

The Small Arms Survey conducts research in Yemen (© Derek Miller).

Living with Weapons:
SMALL ARMS IN YEMEN

5

INTRODUCTION

Mentioned in both the traditions of the Prophet and the Bible, Yemen is at the same time an ancient society and a young nation-state. The Queen of Sheba is thought to have come from Yemeni lands when she met King Solomon to open new trade routes. It was only in 2000, however, that the country signed a border treaty with Saudi Arabia demarcating their territories. Today, Yemen is a poor, traditionally Islamic country with a weak central government, strong tribal traditions, and millions of small arms. Government officials and tribesmen alike often nod, shrug, or even smile when telling foreigners that their country is home to some 50 million guns.

Such estimates are severely exaggerated. While Yemen is indeed heavily armed, the actual number of small arms in the country is now estimated at between six million and nine million. Among a total population of approximately 18 million, this means that Yemen has between 33 and 50 guns per 100 people. The country retains its status as one of the most heavily-armed societies in the world, but it is considerably less heavily armed than the United States, where there are at least 80 guns for every 100 people.

This chapter examines the role of small arms in Yemeni society, including the demand for small arms and the social controls that govern their use.[1] The case of Yemen is an especially helpful source of insights into these issues because the high number of weapons and constant history of intra- and inter-communal violence in Yemen have, curiously, not resulted in a criminal or unstable social structure at either the tribal or the state level.

Until very recently, Yemen has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to absorb massive numbers of weapons without having its traditional social institutions destroyed. By understanding Yemen's demand for small arms, and why the widespread availability of weapons has not undermined tribal structures (as it may be doing in parts of Africa, for example) we gain insights into the role of weapons in society, and into the social and other factors that condition their use.

Specifically, this study answers the following questions:

- **What factors explain the demand for small arms in Yemen?**
- **What features of Yemeni society govern the use of weapons in community life?**
- **How do social controls relating to the use of weapons help explain the impact of weapons on Yemeni people?**

The central argument in this case study is that small arms possession and use in Yemen is governed by complex rules of social behaviour and communication that stem from, and in turn reinforce, the institutions that maintain the society's identity and cohesion. Although community identity and social practices evolve over time, and are therefore changeable, they are nevertheless highly stable and resilient. In Yemen, a combination of tribal *urf* (or the Qaybali code, as social rules of behaviour are called) and strong family and tribal bonds informed by Islamic law and tradition give life structure, meaning, identity, stability, and predictability.

Small arms possession and use in Yemen is governed by the institutions that maintain the society's identity and cohesion.

It is their place in and respect for the tribal community that gives people's lives meaning in Yemen. State criminal and civil law is a modern and highly alien socializing institution that does not conform to the traditional practices of maintaining stability in family, tribal, and inter-tribal relations. Though state law is much preferred as a stabilizing force in the international policy world, at the local level in Yemen it is at best impotent and at worst undermines more established means of community governance. Though public policy could help to transform Yemen into a new, stronger state, it is very unlikely to succeed if the most trusted forms of social life are undermined or challenged. As one Yemeni explained during field work, without the tribe 'A man is nothing. He has nothing'.

By examining the various social controls on the use of weapons in Yemen, this study facilitates an understanding of the demand for weapons. Such an approach is arguably more useful than the 'causes' commonly invoked of weapons demand, such as poverty, insecurity, and the politics of exclusion. Demand, in the end, is a state of mind. Though it is impossible to look into the minds of people, it is possible to look into the 'minds' of societies by examining what they do and how they talk about what they do. By studying the social practices and communicative activities of a community, its world begins to come into focus and the fabric of people's lives can be displayed.

YEMEN: OLD CIVILIZATION, NEW STATE

In 1962, Muhammed al-Badr inherited North Yemen from his father, imam Ahmad Yayha. He reigned for only one week before being overthrown by a group of officers led by Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal, who declared Yemen a republic. The young imam solicited aid from the Saudis, who had no interest in a republic forming on their undefined southern borders. The result was civil war between the Royalists, backed by Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, and the Republicans, supported by Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. The (northern) Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) emerged as a client state of Nasser's Egypt.

The civil war came to an end after the 1967 Six Day War forced Egyptian troops to retreat from Yemen. In November 1967, the British relinquished control of Aden. Almost immediately, the new communist-oriented People's Republic of South Yemen was established there.

Now divided into the northern Yemen Arab Republic and the communist southern People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the region saw continued conflict, exacerbated by the exodus of hundreds of thousands of southern Yemenis to the north after Aden fell. Border wars broke out in 1972, 1978, and 1979. After ten years of negotiations, on 22 May 1990 the north and the south unified, but integration of the country and the military proceeded slowly and was largely unsuccessful. In 1994, these tensions erupted into a full-scale civil war fought by the regular armies of the old northern and southern states. Northern forces won the war with support from key tribes and returning Afghan war veterans.

Lacking a strong central government or permanent foreign military bases, Yemen is not a significant geopolitical actor. It has, however, begun to receive more international attention as a result of the suicide bombing of the USS *Cole* in October 2000; the arrest in 2002 of several Yemenis in the United States and Pakistan, believed to be members of the al Qaeda network; the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibah, a Yemeni citizen accused of being a key plotter of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks; and the attack on the French oil tanker *Limburg* in October 2002 (ICG, 2003). In response to these various incidents, President Ali Abdallah Salih has indicated a willingness to co-operate with the US and other western governments to root out the presence of al Qaeda operatives in Yemen (ICG, 2003).

The task will not be simple. According to *The Economist* (2002a), during the 1994 civil war in Yemen, 'President Salih recruited Afghan veterans from across the Arab world to wage another victorious *jihad* against the Soviet-backed socialists of South Yemen'. Though possibly exaggerating, *The Economist* goes on: 'at its height, the Islamist network had its own school system, its own ministries, and even its own governates, including Hadramawt, the bin Laden ancestral home. After the fall of the socialists in the south, the Islamists set about filling the vacuum with their own quasi-Taliban rule'.

In 2001, Yemen ranked near the bottom of the UN Human Development Index, 133 out of 162 countries.

Recently President Salih has been seeking to control the extreme Islamists by issuing guidelines for Friday sermons and forbidding radicals to speak to the press (*The Economist*, 2002a). However, specialists on Yemen note that the country's stability is based on a negotiated agreement between the government and the regional tribes, and cemented by the vast arsenal of small arms in their possession. Chipping away at that structure may threaten the foundations of Yemen's fragile state-wide peace.

