



کامران آرمز
ڈیلیزبل اسلحہ و کارٹریجز

شاہین



The Legal-Illicit Link: Global Small Arms Transfers

3

Introduction

In April 2001, a group of Thai soldiers raided an airport warehouse near Bangkok. They stole 30 Austrian-made Glock pistols and fled with the booty, apparently unapprehended. To their ensuing dismay, however, their every move had been filmed. The official inquiry that followed exposed that both the shipment and the raid were integral to a scheme to sell guns on the black market. This particular incident is symptomatic of the larger, international scenario. The trade in small arms has become increasingly difficult to control and it leaves a growing trail of corruption and insecurity in its wake.

According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, states do have the right to arm themselves, and small arms are one of the universal weapons of choice. Indeed, members of staff from a wide range of government agencies carry small arms, from armed forces to government militias, local police to wildlife agents and customs authorities to airport security. Millions of ordinary civilians in virtually all countries also keep arms as their rightful property, whether for personal protection or recreation. In fact, roughly 80–90 per cent of the global trade in small arms, worth approximately USD 4 billion annually, is legal trade. Such trade supplies those states and individuals who arm themselves rightfully for defence, security, or leisure.

Yet small arms are also used in acts of violence, crime, and human rights abuses that hinder development and democracy while contributing to regional instability and insecurity. The negative effects are most keenly felt in regions at war or in post-conflict situations. Few countries, however, escape such negative impacts completely. The illicit trade, which probably accounts for no more than USD 1 billion annually, is one way in which various actors can obtain small arms for misuse. Often the same countries and individuals are involved in both aspects of the small arms trade. As the line between legal and illegal transfers blurs, the two merge into one seemingly indistinguishable problem.

This chapter examines several aspects of the linkages between legal and illicit trade in small arms. Here are some of the key findings:

- There has been no dramatic change in the overall scale of the legal and illicit trade on the previous year, although the legal trade appears to be in gradual decline.
- Through analysis of available data, it is estimated that the global legal trade in small arms is worth USD 4 billion annually. This is a revision of the USD 4–6 billion estimate in the *Small Arms Survey 2001*.
- Through official customs data, only approximately 20 per cent of the suspected global, legal small arms trade of roughly USD 4 billion can be definitively documented.
- By adding up all the other country specific declarations of the small arms trade, an additional 20–25 per cent of the global legal trade can be accounted for. Thus, public official documentation exists for approximately 50 per cent of the global legal trade in small arms.
- Specific sectors of the small arms trade appear to be declining. According to customs data, the global export of pistols and revolvers decreased by 49 per cent from 1995 to 1999.

- Small arms enter the illicit realm mainly through the diversion of legal stockpiles.
- Government patronage is the leading source of arms for most non-state actors.
- Preliminary research shows that at least 54 countries have been linked to activities that allegedly violated international small arms embargoes.
- The shipment of illicit small arms by sea deserves much greater international scrutiny.


While the international community grapples with how to define the illicit trade (see Box 3.1), this chapter will examine all types of small arms transfers, showing how individuals, groups, and governments obtain the weapons responsible for a significant proportion of the death and destruction in the world today. By reviewing different types of small arms transfers, the links between the legal and illicit trade become clearer. This chapter will address the following questions:

- **What are recent trends in the legal international small arms trade?**
- **Is the state-authorized small arms trade becoming more transparent?**
- **Who are the main suppliers and recipients of small arms, both legal and illicit?**
- **How do small arms move from legal to illicit circulation?**

The first part of the chapter assesses the quantitative data that has been made publicly available. Transparency in the arms trade is key to understanding how arms get into the hands of those who misuse them. Thus, the chapter begins by examining the data available on the international legal trade in small arms. Using statistics provided by the United Nations and a number of governments, it highlights those aspects of the small arms trade that have been made public. While this picture is far from complete, it provides the only reliable and comparable information available on the subject.

The second part of the chapter examines recent trends in the illicit trade. It pays close attention to the ways in which legally owned small arms are diverted into illegal markets, examining a variety of routes, from wilful violations of embargoes to inadvertent battlefield seizures. Also considered are processes that facilitate the illicit small arms trade, especially the trade in conflict goods and sea shipping. Careful examination of events in Thailand and Bangladesh illustrate the differences between source countries and transit countries in the illicit trade, and the different risks the two face.

FIGURE 3.1 Arms transfer chain of possibilities



Small arms can last a very long time and pass through many different hands. The legal status of a gun can change with each new owner and in ways that seemingly mock the best intentions of policy-makers and activists. Figure 3.1 and Box 3.1 only hints at the complexity of the process. The preoccupation with legal status is somewhat academic. Ultimately, efforts to deal with small arms issues should focus on the weapons themselves.

BOX 3.1 Classifying transfers

The definition of an arms transfer is relatively simple. A *transfer* is the reallocation of small arms from the possession, either *de facto* or *de jure*, of one actor to another. There are always *at least* two principal actors involved, the *originator* and the *recipient*. These actors can be individuals, groups such as firms or rebel bands, or states. Facilitating actors, such as brokers and transport agents, are also often involved in the logistics of the transfer.

Other terms commonly used are much harder to define. One of the most interesting lacunae of the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference was the failure to define both small arms and light weapons, as well as illicit trade (CONFERENCE). The broader small arms community is no nearer to an agreed definition as to what constitutes a legal transfer of small arms, much less what constitutes an illicit one.

Experts on international law have made convincing arguments as to what is legal and therefore what is not (Gillard, 2000). However, these arguments are far from universally accepted and even further from being legally applicable. Attempting to determine issues of legality and accountability in regards to arms transfers is a complicated endeavour. It also ignores the fact that it is not the 'type' of transfer in and of itself that is important, but the end use of the weapons. Of course, illicit transfers may lead to more instances of misuse. While the definitional debates cannot be resolved here, the following guidelines were used in the *Small Arms Survey 2001*.

- *Legal vs illicit*. A transfer generally is legal if it fully conforms to international law and the national laws of both the exporting and importing states. An illicit transfer breaks either international or national laws. This simple division often blurs in practice, especially in ambiguous cases where legal or policy exceptions are exploited. Another source of controversy arises from transfers that are legal by these criteria—for example, which do not violate international embargoes or sanctions—but not in terms of international humanitarian or human rights law (HUMANITARIAN).
- *Authorized vs unauthorized*. Transfers can be *authorized* by both the originating and receiving governments or their agents in compliance with international and national laws, or *unauthorized* by either or both of the sending and receiving governments. This distinction is useful in attempts to attribute accountability for a transfer, but only with caution. A transfer may be authorized but, as is often the case, it never culminates in actual arms delivery for one reason or another. In a growing number of countries, moreover, governments are too weak to make authoritative decisions; and any transfers might better be described as *undefined*. This is clearest where the government structure has broken down or where the country is ruled undemocratically.
- *Intentional vs unintentional*. Transfers can also be classified as being *intentional* or *unintentional*. The transfer is intended either by the supplier or the recipient. There might be a few extraneous cases where a transfer is unintended by both parties—for example, a weapon is lost and then found—but this represents a minute portion of transfers. Determining the intention of a transfer transcends the issue of legality. It provides a basis on which to investigate matters of accountability and ultimately responsibility for any given transfer (Miller, 2001b).

The legal trade in small arms

As long as the trade in small arms occurs in accordance with national and international laws, and is authorized by the respective authorities of the exporting and importing state—that is, it is state-authorized—it is legal for the purposes of this edition of the *Survey*. Legal trade makes up the bulk of the international trade in small arms, but legal arms transfers can be diverted into the illicit market. Moreover by examining legal transfers one can see where major shipments of arms are going and when regions become saturated in arms.



Exhibitors and visitors shake hands over small arms at an aerospace technology trade show open to the public. The vast majority of small arms sales is legal.

© Associated Press/Wally Santana

It is clear that transparency is needed in the legal trade in small arms. Transparency allows governments and the general public to scrutinize transfers, to determine whether or not they conform to national and international regulations, and hence to better enforce said regulations. Many states see the benefits of transparency. As a result, over the last decade, official transparency in the small arms trade has definitely increased. Based on the increase in available data over 2001, it is possible to more accurately estimate the global annual value of small arms exports to USD 4 billion, down from the USD 4–6 billion range cited in the *Small Arms Survey 2001*.

Two main data sources for the international trade in small arms are examined here: *customs data* and *national reports* on arms exports and imports. Each

of these sources has strengths and weaknesses. Customs data, in general, conforms to a global standard when it comes to definitions and categories of small arms. While there are limitations to customs data, as will be outlined below, it remains the only source on small arms exports and imports that is comparable from country to country. National arms export reports often go above and beyond the level of detail found in customs data. While national reports are not comparable, due to their differing methods and definitions, they often provide a clearer picture of a state's international trade in small arms than customs data does.

It is by observing this legal trade that we can clarify what constitutes the illicit or illegal trade, as well as how legally held weapons move from legal to illicit markets. Without studying the legal trade, it is impossible to understand the dynamics of the illicit trade. The illicit trade is believed to contribute to high levels of regional instability and insecurity, crime, war, and human rights abuses, and it usually is of greater concern to governments. However, illicit phenomena cannot be appreciated without a clear understanding of the legal trade in small arms from which they originate. Data available on the legal trade, looking at customs figures, national arms export reports, and other sources is discussed below.

An incomplete snapshot: Customs data on small arms transfers

In the *Small Arms Survey 2001* customs data for global exports and imports of 'military firearms' and 'pistols and revolvers' was examined.¹ This year, the *Survey* also looks at the global export and import of non-military firearms. In 1999, the latest year available, over USD 413 million in hunting and sporting firearms was reported exported through customs worldwide. For the same year, more than USD 111 million of civilian pistols and revolvers was reported exported through customs. As for military firearms, the total value covered in international customs reports was nearly USD 410 million, or about 43 per cent of the total of small arms exported through customs.

There are several problems with customs data. Above all, many countries fail to supply information on relevant categories to the UN Statistics Division. Others do so, but inconsistently. Second, customs data does not encompass

the entire trade in small arms, as many legal transfers—such as military aid—do not pass through customs. Third, despite an agreed universal customs system, differences persist in reporting from country to country. For example, sometimes weapons that are only in transit and are not being imported into the country are reported as an export. The Netherlands, which does not produce small arms, but is a major transit country for shipments that pass through customs, is an example. In addition, shipments usually are reported in US dollars, yet dollar values are not always the best indicator of the small arms trade. Only a few countries report actual quantities of weapons. Many report volume by weight, which is less useful in assessing the global trade in small arms. Finally, some items included in the relevant customs categories are not what are usually considered to be small arms and light weapons, further clouding the issue.

Despite these shortcomings, customs data is the only official data on the global arms trade that allows direct comparisons between countries. While far from comprehensive, it is the most reliable indicator of the overall trade. The analysis here uses data compiled by the International Trade Center based on UN Customs Database and Commercial Trade (COMTRADE) figures as submitted by states to the UN Statistics Division.

Non-military firearms

There are several subcategories of small arms that fall under the customs code 9303 covering hunting, sporting, and target-shooting firearms. These include muzzle-loading firearms, shotguns for sporting, hunting, or target-shooting, and rifles for sporting, hunting, and target shooting. Pistols and revolvers fall under another customs category 9302. In general, COMTRADE customs data shows that:

- many countries have reported regularly for the years 1995–99; 15 of 29 countries supplied data on *pistols and revolvers* for all five years, with 22 of these reporting three or more years. For *hunting and sporting rifles*, 22 of 35 countries supplied data for all five years, with 30 of these reporting three or more years. For *hunting and sporting shotguns*, 25 of 35 countries supplied data for all five years, with over 90 of these reporting three or more years;
- exports of three of the four customs categories have declined over the last five years, the exception being exports of shotguns for sport, which have remained fairly constant (see Figure 3.2);² and
- there is a higher level of countries submitting data for these four categories of weapons than for the category of 'military weapons'.

Hunting and sporting rifles

In 1999 there were just over USD 170.8 million of hunting and sporting rifles exported—through customs—worldwide.³ The top exporters reported were Brazil, Germany, Japan, Finland, the United States, Portugal, and the Czech Republic. There was a steady decline in the value of global exports of sporting and hunting rifles over the 1996–99 period, declining each year from the high of over USD 206 million in 1996 (see Figure 3.2 and Appendix 3.2).

Customs data for this category is the most complete of any category of small arms examined. Of those countries reporting, the top 16 provided data for all four years. With such complete data, it can be concluded that global exports of hunting and sporting rifles did indeed decline over the 1996–99 time period. The total value of hunting and sporting rifles reported exported globally over the five-year period (1995–99) was USD 947.1 million.

