **Russia**[57]
Angola (UNITA)	In the late 1990s, illicit supplies originating in **Bulgaria, Romania,** and **Ukraine** were supplied to UNITA. Chinese and Russian weapons have also been found in UNITA stockpiles.[58]
Burundi	**2000: Poland** (1.0m ammunition)
China	**1998: Austria** (26,000 mainly hunting rifles), **Belarus** (0.2m parts and accessories of military weapons), **Canada** (0.1m ammunition), **Germany** (0.2m mainly hunting rifles and ammunition), **Hong Kong** (11,000 pistols and revolvers), **Italy** (99,000 mainly shotguns), **Mexico** (64,000 ammunition), **Spain** (56,000 shotguns), **Switzerland** (61,000 mainly ammunition and shotguns), **US** (60,000 mainly shotgun cartridges) **1999: Canada** (0.1m ammunition), **Finland** (17,000 ammunition), **Germany** (0.3m mainly hunting rifles and ammunition), **Hong Kong** (28,000 mainly military weapons), **Italy** (71,500 mainly shotgun cartridges), **Mexico** (11,000 parts and accessories of military weapons), **Russia** (8.0m ammunition and parts and accessories for military weapons), **South Africa** (10,000 ammunition), **Switzerland** (0.2m parts and accessories of military weapons), **UK** (0.2m ammunition), **US** (0.1m mainly shotgun cartridges) **2000: Canada** (52,000 ammunition), **Finland** (0.1m ammunition), **Germany** (0.2m mainly hunting rifles), **Hong Kong** (26,500 mainly shotguns), **Italy** (0.1m mainly pistols and revolvers, and shotgun cartridges), **Russia** (9.0m mainly ammunition), **Switzerland** (1.8m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (0.45m ammunition), **US** (23,000 ammunition) **2001: Australia** (11,000 pistols and revolvers), **Canada** (94,000 ammunition), **Finland** (76,000 ammunition), **Germany** (0.3m mainly ammunition and rifles), **Italy** (57,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), **Serbia and Montenegro** (0.6m parts and accessories of military weapons), **Singapore** (0.6m parts and accessories of military weapons), **Switzerland** (4.0m mainly pistols and revolvers), **UK** (0.4m ammunition), **US** (0.2m mainly ammunition) **2002: Australia** (0.1m mainly shotguns), **Austria** (24,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Canada** (57,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Germany** (0.5m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Hong Kong** (58,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Italy** (0.35m mainly shotguns), **Russia** (44,000 parts and accessories of military weapons), **South Korea** (29,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), **Spain** (18,000 ammunition), **Switzerland** (0.9m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (1.0m parts and accessories of military weapons, and ammunition), **US** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons)
Colombia	**1998: Austria** (0.3m pistols and revolvers), **Belgium-Luxemburg** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns and rifles), **Brazil** (3.0m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Bulgaria** (1.9m military weapons), **Croatia** (1.2m military weapons), **Czech Republic** (0.5m mainly pistols and revolvers), **France** (78,000 mainly parts and accessories of military weapons), **Germany** (14,000 mainly ammunition and shotguns), **Israel** (6,3m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Italy** (1,2m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Portugal** (0.1m parts and accessories for military weapons), **South Africa** (3,3m mainly military weapons), **Spain** (75,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **US** (24.0m mainly military weapons), **1999: Austria** (0.4m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Brazil** (1.0m mainly shogun cartridges and ammunition), **Croatia** (1.0m military weapons), **Czech Republic** (0.4m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Germany** (0.1m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Israel** (3.6m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Italy** (3.8m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Singapore** (12,000 military weapons), **South Africa** (1.0m mainly military weapons), **Spain** (0.3m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **US** (9.0m mainly military weapons and ammunition). **2000: Belgium** (1.5m military weapons), **Brazil** (1.9m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Bulgaria** (75,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), **Czech Republic** (0.9m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Germany** (0.2m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Israel** (2.8m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Italy** (0.9m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Portugal** (31,000 ammunition), **South Africa** (0.6m mainly military weapons), **Spain** (38,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **UK** (27,000 mainly ammunition), **US** (8.5m mainly ammunition and military weapons)

Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998–2002

Country	Exporters, years, and USD values
	2001: Belgium (23,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Brazil** (4.4m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Czech Republic** (0.9m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Germany** (0.2m pistols and revolvers), **Israel** (3.3m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Italy** (1.3m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Portugal** (49,000 ammunition), **South Africa** (1.3m mainly military weapons), **Spain** (0.2m mainly shotguns), **UK** (0.1m mainly ammunition), **US** (16.0m mainly military weapons). **2002: Argentina** (40,000 pistols and revolvers), **Brazil** (6.4m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Czech Republic** (1.3m mainly pistols and revolvers), **Germany** (0.4m pistols and revolvers), **Israel** (5.9m mainly military weapons and parts and accessories for military weapons), **Italy** (0.4m mainly sporting and hunting rifles, and shotgun cartridges), **Pakistan** (13,000 military weapons), **Portugal** (26,000 ammunition), **Russia** (37,500 sporting and hunting rifles), **South Africa** (2.7m mainly military weapons), **Spain** (60,500 military weapons), **UK** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **US** (12.1m mainly military weapons and parts and accessories for military weapons)
Colombia (AUC, ELN, FARC)	**AUC:** Illicit supplies originating in **Nicaragua,**[59] **Panama**[60] **FARC, ELN:** Illict supplies originating in **Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela.**[61] **IRA** was allegedly supplying weapons to FARC in the 1990s and quite possibly beyond.[62]
Congo (RoC)	**1999: Italy** (83,000 pistols and revolvers), **Poland** (1.0m ammunition), **South Africa** (15,000 rifles) **2000: Austria** (20,500 rifles), **France** (0.1m mainly shotgun cartridges and shotguns), **Georgia** (0.6m ammunition) **2001: France** (0.1m shotguns), **Italy** (0.2m ammunition) **2002: Italy** (0.4m ammunition)
Congo DRC	**1998: China** (19.0m mainly military weapons and ammunition) **2000: Czech Rep.** (0.15m ammunition) **2001: Germany** (30,000 pistols and revolvers) **China,**[63] **Italy,**[64] **Libya,**[65] **Namibia,**[66] **Zimbabwe**[67]
Congo DRC (insurgents)	**Rwanda,**[68] **Uganda**[69]
Ethiopia	**1998: China** (0.9m ammunition) **1999: Russia** (6.5m mainly ammunition) **2000: Russia** (83,000 parts and accessories for military weapons) **2001: South Korea** (3.7m military weapons) **2002: China** (0.3m mainly military weapons and parts and accessories for military weapons), **Russia** (5.15m parts and accessories for military weapons), **Denmark** (0.2m parts and accessories for military weapons), **Netherlands** (12,500 parts and accessories for military weapons), **South Korea** (0.1m mainly hunting rifles)
Indonesia	**1998: Brazil** (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols), **China** (12,000 military weapons and parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles), **Czech Republic** (16,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **France** (55,000 ammunition), **Germany** (0.7m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **India** (43,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), **Italy** (29,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Netherlands** (0.3m parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols, and parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), **Singapore** (15,000 mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), **South Korea** (1.7m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Spain** (14,000 pistols and revolvers), **Sweden** (0.2m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Thailand** (71,000 parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), **Turkey** (0.4m mainly military weapons), **UK** (0.5m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **US** (70,000 mainly ammunition) **1999: Belgium** (13,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), **Brazil** (0.2m mainly hunting rifles), **China** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), **Czech Republic** (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **France** (11,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), **Germany** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **India** (35,000 parts and accessories for military weapons, and ammunition), **Italy** (37,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Japan** (12,000 mainly military weapons), **Malaysia** (0.1m parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), **Netherlands** (19,000 parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), **Singapore** (76,000 mainly shotgun barrels), **South Korea** (4.4m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Spain** (91,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Sweden** (55,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (1.35m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), **US** (0.1m mainly ammunition) **2000: Austria** (35,000 mainly hunting rifles), **Brazil** (79,000 mainly hunting rifles), **China** (0.5m mainly military weapons and shotgun barrels), **Germany** (80,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Italy** (38,000 mainly military

Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998–2002

Country	Exporters, years, and USD values
	weapons), **Japan** (0.1m pistols and revolvers), **Pakistan** (0.1m parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), **Singapore** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Slovakia** (9.0m mainly ammunition), **South Korea** (0.1m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Sweden** (93,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Turkey** (75,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (0.3m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **US** (49,000 mainly shotguns), **2001:** **Austria** (30,000 hunting rifles and parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), **Brazil** (0.2m mainly hunting rifles), **Hong Kong** (14,000 ammunition), **Czech Republic** (0.1m mainly ammunition), **France** (21,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), **Germany** (0.1m mainly ammunition), **Italy** (15,000 mainly shotguns), **Japan** (30,000 pistols and revolvers), **Malaysia** (13,000 military weapons), **Singapore** (0.3m mainly military weapons), **Spain** (50,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Sweden** (0.2m parts and accessories for military weapons), **Turkey** (98,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (57,000 ammunition), **US** (29,000 mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles) **2002:** **Austria** (0.2m mainly military weapons), **Brazil** (0.6m mainly rifles), **China** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Czech Republic** (34,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Hungary** (11,000 pistols and revolvers), **Italy** (45,000 mainly shotguns), **Philippines** (0.4m parts and accessories for military weapons), **Russia** (17,000 military weapons), **Singapore** (4.4m mainly military weapons), **South Africa** (85,000 military weapons), **South Korea** (0.3m mainly ammunition), **Sri Lanka** (13,000 pistols and revolvers), **Sweden** (87,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), **Switzerland** (14,000 mainly pistols and revolvers, and parts and accessories for pistols or revolvers), **Turkey** (66,000 mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles)
Indonesia (insurgents)	Ethnic Achenese living in **Malaysia,**[70] illicit supplies originating in **Thailand**[71]
Iraq	No information available on SALW transfers
Liberia	Illicit supplies originating in **Serbia**[72]
Liberia, (LURD)	Illicit supplies originating in **Guinea, Ivory Coast**[73]
Myanmar	**1998:** **China** (3.4m military weapons) **1999:** **China** (0.1m parts and accessories) **2001:** **China** (0.1m parts and accessories) **China,**[74] **Israel,**[75] **Pakistan,**[76] **Russia,**[77] **Vietnam**[78]
Myanmar (insurgents)	Allegations of illicit supplies originating in **Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,** and **China.**[79]
North Korea	**1998:** **China** (0.7m mainly ammunition and military weapons) **1999:** **China** (1.9m mainly hunting rifles) **2000:** **China** (81,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons) **2002:** **UK** (13,000 hunting rifles)
Pakistan	**1998:** **China** (3.5m mainly ammunition), **Czech Republic** (64,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Germany** (51,000 mainly pistols and revolvers, and shotguns), **Italy** (0.1m mainly shotguns), **Turkey** (0.4m ammunition), **UK** (18,000 mainly ammunition), **US** (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), **1999:** **China** (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **France** (34,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), **Germany** (16,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), **Italy** (92,000 mainly shotguns), **South Africa** (0.9m mainly ammunition), **Switzerland** (0.1m parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **US** (60,000 mainly military weapons) **2000:** **Brazil** (12,000 hunting rifles), **China** (0.5m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Czech Republic** (40,000 mainly ammunition), **Germany** (84,000 mainly ammunition), **Italy** (22,000 mainly shotguns), **South Korea** (5.4m ammunition), **Switzerland** (70,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (57,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons and ammunition) **2001:** **China** (0.3m mainly shotguns), **Czech Republic** (0.1m mainly ammunition), **France** (22,000 parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), **Germany** (29,000 mainly ammunition), **Italy** (54,000 mainly shotguns), **Switzerland** (57,000 parts and accessories for military weapons) **2002:** **Brazil** (1.9m shotgun cartridges), **China** (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), **France** (74,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), **Italy** (27,000 mainly shotguns), **UK** (17,000 mainly ammunition), **US** (12,000 ammunition)

Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998–2002

Country	Exporters, years, and USD values
Russia	**1998: Austria** (0.7m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Belarus** (12,500 mainly shotgun cartridges), **Belgium-Luxembourg** (0.5m mainly shotguns), **Cyprus** (0.3m mainly shotguns), **Czech Republic** (40,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Finland** (0.1m mainly shotguns), **France** (2.4m mainly shotguns), **Germany** (1.0m mainly shotguns, sporting and hunting rifles, and ammunition), **Italy** (1.1m mainly shotguns), **Kazakhstan** (0.9m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Latvia** (11,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Portugal** (13,000 shotguns), **South Korea** (11,500 sporting and hunting rifles), **Spain** (0.9m mainly ammunition), **Turkey** (29,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **UK** (0.3m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Ukraine** (0.1m mainly shotgun cartridges), **US** (1.0m mainly sporting and hunting rifles) **1999: Austria** (0.5m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Belgium** (0.2m mainly shotguns), **Cyprus** (15,500 mainly shotguns), **Czech Republic** (85,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Finland** (0.3m mainly shotguns), **France** (0.7m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Georgia** (16,000 mainly ammunition and military weapons), **Germany** (0.5m mainly shotguns and sporting and hunting rifles), **Italy** (0.9m mainly shotguns), **Nicaragua** (0.1m shotgun cartridges), **Switzerland** (76,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Turkey** (0.2m parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles), **Ukraine** (18,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **United Arab Emirates** (11,000 ammunition), **US** (57,000 mainly shotguns and parts and accessories for military weapons) **2000: Australia** (11,000 ammunition), **Austria** (0.7m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Belgium** (0.3m mainly shotguns), **Bulgaria** (88,000 ammunition), **Cyprus** (11,000 mainly shotguns), **Czech Republic** (0.2m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Finland** (0.1m mainly shotguns), **France** (1.2m mainly sporting and hunting rifles, and shotguns), **Georgia** (1.4m mainly military weapons), **Germany** (1.5m mainly shotguns), **Italy** (1.2m mainly shotguns), **Kazakhstan** (65,000 military weapons and parts and accessories for military weapons), **Spain** (46,000 mainly ammunition), **Turkey** (0.15m parts and accessories of shotguns or rifles), **UK** (0.1m mainly shotguns), **Ukraine** (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **US** (57,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles, and ammunition) **2001: Austria** (1.5m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Belgium** (0.5m mainly shotguns), **Czech Republic** (0.3m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Finland** (0.3m mainly sporting and hunting rifles, and shotguns), **France** (1.2m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Germany** (2.8m mainly shotguns and sporting and hunting rifles), **Italy** (1.8m mainly shotguns), **Japan** (15,000 mainly shotguns), **Portugal** (64,000 shotguns), **Spain** (0.5m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), **Sweden** (36,000 ammunition), **Switzerland** (51,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Turkey** (50,000 mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles), **UK** (0.2m mainly shotguns), **Ukraine** (40,000 parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles), **US** (0.7m mainly ammunition) **2002: Austria** (1.7m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Belgium** (0.7m mainly shotguns), **Cyprus** (11,000 shotgun cartridges), **Czech Republic** (0.4m mainly hunting and sporting rifles), **Finland** (0.3m mainly hunting and sporting rifles), **France** (1.1m mainly hunting and sporting rifles, and shotguns), **Germany** (0.4m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), **Italy** (2.9m mainly shotguns), **Japan** (85,000 shotguns), **Portugal** (0.1m mainly shotguns), **South Korea** (0.1m ammunition), **Spain** (0.3m mainly shotgun cartridges), **Sweden** (39,000 mainly ammunition), **Switzerland** (69,000 sporting and hunting rifles), **UK** (45,000 mainly shotguns), **Ukraine** (0.7m parts and accessories for military weapons), **US** (82,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles)
Russia (Chechen insurgents)	Illicit supplies originating with **Russian** military officials,[80] **Georgia,**[81] the **Taliban,**[82] various militant Islamic non-state actors,[82] **Turkey**[84]
Rwanda	**1998: China** (13,000 mainly shotguns) **2000: Russia** (0.8m parts and accessories for military weapons) **2002: Turkey** (37,500 ammunition), **Saudi Arabia** (11,000 military weapons) **US,**[85] although unclear whether US military aid includes SALW.
Sierra Leone	**2000: UK** (10,000 ammunition) **2001: Lebanon** (0.2m military weapons), **US** (29,500 parts and accessories), **Spain** (13,000 ammunition)
Sierra Leone (RUF)	**Liberia,**[86] **Burkina Faso,**[87] **Niger,**[88] **Ukraine**[89]
Sudan	**1998: China** (40,000 rifles) **1999: Cyprus** (22,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), **Iran** (0.8m ammunition) **2000: Cyprus** (17,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), **Iran** (2.5m parts and accessories for shotguns and hunting rifles, and ammunition) **2001: Austria** (26,000 mainly shotguns), **Cyprus** (11,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), **UK** (10,000 pistols and revolvers), **Ecuador** (10,500 parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols)

Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998–2002

Country	Exporters, years, and USD values
	2002: China (1.0m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), **Egypt** (14,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), **Iran** (5.4m mainly ammunition, military weapons, and shotgun cartridges), **Saudi Arabia** (65,000 mainly military weapons), **Switzerland** (4.3m military weapons), **UK** (0.2m parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols), **Russia,**[90] although unclear whether Russian weapons include SALW. *A Human Rights Watch report (1998b) shows that supplies in the earlier part of the 1990s were extremely varied.*
Sudan (insurgents)	There is a significant amount of illicit trafficking in SALW between **Uganda, Sudan,** and **Kenya.**[91]
Yugoslavia	Allegations for 1998-2002 period do not include small arms.
Yugoslavia (KLA)	Illicit supplies originating in **Albania, Croatia, Germany, Iran, Switzerland,**[92] **Bosnia and Herzegovina,**[93] **Montenegro**[94]

Note: Cut-off point for inclusion in table: USD 10,000 per annum.