Map 5.1 Yemen and its neighbours



Yemen's history has not resulted in a developed, 'modern' society. In 2001,Yemen ranked near the bottom of the UN Human Development Index, ranking 133 out of 162 countries (UNDP, 2001). Only 38 per cent of its people are literate and life expectancy is 58 years for men and 62 years for women (US, CIA, 2001).[2] Despite its revenues from oil production, Yemen remains one of the poorest countries in the Arab world, with an estimated annual per capita

GDP of USD 820 (US, CIA, 2001). Yemen's unemployment hovers at around 30 per cent (1995 est.) (US, CIA, 2001). The country also has the highest population growth of the Arab world (4.1 per cent) and the highest infant mortality rate (75.3 per thousand infants) (UNDP and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 2002, pp. 143–45).

© Derek Miller

Modern-day Sana'a.

Yemen has limited natural resources. In 1987, oil production started in the Marib. By 1990, oil accounted for over 90 per cent of total export earnings (Jane's Information Group, 2001, p. 859). Only three per cent of the land is arable, and limited irrigation is predominantly allocated to the cultivation of *qat*, a mild stimulant which is widely grown and chewed during afternoon socializing. Qat production consumes one-third of the water use in a country with no lakes or streams and limited fresh ground water (*The Economist*, 2002b).

FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OF SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS

Early transfers [3]

Yemen relies on imports and the vast arsenal of weapons left behind by earlier empires and foreign powers.

The number of small arms in Yemen is estimated at between six million and nine million. The majority of these weapons are assault rifles from the former Soviet Union, eastern Europe, and China, with smaller numbers of various makes and models from other countries. Weapons from much earlier periods (e.g. the Ottoman Empire) are still in wide circulation and are highly prized. Paradoxically, perhaps, for a country with strong public demand for them, Yemen has no regular domestic production of small arms, though some weapons were produced in small quantities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Instead, Yemen relies on imports and the vast arsenal of weapons left behind by earlier empires and foreign powers (TRANSFERS).

The importation of weapons into Yemen is not a new phenomenon. Among the oldest weapons known in Yemen are a pike and sword that came from Asia, probably India, during the first centuries AD (Breton and Bafaqih, 1993, pp. 52–58). When the first Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century, they found that both the Turks and the imams had artillery installed in fortifications. In the third quarter of the sixteenth century, Ottoman inventories included 2,500 harquebuses, a predecessor of the musket (Serjeant and Lewcock, 1983, p. 71). In the seventeenth century, the Ottomans could mobilize forces of 8,000–10,000 men, needed primarily to suppress revolts by small tribal armies which were well-equipped with muskets (Brouwer, 1997, pp. 41–43, 154–55, 179–200).

As firearms gradually became commonplace, most remained technologically backward, albeit effective. By the eighteenth century, gun-barrels, stocks, and gunpowder were being manufactured and sold in Sana'a, although local production appears to have ended by the late nineteenth century (Serjeant and Lewcock, 1983, p. 226, 245). In the nineteenth century, the possession of matchlock firearms became commonplace all across Arabia. In a prominent case, a sheikh controlling a city and several villages could marshal an armed force of four thousand men (Waterfield, 1968,

pp. 25–29). Imports continued apace, so that visitors to Yemen in the early twentieth century could encounter tribesman bearing antique matchlocks alongside others with then-modern bolt-action breech loaders (Stark, 1953). The best Arab matchlocks remained in use until quite recently. Some of them had barrels made in British India by local gunsmiths.

Just as the Ottomans had introduced thousands of harquebuses in the sixteenth century, the influx of modern repeating weapons can be linked to the country's colonial period. The British established their rule in Aden in 1839 and the Ottomans re-established their control in the rest of Yemen later on, retaking Sana'a after 1872. The initial preparations for the British assault on Aden included 300 troops armed with percussion-cap muskets (Waterfield, 1968, p. 72). The opposition's matchlocks proved inadequate, and the introduction of modern weapons began on a large scale.

The increase in the numbers of weapons in Yemen in the century and a half following the conquest of Aden by the British had several causes. One was the presence of foreign troops in Yemen. Another was the rivalry between the Ottomans, the Egyptians, the British, the French, and the Italians. A third was technological developments in Europe. Together, these factors resulted in a massive increase in the numbers of weapons in Yemen, although without a decisive and proportionate increase in the number of gun-related fatalities (Warburton, 2002).

The most important single element in nineteenth-century history relevant to the availability of weapons in Yemen was the improvement in firearms technology. After the Napoleonic Wars, the percussion cap replaced the flintlock. This improvement was followed by the rifled barrel, the breech-loader, the repeater, and the small-bore repeater. Between roughly 1820 and 1920, the armed forces of Europe, Japan, and the United States repeatedly replaced their military small arms as each new technological advance meant that older weapons could no longer compete on the battlefield. These older weapons ended up in places like Yemen.

The imperial powers did not fear arming the colonized. Liberation struggles were a remote prospect. But while small arms did not play a significant role for the imperial powers, the surplus military weapons would come to play a significant role in the social life of the peoples on the edges of the empires, such as Yemen.

European colonization led to increased trade at the same time as rapidly changing generations of small arms were coming on to the market. Shippers, primarily interested in whaling in the Indian Ocean, could load obsolete surplus weapons on their outward journeys to sell to the local populations. By the time significant quantities of small-bore repeaters were available to tribesmen in Yemen, colonial administrations had escalated to the use of artillery and aircraft to suppress rebellion. A leading historian noted, 'The Royal Air Force had assumed military control of Aden in 1928' (Belhaven, 1955, p. 134).

Table 5.1 Early European firearms imports to Yemen

Origin	Weapon
Ottoman Empire	Mauser 87
Germany/Ottoman Empire	Mauser 98k
Britain	Enfield, Snider, Lee Enfield, Martini-Henry
France	Gras, Lebel
Italy	Vetterli, M1
Austria	Mannlicher
Scandinavia	Remingtons

Source: Warburton (2002)

Virtually every type of rifle developed in Europe after about 1850 could probably be found somewhere in Yemen.

In the absence of written documents, the best available information on nineteenth century small arms imports to Yemen remain field observations, an easy method in a culture that values public display of weapons. Although the list in Table 1 is not comprehensive, it is almost certainly the case that virtually every type of rifle developed in Europe after about 1850 (when rifled breech-loaders began to be mass produced) could probably be found somewhere in Yemen. As already noted, in the early stages of this processes of diffusion, weapons reached Yemen through three sources: colonial presence, major power rivalry, and trade.