TABLE 3.1 Customs data for top non-military firearms exporters by export category (1999)

Pistols & revolvers	Value (USD million)	Sporting rifles	Value (USD million)	Non-military shotguns	Value (USD million)	Muzzle-loading firearms	Value (USD million)
Germany	32.2	Brazil	35.6	Italy	108.2	Spain	10.7
US	26.6	Germany	23.9	Japan	15.2	Italy	8.4
Italy	19.3	Japan	15.1	UK	13.7	US	1.2
Czech Republic	10.3	Finland	12.0	Belgium	13.4	Germany	0.2
Canada	6.6	US	11.9	US	12.3	China	0.2
Switzerland	4.2	Portugal	11.5	Russia	12.0	Czech Republic	0.05
Spain	3.6	Czech Republic	10.6	Spain	10.6	France	0.03
Argentina	3.4	Italy	8.7	Germany	10.3	Norway	0.01
Indonesia	0.9	Austria	7.8	Brazil	6.2	Switzerland	0.01
Portugal	0.8	Belgium	7.6	Turkey	5.1	Malaysia	0.01

Source: COMTRADE customs data (2001)

Non-military shotguns

In 1999 there were USD 221.7 million of non-military shotguns exported worldwide. The top exporters in 1999 were Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Belgium,⁴ the United States, and the Russian Federation. Thirty-five countries provided export data for at least one year over the period 1995–99, but the data is less complete than that for hunting and sporting rifles (see above) in that a major exporter, the Russian Federation, did not submit data for 1995 or 1997. There is no discernible trend over the five-year period examined in shotgun exports (see Figure 3.2). The five-year total (1995–99) for reported global exports of non-military shotguns was USD 1.1 billion.

Muzzle-loading firearms

Often overlooked but important in the non-military market, there were USD 20.8 million of muzzle-loading firearms exported through customs worldwide in 1999. The top exporters were, in descending order, Spain, Italy, the United States, Germany, China, and the Czech Republic. Nineteen countries are reported exporters of muzzle-loading firearms. The global trade in these weapons decreased steadily over the period 1995–99 (see Figure 3.2 and Appendix 3.2). The five-year total value of muzzle-loading firearms reported exported through customs was USD 118.2 million.

Pistols and revolvers


There is also a discernible decrease in the worldwide export of pistols and revolvers reported through customs from 1995 to 1999. From a high of USD 216.5 in 1995, the trade reportedly fell to USD 111.2 million of pistols and revolvers exported globally in 1999. The 1999 top exporters were Germany, the United States, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Canada (see Table 3.1).

All of these countries have seen a substantial decrease in exports of pistols and revolvers over previous years, most by half (see Figure 3.2 and Appendix 3.2). Some export declines were even more dramatic. Portugal, for example, reported a decline from USD 10.7 million of exports of pistols and revolvers in 1995 to USD 762,000 in 1999.

In terms of data on reported imports from 1995 to 1999, the top importers—by value—of pistols and revolvers were, in descending order, the US, Germany, Thailand, Turkey, Switzerland, Mexico, the Philippines, Canada, and Venezuela.⁵ Of those few countries that report on the ‘quantity’ of weapons imported, the United States imported 4.1 million, Thailand imported 523,000, and Canada imported 83,000 pistols and revolvers in total from 1995 to 1999.

According to customs data, exports of pistols and revolvers worldwide decreased substantially from 1995 to 1999.

FIGURE 3.2 Trends in worldwide small arms exports, non-military, 1995–1999



Military firearms

Customs data on military weapons is much less complete. Recalling that this customs category also includes larger weapons systems, the data show that:

- Due to inconsistent reporting practices on the part of exporting countries, it is exceedingly difficult to discern any trends in the trade. Only ten of 29 countries supplied data every year for the five-year period in question, with only 59 per cent of the countries supplying data for three or more years.
- Several known exporters of weapons of this category do not submit data for this category of weapons, but do submit data for other categories: for example, the Russian Federation and Israel. It is clear that many countries still consider exports of this category of weapons as secret.

Customs data on exports of military weapons was reported more sporadically than those for any other category of weapons.⁶ In 1999, USD 409.9 million in military weapons were reported as exported globally. The top exporters were the United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa,⁷ Switzerland, and Canada. However, certain countries are noticeably absent from the 1999 data. The Netherlands, a major trans-shipment country but not an important exporter, did not submit export data in this category for 1999, nor did China, which exported USD 22.8 million in this category in 1998. Significant exporters of these weapons, such as the Russian Federation and Germany, provided no export data in this category. Therefore, customs data in the category of military weapons—again, a category that also includes arms other than those falling under the UN definition of small arms and light weapons—does not really represent the reality of this sector of the small arms trade.

TABLE 3.2 Top exporters and importers of military weapons through customs, 1999

Military arms exporters	Value 1999 (USD million)	Military arms importers	Value 1999 (USD million)
US	322.8	Cyprus	83.0
UK	32.9	South Korea	57.8
South Africa	16.3	US	25.6
Switzerland	16.3	Turkey	8.8
Canada	8.9	UK	8.8
Poland	5.3	Australia	8.6
Czech Republic	3.0	Bolivia	6.6
Croatia	1.7	Estonia	6.5
Republic of Korea	0.7	Switzerland	4.5
Turkey	0.4	Mexico	4.5

Source: COMTRADE customs data (2001)

In 1999, data on imports of military weapons was provided on an equally sporadic basis; hence, such data does not reflect the actual trade in these weapons worldwide. Nevertheless, in 1999 the top importers of military weapons who reported customs data were Cyprus, South Korea, the United States, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Australia (see Table 3.2). Former major importers that did not provide data for this category in 1999 were the Netherlands—again, a major trans-shipment country and not a major importer; Saudi Arabia—USD 37 million in imports in 1998; and Thailand—USD 10.9 million in imports in 1998.

Other sources of customs data

Commercially available customs data can be prohibitively expensive and does not always include information on categories of interest to the small arms community. There are at least three countries whose customs data, including data on small arms transfers, is available on the web free of charge: Thailand, Chile, and the United States.⁸ Customs data

BOX 3.2 Man portable air defence systems

One of the most worrisome light weapons is the 'man portable air defence system' (MANPAD) or shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. The best known examples are the American-designed FIM-92 Stinger and the Russian SA-16 Iglá. While many governments maintain that proliferation of rifles and pistols does not constitute a grave threat to their own national security, they certainly recognize the danger of MANPADs in the hands of terrorists or insurgents.

One of the greatest fears of aviation authorities was the risk that these weapons could be used to bring down a commercial airliner in an act of terrorism. In early 2001, a witness testified in a New York courtroom that the Al-Qaida tried to acquire US-made Stinger missiles in 1993 and bring them to Sudan (Loeb, 2001).

A growing number of countries produce and export MANPADs. Available data points to the United States and the Russian Federation as the leading exporters. From 1991 to 2000, for example, the United States exported Stinger missiles to Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia (US, GAO, 2001). In 2001 Raytheon was awarded a deal worth USD 89 million to build 1,007 Stinger missiles for Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom (*Armada International*, 2001).

In 1997 the Russian Federation sold 440 Iglás to Singapore and licensed assembly of up to 3,000 more (CAST, 2001). In 1999 the Russian Federation sold 70 Iglás to Malaysia (Brooke, 2000). The Russian Federation also delivered several hundred Iglás worth USD 32 million to India in July 2001 (CAST, 2001).

At such prices, it is clear that sales of MANPADs, though only a tiny proportion of the total number of individual items in the global small arms trade, can make up a large chunk of the overall value of light weapon sales.

on Chile's exports and imports of small arms, available for 1997 to 1999, is useful for those studying arms transfers as it lists data by exporting and importing company. US data is available from 1994 to 1998 on the Internet. More recent data can be purchased on CD-ROM. Thailand also sets a good example when it comes to transparency in customs data, with exports and imports, including small arms categories, updated monthly on the Internet.

Through commissioned research, the Small Arms Survey has obtained some customs import data for certain countries. Data for Paraguay and Uruguay was reported in the *Small Arms Survey 2001*. For Guatemala, the customs office reported that, in 2000, Guatemala imported 31,143 pistols and revolvers and 5,675 assault rifles, hunting rifles, and shotguns (Godnick, 2001a).

Toward transparency: National export reporting

Some 22 countries now make official data publicly available in annual or other regular reports on their arms exports and/or export licences.⁹ The number of countries releasing such data has grown dramatically, from only a couple just ten years ago. The majority of these reports categorize small arms and light weapons exports; however, some make no such distinction and lump all arms exports together. A number of the documents are available on the Internet, setting examples for transparency in the arms trade. Those reports available on the Internet can be accessed through the Small Arms Survey web site at <<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>>

There still is no international norm governing national arms export reports. The presentation of data can vary widely from country to country, making direct comparisons virtually impossible. Sometimes data from these reports is in contradiction with other official data sources, notably customs data and reports in the open press. Ideally, reports should include country-by-country breakdowns of exports of small arms, with figures for values and quantities of weapons exported by weapon type. The same information should also be provided for approved export licences, as well as denials, deliveries, and unfulfilled orders. No country provides all of this information.

While there is enormous room for improving transparency in many of these reports, the countries producing them should be commended for providing information that was deemed secret just a decade ago. A short overview of national export reports with respect to information on small arms and light weapons follows. While the *Small Arms Survey 2001* focused on the value of small arms exports presented in each report, the *Small Arms Survey 2002* looks at how long a country has been producing public reports, the usefulness of information concerning small arms, and how easy it is for the public to access the reports. Table 3.3 presents a comparison of information provided in the various national reports.

Australia: Australian reports cover exports of 'defence and strategic goods' back to the 1994–95 time period, but do not make a distinction for small arms. The monetary value of deliveries of military goods, disaggregated by importing country, are given for the following categories: military goods, non-military lethal goods, all defence-related goods, and dual-use goods. While the report includes information on current Australian legislation on defence exports, export-licensing procedures, and export control regimes, there is no data specific to small arms and light weapons.

Australia's national arms export report provides no data on small arms and light weapons.

Austria: The Ministries of the Interior and Economic Affairs release a joint annual report on arms export licences granted and refused. The Ministry of Economic Affairs lists the total value and number of licences granted for export. Data from the Ministry of the Interior is more detailed, listing quantities exported by geographic region.

Unfortunately, categories are ill-defined and obscure. The report is available in English and German, but it is extremely difficult to obtain. A more detailed report listing export licences granted by importing country has been distributed confidentially to European Union (EU) member states.

Belgium: Since 1994 Belgium has published reports on its arms exports. These show values of actual deliveries divided by weapons category, including categories for small arms. The 1999 report was more transparent than previous reports in that it also contained a table of the quantity of export licences granted by country and weapons category. Belgium also reports arms imports.

Canada: In 1997 Canada published its first report on arms exports, with data from 1996. Canada's report is quite transparent with respect to small arms exports as they list values of exports by country and weapons category, including the category 'firearms' which covers arms falling under the 1997 UN definition of small arms. It does not, however, detail licences for exports, nor does it list exports to the United States, a major importer of Canadian arms.

Czech Republic: In 2001 the Czech Foreign Ministry published a report titled *The Czech Republic and Small Arms and Light Weapons*. This document covers the value of annual exports of small arms and light weapons as a percentage of total arms exports from 1996 to 2000. It lists the producers of small arms and light weapons in the Czech Republic, as well as numbers of civilian weapons permit holders, the number and type of registered weapons in the country, and the quantity of 'non-commercial' weapons exported. While the report is not very clear on small arms exports, it is an impressive review of other aspects of firearms in the Czech Republic. The report is published in English and is available from the Foreign Ministry.

Denmark: After intense pressure from the public and NGOs, Denmark issued its first report on arms exports in December 2000, covering the prior year. The report covers only the number of licences granted by country, which is not at all helpful in determining actual exports in terms of quantity or value.

Finland: The Finnish report on arms exports, published since 1998, is one of the better examples of transparency in national arms export reports. The 2000 edition lists the value of exports by countries and detailed weapons categories, such as 'sniper rifles and accessories'. It also provides data on licences granted by country and weapons category.

France: In March and December 2000, France published its first two reports on arms exports, for 1998 and 1999 respectively. In the appendices there is data covering the quantity and value of government-negotiated sales by country of small arms and light weapons, as well as those countries which received free transfers of small arms and light weapons. In addition, the report lists the number of export authorizations of small arms by country, broken down into sub-categories. France's national export report for the year 2000, published in December 2001, showed an even greater degree of transparency in small arms transfers, including several sections on small arms transfers that list authorizations for commercial exports and actual exports of military small arms and light weapons listed by quantity, type, country of destination, and year exported/authorized for the years 1997 to 2000.