Source: Whenever not otherwise stated, UN Comtrade. Download date: 23 January 2004

Box 4.5 Using international law to curb arms transfers to human rights abusers?

In the autumn of 2003, a coalition of NGOs (Amnesty International, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), and Oxfam) launched a campaign to control the international trade in arms, and in particular the small arms trade, and called for the adoption of the so-called Arms Trade Treaty (or the 'Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers').

The draft Arms Trade Treaty was first developed in 2000–01. It was a collaborative effort involving a number of international NGOs, the Commission of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, and international lawyers. The treaty is informally supported by a number of states, and as of early December 2003 seven states had expressly pledged their support for a treaty of this kind: Brazil, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Finland, Macedonia, Mali, and the Netherlands (Control Arms, 2003).

As currently envisaged, it covers all arms transfers, not only small arms. It is a short text (comprising ten articles all in all), stipulating (a) that contracting states should not license exports of arms which would violate their express obligations under international law (such as UN Security Council decisions, international treaties, and customary law); (b) that contracting states should not license arms exports when the state 'has knowledge or ought reasonably to have knowledge' that transfers of arms of the kind under consideration are 'likely' to be used in violation of the prohibitions on the threat or use of force, or to commit serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law; (c) that that there should be a 'presumption against authorization' when the arms to be exported are likely to be used in committing violent crimes or would undermine political stability, regional security, or economic development; and (d) that the states adhering to the Treaty should establish an international registry of international arms transfers to monitor compliance.[95]

In essence, the drafters and proponents of the Arms Trade Treaty have claimed that it assembles and consolidates into one single document those limitations on states' freedom to transfer weapons that can be derived from existing legally binding international agreements and norms on human rights, international humanitarian law, and peace and security. Some critics of the Arms Trade Treaty argue that, in fact, some of the provisions of the draft treaty go beyond current binding international law. Others, in contrast, argue that it is 'unambitious'. The many promoters of the project have argued that the Treaty and its format is a good way forward as it would be legally binding (rather than a political document such as the UN *Programme of Action*), valid internationally (hence preventing the case in which an irresponsible sale rejected by one state is accepted by another), and flexible (it is conceived as a framework convention, to which more specific legal provisions, such as on brokering or transport agents, can be added).

As of December 2003, Brazil, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Finland, Macedonia, Mali, and the Netherlands had pledged their support for a treaty to control the arms trade.

CONCLUSION

This chapter introduces a couple of novelties in examining the authorized global small arms trade. For the first time, it gives information not only on the main exporting and importing countries but also on their most important trading partners and principal categories of weapons traded. Thus, some problematic cases which have not yet attracted much attention were revealed: known medium-sized producers without recorded authorized exports (Iran, Pakistan, and Singapore) and whose export activities thus remain 'black holes'; Czech exports of small arms to Yemen; Brazilian and Russian exports to Algeria; massive imports by Cyprus and Saudi Arabia (not least from Western states); and significant imports by Colombia, Israel, Lebanon, Venezuela, and others. Subsequent editions of the *Small Arms Survey* will try to map illicit transfers in a similar way.

The analysis of main exporters and importers is based on international customs data and export reports. The comparison of the two sources shows that we are still far from a clear and coherent picture of the authorized global trade in small arms. This is an important reason for introducing a second novelty: the **Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer,** which assesses state export transparency on a 20-point scale. The barometer is based on the information made available by the main exporting states (that is, export reports and international customs data). The barometer will be a recurrent feature of the *Small Arms Survey*. In subsequent editions, it will thus be possible to assess whether individual states, as well as the international community as a whole, are becoming more or less transparent over time. This chapter has shown that, with an average of 8.5 out of 20, such developments would be more than welcome. Another issue that will have to be dealt with is the transparency of importing states.