The earliest modern European military small arms to enter the market in Yemen were probably British products, initially 1853 Enfields, Sniders, and Martini-Henry rifles. The weapons were official British versions and appeared generally to be carbines (designed for use by cavalry) rather than rifle-size (for infantry). They may have originally belonged to the garrison at Aden, entering the market either illicitly or after decommissioning. Firearms, part of a continuous series of weapons issued to colonial forces, are still present in Yemen. This process appears to have continued until the end of the British presence in the 1960s, when British troops carried FN-FAL automatic rifles.

The actual number of small arms introduced in this fashion was not great, and none of these weapons is abundant today. Although the Lee Enfields and FN-FALs are still widely used, the British contribution to the total number of weapons in Yemen cannot have been significant. These weapons are appreciated for their reliability and quality, and therefore kept, but the numbers are not great in relative terms.

Ottoman forces in North Yemen were far more numerous and left a greater weapons legacy. Theirs was a military occupation in a constant state of war with the tribes and the imam. The Mausers in Yemen today are almost all Ottoman in origin, and a manifestation of the continuous re-equipment of the Ottoman forces throughout the occupation. They are still commonly used in Yemen. Some are seen in the hands of youths whose fathers have acquired more modern weapons.

Other older weapons that can still be seen in Yemen today represent a cross-section of the arms trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: French Gras, German Mausers, Austrian Mannlichers, and Scandinavian-sourced Remingtons. Original American weapons are rare or unknown in Yemen; the few American brand rifles seen first-hand were foreign-made versions manufactured under licence. This was almost exclusively a European trade.

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Weapon sales from the back of a truck.

The largest quantities of weapons were doubtless those brought in officially by the British and Ottoman colonial administrations. Other outsiders, like the French, Germans, and Italians, probably made additional deliveries largely to stir up colonial trouble. In general, these weapons were not conceived as part of a major transfer programme, but, inevitably, each colonial power may have sought to win favour with various tribal groupings through the gift of insignificant quantities of weapons.

Modern transfers

In 1955, the Soviet Union began conventional arms transfers to Egypt via Czechoslovakia to gain influence with the pan-Arabic government of Gamal Abdul Nasser. Soviet transfers were later broadened in the region (Page, 1985). The old colonial client relations remained active until the Arab–Israeli conflict started attracting the interest of the United States, making it a Cold War battlefield.

Yemen was an area of interest for Soviet military diplomacy due to its control of the Gulf of Aden and therefore passage through the Suez Canal. With Nasser supporting the new Republicans in the north, Yemen started receiving some of its first shipments of modern, fully automatic rifles. Chinese weapons—which are abundant today and generally unpopular as their barrels have a tendency to overheat and warp—first appeared in Yemen from the unguarded border with Oman to the northeast. The Dhofari rebellion in Oman, which began in 1965, sought to overthrow the oppressive rule of Sultan Said ibn Taimur and started to receive Chinese support at the end of 1967. Soon after, Beijing and Aden (the capital of South Yemen) started to collaborate. The Chinese sent small arms to the Yemeni border, from where they were shipped over to the Omanis in Dhofar. 'By the end of the 1960s, almost all of the [rebellion's] weapons were Chinese, light weapons mostly, but also some artillery and anti-aircraft guns' (Behbehani, cited in Page, 1985, pp. 125–27).

When South Yemen became a proto-state in 1967, thousands of South Yemenis fled north into the Yemen Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. Some of the sheikhs of the south had rallied against the new government; and, as tribal affiliations were strong and collective punishment a common and accepted practice, the exodus was largely based on political alignments. Raids began from the north into the south thereafter and found support from King Faisal in Riyadh, who was alarmed by the appearance of a radical regime on his southern border. Page (1985, p. 19) reports that these raiders were armed with US weapons, supplied by the United States, as early as 1968.

Direct transfers from the Soviet Union (as opposed to transfers by third parties such as the Egyptians) began in mid-March 1968, when two ships carrying Soviet arms arrived in Aden but were diverted to the north. This shipment was followed by another small one in July (Page, 1985, p. 16). Such small shipments, coinciding as they did with Chinese aid, were probably more symbolic than designed to create a genuine military capacity in South Yemen. However, Soviet involvement in Yemen would soon escalate and persist until the end of the Cold War. The Soviet and Chinese leaderships (though vying against each other) simultaneously supplied arms to the Omani Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf. In 1972, Cubans also started sending officers and equipment to train Omani rebels based in South Yemen (Page, 1985, pp. 16, 130).

The pace of Soviet assistance accelerated with the injection of massive military and technical aid to South Yemen. A large and complex military and industrial infrastructure was built in the area around Aden. The air base at Al-Anad, 40km east of Aden, required a support structure of petroleum reserves, technical infrastructure, early warning and security facilities, and housing. The infrastructure remains to this day. Like other former Soviet client states, South Yemen suffered from the end of the Cold War, as military support immediately dried up. At the end of the civil war in 1994, tribes in the north, with the complicity of the new central government, were allegedly allowed to loot entire stockpiles (mainly supplied by the Soviets) from the defeated former southern army as a means of strengthening their loyalty.[4]

Traders have long supplemented these political processes through ordinary commerce, smuggling being unnecessary as weapons imports were not illegal. Chinese weapons are ubiquitous today. Most were sold or supplied directly by the Chinese and others appear to have flowed across the Omani border with traders or nomads.

At present, Yemen does not provide official information on its legal small arms imports. However, many countries report exports to Yemen via the UN Customs Database and Commercial Trade (COMTRADE). According to COMTRADE data, between 1996–2000 small arms and/or ammunition were supplied to Yemen by Argentina, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and the United States (see Table 5.2). Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, and China are among the largest suppliers of small arms, by value. Recent information suggests that the Czech Republic remains one of Yemen's most important suppliers of small arms (*Financial Times*, 4 February 2003). As COMTRADE data are incomplete, Table 5.2 gives only a partial picture of the legal supply of small arms to Yemen.