France's 2000 national report on arms exports provides some of the most transparent data on small arms transfers to date.

In addition, Annex 9 of the report lists transfers of small arms, including free grants, carried out by the Ministry of Defence disaggregated by type, quantity, and country of destination. The 2000 French report stands as one of the most transparent national export reports issued to date by any country in terms of small arms exports.

Germany: The first report on arms exports of the Federal Ministry of the Economy and Technology in Germany was published in September 2000 for licences granted and refused in 1999. The report is quite specific in that it lists the total value of licences issued for each importing country, then lists the categories of weapons licensed, followed by the percentage value of that category as part of the total of exports authorized to that country. However, with respect to EU and NATO countries, only partial information is given. Germany's export report 2000, published in December 2001, contains a special section on the value of authorizations for military small arms and ammunition transfers for the years 1996 to 2000 broken down into the destination categories of EU countries, NATO countries (minus EU countries), and other countries. Germany does not publish any data on actual exports.

India: The Indian government provides data on the sales of the Ordnance Factories Organization (OFO), which produces military small arms and ammunition as well as larger weapons systems, vehicles, clothing, and other equipment. The value of these sales is subdivided between the Indian armed forces and other defence departments, and sales to paramilitary forces and exports. The data goes back to the 1996–97 fiscal period. The report is not very useful, as there is no indication of destination countries or of the small arms share of exports.

Ireland: The Export Licensing Unit of Ireland's Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment provides statistics on military export licences issued. While there is no indication of monetary values of the licences or of quantity, the data is disaggregated by country and weapons category, including a specific category for small arms. One unique aspect of the Irish data is that it is updated monthly on the Internet.

Italy: The Italian Parliament has received an annual report on the import, export, and transit of arms and military equipment since 1991. The report is extremely detailed, providing information on quantity and value of licences and actual exports of equipment, with descriptions of the items. Until 1993 the Italian report also listed destination countries, but this ceased on requests from Italian defence firms claiming that it was detrimental to their competitiveness abroad (Mariani and Urquhart, 2000). The profuse data in the Italian report makes it one of the more transparent reports; however, it also is at times overwhelming and difficult to analyse. The report is available in Italian from the Chamber of Deputies' Stationery Office in Rome.

Netherlands: The Netherlands' first arms export report, on activity in 1997, was published in 1998. The Dutch report lists the value of export licences by weapons category, and then the value of export licences by country broken down into two categories: arms and ammunition, and other military goods. With respect to actual exports, information is less useful in that it contains only a five-year total—for 1994–98—of exports attributable to 'military production'. The document stands out by providing the most information on licence refusals of any report released so far. Another distinguishing feature is that the Dutch issue semi-annual and annual reports.

The Netherlands and Spain publish data on arms exports semi-annually. Ireland provides monthly updates.

TABLE 3.3 National export reports and analogous official data

Country	Data on value of total small arms exports?	Value of small arms exports disaggregated by country?	Quantity of small arms exported disaggregated by country?	Language	Available on Internet?
Australia	no	no	no	English	yes
Austria	yes	by region	no	English, German	no
Belgium	yes	no	no	French, Flemish	yes
Canada	yes	yes	no	English, French	yes
Czech Republic	yes	no	no	English	no
Denmark	no*	no	no	Danish	yes
Finland	yes	yes	no	English	yes
France	yes	yes	yes	French	yes
Germany	yes	yes	no	German	yes
India	partial	no	no	English	yes
Ireland	no*	no	no	English	yes
Italy	yes	no	no	Italian	no
Netherlands	yes	no	no	English, Dutch	yes
Norway	yes	no	no	Norwegian	yes
Portugal	yes	yes	no	Portuguese	no
Slovak Republic	yes	no	no	English	no
South Africa	yes	yes	no	English	yes
South Korea	yes	no	no	English	yes
Spain	yes	no	no	Spanish	no
Sweden	yes	no	no	English	yes
Switzerland	yes	yes	no	French, German	yes
United Kingdom	yes	no	yes	English	yes
United States	yes	yes	yes	English	yes

* Data given on quantity of export licences issued for small arms.

Norway: The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its first annual report on weapons and related material exports in 1997, covering exports for 1996. With respect to small arms, value of total small arms exports is listed, as well as a list of recipient countries. There is no information on value of small arms exports by country or on volume.

Portugal: Since 1998 Portugal has produced an annual report on arms exports. The report lists the value of exports by weapons type and destination country, as well as the exporting company. Weapons descriptions are fairly detailed: for example, '9mm pistols' and 'ammunition <12.7mm'. The report is available in Portuguese from the Ministry of Defence.

Slovak Republic: Since 1997, the Slovak Republic has compiled data on its arms exports based on customs data. The report lists the annual value of exports by customs category, as well as total arms exports by destination country. There is no information on volume or quantity of arms exported. The report is available on request from the Slovak Ministry of Economy.

South Africa: The first year for which official data on South Africa's arms exports is available is 1996. South Africa lists value of exports by country, broken down into weapons categories. Category B covers 'all types of infantry hand-held and portable assault weapons and associated ammunition for calibre smaller than 12.7mm'. The data does not cover civilian firearms exports or data on licences.

South Korea: The Republic of Korea has made statistics on its arms exports public only once, in its Defence White Paper of 1998. Data on annual exports for 1990–97 inclusive was listed. This single report was hardly a model of transparency, but it did list the value of exports broken down by weapons category.

Spain: The Spanish government has produced an annual report on arms exports since 1998. The report lists the total value of arms exports for each of six categories, including the category 'small arms and their ammunition'. The report also lists the value of total arms exports by country of destination. Like the Dutch report, data is provided on a semi-annual basis. The report is available in Spanish.

Sweden: A pioneer in the field of transparency in arms exports, Sweden published its first report in 1985. Since 1993 the reports have included the value of arms transfers by weapons category, including a category for 'small calibre barrel weapons'. Values are also given for total exports to each country, broken down into two categories: military equipment for combat purposes, and other military equipment. Its most recent report of April 2001 included information on licences granted as well as the types of equipment that were actually exported to each country: a level of transparency that is a substantial improvement on previous years.

Switzerland: In January 2001 Switzerland published its most transparent report on arms exports to date. The report lists the value of arms exports by category and importing country for 2000. There is also a graphic showing the percentage of the value of arms export by weapons category: for example, handguns accounted for six per cent of Swiss arms exports; small arms and light weapons other than handguns accounted for over 24 per cent; and ammunition for 22 per cent. The Swiss report provides no information on licences, nor does it cover arms exported by the Swiss Ministry of Defence or other government bodies.

United Kingdom: In March 1999 the United Kingdom published its first Annual Report on Strategic Exports, covering exports for 1997. Every report since has been marked by a better format and greater transparency. The 2000 edition includes data on licences granted and refused by country, as well as data on quantities of small arms licensed for export. It also includes a table of actual exports of small arms based on customs data, that lists weapons by quantity and destination. It also lists transfers of arms, giving quantities and destination for those arms transfers that do not pass through customs, such as the government-to-government transfer of '4,550 self-loading rifles' to Sierra Leone in 2000 (see Appendix 3.1). The UK report is one of the better models of transparency, listing actual quantities of small arms exported as well as those licensed for export, by country.

United States: The United States has produced a highly detailed and transparent report on arms exports since 1997, known as the '655 Report'. The report is compiled by the State Department and the Department of Defense.



© Associated Press/Alan Mothner

The United Parcel Service no longer ships handguns through its regular ground service, as they are too easily stolen. Rifles and shotguns, less easily stolen, are still shipped over land.

The United States, France and the United Kingdom have the most transparent arms export reports with respect to small arms, although there is definitely room for improvement.

The State Department portion reports export licences granted through commercial sales, with a breakdown by country of weapon type, quantity, and value. After legislation passed in 2000, future reports must include actual exports also. The Department of Defense portion lists actual exports of arms transfers negotiated by the Department of Defense, again broken down by country, weapon type, quantity, and value. This section also includes similarly specific data on transfers of surplus weapons donated through the Excess Defense Articles Program.

Best national reporting practices

While no country has yet achieved total transparency with respect to arms transfers, several reports contain elements that greatly facilitate oversight by parliamentarians and the public. Those countries that provide quantity, destination, value, and a detailed description of the weapon are the most transparent, of which the United States and France offer the best examples. Countries which list small arms exports by exporting company or agent, such as Italy and Portugal, should also be mentioned, as this gives an even clearer picture of all of the players involved in the arms transfer.

Those countries that report actual quantities of weapons exported—the United Kingdom, France, the United States—are in the minority, but it should be emphasized that such quantitative values are much more important than monetary figures when it comes to arms exports. Another interesting case is that of Ireland, where licences granted are updated on the Internet on a monthly basis. This practice is extremely important as it allows for reaction on the part of the public or parliament to a specific licensed transfer.

Many of the reports take so long to compile that the licences may have been issued more than a year before the public learns of it. The semi-annual reports of the Netherlands and Spain are an improvement in this respect. In addition, Belgium should be mentioned as it lists imports as well as exports. While arms producers argue that secrecy is

BOX 3.3 Small arms transfers to Macedonia

Since the UN arms embargo was lifted on Macedonia in 1996, a number of states have assisted the country in building up its conventional armed forces. When the Macedonian Army was created, it started with a stockpile of 40,000 obsolescent repeating rifles and 5,000 Kalashnikovs that it had inherited from the Yugoslav People's Army. The Macedonian Army's strength when it was admitted into NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1995 was 24,000 active troops and 60,000 reservists. Shortly after, NATO convinced Macedonia to cut its active troop strength to 15,000 troops. This still was much more than could be provided with modern arms (Kusovac, 2001a).

Fully aware of the delicate tensions in the region, donors wanted to strengthen the Macedonian government without igniting civil war. Reports in the German and Macedonian press that Germany donated 100,000 assault rifles and 10,000 sub-machine guns to Macedonia (*Deutsche Presse Agentur*, 2000a) in early 2000 are false, and the German government has confirmed that no such transfers have taken place.

In 1998–99, the United States provided Macedonia with 707 ageing M3 sub-machine guns. In 1999, France donated 12 'Milan' anti-tank systems (France, 2000). Ukraine, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy donated larger systems, including armoured personnel carriers (APCs), tanks, and artillery (Varouhakis, 2001). Reports also allege that Macedonia has purchased assault rifles and mortars from RH Alan of Croatia (Kusovac, 2001b). Other weapons systems, including helicopters and APCs equipped with small arms, have been purchased from Russia and Ukraine (Clark, 2001). In July 2001, though, Ukraine suspended arms shipments to Macedonia (Pravda, 2001). Macedonia has further built up its arsenals with small arms confiscated from ethnic Albanians brought into the country during the Kosovo conflict and since the fighting began in Macedonia in 2001.

needed to protect business interests, it must be acknowledged that the most transparent country when it comes to arms exports is the United States, the largest and the most competitive arms exporter in the world.

Other official data on the global small arms trade

For many countries, the only source of data on legal small arms exports or imports is the press. Government officials often make statements to the press or to research institutions with respect to small arms exports and/or imports. Also, there is information in the form of company data from production firms, including exports. Further, a number of NGOs have published numerous reports detailing the small arms trade (see HRW 2001a, 2001b; Global Witness 1998).

The *Small Arms Survey 2001* identified 18 known exporters of small arms for which no data at all was available on the value or quantity of their annual small arms exports. Now, the value of annual small arms exports for some of these countries can be approximated. Further, more precise figures can be given for other countries.

One of the most significant exporters of small arms is the Russian Federation (PRODUCERS). The various data combined show that exports of small arms and light weapons from the Russian Federation in 2000 amounted to USD 177.5 million (CAST, 2001). This includes the approximately USD 80 million exported through the state exporting agency, Rosoboronexport, which listed a quantity of 130,000–150,000 weapons and 150 million–200 million rounds of ammunition exported.¹⁰ The main producers of Russian small arms and ammunition, the Tula Arms Plant and Izhmash, export all their products through Rosoboronexport. The additional USD 97.5 million was exported by the Tula-based KBP Instrument Design Bureau, which has the right to conclude foreign contracts independent of Rosoboronexport. It produces man portable anti-tank missiles and infantry rocket launchers. The Russian Defence Ministry is also a minor exporter of small arms, exporting about USD 1.6 million worth in 1999 (CAST, 2001).

The Russian Federation exported approximately USD 177.5 million worth of small arms and light weapons in 2000.