It is with a view to better understanding the authorized trade that this chapter also sets out to examine the relationship between production and trade for the first time. We have shown that, for some of the world's largest producers of small arms, export is key to survival. Until recently, virtually all of Russia's military small arms production depended on international orders. Its civilian production is less export-dependent, although a considerable share is sold abroad. The same is true for Brazil, more than 60 per cent of whose production is exported. Germany, one of Europe's largest producers, follows the same pattern. The exception to what seems, albeit at a first glace, to be a uniformly export-dependent industry is the US, less than 10 per cent of whose production (but a higher share of military weapons) is exported. Future editions of the *Survey* will deal with the other main source of small arms transfers, namely pre-existing state stockpiles.

Lastly, in line with the theme of the 2004 edition of the *Small Arms Survey*, the chapter examines the links between human rights violations and small arms transfers. When examining transfers to countries with serious human rights problems, it becomes clear that many governments still have some way to go to achieve full consistency between their various foreign policy objectives: a relatively large number of states where human rights violations are widespread have no shortage of suppliers.

4. LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendices 4.1–4.4 are available on the Small Arms Survey Web site at
www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2004.htm.

4. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATF	US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
BRL	Brazilian real
CAD	Canadian dollar
CHF	Swiss franc
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HS	Harmonized system
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MANPADS	Man-portable air defence system
NOK	Norwegian kroner
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCASED	Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
RoC	Republic of Congo
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SEK	Swedish krona
SITC	Standard International Trade Classification
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USD	United States dollar
WMEAT	World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
ZAR	South African rand

4. ENDNOTES

[1] In this chapter, 'small arms', 'guns', 'firearms', and 'small arms and light weapons' are used interchangeably unless explicitly stated otherwise.

[2] In this chapter, 'trade' and 'transfers' are used interchangeably, unless otherwise stated.

[3] More technically, production and pre-existing stockpiles of small arms are called primary and secondary levels of supply. There is also a tertiary level of supply, which indicates arms supplies from groups within the wider population (insurgents, ex-combatants, criminals, and so on) (Naylor, 1998, p. 232).

[4] In Box 4.1, Sergio Finardi and Carlo Tombola come to a slightly larger figure, USD 2.8 billion, also based on customs data, because they include slightly different categories in their definition of small arms.

[5] The international customs database employed here is UN Comtrade. For a more detailed discussion of this source, see Small Arms Survey (2001, ch. 4; 2003, Box 3.1).

[6] A major problem with estimating exports is that they fluctuate from year to year. For smaller exporters in particular, exports are dependent sometimes on a single transaction, and can hence go up or down several hundred per cent from one year to the next. Estimates are therefore restricted to major producers only, for whom such fluctuations should be relatively smaller.

[7] <www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2004.htm>

[8] Brazil may also record its firearm exports in a somewhat unorthodox way, filing its pistols and revolvers exports under the customs category 'other sporting, hunting or target shooting rifles'. If this is correct, as some preliminary research by Dreyfus and Lessing (2003) seems to suggest, the above figures overestimate the actual trade.

[9] The research projects (Adriane's Thread: The Transport Networks of Arms Trade; and The Matchmakers: How Legal and Illegal Business Meet at Ports and Airports) were funded by the Program of Global Security and Sustainability of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in 1999 and 2001.

[10] We reviewed all SALW-related 51,358 exporter and 56,442 importer declarations included in SITC Rev. 3 code 891 (SITC [Standard International Trade Classification] is a different coding system from the HS codes used elsewhere in this chapter). The cross-analysis of exporter and importer declarations was necessary for *(a)* amending gaps and inconsistencies in reporting and *(b)* trying to amend inconsistencies in coding, because 'the rules for the same products can be applied differently between countries... the registrations of imports and exports are done independently... and the commodity classification systems are likely to be different' (Ronald Jansen, Chief of the UN Statistics Division's Commodity Trade Statistics Section, personal communication, 9 October 2003). At the end

of this process, the database included about 82,545 entries relevant to SALW trade, selected according to the following criteria: *(a)* if available, matching exporter and importer declarations were compared and the higher value was chosen; *(b)* exporter's declarations were supplemented by the importer's when the former did not declare exports that were recorded by the latter. In theory, at world level, imports and exports should be of identical value, net of f.o.b. (free on board, excluding insurance and freight) and c.i.f. (cost including insurance and freight).

[11] SITC codes 891.14 (Revolvers and pistols); 891.22 (Cartridges for shotguns); 891.23 (Air gun pellets and parts of cartridges for shotguns); 891.24 (Cartridges and parts thereof, n.e.s.); 891.31 (Non-military firearms); 891.91 (Parts and accessories of revolvers or pistols); 891.93 (Sports shotgun barrels.); 891.95 (Parts of sports shotguns and rifles); 891.99 (Parts and accessories of military weapons other than revolvers and pistols, and nonmilitary arms other than firearms and side arms).