Table 5.2 Small arms transfers to Yemen, 1996–2000 (in current US dollars)

Custom codes*	Exporter	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Total
930100	Poland	6,619,000	3,466,000	761,000	1,917,000		**12,763,000**
	South Africa				354,000		**354,000**
	China			424,000			**424,000**
	Total	**6,619,000**	**3,466,000**	**1,185,000**	**2,271,000**	**0**	**13,541,000**
930200	Czech Rep.			25,000	427,000	3,000	**455,000**
	Spain		643,000				**643,000**
	Poland	918,000		499,000	290,000		**1,707,000**
	Argentina	80,000					**80,000**
	Total	**998,000**	**643,000**	**524,000**	**717,000**	**3,000**	**2,885,000**
930330	Germany	1,390,000	1,204,000	5,000			**2,599,000**
	Czech Rep.	3,507,000	3,074,000	3,374,000	2,053,000		**12,008,000**
	France	101,000					**101,000**
	Philippines			390,000		26,000	**416,000**
	Brazil		260,000			447,000	**707,000**
	Total	**4,998,000**	**4,538,000**	**3,769,000**	**2,053,000**	**473,000**	**15,831,000**
930390	USA				50,000		**50,000**
	Czech Rep.	102,000					**102,000**
	Total	**102,000**	**0**	**0**	**50,000**	**0**	**152,000**
930510	Germany	57,000	25,000				**82,000**
	Total	**57,000**	**25,000**				**82,000**
930590	Switzerland		9,000		241,000		**250,000**
	Poland	220,000					**220,000**
	Total	**220,000**	**9,000**	**0**	**241,000**	**0**	**470,000**
930621	Czech Rep.	174,000		4,000	89,000		**267,000**
	Poland				525,000		**525,000**
	Total	**174,000**	**0**	**4,000**	**614,000**	**0**	**792,000**
930630	USA	101,000	40,000				**141,000**
	UK	181,000	193,000				**374,000**
	Russian Fed.					111,000	**111,000**
	Germany	1,257,000	1,735,000	711,000		443,000	**4,146,000**
	Czech Rep.					249,000	**249,000**
	China			2,987,000			**2,987,000**
	South Africa				118,000		**118,000**
	Brazil	216,000					**216,000**
	Philippines		61,000		390,000	455,000	**906,000**
	Total	**1,755,000**	**2,029,000**	**3,698,000**	**508,000**	**1,258,000**	**9,248,000**
930690	China			5,341,000			**5,341,000**
	Portugal	664,000	763,000				**1,427,000**
	Total	**664,000**	**763,000**	**5,341,000**	**0**	**0**	**6,768,000**
930700	Iran					240,000	**240,000**
	Total	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**240,000**	**240,000**
Total		**15,587,000**	**11,473,000**	**14,521,000**	**6,454,000**	**1,974,000**	**50,009,000**

Note: Lack of figures does not mean that no exports were made that year. Many countries do not report annually to COMTRADE.
* See key to customs codes below.

Source: UN, Statistics Division (2001)

COMTRADE customs codes

Code	Description
930100	Military weapons other than revolvers, pistols, and arms of heading no. 9307 (includes some non-SALW)
930200	Revolvers and pistols, other than those of heading 9303 or 9304
930330	Rifles, sporting, hunting, or target shooting
930390	Firearms and similar devices operated by the firing of an explosive charge, not elswhere specified
930510	Parts and accessories of revolvers and pistols of heading nos. 9301 and 9304
930590	Parts and accessories not elswhere specified of heading nos. 9301 to 9304
930621	Cartridges, shotgun
930630	Cartridges, not elswhere specified, and parts thereof (includes some non-SALW)
930690	Munitions of war and parts thereof and other ammunition, and projectiles and parts thereof
930700	Swords, cutlasses, bayonets, lances, and sim arms and parts, scabbards and sheaths

Source: UN Statistics Division (2001)

Table 5.2 suggests that Yemen is a declining market for small arms and light weapons. The value of imports has declined from USD 15 million in 1996 to USD 1.9 million in 2000, although the low figures for 1999 and 2000 may be related to a lack of reporting. However, when one looks at the region as a whole, it appears that fewer weapons are being sold to the entire Middle East (Miller, 2000). In addition, former Communist countries of central and eastern Europe have reduced their exports to Yemen over the past few years. This is probably due to the depletion of surplus Cold War stockpiles that were sold off during the past decade. It is also possible that Yemen bought as much as the supplier countries could offer, and that the reduction in exports was due to a drop in *supply*, not a reduction in demand.

Recently, that trend seems to be reversing, but it is too soon to tell. It is reported that the Czech Republic exported arms and ammunition worth more than KC199 million (USD 6.6 million) to Yemen in 2002, 50 per cent more than in 2001, thus making Yemen the third largest buyer of Czech arms after the US and Germany (*Financial Times*, 4 February 2003). Some observers also claim that weapons destined for Yemen are diverted to other Arab countries, and to countries in the Horn of Africa (*Warsaw Rzeczpospolita*, 2000).[5]

Despite the many weapons circulating in Yemen, the demand for weapons appears to be growing as a result of population growth.

Despite the many weapons circulating in Yemen and an apparent decline in legal imports, the market for small arms is not saturated. Indeed, the demand for weapons appears to be growing as a result of population growth. As the role weapons have played has remained remarkably stable since they began to be imported, it is reasonable to assume that existing patterns of weapon acquisition will continue. Based on the assumption that the ratio of men to weapons (1:1.26) will not change unless state policies alter the demand for weapons (or control or restrict the supply), the consumption rate appears to be roughly 200,000 new small arms every year (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Projected estimated tribesmen holdings and demand

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Projected estimated tribesmen totals of small arms and light weapons	5,580,000	5,770,000	5,960,000	6,160,000	6,370,000	6,590,000
Projected estimated new demand per year	-	190,000	190,000	200,000	210,000	220,000

Source: Miller (2003)

DEMAND: THE ROLE OF WEAPONS IN YEMENI LIFE

The distribution pattern of small arms in any society is the result of two opposing forces: people's desire to own guns and the obstacles that prevent weapons from reaching them. These obstacles might include: physical barriers, like mountain ranges or rivers; legal obstacles; or customs that pressure people to meet certain social expectations. Neither is immutable. Demand, for instance, varies with the ebb and flow of events, changes in values, and new economic conditions. The demand for weapons is thus a dynamic phenomenon.

Questions about demand factors and community customs usually relate to broad factors like economic conditions, perspectives on security, and political inclusion or exclusion. Understanding community practices with weapons, however, can shed more light on small arms holdings, distribution patterns, and the likelihood of problematic transfers. Questions that need to be researched further, and which are only touched upon here, are listed below.

- *What happens to the weapons of the dead?* By tracing inheritance issues among Yemeni men, it would be possible to refine the figures for annual demand. Projections of demand for weapons (estimated at 200,000 a year) will be affected by the death rate—or life expectancy—of men. Furthermore, where communities are interested in reducing the level of small arms, public awareness campaigns could encourage members of society to 'retire' the weapons of the dead rather than passing them on to younger generations.
- *Do small arms have sentimental value? Do the relationships between men and weapons affect whether weapons will be traded, sold, or otherwise passed on?* For example, if weapons are kept because of whom they belonged to or their historical significance, owners will be unlikely to hand them over to collection and destruction programmes. The social or emotional significance of weapons will affect whether they are passed on to another party.
- *Are there community rules about to whom a member may sell a weapon?* This information would both inform distribution patterns of weapons, and provide clues about the transfer dynamics of weapons between and through communities.
- *What is the relationship between ammunition availability and weapon preference?* In certain cases, ammunition is extremely difficult to purchase and weapons are very expensive to operate. Weapons that communicate wealth and prestige may be desirable. They may also be undesirable if they are not very useful.