Since the *Small Arms Survey 2001*, researchers commissioned by the Survey have been able to obtain figures for the small arms exports of the Ukraine. According to Ukrspetsexport, the Ukraine's state exporting agency, small arms exports make up less than three per cent of its total arms exports. Official figures for Ukraine's arms export for 2000 amounted to USD 500 million, making the value of Ukraine's annual exports in small arms in the USD 10 million–15 million range. As Ukraine produces virtually only the Fort pistol and ammunition for export, this figure seems plausible. It is likely that much of the excess small arms that the Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union has been sold off by now.

Data is more difficult to obtain on Israel's small arms exports. However, whereas the *Small Arms Survey 2001* noted that no data at all was available, this status has since changed. There are some statistics for Israel Military Industries (IMI), which is the largest producer of small arms and ammunition (PRODUCERS). With respect to small arms sales—that is, total sales, not just exports—in 1998 IMI sold about USD 32.4 million in small arms. Of this amount, USD 19 million, or 60 per cent of the total, was accounted for by sales of the Galil assault rifle. The Negev machine gun, which has replaced the Uzi as the primary military small arm, accounted for USD 1.8 million of 1998 sales (5.5 per cent), while the Uzi accounted for only USD 0.8 million (2.5 per cent). Pistol sales (Jericho and Desert Eagle) accounted for USD 6.4 million of 1998 sales, or 20 per cent of the total. The remaining 12 per cent of sales for 1998 were for spare parts for the above weapons. According to other data, the Small Arms Factory Group (SAF), a subsidiary of IMI, exported 80 per cent of its small arms produced in 1999; the remaining 20 per cent were sold domestically. In 1999 SAF forecast sales of USD 30.2 million. Israel exported about USD 25 million worth of firearms annually in 1998 and 1999, plus an unknown value of ammunition and other items.



Internal transfers of weapons are rarely tracked. Here, Russian troops supply anti-Chechen volunteers with AK-47s.

© Associated Press

With respect to hunting and sporting firearms, the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WSFA) published data in a 2001 study. It cited customs data and other official data as its sources. Although no analysis of the quality of this data is included in the study, nor any explanation of which customs categories were used, it gives a clearer picture of the world trade in hunting and sporting firearms. The WSFA found that the United States and the EU accounted for 49 per cent of the global total of exports of sport shooting firearms. It also found that United States and the EU were major importers, with some 1.6 million guns imported in 2000. According to the report, the US and EU were importers for 72 per cent of the firearms exported by the rest of the world in 2000 (see Table 3.4).

When compared with UN customs data from 1999, several inconsistencies emerge in the WSFA data. Brazil, the Russian Federation, and Japan provided data in weight (in tons), not individual guns, as did many countries in the EU. Although this measure is widely used, there is no standard definition of how many items are included in a typical ton of small arms or how much a typical ton is worth.

Another major problem concerns Chinese exports. According to official statistics, China's exports of sporting guns for 1999 totalled 65,012 in 1999, one-third of the total reported here for 2000. It is possible that Chinese exports nearly tripled in one year, but it is more likely that different things are being counted. It is to be hoped that future editions of this worthwhile report will deal with these problems.


The major players: Exporters and importers

The data examined in this chapter confirm the findings of the *Small Arms Survey 2001* that the top exporters of small arms are the United States and the Russian Federation. A careful review of the US 655 Report shows that in 1999 the US exported or authorized for export at least USD 355.7 million of small arms, ammunition, and parts. This figure is considerably lower than the number cited in the *Small Arms Survey 2001*, but this is partly because it does not include light weapons exports. While Germany and Brazil were listed as top exporters in the *Small Arms Survey 2001*, the most recent data does not confirm this. However, the data for 2000 on Brazilian and German small arms exports is not comparable to that of 1999. For example, Brazil's 2000 exports

BOX 3.4 Brazil's small arms exports

In November 2001, the NGO Viva Rio published the most comprehensive and accurate report on Brazil's small arms exports available to date. The *Small Arms Survey 2001* estimated that Brazil exports USD 100 million–150 million worth of small arms annually. While this estimate was fairly accurate for Brazilian exports in the early 1990s, exports since then have dropped substantially. Viva Rio used data from Brazil's Ministry of Development Industry and Exterior Commerce and analysed exports of small arms and ammunition from 1989 to 2000. In 2000, Brazil exported USD 69.7 million of small arms, ammunition, and accessories. This is a decrease of almost 65 per cent from the 1992 high of USD 196.4 million in exports (see Figure 3.3).

FIGURE 3.3 Brazilian exports of small arms and light weapons, ammunition, parts, and accessories, 1989–2000



Source: Viva Rio (2001)

of USD 70 million do not include pistols and revolvers, a significant portion of the Brazilian small arms industry (see Box 3.4). Likewise, Germany's military small arms and ammunition exports of 2000, according to its national report, were only USD 14 million, but this does not include light weapons and hunting and sporting rifles, which would increase this value significantly. However, there was a significant drop in German exports of military small arms and ammunition, from USD 37 million in 1999 to USD 14 million in 2000. Table 3.5 shows the dollar value of small arms exports by country for the most recent year available.

The top exporters of small arms are the USA and the Russian Federation.

TABLE 3.4 World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WSFA) data on sporting firearms exports

Exporter	Sporting firearms exported in 2000 (number of weapons)
European Union	839,163
Brazil	314,000 *
United States	267,902
China	185,000 *
Russia	99,000 *
Canada	96,000 *
Japan	87,000 *
Total	1,888,000 *

* Estimated

Source: WSFA (2001)

BOX 3.5 The gun lobby vs Vanuatu

The archipelago nation of Vanuatu, some 2,000km north-east of Australia, is an unlikely place for a major confrontation over arms export policy. It is a nation of fewer than 200,000 people—mostly poor—spread out among 66 islands. Remote as it is, it could not escape from one of the United States' strongest domestic lobbying groups over small arms export controls.

Negotiating to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), Vanuatu became embroiled in a heated debate with the US that extended far beyond its original parameter. Clearly influenced by the National Rifle Association (NRA), Washington insisted that the tiny nation abandon discriminatory tariffs against small arms exporters in order to join the WTO.

'It has become one of the clichés of accession negotiations', wrote two analysts, 'that in the end [they] always come down to booze and cigarettes; but now the United States, clearly under pressure from its own gun lobby, is putting pressure on acceding countries to liberalize the trade in weapons'. Though commercial interests may have played a nominal role in the accession negotiations, it appears that the US position was conditioned by principle, rather than commercial advantage.

Source: Grynber and Joy (2000)

As for the international trade in ammunition exports, even less data is available than for firearms. While many national reports include exports of small arms ammunition, meaningful figures are not available from customs data. The role of exports of small arms ammunition in the global small arms trade will be covered in a subsequent edition of the *Small Arms Survey*.

Comparing the top ten exporters for 1999 according to weapons category using customs data alone produces a slightly different picture (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Again, it should be emphasized that many countries did not provide values for all export categories. China did not supply values for military arms and pistols and revolvers in 1999, although it exported USD 22.7 million and USD 4.2 million worth respectively in 1998.

As for the major importers, we must rely on a combination of customs data and those national export reports that disaggregate their data by country. For weapons for hunting and sport, the United States is clearly the top importer. As mentioned earlier, the top importers of military firearms for 1999 according to customs data were Cyprus, South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Data from national arms export reports shows other emerging trends. The top importers of South African small arms in terms of value from 1997 to 1999 were Colombia, Singapore, Israel, and Taiwan. The top importers of Canadian small arms in terms of value in 1999, excluding the United States, were Germany, France, Thailand, and Australia. The top importers of small arms in terms of quantity from the UK in 2000 were Sierra Leone, the United States, Uruguay, and Singapore.

According to the US 655 Report, in terms of value the top countries authorized to receive commercial sales of small arms from the US in 1999 were Belgium, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates; the top recipient of actual transfers from the US Department of Defence was Greece. According to US Customs Data, in 1999 the top recipients of military rifles from the United States in terms of quantity were the United Arab Emirates, Thailand, Kuwait, Brazil, and Israel. The top recipients in terms of value of Brazilian small arms from 1999 to 2000 were the United States, Venezuela, Germany, and Argentina (Viva Rio, 2001).

When countries appear to be top importers of small arms from more than one country, it can be assumed that they are likely to be major importers. In this respect, the United States, Thailand, Israel, and Germany are countries that appear as top importers through various data sources. Other factors must also be considered in interpretation of this data, such as population and national gun laws. For example, the United States has a large population that has the right to own and carry arms. On the other hand, Singapore stands out as importing large quantities of small arms relative to its population.

TABLE 3.5 Annual small arms exports, by country with most recent year data available

Country	Year data	USD value	Data source	Remarks
United States	1999	356 m	National Report	Includes authorizations and actual transfers; includes ammunition but not light weapons
Russian Federation	2000	178 m	Official data	Actual transfers
Italy	1999	145 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9302, 930310, 930320, and 930330 (majority—USD 108 million—were sporting shotguns)
Switzerland	2000	71 m	National Report	Includes ammunition and some systems larger than light weapons
Brazil	2000	70 m	Viva Rio	Includes ammunition and accessories
Austria	1994	60 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9301 and 9302
United Kingdom	1999	53 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 9302, 930310, 930320, and 930330
South Korea	1997	43 m	National Report	'Guns and Ammunition exports' (no definitions of categories given)
Poland	1999	40 m	Press report	
Belgium	1999	33 m	National Report	
Pakistan	1999	30 m	Press report	
Japan	1999	30 m	Customs data	Customs codes 930320, 930330
Czech Republic	1999	28 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 9302, 930310, 930320, 930330
China	1998	27 m	Customs data	
Spain	1999	26 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9302, 930310, 930320, and 930330 (majority sporting arms)
Israel	1998	25 m	Company trade data	
Portugal	1999	16 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9302, 930320, 930330
Romania	1996	15 m	Customs data	Customs code 9301
Germany	2000	14 m	National Report	Authorizations only. Does not include hunting and sporting firearms and light weapons. Includes ammunition.
Canada	1999	13 m	National Report, US Customs import data	Firearms of 12.7mm and less (National Report), plus US customs data for pistols and sporting firearms (USD 12 million to US)
Ukraine	2000	10 m	Official data	Estimate based on official statement that 3 per cent of Ukraine's defence exports are small arms
South Africa	1999	9 m	National Report	
Turkey	1999	6 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 9302, 930320, 930330
France	2000	5 m	Customs data	Customs codes 930310, 930320, 930330. National Report lists military weapons exported in quantities of weapons.
Argentina	1999	3 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9302, 930320, 930330
Croatia	1999	2 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 9302
Philippines	1999	2 m	Customs data	Customs Codes 9302, 930320, 930330
Finland	2000	1 m	National Report	Includes ammunition
Denmark	1999	1 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 9302, 930320, 930330
Indonesia	1999	1 m	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 9302
Yugoslavia	1998	874,000	Customs data	Customs codes 930320, 930330
Netherlands	2000	855,000	National Report	
Greece	1999	678,000	Customs data	Customs code 930320
Slovak Republic	1999	576,000	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 9302, 930330
Nicaragua	1999	375,000	Customs data	Customs code 9301
Senegal	1999	354,000	Customs data	Customs code 9301
Malaysia	1999	346,000	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 9302, 930310, 930320
Australia	1999	257,000	Customs data	Customs codes 9301, 930320
New Zealand	1999	205,000	Customs data	Customs codes 9302, 930320, 930330
Venezuela	1997	122,000	Customs data	Customs code 930320
India	1998	97,000	Customs data	Customs codes 9302, 930330
Singapore	1999	75,000	Customs data	Customs code 930320
Norway	1999	57,000	National Report	
Hungary	1998	36,000	Customs data	Customs code 930330
Mexico	1998	25,000	Customs data	Customs code 9302
Panama	1997	20,000	Customs data	Customs code 930310
Chile	1999	19,000	Customs data	Customs code 9301
Ireland	1998	9,000	Customs data	Customs code 930320
Thailand	1999	8,000	Customs data	Customs code 9302
Latvia	1999	4,000	Customs data	Customs code 9301

Now the question is: are the countries that are importing arms in large quantities a source for the illicit market? That question will be answered with evidence presented in the following section.

The illicit trade in small arms

Global concern with small arms now focuses above all on how various actors—whether individuals, groups, or governments—obtain small arms and then misuse them, despite current efforts to prevent this from happening.

What exactly is an illicit transfer of arms? The 2001 UN Small Arms Conference was unable to resolve this issue (CONFERENCE). Is it a transfer that occurs outside government control? This is true in part, but this does not take into account government participation in the illicit trade, which often makes prosecution impossible. Nor does it take into account *grey market* transfers, those that are legally questionable, typically authorized by either the supplying or the recipient government, but not by both. The *Small Arms Survey 2001* defines an illicit transfer as one that violates international and/or national laws of the sending and/or receiving country. It includes both grey- and black-market transfers.