[12] SITC 891.12 (Military weapons, other than revolvers and pistols); 891.29 (Munitions of war and parts thereof, n.e.s.).

[13] SITC 891.39 (Non military arms other than firearms such as air guns, rifles and pistols, and truncheons); 891.13 (Swords, cutlasses, bayonets, lances and parts thereof).

[14] According to factors provided by the US Department of Defense.

[15] For example, the M-47 (Dragon), the 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn), or the surface-to-air FIM-92 Stinger.

[16] Harmonized System 2002 (HS2002), codes 930111 and 930119; 930120; and 930190.

[17] For the UN definition, see PRODUCERS.

[18] Kalashnikov's AK-47s, AKM, AKS-74 are all outfitted with detachable bayonet-knives, as are Heckler-Koch's HK G36s and many other assault rifles. Widely traded bayonets and knives are, for example, Smith & Wesson SWAT, US combat M3 to M10, Beretta Model 92 knife, and Spanish FR7 bayonet, as well as the famous Gurkha Kukris and machetes, standard weapons for the Royal Gurkha Rifles.

[19] An energy in excess of 6ft/lbs for pistols and 12ft/lbs for rifles at the muzzle is considered very dangerous and, for example, the popular Webley & Scott Patriot and the Beeman Crow Magnum rifles produce 26–30ft/lbs at the muzzle, not to mention that some air weapons may be easily converted to use conventional ammunition.

[20] See, for example, the Prowler XS-B3, by China Xifeng, official training rifle for Chinese military youth.

[21] Such as Webley & Scott, Beretta, Walther, Smith & Wesson, and Colt. A list is available at <http://www.pyramydair.com>

[22] Exceptions include Belgium and Italy.

[23] For background information on the process, see Lodgaard and Rønnfeldt (1998).

[24] According to Courtney (2002, p. 8), '[d]espite accounting for less than 1% of total world trade... and less than 10% of the five most corruptible trades, sources from the US Department of Commerce indicate that [the overall arms trade] accounts for around 50% of all corrupt transactions'. The arms trade generally is the second most corruptible trade, after public works/construction, in terms of both frequency and value of bribes paid (Transparency International, 2002).

[25] It is important to note that transparency is only a first step to accountability. In future editions of the *Small Arms Survey*, accountability in the SALW trade will be addressed further. For more detailed arguments in favour of transparency, see Haug *et al.* (2002).

[26] The first information exchange in 2001 did not include transfers.

[27] This is the case when a country identifies both the recipient country and the type(s) of weapons exported to that particular country. This is different from reporting separately on trading partners and types of weapons exported. A country can report on both, but they do not necessarily have to be linked, in the sense that it is possible to tell which types of weapons are exported to which countries.
Not included here are total numbers of deliveries and licences granted and denied, which refer to the global number for all arms exports (that is, including SALW as well as larger weapons and weapon systems, and summing up deliveries to all foreign countries). Also not included are deliveries disaggregated by country (that is, a list of figures for all arms transactions with one particular recipient state; for example, Sweden reports that its arms exports (all categories of arms) to Singapore in 2002 totalled SEK 419.8 million (USD 43.4 million) (Sweden 2003)). Neither tells us anything about small arms exports.

[28] The only exceptions are availability *(a)* on Internet *(b)* free of charge (worth half a point each) and information on licence denials, which has been weighted as being less important than information on licences granted and actual deliveries.

[29] For a thorough discussion on which the following is based, see Marsh (2003) and Lessing (2003).

[30] For a critique of the UK export report, see Saferworld (2003). A similar critique of the German report is published yearly by the Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung (GKKE).

[31] This table is based on the analysis made in Kytömäki and Firchow (2004). Its format is adapted from Haug *et al.* (2002, pp. 30–1)

[32] These are: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

[33] This subsection is based on Haug (2003).

[34] All data in this paragraph is based on ATF reports, as they are the only source of data to list both production and exports of small arms.

[35] This subsection is based on CAST (2003) unless otherwise stated.

[36] The information on Brazil is based on Dreyfus and Lessing (2003).