Answers to these questions can contribute to a profile of community attitudes to weapons and hence to stockpiles and demand factors. This profile is bound to be unique, although characteristics may overlap with those of other communities. Once community practices have been mapped, they can be used to help model demand, or the movement of weapons into or between groups. For example, if the weapons of the dead are destroyed, then death rates for men can be used as proxy measures for the destruction of small arms. If, on the other hand, weapons are passed on to eldest sons, then weapons are in fact 'recirculated'. They fulfil some outstanding demand, reducing the likely consumption rates and hence the estimates of annual import or production for domestic use. Thus, cultural or ethnographic knowledge can be used to support modelling techniques for estimating small arms demand, transfers, and distribution patterns.

Even in countries in which weapons are seldom used to cause injury or death, they may well be displayed, discussed, and stored for possible use. Their possession and the associated threat of violent use send signals to other people. Though levels of small arms signalling have never been studied or measured, in a country like Yemen it is evident that the primary factor behind demand is the communicative role guns play—as a means of potential violence rather than as instruments of actual, planned violence.[6]

This communicative role is highly important for micro-deterrence. Deterrence means the communication of a credible threat to a potential adversary in response to actions that the adversary might take. Deterrence has been widely studied in the fields of strategy, nuclear warfare, and international relations. It has not been treated systematically in the literature on small arms. If the primary role of weapons is communicative, then at least one implied message is some version of 'I have the capacity to kill and have power over other people'. If the consequences of that message are that other people refrain from taking actions that might otherwise have been taken, then they have been deterred. Knowing whether this has in fact taken place, however, is difficult to prove without studying community intentions and explanations for non-action. However, it must be noted that, where deterrence works, weapons become a *stabilizing factor* in inter-communal relations, even though the capacity to do extraordinary harm remains a reality. It is not suggested that this is the primary reason for relative calm in Yemeni society. However, the consequences of exercising one's desire for revenge are unquestionably held in check by the community's values and its knowledge that unregulated bloodshed can bring about harsh retribution and ultimately threaten group cohesion. As academic Shelagh Weir notes: 'People are scared of inflicting too many casualties because they have to pay blood money in the final totting up of the score.'[7] Tribes know that mass warfare will undermine tribal cohesion and power because the rites of blood money and revenge killings cannot be practised if the number of dead is too high (Warburton, 2002).

Weapons are an ordinary feature of Yemeni life, and personal weapons can range from small daggers to artillery. Weapons play a role as actual instruments used in conflict, but also as a statement about identity. The ordinary Yemeni man views his dagger and his automatic rifle as items of personal apparel. High-quality weapons give prestige to the owner. The capacity to purchase such items and to reward followers with weapons is both a form of power and a statement about power. The fact that the weapons are actually used to resolve conflicts should not obscure their social role. A weapon is a statement about the capacity and willingness to protect one's family, clan, and tribe. As such, it is a statement about personal identity, self-worth, and one's role in the community. To understand the desire for weapons is to understand the way life is organized in Yemen.

The ordinary Yemeni man views his dagger and his automatic rifle as items of personal apparel. High-quality weapons give prestige to the owner.



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Yemeni men of all ages carry weapons, both daggers and rifles, as personal apparel and icons of masculinity.

The limited role of guns in criminal violence

Al-Bab (a news aggregator for the Arab region) hosted a web site[8] collating data about violent incidents in Yemen as reported in Yemeni regional and international newspapers, with a daily summary of known criminal or violent actions. The data should be seen as complementary to official crime data, including data submitted to Interpol. Data collection techniques are irregular and unsystematic, which means that comparisons of numbers of reported incidents are not possible. For example, in 1998, 138 separate incidents, ranging from jailbreaks to donkey bombs, were listed and detailed. In 1999, only 55 incidents were reported.

Nevertheless, in so far as this material is a reasonable presentation of the types of incidents that occur in Yemen, a great deal can be learned about the practice of small arms violence by classifying the several hundred news reports into different types of incidents and then looking for more detailed regularities among incidents of a similar type.[9] By seeking patterns of violent actions in the 138 cases reported in 1998–99, eight types of small arms related incidents could be identified:

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A family-run gunshop in Dhamar, Yemen.

- public demonstrations that turn violent;
- tribal clashes;
- tribe–state clashes (including security sector incidents);
- tribe–company/private sector clashes or incidents;
- single weapon accidents;
- stockpile accidents;
- radical Islamist attacks or provocations; and
- kidnapping.

It is particularly notable that inter-personal criminality (when one individual attacks or threatens another for personal reasons) was never reported in newspapers. Inter-personal violence is either very rare or not considered newsworthy. In all cases of injury, actions were either attributed to inter-tribal conflict or were considered accidental.

It is impossible to quantify levels of criminality on the basis of this material. However, specific numbers of criminal incidents have been reported to Interpol. Yemen submitted data for 1996, 1997, and 1999 (see Table 5.4). Interpol has not yet released data for 2000 and 2001. Definitions of criminal acts are not readily available, thereby making comparative interpretation between countries impossible.[10] Despite their unreliability, the numbers suggest that violent crime is rising and taking new forms. Anecdotal evidence also tends to support this.[11]

Table 5.4 Selected national crime statistics as reported to Interpol, 1996–1999

	1996		1997		1998		1999	
	Cases	Solved	Cases	Solved	Cases	Solved	Cases	Solved
Murder	525 (924)	525	787	-	-	-	942 (12%)	82.59%
Sex offences	62 (54)	110	31*		-	-	238 (18%)	94.95%
Serious assault	-	-	-	-	-	-	567	70.01%
Theft (all kinds)	4,438	2,926	2,593	-	-	-	3,147 (1.24%)	48.23%
Drug offences	727	706	247	-	-	-	24	91.66%
Total number of offences contained in national crime statistics ***	**9,525 (108)**	**6,267**	**5,101**	**62****	**-**	**-**	**11,316**	**-**

Notes: * In 1997, no data were submitted under the category 'sex offences', so numbers are for 'rape'.
** In 1997, Yemen reported this information as a percentage, not a raw figure.
*** Total includes other crime statistics, not cited here.
Numbers in parentheses are for 'attempts'. In 1999 Yemen changed its reporting of solved cases from raw numbers to percentages.