It is increasingly acknowledged that illicit transfers contribute to crime, conflict, and violence worldwide. What is less apparent is the role that legal transfers play in these same problems. Controls over the legal trade and efforts to control illicit arms trafficking are therefore linked. The *Small Arms Survey 2001* provided a regional overview of grey- and black-market transfers. In this chapter we attempt to expose some of the dynamics of the illicit trade, looking at the source of arms—both legal and illegal—and trends within the trade. Exploring in further detail the sources of arms for the illicit trade helps answer the following questions:

- How are small arms obtained for misuse?
- How many arms are coming from legal sources?
- How many arms are coming from ‘illicit’ sources?

Same guns, different implications: Legal to illicit

An increasingly large body of evidence indicates that the primary method by which actors obtain arms for misuse is through *diversion*. Diversion is the process by which small arms move from legal government control into the illicit realm. This can be authorized or unauthorized, intentional or unintentional, since in the broadest sense diversion is simply the movement of a weapon from legal origins to the illicit realm. Diversion can occur domestically as well as internationally, though this survey focuses primarily on the international aspects.

The diversion of arms can happen at any point along the transfer chain. It occurs when governments or authorized private owners intentionally or unintentionally transfer arms to embargoed governments, unauthorized paramilitary groups, non-state actors (NSAs) such as rebel insurgents or mercenaries, criminals, or unauthorized private users (see Figure 3.4). Frequently, the process of diversion involves an intricate network of actors adept at finding loopholes in existing legal regimes, escaping detection and legal accountability. Six methods of diversion are discussed below:

- government supplies to NSAs;
- violations of arms embargoes;
- violations of end-user undertakings;
- the ant trade;


Grey market transfers are those that are legally questionable, typically authorized by either the supplying or recipient government, but not by both.

Black market transfers are those where suppliers and receivers knowingly violate international and/or national laws of both the supplying and receiving country.

- losses from state arsenals/authorized private owners; and
- battlefield seizures and war booty.

These methods can be classified into two groups by reference to the intention of the supplier. The first four are intended by the supplier, although they may not be legally authorized. The last two, on the other hand, obviously do not reflect the intentions of the supplier. Re-transfers, as well, may not be consistent with the intentions of the original supplier.

FIGURE 3.4 Possible transfers from legal to illicit



The primary method by which actors obtain arms for misuse is through diversion.

Government supplies to non-state actors

Government patronage appears to be the leading source of arms, funds, and training for the vast majority of non-state actors, though by no means their only source of supply. Government support can be politically, ideologically, or economically motivated. Nearly every region of the world has experienced this phenomenon.

There have been numerous examples of covert state support and arms transfers to NSAs during and since the Cold War. For example: Soviet Union and US support of Central American NSAs during the Cold War (Godnick, 2001a); American sponsorship of Nicaragua’s Contras between 1981 and 1984; South Africa’s financial and arms support of Mozambique’s Renamo in the 1980s (Claiborne, 1987); Libya’s supplies of arms to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) between the early 1970s and the late 1980s (Boyne, 1996); India’s support of Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) between 1983 and 1987 (Gunaratna, 2000) and Bangladesh’s Shanti Bahini between 1976 and 1989 (Ibrahim, 2001); Chinese arms supplies to Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge until 1991 (*Bangkok Post*, 1993); US arms shipments to Cambodia’s Sihanouk and Son San prior to 1991 (Phongpaichit, Piriyaangsan, and Treerat, 1998); and Thailand’s support of Burmese NSAs operating along the Thai-Myanmar border from the late 1980s to the late 1990s (*Bangkok Post*, 1989).

Government patronage is the leading source of arms for the majority of non-state actors.

A recent Small Arms Survey study of the Middle East shows that six governments have supported more than 19 NSAs in the region over the last ten years (see Table 3.6). An examination of apparent transfers to NSAs by Middle Eastern states—many denied by them—shows that the most common reasons are: to foster goodwill with the recipient organization for political purposes; to symbolize their political support of the recipient organization; and in some cases to support proxy warfare in order to destabilize or topple a regime. Economic motives appear not to be a factor, as the provision of arms to NSAs is not known to be profitable for states, though certain individuals might benefit. It appears that state support of NSAs is a common feature of international relations in the region, where it may be considered a standard tool of statecraft (Miller, 2001a).

TABLE 3.6 Support for selected Middle Eastern non-state actors

Non-State Actor	Alleged government sponsor(s)
Al-Dawa al-Islamiyya (Iraq)	Iran
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)	Iran, Sudan
Groupe Islamique Armé (Algeria)	Iran, Sudan
Hizbullah (Lebanon)	Iran (through Lebanon), Sudan, and Syria
Hizbullah (Turkey)	Iran
Movement for Islamic Change, Tiger of the Gulf, Legion of the Martyr Addullah al-Huzaifi, Hizbullah-Gulf, Brethren (Battalions) of the Faithful, Islamic Peninsula Movement for Change—Jihad Wing, Jamaat al-Adala al-Alamiya and the Fighting Ansar of Allah (Saudi Arabia)	Iran, Lebanon, and Syria
Polisario Front (Western Sahara)	Algeria
The Abu Nidal Organisation (Israel)	Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq
The Amal group (Lebanon)	Syria
The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Syria)	Syria
The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Kurdish Communist Party of Iran (Iran)	Iraq
The Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan and the Al-Harakan al-Islamiya (Saudi Arabia)	Iraq
The Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group (Egypt)	Iran
The Hamas and Islamic Jihad (West Bank)	Syria (through Lebanon) and Iran
The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Movement for the Liberation of Bahrain, and Hizbullah-Gulf/Bahrain (Bahrain)	Iran
The Mujahideen-e-Khalq (Iran)	Iraq
The Palestine Liberation Front (West Bank and Gaza)	Syria, Iraq, and Iran
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (Israel)	Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq
The Popular Struggle Front (West Bank)	Syria, Libya, and Lebanon

Sources: Agence France Presse (2001); BBC News (1999); Jane's Information Group (2001); Miller (2001a); UK (2000a); Wilkinson (2000).

Sometimes, government support of NSAs need not be covert, especially when the group is fighting an unpopular government or when the scale of assistance makes it impossible to conceal (see Box 3.6). A prominent example of the former is the joint support of Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Iran, and India for the Northern Alliance fighting in Afghanistan against the Taliban (Davis, 2001; Rashid, 2001b). Though never covert in nature, transfers of military

equipment to the Northern Alliance became a major public issue after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on 11 September 2001. The terrorist attacks led to an increase in material support, and the Northern Alliance emerged as perhaps the best-supplied NSA in all of 2001 (Pakistan News Service, 2001; *Toronto Star*, 2001).

However, many post-conflict countries whose NSAs received covert state support are now among the largest arm suppliers to the illicit market. Yet, despite the risks such support involves, at the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference there was strong opposition to a ban on assistance to non-state actors from the United States, the Arab League, and others (CONFERENCE).

The limits of good intentions: Violations of arms embargoes

Arms embargoes represent a unique combination of *Realpolitik*, carrot-and-stick diplomacy, and ethical foreign policy motivated above all by the hope of ending conflict or ending oppression. Traditionally, they have been used against states; however, increasingly they are also being used against NSAs, such as União Nacional para a Independência

BOX 3.6 Illegal arms in Palestinian territories

There are a number of armed militias active in the self-ruled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These include militias connected to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), such as Force 17—controlled directly by Yassir Arafat—and the Tanzim—local armed gangs loosely connected to the Fatah organization—as well as ‘non-official’ groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

One unofficial estimate suggested that the Tanzin groups alone hold at least 70,000 guns, primarily M16s and AK-47s, as well as other automatic rifles and some heavy machine guns. Many of these weapons were allegedly stolen from the Israeli army (Goldenberg, 2000). Another estimate from 1998 suggests that over 40,000 weapons were illegally distributed within the Palestinian Authority (Conteras, 1996; Luft 1999). Arms that can be found within the Palestinian Authority include handguns, rifles, semi-automatic weapons, machine guns, hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles, and shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (Luft, 2000).

Palestinian groups allegedly obtain arms from the governments of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and even from Israel via theft from Israeli army depots or from Israeli criminal elements (Miller, 2001a; Goldenberg, 2000). Other groups in the region, including Hizbullah in Lebanon, also supply arms to Palestinians (Dudkevitch, 2001). A large majority of these arms are transited through Jordan and Egypt before being smuggled into the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Rodan and O’Sullivan, 1998; Sobelman, 2001). Smuggling routes include all methods available by land, sea, and air.

A prominent example was a shipment intercepted in January 2001. This included 40 barrels containing weapons and ammunition, which were thrown from an Egyptian boat along the Gaza coast. The barrels contained 50 rocket propelled grenades, 1,000 rockets, and a large number of mortar rounds (Harel, 2001a). Another typical shipment, this one over land from Jordan, was intercepted in 2001. This included four Kalashnikov assault rifles, two M16s, a Beretta 9mm submachine gun, and 20 handguns (Dudkevitch, 2001). Foiled smuggling attempts suggest that earlier estimates on the number of illegal weapons circulating within the West Bank and Gaza Strip have to be increased.

Source: Gerald Steinberg and Human Security Research Group (2001)

MAP 3.1 Israel and Palestinian territories




TABLE 3.7 Multilateral arms embargoes effective in 2001

Country	Effective date	Alleged violations
<i>Mandatory UN embargoes</i>		
Afghanistan	19 Dec. 2000	◇ Pakistan (2001) ¹
Angola (UNITA)	15 Sep. 1993	▲ Belgium ² ◇ ▲ Bulgaria ³ ♦ Burkina Faso ⁴ ♦ Congo-Brazzaville ⁵ ♦ Côte D'Ivoire ⁶ ◇ ▲ DRC/Zaire ⁷
Eritrea	17 May 2000 – 16 May 2001	◇ Russia ¹⁸
Ethiopia	17 May 2000 – 16 May 2001	◇ France ¹⁹ ◇ Russia ²⁰
Iraq	6 Aug. 1990	◇ ▲ Belarus ²¹ ◇ China ²² ♦ Iran ²³
Liberia	19 Nov. 1992	◇ ♦ Burkina Faso ²⁸ ▲ Central African Republic ²⁹ ▲ Congo-Brazzaville ³⁰ ♦ Côte D'Ivoire ³¹ ♦ * Egypt ³²
Rwanda (ex-RAF)	16 Aug. 1995	◇ Albania ⁴⁵ ♦ * Belgium ⁴⁶ ◇ ▲ Bulgaria ⁴⁷ ◇ China ⁴⁸ ◇ Czech Republic ⁴⁹ ♦ ▲ DRC/Zaire ⁵⁰ ♦ Egypt ⁵¹ ◇ France ⁵² ▲ Ghana ⁵³ ◇ Israel ⁵⁴
Sierra Leone (RUF)	5 Jun. 1998	* Belgium ⁷⁴ ◇ Bulgaria ⁷⁵ ▲ ♦ Burkina Faso ⁷⁶ ♦ Gambia ⁷⁷
Somalia	23 Jan. 1992	◇ Djibouti ⁸⁶ ◇ Eritrea ⁸⁷
Yugoslavia (FRY)	31 Mar. 1998 – 10 Sep. 2001	♦ Albania ⁹¹ ◇ Bosnia & Herzegovina ⁹²
		* Israel ⁸ * Lebanon ⁹ ◇ ▲ Namibia ¹⁰ ◇ Romania ¹¹ ◇ ▲ * Russia ¹² ◇ ▲ * South Africa ¹³
		♦ Togo ¹⁴ ◇ Uganda ¹⁵ ◇ * Ukraine ¹⁶ ♦ Zambia ¹⁷
		◇ Romania ²⁴ ◇ Russia ²⁵ ◇ Ukraine
		◇ United Kingdom ²⁶ ◇ Yugoslavia ²⁷
		* Guinea ³³ ◇ * Kyrgystan ³⁴ ▲ Liberia ³⁵ ◇ ▲ Libya ³⁶ ▲ * Moldova ³⁷ ◇ Niger ³⁸ Portugal ³⁹ ▲ * Russia ⁴⁰ ◇ * Slovakia ⁴¹ ◇ Uganda ⁴² ◇ ▲ * Ukraine ⁴³ ▲ United Kingdom ⁴⁴
		◇ Italy ⁵⁵ ♦ Kenya ⁵⁶ ▲ Lebanon ⁵⁷ ▲ Liberia ⁵⁸ ◇ Libya ⁵⁹ ♦ Malta ⁶⁰ ▲ Niger ⁶¹ ◇ Russia ⁶² ◇ Seychelles ⁶³ ◇ * South Africa ⁶⁴ Spain ⁶⁵ ♦ Tanzania ⁶⁶ ♦ Uganda ⁶⁷ ▲ * Ukraine ⁶⁸ ▲ * United Kingdom ⁶⁹ * United States ⁷⁰ Yugoslavia ⁷¹ Zambia ⁷² ♦ Zimbabwe ⁷³
		Ghana ⁷⁸ * Lebanon ⁷⁹ ◇ ▲ * Liberia ⁸⁰ ♦ Niger ⁸¹
		◇ Ethiopia ⁸⁸ ▲ Russia ⁸⁹
		◇ Greece ⁹³ ◇ Macedonia ⁹⁴ ♦ Montenegro ⁹⁵