[37] The actual amount listed is BRL 233,264,096, and includes pistols, revolvers, shotguns, carbines, and all other non-military firearms; ammunition and cartridges for such weapons; and parts, accessories, and services related to these items. In addition, the survey lists USD 38.5 million (BRL 89,624,377) under another heading, 'heavy military equipment', which includes military arms *(armas de guerra)*, bombs, grenades, and other projectiles; armoured combat vehicles; and parts, accessories, and services related to these items. Some of these items, particularly assault rifles, grenades, and mortar ammunition, may be small arms.

[38] SECEX database (Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade; Secretariat for Foreign Trade). This figure includes all customs subheadings of Chapter 93 except for those under the headings 9301 (military arms), 9303.90 (starting pistols, flare guns, and captive-bolt guns), 9304 (compressed air and spring-powered guns), 9305.91 (parts and accessories of military arms), 9306.90 (guided missiles, bombs, grenades, and munitions of war) and 9307 (swords, cutlasses, bayonets, etc.).

[39] Company information filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, CVM). All information is taken from Annual Reports (Informações Anuais, IAN) and Standard Financial Reports (Demonstrações Financeiras Padronizadas, DFP). See <http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing.asp>

[40] Data from SECEX database.

[41] For more details on Argentina and other Latin American countries, see Dreyfus and Lessing (forthcoming).

[42] In 2002, Brazil reported USD 117.6 million in arms exports to Malaysia, of which USD 67.5 million fell into non-military export headings. However, the anomalous size of these totals, along with corroborating press reports of a sale of an advanced missile system to the Malaysian government, suggest that most of these exports were not SALW. Consequently, we have not included them here.

[43] For an allusion to this European view of the US as 'a society plagued by guns and violence', see Blinken (2001).

[44] This section covers mainly human rights, rather than international humanitarian law.

[45] Belgium did so in the aftermath to the 'Arms to Nepal' row, over which a government minister resigned in August 2002 (BICC, 2003, Box U.18).

[46] Here, internal repression is taken to include, *inter alia*, 'torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' (EU Code of Conduct, criterion two).

[47] The Latin American NGO Viva Rio has been doing the same kind of research, but is most well known for tracing guns used in crime.

[48] Four or more on average for 1998–2002 on the Political Terror Scale. This scale is based on two annual series of country reports: Amnesty International reports and the US State Department reports. Each report is classified on a 1–5 scale, on which grade 1 implies secure rule of law and no problem of political murders, torture, or imprisonment because of political opinion or beliefs. Grade 4 means that 'murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas'. For grade 5 'the terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals'. <http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney.html>
[49] Kanzhetaev (2001), HRW (2001b).
[50] HRW (2001b, p. 4).
[51] Davis (2001a).
[52] Davis (2001a), HRW (2001b).
[53] HRW (2001b).
[54] Fitchett (2001).
[55] HRW (2001b).
[56] Global Witness (2002).
[57] Amnesty International (2003a).
[58] UNSC (2000c).
[59] OAS 2003.
[60] Cragin and Hoffman. (2003).
[61] Cragin and Hoffman. (2003).
[62] McDermott and Harnden (2001); Akbar (2002).
[63] GRIP (2002, p. 2).
[64] Amnesty International and Oxfam (2003).
[65] GRIP (2002).
[66] GRIP (2002).
[67] GRIP (2002).
[68] GRIP (2002).
[69] GRIP (2002).
[70] *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor* (2000); *Jakarta Post* (2002).
[71] Davis (2001b); *Jakarta Post* (2002).
[72] UNSC (2003a).
[73] UNSC (2003a, p.14); HRW (2003, p. 15 ff.).
[74] *Jane's Intelligence Digest* (2001).
[75] Ashton (2000a).
[76] *Jane's Intelligence Digest* (2001); Ashton (2000b).
[77] *Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter* (2000, p. 34).
[78] *Jane's Defense Weekly* (2001).
[79] Thaitawat and Charoenpo (2000); *Far Eastern Economic Review* (2000, p. 10).
[80] Small Arms Survey (2002, p.137).
[81] Demetriou (2002, p.36).
[82] Small Arms Survey (2001).
[83] Small Arms Survey (2001).
[84] Small Arms Survey (2001).
[85] GRIP (2002, p. 15).
[86] UNSC (2000b).
[87] UNSC (2000b).
[88] UNSC (2000b).
[89] UNSC (2000b).
[90] Pronina (2002).
[91] Majtenyi (2001).
[92] Ripley (2000).
[93] UNSC (1999).
[94] Smith and Sagramoso (1999).
[95] The full text of the convention can be found at <http://www.arias.or.cr/fundarias/cpr/armslaw/fccomment.html> and also at <www.armslaw.org>

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