Source: Interpol (reports from 1996 to 1999).

Small arms, tribes, and the state in Yemen

The modern state of Yemen can be traced back to the states of South Arabia, known from the first millennium BC. The tribal confederations of modern Yemen also have their roots in the beginning of our era,[12] so that states and tribes have coexisted for more than two thousand years in what is today Yemen. Conflict between states and tribes has always been regulated by warfare; tribal behaviour reflects a balance between custom, authority, and violence. The modern Yemeni state is a compromise solution, which has involved the gradual introduction of 'modern' western values and institutions, such as written civil laws and the state.

Before the introduction of modern weapons, the tribal system was based upon honour, matching a death with a death. The fundamental problem with the system was that a thief or vandal could trigger a war which involved entire tribes. This frequently happened, so that the individuals who initiated conflicts were not acting out of tribal interest; yet the tribes rallied around the victims in the interest of tribal cohesion.

Every observer in Yemen or South Arabia tells a tale of constant armed conflict, both among tribes and between tribes and authorities. The tribal conflicts always took place in the context of foreign invasions: the Fatimids, the Ayyubids, the Ottomans, and the British being among the recent ones. Killing was an ordinary part of this activity, long before the arrival of modern weapons or of European influence. Weapons were freely available and frequently used, but such use was always restrained and controlled. Tribal encounters would involve demonstrative shooting, but even when two tribes were in a state of war and unaccustomed to meeting, there would be little or no violence at accidental or planned meetings. The violence was controlled by a code of conduct—a code that is well known to all tribesmen, and is taught to children both explicitly and through reward and reprimand. This system ensured, not only that conflict was more or less constant, but also that killing could not become widespread. Too many deaths could not be avenged without risking the life of the tribe. Therefore, the very killing that formed such a fundamental part of tribal life was also fundamental in ensuring that the killing did not get out of hand. Peculiarly, this attitude towards restraint characterizes the activity of both the tribes and the state.

Even after the introduction of modern weapons, the local tribes in Yemen maintained their established attitudes, viewing killing as an expensive activity. This is normal in tribal warfare. Each killing has to be paid for. The motivation to kill randomly does not develop in a system where everyone knows who is killing whom and is certain of being able to call on allies to avenge any death. The instability of tribal confederations means that warfare is endemic but not terribly murderous (Warburton, 2002). The role of weapons has not changed drastically, except for the possibility of the distribution of arms through patronage. There is no reason to expect that modern weapons could alter the degree of violence involved with their use, since traditional tribal ties are strong and the power of the state to influence behaviour weak.

The state can transform the system by loosening tribal ties and dividing allegiances, as well as asserting claims to a monopoly on the use of force.

The state can intervene to change this, but must first have the capacity to impose justice as well as employ force. The state can transform the system by loosening tribal ties and dividing allegiances, as well as asserting claims to a monopoly on the use of force. It is characteristic of all tribal peoples who engage in regular warfare, whether in Yemen or elsewhere, that the participants would prefer to put an end to the violence in the short term. The difficulty in resolving shorter conflicts lies in establishing the authority capable of doing so. The mere capacity of a state to employ force is insufficient. It must also command respect and dispense justice acceptable to all. What constitutes respect and justice, however, differs from one tribal society to another. Law, as enforced by the state, may not be considered just, and those who somehow live 'above' tribal life at the state level may not enjoy community respect.

The state plays a fundamental role in international relations, but its presence can also destabilize inherently stable tribal systems at the 'sub-state' level. A state cannot compete with tribal organizations merely by drafting laws. Significantly, where the state undermines tribal ties and identities, it also risks undermining the inhibitions related to killing in tribal environments. Only if there are adequate guarantees can the will of the state translate into social peace. Where the state has undermined tribal ties but fails to assert its authority, random killing can destroy social structures. Where killing involves personal interests and ideological matters, and the state is unable to restrain the participants, killing will get out of hand if the constraints of tribal life have ceased to function. Such killing does not require modern weapons—much of the work in Rwanda was done with machetes. The killing is related not to the weapons, but rather to the restraints that prevent a conflict from getting out of hand.

In *Peaks of Yemen I Summon*, Steven Caton (1990) explains that two of Yemen's finest contemporary poets—who wielded a great deal of political influence when Caton did his work—fear that modernization has led to westernization and an abandonment of ancient Yemeni tribal traditions. This transformation of values, they believe, continues to weaken the country politically. In their opinion, tribalism has been the nation's backbone since time immemorial; to threaten tribal traditions is to imperil Yemen's political independence by gradually absorbing it into the western socio-political system.

This debate is very much alive in Yemen today. Time-honoured social structures of tribal life are not only considered part of Yemen's past, but for many are also Yemen's destiny and strength. The argument of some Yemeni intellectuals that tribalism is 'backward' or 'uncivilized' must contend with highly persuasive and forceful arguments that claim just the opposite. Consequently, the debate about the role of the tribe in Yemeni life lies at the heart of the issue of how violence is to be regulated. It is through the rules of the tribe that we learn what is considered reasonable and unreasonable about small arms possession and use.

The government recognizes and makes use of this ambiguity. As Caton (1990, p. 218) explains,

> Politically, the tribes . . . remain relatively autonomous. They are also quite well armed. In fact, to some extent the government depends on the armed tribes, especially in the east, to help defend its borders in case of external aggression, and it is always nervous about the possibility of tribal dissidence stirred up by its policies. In short, the tribes are a power to be reckoned with, and their actions and discourses are not taken lightly by the state.

Although the balance is tilting somewhat in favour of the state, as US President George Bush's 'War on Terror' has created new relations between the Yemeni government and several western states, the nature of the relationship has not changed, nor has the concern that the Yemeni government's policies can be undermined by those who live outside major cities.

The constant condition of negotiated stability in Yemen presents a challenge to attempts to 'understand the root causes of conflict'. Given that conflict is a constant and accepted feature of the Yemeni landscape, one is confronted with the reverse question: What are the root causes of peace? Rather than assuming that conflict is unusual, this question assumes instead that all life is characterized—in Yemen and elsewhere—by some social conflict that must be dealt with on a regular, ongoing basis. What is interesting is how conflict is resolved, whether with or without violence, and which of the two is preferred in the relevant community. More subversively, it emphasises that not all instances of economic

underdevelopment, ethnic conflict, or inequality lead communities to either increased demand for weapons or violence. It underscores that something else is restraining and controlling violence, rather than causing it. In turn, it forces an inspection of those mechanisms of social controls, even under adverse circumstances, like extreme poverty. Once locally embedded ideas about the use of violence as a tool of conflict resolution are understood, we can then ask whether the presence of small arms changes that calculation or preference system. And, if so, how? If not, why not? Can lessons learned from more stable communities' relationship to small arms be applied to those in more violent societies, or are preferences towards using violence too ingrained in social practices to be ameliorated by state policy adjustments?