TABLE 3.7 Multilateral arms embargoes effective in 2001 (continued)

Country	Effective date	Alleged violations
<i>EU embargoes (non-mandatory)</i>		
Afghanistan (Taliban)	17 Dec. 1996	Unknown
Bosnia & Herzegovina	5 Jul. 1991	▲* Austria ⁹⁶ ◇ Germany ⁹⁸ * Belgium ⁹⁷ ◇ Italy ⁹⁹
China	27 Jun. 1989	◇ France ¹⁰⁰
DRC (formerly Zaire)	7 Apr. 1993	* Belgium ¹⁰¹ ◇ France ¹⁰²
Eritrea	15 Mar. 1999 – 31 May 2001	Unknown
Ethiopia	15 Mar. 1999 – 31 May 2001	◇ France ¹⁰³
Iraq	4 Aug. 1990	◇ United Kingdom ¹⁰⁴
Libya	27 Jan. 1986	Unknown
Myanmar (Burma)	29 Jul. 1991	◇ Portugal ¹⁰⁵
Sierra Leone	8 Dec. 1997	* Belgium ¹⁰⁶ ▲* United Kingdom ¹⁰⁷
Sudan	16 Mar. 1994	Belgium ¹⁰⁸
Yugoslavia (FRY)	5 Jul. 1991 – 8 Oct. 2001	* France ¹⁰⁹ ◇ Greece ¹¹⁰
<i>OSCE (non-mandatory)</i>		
Nagorno-Karabakh (i.e. Armenia & Azerbaijan)	28 Feb. 1992	◇ Russia ¹¹¹ ◇ Ukraine ¹¹³ ◇ Turkey ¹¹²
◇ Country from which weapons originate		
* Country nationals breaking embargoes		
▲ Country in which flag vessels and aircraft are breaking embargoes		
◆ Transit countries		
Source: Appendix 3.3		

Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone. Multilateral embargoes have been initiated by the UN, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Some are binding and some are not. Table 3.7 presents a list of multilateral embargoes that were in effect during 2001. Embargoes can also be implemented unilaterally, as shown by the United States, which maintains a policy 'to deny licences, other approvals, exports and imports of defence services destined for' 20 countries, in addition to those countries on which the UN maintains a standing arms embargo (US Department of State, 2001).¹¹

As Table 3.7 and Appendix 3.3 demonstrate, there have been allegations of violations of nearly every arms embargo currently in place.¹² Preliminary research shows that 54 countries have been linked to shipments of small arms in violation of international arms embargoes effective in 2001. The nature of non-compliance varies. Many of the states listed here deny any involvement in embargo-busting activities. Some countries such as Bulgaria and Romania claim to have sold arms in good faith to non-embargoed countries and only later discovered that the end-user certificates used to justify the purchases were forged. In other cases, arms may have been sent in good faith to recipients such as Burkina Faso, a country not under arms embargo, only to be re-transferred to an embargoed party. Of special interest is the involvement of brokers and transport agents in embargo-busting activities. The UN has taken this into account, and, since 1992, embargoes specifically hold member states responsible for the activities of their nationals and transport agents registered in their country with respect to embargo-busting activities.

Just a slip of paper: Violation of end-user undertakings

End-use certificates and related assurances are the exporting country's way of obtaining assurances about where its arms exports are going and retaining a measure of control over them once they leave the originating country's jurisdiction (Joseph, 2001). Even so, there are no guarantees. Typical end-user violations include re-transferring shipments in violation of a non-transfer pledge, covering up the identity of the real end-users—which might be countries under embargo or rebel groups—or simply forging end-user certificates.

End-use violations have been well documented in UN reports on embargoes against UNITA, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Most often a violation of end-user undertakings requires the assistance of a sympathetic government, or, at the very least, the collaboration of a corrupt, high-ranking government official. Such ruses are particularly successful if the assistance comes from a neighbouring country. For example:

- UNITA apparently received one official end-user certificate in July 1997 from Togo signed by the then Army Chief of Staff. Though the original document never surfaced, 18 forged versions surfaced in Bulgaria during 1997–98 of which nine were executed either partially or in full, amounting to a total of USD 14 million. Another two forged certificates were used successfully in Romania in 1996 and 1999 amounting to a total of USD 646,780 in arms. All shipments transited through Togo, where the government allegedly kept up to 20 per cent of the equipment (United Nations Security Council, UNSC, 2000c).
- In March 1999, the RUF received a shipment of 68 tons of small arms that originated in Ukraine. Investigations by the UN showed that Ukraine had authorized the export of arms to Burkina Faso, from where the shipment was flown to Liberia before being transported to the RUF. According to Ukraine, the arms had been transferred with the understanding that they would not be sent to a third party (UNSC, 1999a).
- In July and August 2000, ammunition was transported from Abidjan to Monrovia in direct violation of the UN arms embargo against Liberia. The ammunition—five million 7.62mm cartridges, weighing 113 tons—originated in Ukraine. Investigations revealed that the Côte D'Ivoire head of state, General Robert Gueï, signed the end-user certificate for the ammunition as well as for a long list of additional weapons. The certificate was authenticated by the ambassador of Côte D'Ivoire in Moscow, and on that basis the Ukrainian government issued an export permit and authorized the flight. A Ukrainian military officer accompanied the flight to guarantee delivery. Further investigation revealed that upon assuming office after a *coup d'état* General Gueï had asked for assistance from

several African heads of state in procuring ammunition. In payment for assistance in procuring the arms on behalf of Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia requested a portion of the armaments. In an interview, General Guei admitted that most of the ammunition obtained on behalf of Côte D'Ivoire was re-transferred to Liberia (UNSC, 2000c).

- Former Argentinian President Carlos Menem was put under house arrest in July 2001 for allegedly heading a conspiracy that smuggled small arms to Croatia and Ecuador in 1991–95. According to reports, Menem signed official decrees authorizing the state weapons factory, Fabricaciones Militaries, to sell arms nominally to Panama and Venezuela. In reality, the equipment went to Croatia and Ecuador. The combined value of the 6,575 tons shipped amounted to USD 100 million (Faiola, 2001). At the time, Croatia was under a UN arms embargo, and Ecuador was fighting a border war with Peru in which Argentina was a guarantor in the peace process. And, though in November 2001 Argentina's federal court ordered Menem's release due to lack of sufficient evidence, a number of other former high-level officials remain in prison, including the former Army Chief and Minister of Defence (*Financial Times*, 2001).

The ant trade

In some regions the 'ant trade'—a term coined by the Mexican authorities to describe smuggling from the US to Mexico—accounts for a significant portion of diverted illicit arms. The ant trade is the process by which arms are bought legally in one country and then smuggled in small increments, sometimes one at a time, into another country. Typically traders are taking advantage of controls that are less strict in the country where they buy firearms than in the receiving country. The same phenomenon has been seen on the Canadian-American border and between Paraguay and Brazil (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 186).

Mexican officials estimate that 80 per cent of the illegal weapons in the country are illegally imported from the United States (Weiner and Thompson, 2001). Arms are smuggled into Mexico both by sea and land, though it is the 3,000km land border where most of the ant trade occurs. Often the firearms originate in gun shops and pawn brokers in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. Florida is increasingly becoming a source for weapons smuggled into Mexico by air and by sea (Weiner and Thompson, 2001). Straw purchasers, legally eligible American residents, acquire firearms from a licensed dealer, concealing the identity of the intended recipient (US, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, BATF, 2001). The guns are passed on to smugglers, usually petty criminals, who take them across the border. Smugglers can repeat this process hundreds of times a year. The recipients of the small arms include drug cartels and criminals (Lumpe, 1997).

A study by the US BATF (2000) showed that 46.3 per cent of 1,530 criminal cases involving arms trafficking investigated from July 1996 to December 1998 involved a straw purchaser. The same study found that 11.1 per cent of the cases examined involved shipments across international borders. Mexico is not the only country experiencing a flow of illegal arms from the US. It is estimated that more than half of the handguns recovered from crime scenes in major Canadian cities like Toronto were smuggled into the country from the United States. These illegal firearms were mainly acquired at gun shows or via straw purchases (Canada, Department of Justice, 1995; 1997). Japan has found that 30 per cent of firearms recovered each year are illegally imported from the United States, while 21 per cent come from China (United Nations, 1999). Arms smuggled from the United States have found their way into Latin America and Northern Ireland.

Mexican officials estimate that 80 per cent of the illegal weapons in the country are illegally imported from the United States.



A half a million weapons were looted from Albanian military depots in 1997. Some turn up at markets such as this one, in northern Albania.

BOX 3.7 An attempted violation?

The difficulty of distinguishing legal and illegal deals, or even simply understanding what is going on, was illustrated by an arms affair involving actors from the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Georgia, Israel, Ukraine, and Eritrea. Although the deal might at first appear complicated, it is surprisingly typical of questionable arms deals in the early twenty-first century.

The affair became public on 26 April 2001, when a Ukrainian plane carrying arms from the Czech Republic was detained at Bulgaria's Burgas airport. It was loaded with howitzer parts consigned to Gamma Centre, a Georgian company. Both the Czech Republic and Georgia confirmed that the arms shipment was authorized and 'completely legal' (see ①). Everything seemed in order. So why the fuss?

When the plane landed in Bulgaria, its next destination was stated as Asmara, Eritrea, a country under a UN arms embargo. However, documentation for the military cargo clearly noted that the arms were destined for the Ministry of Defence of Georgia. When confronted, the pilot repeatedly insisted that the flight was to Asmara, as was also noted in the plane's flight journal (see ②). Due to the contradiction, the authorities detained the plane pending clarification on the real final end-user.¹³

Newspaper accounts suggest that the original flight plan was to Georgia's Aspara airport, reportedly with the approval of the Czech Foreign Ministry and the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade (*Czech News Agency*, 2001c). The pilot and crew are thought to have changed the flight plan from *Aspara*, Georgia to *Asmara*, Eritrea. The change was claimed to have been made in order to pick up additional cargo in Eritrea at the request of the client before flying to Georgia (see ③). The client in question, the Israeli company Unitag, was responsible for arranging the transportation of the arms from the Czech Republic to Georgia (*Africa News*, 2001; *Czech News Agency*, 2001d). A change in flight plans is ordinarily not a problem if authorized by the relevant governments. In this case it was not. Given that Eritrea was still under a UN arms embargo, the transport of arms from Bulgaria would have constituted a violation of international law.

Bulgarian authorities detained the flight for over a month to ask all the countries and parties involved why a request was made to fly to Eritrea with a cargo of arms in violation of the UN embargo. According to both the Georgian Deputy Defence Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and Thomas CZ—the Czech company exporting the armaments to Georgia—the shipment contained only howitzers. The total cargo was reported as weighing 30 tons and amounting to over USD 250,000 in arms (*Czech News Agency*, 2001a). Newspaper reports state that an unlisted cargo of Czech-made Kalashnikov rifles was found aboard the plane. Bulgarian authorities denied the allegation.¹⁴

The drama ended on 6 June 2001 when Bulgarian authorities finally authorized the plane to depart for Kopitnari, Georgia (*Czech News Agency*, 2001d; *ITAR-TASS*, 2001 (see ④). Ominously, all the companies involved have been accused of illicit activities in the past (*Czech News Agency*, 2001b).

MAP 3.2 A snapshot of an alleged embargo violation

Isn't that government property? Theft from state arsenals

Unlike the previous examples of diversion, theft from state arsenals or authorized private owners occurs without the intent or authorization of the supplier. Leakage from state arsenals can occur either in large quantities or in small increments over time. Theft or pilfering from military or police stockpiles is especially serious when security collapses or corrupt officials sell or rent arms without authorization. In some cases, the arms in question had been previously confiscated by authorities or were being held as criminal evidence (WEAPONS COLLECTION). In other cases, arms have been acquired by military officers under the auspices of the ministry of defence for the purpose of reselling them on the black market.

In early April 2001, troops raided an airport warehouse in Bangkok to steal a shipment of 30 Glock pistols. The soldiers escaped with the pistols but were caught on film. An inquiry revealed that a senior air force officer authorized the shipment for the express purpose of reselling the arms on the black market. When warehouse officials refused to release the shipment to anyone other than the officer, he organized the raid. In a news interview, Deputy Defence Minister Yuthasak Sasiprapha admitted that there had been instances of corruption in the military over arms procurement. Typically, this occurs when arms importers under contract to the military are allowed to import more guns than needed by the military. These are then sold on the black market (*The Nation*, 2001a; 2001b; Tang, 2001).

Most serious are the losses resulting from a breakdown of state security, as when 549,775 military small arms were taken from Albanian arms depots by the general population in 1997 (Republic of Albania, 2001); from a collapse of the state, as in the case of Somalia; or from inadequate stockpile management, as in the early days of the newly independent states of the former USSR which suddenly found themselves in control of stockpiles whose records were all kept in Moscow (Coker, 2001a).

Theft from government stockpiles is frequently linked to corrupt military or police officers. Poor record keeping and stockpile management systems facilitate insider jobs (MEASURES). This was illustrated on 10 May 2001 when Thai police intercepted two trucks carrying 23 landmines, 60 hand grenades, 720 bars of detonating powder, and 15,000 rounds of ammunition for rifles and machine guns. The weapons, classified as non-inventoried items, had been stolen from several arms depots and were destined for Indonesian insurgents in Aceh (*The Nation*, 2001c; Tang, 2001). There are also reports of individual soldiers or officers bartering arms for food or other items in conflict zones when rations or pay has been delayed. At a road junction in Chechnya, a reporter observed Russian soldiers trying to exchange a grenade for a pack of Prima cigarettes. Another report recalled soldiers exchanging two rocket-propelled grenades for two bottles of vodka and a small box of hashish (Sventsitskiy, 2001).

Western countries, which might be expected to manage their stockpiles adequately, experience losses due to theft by both insiders and outsiders (MEASURES). In a well-publicized attack in April 2000, a British Royal Artillery armoury in Larkhill, Wiltshire, was raided by thieves who took 19 pistols, 13 shotguns, and three starter pistols. Authorities suspect that the arms were stolen to supply Britain's underworld (Evans, Bayley, and Tendler, 2000). As of August 2001, only three of the arms had been recovered (Carrell, 2001).

Theft, of course, is even more serious for private owners and dealers, who cannot afford as much protection. Valuable and useful, guns are a tempting target for thieves. According to the South African Police Service, 70 per cent of all illegal arms within circulation in the country were either lost or stolen. Between 1994 and 1998, a total of 76,797 firearms were reported as lost or stolen in South Africa. Even this figure appears to be far from complete, since, during the same time period, 84,557 illegal firearms were confiscated by police (Hennop, 2000). By way of comparison, in Guatemala, during 1996–98 a total of 3,458 registered firearms were reported as stolen (Table 3.8; Godnick, 2001a).

In the United States, of 1,530 cases of firearms trafficking investigated, 13.7 per cent involved arms stolen from licensed gun dealers, accounting for a total of 6,084 firearms. The same study found that 10.3 per cent of illegally trafficked firearms had been stolen from residences, accounting for a total of 3,306 firearms (US, BATF, 2000).

TABLE 3.8 Cumulative firearms reported stolen (or lost) in Guatemala and South Africa, 1994–1998

Year	South Africa		Guatemala	
	Number	% increase over previous year	Number	% increase over previous year
1994	7,285	n/a	n/a	n/a
1995	9,109	20.0	n/a	n/a
1996	13,746	50.9	1,003	12.4
1997	16,963	23.4	1,117	11.4
1998	29,694	75.0	1,338	19.8

n/a not available
 Sources: Godnick (2001a); Hennop (2000)

TABLE 3.9 Some recent small arms seizures and government recoveries in the Philippines

Date	New People's Army seizures	Date	Government recoveries
12 Jun. 2001	2 M14, 1 M16 automatic rifle, and 1 grenade launcher	23 Jun. 2001	3 firearms
23 Dec. 2000	7 M16 rifles and two 9mm pistols	12 Feb. 2001	Several firearms recovered
20 Aug. 2000	11 M1 rifles, 3 M16 rifles, 2 M14 rifles, and a cache of assorted ammunition	8 Jan. 2001	7 M16 rifles, 1 grenade rifle, 1 Russian AK-47 rifle, 1 US Thompson submachine gun, 1 automatic carbine, and thousands of rounds of ammunition
3 Nov. 1999	5 Armalite rifles, 1 M14 rifle, 4 .38 calibre revolvers, and 2 9mm pistols	9 Feb. 2000	2 M16 rifles, 2 M14 rifles, 1 M76 grenade launcher, and 1 M1 rifle
11 Jun. 1999	High-powered rifles and ammunition	3 Aug. 1997	51 high-powered firearms, including 3 M16 machine guns, 39 Armalite rifles, 5 AK-47s, and some M1 rifles
7 May 1999	Several firearms, including an M-16 rifle and ammunition		
2 Apr. 1999	13 military-issued high-powered rifles and ammunition		
18 Feb. 1998	Two M16 rifles and an M1A carbine rifle		
3 Jan. 1998	5 M14 assault rifles, 17 M1 rifles, and an M60 7.62mm light machine gun		

Sources: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (1997: 1999b); Business World (1998: 1999: 2000: 2001); Deocadiz (1998); Deutsche Presse-Agentur (2000b); Garcia (1999); Lugo and Garcia (1999); Manila Times (2000); Philippine Star (2001); Villanueva (2001); Xinhua (2001)

Battlefield seizures and war booty

Rebel movements have long staged attacks on police headquarters, military cantonments, and patrols specifically to steal equipment. The practice is extremely dangerous, but for desperate, isolated, or weak rebel movements it can be the only way to obtain equipment. For some NSAs, over half of the weapons held are derived

from operations against the state. This would include arms seized during battles, theft from government arsenals, arms that are abandoned by government forces in conflict situations, and arms caches that are acquired by gaining territory.

It is important to note that arms are transferred in each direction between government forces and NSAs in conflict situations. During armed conflict, for example, areas of control are traded between factions. The territory gained or lost may include weapons caches. Effective control over these caches depends on who controls the territory at any given time. This is illustrated in the Philippines, where press reports frequently note the amount of arms acquired by local insurgencies during a particular raid, only to be retaken by government forces in counter-attacks (see Table 3.9). While the situation in the Philippines may be extreme, there seems to be some fluidity in the movement of arms between parties in most conflicts (HUMANITARIAN).

Other sources for the illicit trade: Illicit craft production

The most significant proportion of arms available for the illicit trade is drawn from illicit markets, including weapons that have already been diverted or which fuelled one conflict and are now being moved to another. The smaller number is derived from illicit craft production (Small Arms Survey, 2001, pp. 45–47; PRODUCERS).

Illicit craft production—unlicensed work carried out in small workshops—accounts for only a small portion of small arms involved in illicit transfers. Buyers who can afford to be selective seem to prefer legally manufactured arms. Craft production is characterized by inferior quality, unreliability, and low cost. Craft-produced arms are often favoured by criminal elements and unlicensed individuals as well as by a few insurgency groups. Most often, craft-produced small arms appear to be manufactured and transferred domestically. There are also cases where these weapons cross international borders. This can happen in small shipments, such as the case of small arms manufactured illegally in India’s Bihar State that are smuggled into Bangladesh, or in larger shipments, such as small arms manufactured illegally in the Philippines that are supplied to the Yakuza and other criminal gangs in Japan (Parreño, 1995). A well-known illicit production site is Darra Adam Khel, in Pakistan. Darra has allegedly supplied Pakistan’s troubled provinces of Punjab and Sind, as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan, the IRA, and insurgency groups in Kashmir and the Middle East (Sullivan, 1998; Lallemand, 2001).

Illicit craft production accounts for only a small percentage of illicit arms in circulation.

Conflict trade and illicit arms acquisitions¹⁵

The trade in ‘conflict goods’ is an increasingly salient feature of war economies of contemporary conflicts, often providing the finances and means for procurement of arms and continuation of war (HUMANITARIAN). The best known conflict goods are diamonds, which have fuelled conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the



© ICRC/Charles Page

An arms dealer in Darra, Pakistan, a town notorious for its illicit production of small arms. Darra’s arms are believed to reach non-state actors in India, the Taliban, the IRA, and insurgency groups in Kashmir and the Middle East.

Democratic Republic of Congo. Other goods, such as timber, oil, and coltan—a mineral used in a variety of high-tech products, most notably mobile phones—have also perpetuated conflict. Conflict goods can be defined as:

non-military materials, knowledge, animals or humans whose trade, taxation or protection is exploited to finance or otherwise maintain the war economies of contemporary conflicts. Trade can take place by direct import or export from the conflict zone or on behalf of military factions (both government and non-government) by outside supporters. Conflict goods do not include arms, military aid or the services of mercenaries, although these may be paid for in kind with goods or concessions to trade in products which would then become conflict goods (Cooper, 2001b).

The profits from the trade in conflict goods are used not only to purchase arms but to supplement wages for soldiers and to pay for food, oil, and medical supplies. Such trade also generates personal wealth, particularly for leaders and key supporters. Whilst the profits from the trade in conflict goods are occasionally directed to the purchase of major weapons, small arms have been the weapon of choice in 90 per cent of the conflicts since 1990 (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 210). There is a dynamic nexus between the trade in conflict goods and that in small arms. There are a variety of ways in which the trade in conflict goods can facilitate arms acquisition:

Profits from conflict trade are not only used to purchase arms, but to fund wages for soldiers and to pay for food, oil, and medical supplies.

Conflict goods bartered for small arms: This is not a phenomenon confined either to the small arms market or to illicit arms sales. Perfectly legitimate major arms deals are often paid for in whole or in part with oil or other products from the purchasing country. Yet it is also a path frequently used by NSAs. This has apparently been the preferred purchasing method of UNITA in Angola, which has reason to be wary of having its funds frozen in national and foreign bank accounts. In such situations, agents who act as arms brokers for equipment going into a conflict will act as commodity brokers for goods coming out.

According to a report prepared for the UN Security Council, key brokering agents for UNITA in the early 1990s, selling about one third of UNITA's diamonds, were Fred Rindel—who allegedly went by the name Watson—and the De Decker brothers of South Africa. Typically, they would fly to Andulo in Angola where Rindel would negotiate the arms component of the deal that might include a variety of small arms and light weapons, mostly supplied from Eastern Europe. Once the arms component of the deal was agreed, Joe De Decker allegedly would sit with UNITA's own diamond experts to assess packages of diamonds, with each parcel being worth some USD 4–5 million. The brothers and Rindel would take the packages to Antwerp or Tel Aviv, where they were sold to the De Beers Diamdel buying offices. They would then return to Angola with the money and sales documents (UNSC, 2000c).

Supplementing military budgets: The proceeds from the trade in conflict goods also may be used by states to supplement defence budgets. Alternatively they can be banked, often after laundering, by insurgent groups thus presenting an important opening for the international community to intervene. Indeed, in some cases, as with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), proceeds from conflict trade may be invested in the stock market or other perfectly legitimate enterprises for laundering to provide long-term funding. One example of trade revenues supplementing formal defence budgets is the Rwandan army, which, through the companies Rwandan Metals and Grand Lacs Metals, made an estimated USD 250 million from the export of coltan from the Congo—formerly Zaire—

in an 18-month period between 1999 and late 2000. This is much larger than the official annual defence budget of USD 70 million (UNSC, 2000b).

Paying for an indigenous defence manufacturing capability: The proceeds from trade in conflict goods may be used to fund the development of a industrial defence capacity. This has been most striking in the case of Sudan, where oil-related revenues have enabled the government to double the defence budget to USD 327 million a year and to develop two defence industrial complexes manufacturing light weapons, machine guns, ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and ammunition (Christian Aid, 2001; CLW, 2002; HRW, 1998).

Providing infrastructure for military logistics: The roads or airstrips built by companies to facilitate the movement of goods also provide a dual-use infrastructure that can be utilized by combatants to transport both troops and arms. In Liberia, timber exports amounting to at least USD 187 million annually not only provide Charles Taylor with funds by which to train, arm, and supply his security forces and those of the RUF in Sierra Leone, but the infrastructure of the timber industry itself can facilitate the transfer of arms.