Social controls on small arms in Yemen

Generally, social controls are restrictions or limitations on individual actions by members of an individual's community. Such controls may be normative, for example based on customary practice or law. At the most general level, social controls function by threatening the individual with some kind of loss (or promising a reward) as a consequence of undertaking certain action. Such sanctions need not be explicit. In some cases, they may take the form of a loss of personal freedom, as when an individual is imprisoned for committing a legal offence. In other cases, they may involve a loss of social standing, such as a loss of reputation, honour, or dignity. These losses may be personal, in that they relate *only* to the person who committed the offence, or they may be *communal*, in that they bring shame or dishonour to one's community (family, clan, tribe, or even nation).

While Yemeni tribes are different, certain general practices, including the use of small arms, are common.

How customs and law interact is very important and complex, and is beyond the scope of this chapter. The main point is that all societies everywhere, in order to maintain some social cohesion and identity through time, must have controls that are understood by, and enforceable on, the members of that society. This implies that the most fruitful way of understanding social controls on small arms in a society is to focus, not on change and the future, but on continuity and the past. If there is new demand for small arms, and if violence is increasing, we can better understand the reason by considering the institutions that govern social life instead of assuming that small arms as responsible for 'changing everything'.

Based on the work of Yemeni and Arab scholars (Caton, 1990; Dresch, 1993; Warburton, 2002) and on fieldwork conducted by the Small Arms Survey in Yemen, it is clear that, while Yemeni tribes are different, certain general practices, including the use of small arms, are common. If a member of a tribe shoots another member of the same tribe, for whatever reason, families often try at first to find an honourable solution before turning to the sheikh. Failing this, mediation begins through the sheikh. The sheikh's position as first among equals requires his intervention to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflict. Some temporary monetary compensation is usually paid to the family of the victim and a dagger or some firearm is given both as payment and as a symbolic gesture of handing over the weapon that caused the injury. The amount of money and the number and types of weapons first given depends on the importance of the person who was killed.[13]

When the aggrieved party is temporarily satisfied by these initial actions, a truce is agreed for a certain period of time, for example, one year. The issue or 'blood' is considered as 'hanging up' (set aside) and needs to be solved permanently. The sheikh may be able to secure an indefinite extension of the truce. In other cases, intervening factors in the life of the community change the significance of what has occurred. However, sometimes the issue will not go away. In such cases, monetary compensation (blood money) is agreed on and weapons are also usually asked for in compensation.

However, those representing the victim often want the perpetrator of the violent action to be killed. This is not a *preferred* outcome for the community as a whole, though it may be for the family in question. In these cases, the sheikh may make a decision for the community and either order the execution or carry it out himself. If events drag on, the victim's family may decide unilaterally to kill the guilty party.

Retribution killing is common, and is a socially recognized and tolerated practice. It takes place not only at the intra-tribal level, but also at the inter-tribal level. The latter practice also has its rules. If a tribesman kills a member of another tribe, and there is no historical vendetta between the two parties involved, then he may be publicly excommunicated by his tribe; money may be sent to the other tribe along with an empty coffin that signifies that anyone who finds the perpetrator can kill him, or he is handed over to the wronged tribe to do whatever they want with him.

Salah Hadash (1998), in a paper delivered to the Consultative Council in Yemen, cites four customary rules of tribal violence: blood revenge, kidnapping, inter-tribal wars, and arms carrying. According to the *Yemen Times* (1998) review of this conference, blood revenge was explained in the following manner:[14]

> Conventional and tribal norms confess or recognize blood revenge as a means of retaliation. It gives the person the right to fire his gun at his enemy using only three bullets. If he is not able to seize this chance, he doesn't have the right to shoot him again. The revenge seeker may not commit this crime in crowded markets, which are assigned as safe areas for people to trade. The punishment is blood money and if it is not accepted, the death punishment is inevitable. The Law of Crimes and Punishment No. 12 of 1994 considers blood revenge a crime deserving capital punishment or blood money, if the relatives of the killed person accept. The number of blood revenge incidents in Yemen reached 1,257 during 1996.

Other social practices that control small arms violence at the tribal level include: the use of mediators in resolving disputes between communities; the kidnapping of foreigners in order to signal disapproval and open a dialogue for the settlement of grievances; 'blood money' or payment to another tribe for wrongs committed; low-level armed skirmishes; communal punishment; the use of complex signalling techniques about intentions through the use of poetry recited in front of other tribes; and the social pressures of shame and honour within the community or family.

Needless to say, the subject is broad and the scholarship about tribal practices in the region is rich. This brief review of conflict-resolution mechanisms in Yemeni society illustrates the following key points:

- the absence of state law does not mean that communities are without rules of their own;
- the rules that societies follow may or may not be threatened by the proliferation of small arms;
- not all conflict resolution mechanisms are peaceful or non-violent; in some communities, violence is in fact the *preferred* means of resolving disputes;
- social controls exist in all societies, and careful study of them will help explain the role that small arms play in that community;

- such an investigation, if conducted over an extended period of time, will also help create a far better understanding of whether the proliferation of small arms has weakened, strengthened, or otherwise left unaffected the primary institutions that maintain the society's cohesion.

It is now illegal to carry weapons in the city centre of Sana'a.

Influencing attitudes towards firearms possession in Yemen would require long-term co-operation between the state, tribal councils or sheikhs, and local mosques.

State control over small arms in Yemen

State control over small arms possession and use in Yemen is extremely limited, and it is highly unlikely that the state will be able to encourage safe firearms possession and use through coercive means outside the major cities. There are few national laws on weapons possession, and those on the books are impotent outside the major cities. Nevertheless, public awareness campaigns could be effective if major non-state institutions—particularly tribal elders and imams from local mosques—could be encouraged to participate in them, addressing for example such issues as small arms storage and use. Such campaigns could be conducted through traditional means of information dissemination, including the production and distribution of tape cassettes, radio programmes, religious speeches in mosques (as appropriate), and even the use of poetry, which is a very rich form of local expression.

On matters of possession and firearms use, there would need to be a rather dramatic change in the associations in the minds of tribesmen between manhood, social standing, tribal strength, and weapons possession and skill. Such a task would be daunting, and would require long-term co-operation between the state, tribal councils or sheikhs, and local mosques, possibly with the support of international civil society actors like NGOs. Such an endeavour,

furthermore, is not likely to be successful unless the broader goals of the government to create a modern and effective central state can be seen as complementary to key institutional characteristics of tribal and Islamic traditions. Even awareness programmes about accidental death and injury would have to be carefully crafted because they might offend the religious belief that nothing is accidental.

Tribes in the north of Yemen are unlikely to disarm or consider changing weapons possession and use practices unless their cohesion, identity, religious beliefs, and traditional forms of law can flourish in a modern nation-state, or unless the tribe itself is undermined or replaced as a viable social institution. This has been attempted in many parts of the world, but often at the cost of extraordinary coercion and suffering. Furthermore, there is a great need to establish a respected and efficient judiciary with a credible enforcement capacity. The concept of independent civil law unconnected to religious law is foreign to much of the Islamic world and elicits sharply divided views, making the problem of developing a unique 'civil society' central to the state-building paradox in the Arab world.

Small arms initiatives in Yemen may best be directed in the near term towards safety training—including weapons use, storage, and handling, if not actual shooting—with awareness campaigns that emphasize the tragedy of deaths that flow from ignorance or carelessness, and security sector reform (SSR) programmes that aim to train security staff to cope with tense situations involving armed opponents. SSR might be a successful route to addressing small arms issues, as it would allow the state to exercise greater control over its security forces and facilitate directed, locally relevant action and interaction with the population. There is an especially pressing need in Yemen, and many other countries in the region, to promote constructive relationships between tribes and security personnel in areas where tensions are often exacerbated by the poor handling of delicate situations. Unless state abuses are mitigated, and the security sector trained to respond appropriately, tribesmen will not disarm. While removing such obstacles will not ensure success, neglect of these basic considerations will all but ensure failure.

Yemen has a public, rather than private, weapons culture.

CONCLUSION

Yemen does not have 50 million small arms. Best estimates place the figure between six million and nine million. The majority are in the hands of the tribal population and the most heavily-armed regions in the mountainous north. While this estimate confirms that Yemen is heavily armed, it is certainly not the most heavily armed society on the planet.

The country appears to generate a continued demand for small arms. Most small arms are probably imported legally from a wide range of international suppliers, including many western countries. There are also reports that some of these legal imports are trans-shipped through Yemen for possible export to states in the Arabian Peninsula and countries in the Horn of Africa. With almost no naval capacity to secure Yemen's vast coastline, unregulated trafficking to and from Africa is extremely easy.

Yemen has a public weapons culture. Guns are carried and boldly displayed in public to communicate honour, pride, status, and wealth. Demand for weapons is not primarily a function of poverty, ethnic conflict, the politics of exclusion, or other such factors, but rather one of unique, deeply-rooted identity and values. To understand the relationship of men to their weapons is to explore the foundations of Yemeni social life itself.

Despite the great number of highly lethal small arms in Yemen, the level of armed crime appears to be relatively low, although evidence is accumulating that violent crime is rising and taking new forms, including kidnapping people for money, serial killing, seemingly random killings, and breaches of traditional sanctuary rules. The slow but gathering process of urbanization in Yemeni life may explain the rising crime rates, though there is little evidence to support this view at present. It is clear that, as people move to the cities, their bonds with their tribes and communities are weakened, leading to fewer social controls on their behaviour.

The primary reasons for the apparently low levels of criminal violence in Yemen—as distinct from intra- or inter-communal violence—is the strong and central role of tribal values in Yemeni life, moderated and refined by Islamic law and spiritual teachings. Violence, in Yemeni life, is a deliberate act of the community. Though conflicts do sometimes get out of hand, this is frowned upon. Instead, killings within and among tribes may be laboriously decided through clear social rules.

Great benefits will be available to policy-makers addressing the problem of small arms in fragile states, as during peace settlements, or in post-conflict societies for example, if further attention is paid to matters of locally-legitimated violence. This will provide needed information on what policy solutions will work, and which will likely prove ineffective or detrimental during such activities as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration initiatives, post-conflict reconstruction, and development initiatives that endeavour to encourage sustainable security and respect for the needs of the people whose lives will be affected.

5. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
SSR	Security sector reform
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic

5. ENDNOTES

[1] This chapter is adapted from Miller (2003).

[2] Calculations for this case study are based on 2001 statistics. The 2001 statistics of the *World Factbook* are no longer available online, as they have been replaced by the 2002 statistics. See <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ym.html>

[3] This section is based on Warburton (2002).

[4] Interview with two members of the military attaché association in Sana'a, August 2001.

[5] An arms dealer in Dhamar, Yemen, interviewed by the author in July 2001, backed up this claim, asserting that Yemeni merchants illegally re-export arms from Yemen to other Arab states and to countries in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia (presently under a UN arms embargo).

[6] Violent use is distinguished from non-violent use, such as regular target shooting or responsible hunting.

[7] Correspondence with Shelagh Weir, former Middle East curator for the British Museum, and presently a research associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 10 June 2002.

[8] This web site was at <http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/data/incident> until 2000. Although not comprehensive, the data provided detailed summaries of events with full citations. It has subsequently been moved to: <http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/data/incident94.htm>

[9] Only western and Middle Eastern news sources seem to be listed. This may reflect a collection bias from those who compiled the material, or else represents a larger reality that only newspapers from these regions are concerned with Yemen. This is uncertain. Sources listed include (in no particular order): Associated Press; al-Jazirah satellite channel, Qatar; al-Sharq al-Awsat; Yemen Times; al-Ayyam newspaper; al-Quds al-Arabi; al-Sahwa, Islah newspaper; al-Hayat; al-Jamahir; Reuters; al-tariq; Agence France Presse; al-Sahwa; al-Bayan; al-Jamahir; Attariq; al-Balagh; al-Umma; al-Shoura; al-Soura; and others.

[10] The information from Interpol should be interpreted with caution. The Interpol General Secretariat merely reproduces the information sent to it by states. It is not processed, but merely classified according to category of offence, as defined in each individual country. The data are thus not comparable across states. Statistics also reflect only reported crimes.

[11] Interviews confirmed that citizens of Sana'a, at least, felt crime was on the rise, but this could not be independently confirmed.

[12] See maps of tribal distribution in ancient (Robin, 1991–93, p. 54) and medieval Yemen (Pridham, 1984, p. 4).

[13] Special thanks to Sharif Talal bin Saleh bin Hussein and Diane al Habieli for their knowledge and assistance in answering questions on this subject.

[14] The views expressed by these writers are provided as examples of the ongoing discussion within Yemen about these matters.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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David Warburton.

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James Bevan, Aaron Karp, Anna Khakee, Elli Kytömäki, and Glenn McDonald.