In May 2001, a cargo ship owned by the Belize-registered firm Alpha Paramount, arrived from Dakar, Senegal, and allegedly unloaded a cargo of armaments at Harper Port, Liberia. The port is controlled by the logging company MWPI through its representative, Hussein Fawaz. The ship was then loaded with logs for export from Liberia. Arms are apparently also frequently transported inside Liberia using trucks owned by the timber companies that travel on roads built by these same companies (Global Witness, 2001; HRW, 2001b).

Purchasing allies: Commodities—usually precious stones—may be used instead of cash to buy or reward favours from allies. UNITA used diamonds to win and maintain regional allies who would facilitate the provision of arms or training to UNITA forces. These included diamond payments allegedly made to ex-President Mobutu in the former Zaire, as well as to the presidents of both Burkina Faso and Togo (UNSC, 2000a). Engagement in trade of conflict goods serves as a perk for military officers and ordinary soldiers who participate in conflict. This can cement loyalty, although arguments over such perks can lead to disputes between allies as well.

Since much of the trade in conflict goods is illicit, it is difficult to quantify the value of this trade as a whole or the extent of it within any industrial sector. As the figures in Table 3.10 show, the revenue-raising potential of such trade can be quite substantial, particularly in comparison with the defence budgets of many states in the developing world or the weapons procurement budgets of armed insurgent groups.

Black-market sourcing and transiting: Thailand and Bangladesh

Once small arms enter into illicit trade, they can continue to circulate for years, before they are either confiscated and/or destroyed. Covert arms supplies, arms left over from civil wars, diverted arms, and arms produced illegally all continue to circulate in the black market. For the most part, small arms are durable, and if kept in good condition can move through many different hands and across many international borders before they become unusable.

When the trade becomes international, three principal kinds of countries are involved: *source* countries, *transit* countries, and *destination* countries. In a source country weapons first enter illicit markets; they must physically pass

Infrastructure built to accommodate legitimate trade also can be used by combatants to transport troops and arms.

through transit countries to reach destination countries. In the case of black-market transfers, source countries for the most part are not producing states. Instead, they are often countries that have recently experienced war and have an abundance of leftover weapons or large stockpiles ripe for diversion. Transit countries tend to border regions of conflict. Destination countries provide the demand for illicit arms.


TABLE 3.10 Putting a price on conflict goods

Organization	Product	Period	Value of trade (USD)
UNITA (Angola)	Diamonds	1992–2000	4.1 billion
Charles Taylor (Liberia)	Timber, diamonds, iron ore Timber	1992–6 Current	400 million annually Minimum 187 million
RUF (Sierra Leone)	Diamonds	Late 1990s	30–125 million annually
Taliban (Afghanistan)	Taxing opium trade Taxing border smuggling	Late 1990s/2000	30–40 million 75 million
Afghan opposition	Lapis lazuli Taxes on opium and consumer goods	Late 1990s/2000	30–40 million 12–20 million
FARC (Colombia)	Taxing cocaine trade Total income from drugs, kidnapping, extortion, etc.	Late 1990s	140 million annually 600 million annually
All Colombian rebel groups	Kidnapping	1996–2001	900 million
Rwandan government	Coltan from the Democratic Republic of Congo	1999–2000	250 million over 18 months
Sudan government	Oil	Current	400 million annually
Khmer Rouge (Cambodia)	Timber	Mid-'90s	120 million annually
Cambodian government	Licensing of timber exports by Defence Ministry	Mid-'90s	150 million annually

Sources: Global Witness (1998); UNSC (2000a); Alao and Olonisakin (2000); Berman (2000); Rashid (2001a); Human Rights Watch (2001a); Rangel Suárez (2000); Guardian (2001); Christian Aid (2001); Berdal and Keen (1997)

Thailand: These three categories are not always clearly distinguishable, as the case of Thailand illustrates. Though Thailand is technically considered a transit country, it is here that Southeast Asia's principal black market in arms is found. Illicit arms are trafficked through the country to be redistributed around the region. Its contemporary role in arms trafficking began when it was used as a preferred transit route for covert arms shipments from China and the United States to Cambodia's anti-Vietnamese factions beginning in the late 1970s. From the Cambodian 'pipeline', small arms were diverted by Thailand's military to ethnic groups along the Thai-Myanmar border. At the time, this fell in line with Thai policy of creating a buffer zone between Thailand and perceived external threats. When the Cambodian war ended in the early 1990s, arms began flowing back into Thailand. At first, these arms continued to flow primarily to Burmese insurgents, but as time passed, policies changed, and the trade was

FIGURE 3.5 Overview of Thailand's black market



It is estimated that 80 per cent of all illegal weapon consignments from Cambodia pass through Thailand.

motivated less by politics and more by economics. Thus, Thailand became the primary source of arms for insurgents operating in north-east India, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka in addition to criminal groups operating in Southeast and East Asia (Kramer, 2001).

Today, it is estimated that 80 per cent of all illegal weapon consignments from Cambodia pass through Thailand. It is also believed that illegal arms coming from Pakistan, China, and North Korea also pass through Thailand for redistribution (Chalk, 2001). Other sources for Thailand's illicit arms market include thefts from military arsenals, illicit deals by licensed gun dealers, and confiscations made by the police that are then offloaded onto the black market by corrupt officers (Kramer, 2001).

There are several reasons why arms trafficking continues in Thailand. There is a well-established network of brokers and transport agents. Many of those involved are influential within their locality; and, though the actors have changed, traffickers continue to be members of the military and police, businessmen, gun dealers, politicians, and gangsters.¹⁶ The residual Thai socio-political structure of patronage and the ease with which traffickers can buy co-operation and silence have allowed the trafficking to continue.¹⁷

MAP 3.3 Thailand



Bangladesh: Bangladesh illustrates the dangers of being a transit country. Until recently, regional hot spots in Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka overshadowed armed violence in Bangladesh. Bangladesh attracted attention only because of its position as a conduit of arms for insurgency groups operating in north-eastern India and western Myanmar. Yet a recent study undertaken by the Small Arms Survey reveals that Bangladesh is itself a destination for illicit arms rather than solely a transit state.¹⁸ Today arms enter the country increasingly to feed an ever-growing domestic demand. The main end-users of illicit arms are petty criminals or political cadres, armed groups affiliated with a criminal syndicate or one of Bangladesh's many political parties (*Independent*, 2001). Other recipients include smugglers and some businessmen, specifically large landowners along the coastal belt and managers of illicit logging ventures.

Bangladesh is the transit route for small arms deliveries to north-east Indian—Assamese and Naga—and Burmese—Rakhyan, Rohingya, and China—insurgent groups operating along Bangladesh's borders. Most of the shipments come from Thailand's black market or from Pakistan. Most of these arms shipments occurred between 1991 and 1998. Though some of them have been pilfered to feed domestic demand, or in some rare cases sold outright by insurgent groups or individual insurgents, they are not a significant source of illicit arms within the country (Ahmed, 2000; Chakma, 2000; *Daily Janakantha*, 2000).

A small percentage of the illicit trade was supplied by Bangladesh's war for independence. After independence, a large number of guns remained in the hands of both the pro- and anti-independence forces. A significant number of former

Bangladesh, once perceived as primarily a transit country, is increasingly becoming a destination country.

BOX 3.8 Arms deliveries

Although illicit small arms deliveries by air receive more international attention (Small Arms Survey, 2001, pp. 111–23; Johnson-Thomas, 2000), shipments by sea are no less important. Reports of illicit small arms transfers routinely mention transport by sea.


Over 60 per cent of the world's total commercial trade is moved by sea. The large volume of cargo passing through major ports each year around the world makes checking cargo very difficult. This is compounded by the fact that, with limited resources available, more attention is paid to incoming shipments than to transshipment cargoes. Thus, it is an ideal mode of transport for illicit small arms.

One of the most active regions for maritime illicit small arms trafficking is Asia. Patrolling the vast waterways and islands has proved a daunting task for the region's navies and coastguards. Insurgency groups in north-west India, western Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines use anything from commercial ocean freighters to fishing boats to deliver small arms procurements. Speedboats are frequently used to unload cargo at sea and ferry the shipments across coastguard patrol lines to bring them to shore.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have a highly sophisticated sea transport network. The LTTE has set up at least 12 foreign-based shipping companies, mainly in Southeast Asia, and has a fleet of at least 11 deep-seagoing vessels at its disposal travelling mostly under Panamanian, Honduran, or Liberian flags (*Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*, 2000; Chalk, 1999). Ninety-five per cent of the time, the vessels transport legitimate commercial goods. It is the other five per cent of the time that they play a vital role in supplying small arms, ammunition, explosives, and other war-related material to the LTTE (Chalk, 1999).

The LTTE's maritime wing, the Sea Tigers, 'meet incoming LTTE supply vessels at pre-arranged rendezvous points and the supplies are then transferred to clandestine landing points in the many creeks and inlets in the northeast of the country' (*Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*, 2000). In June 2000 it was reported that the Burmese navy seized a suspected LTTE speedboat reportedly on its way from southern Thailand to Sri Lanka. In addition to 33 pistols, 42 M16 assault rifles, nine Chinese machine guns, and a large amount of ammunition, two Arakanese insurgents and one Mon insurgent were also found on board the boat (*Irrawaddy*, 2000), suggesting that the LTTE smuggles arms in collaboration with other insurgency groups in the region.

pro-independence forces later joined Maoist and Marxist extremist groups, taking their arms with them. The guns in the hands of anti-independence forces like East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces helped form the base of the Shanti Bahini armed insurgency, though they later received guns from India as well. Most of the guns supplied by the Indians were from the stocks received from the Pakistani army which had surrendered to Indians in 1971. After giving up their own struggle in 1998, some members of the Shanti Bahini began selling arms on the black market (Hosain, 1999; Ibrahim, 2001).

MAP 3.4 Bangladesh

Another source of small arms is those smuggled into Bangladesh via unaccompanied air cargo, foreign-posted parcels, and, allegedly, diplomatic consignments, which are exempt from customs inspections (*Daily Manabjamin*, 2001; *Independent*, 2000). Such smuggling is carried out in collusion with customs, postal, or intelligence officers. The smuggling goes on unhindered as long as the officials along the way are paid.

The largest source of illicit arms in Bangladesh is the neighbouring Indian State of Bihar. Both illicit craft-made guns and foreign-made guns, including arms made in France, Italy, Germany, and the United States, are smuggled across Bangladesh's border with West Bengal (*Daily Janakantha*, 1999). Guns originating in Pakistan also transited through India to arrive in Bangladesh. Pistols and revolvers are sought-after mostly by criminal and political groups operating in Dhaka, while actors operating in Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar reportedly prefer assault rifles.

Thailand and Bangladesh both illustrate the possible dangers that can face small arms transit countries, not to mention the destabilizing effects for the regions in question. Much work still needs to be done to determine the risk factor of transit countries becoming either source countries or destination countries themselves, because, either way, the social, political, and economic effects can be severe.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have come closer to documenting half of the value of the global small arms trade. Approximately USD 2 billion of the estimated USD 4 billion can be accounted for. While the legal trade in handguns and certain sporting firearms seems to be declining, no such trend is apparent in the trade of military small arms. It is impossible to determine trends within the illicit trade, as the data is limited and fragmented. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that the downward trend in the legal trade has little impact on the illicit trade.

As the legal trade becomes more transparent, and greater emphasis is placed on uncovering the illicit trade, it will become easier to estimate the value and volume of the illicit trade. Several obstacles need to be overcome. First, there is no base figure available to judge the stock of weapons currently circulating within the illicit market. Second, the market is not stagnant. Small arms flow continuously into the illicit market via diversion and illicit craft production, and out as a result of confiscation and destruction (PRODUCERS; WEAPONS COLLECTION). Only once these inflows and outflows are quantified, can we judge whether governments who are confiscating and destroying large caches are actually gaining the upper hand.

This chapter poses the question: Is there a link between the legitimate and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons? The answer is a qualified yes. There is clear evidence in certain cases subjected to UN investigation that legal transfers do risk disintegrating into illicit ones. Consider the case of Ukrainian arms sent to Burkina Faso that were eventually re-transferred to the RUF in Sierra Leone. Further transfers are simply illegal right from the start, such as the instance when several top Argentinian government officials transferred arms to Croatia and Ecuador. Finally, there are cases in which stockpile security ultimately determines whether or not arms feed into the illicit market. Direct evidence of the links between the legal and illicit trade may not always exist. For example, the United States is one of the largest manufacturers and importers of small arms and light weapons, of both military and sporting firearms. It is no coincidence too that the United States is also a major source of illicit arms circulating in Mexico. Thailand is yet another example, as it is both a major importer of arms on the legal market and a major source of illicit arms for criminals and NSAs in Southeast Asia.

Legal and grey market transfers may place arms in the hands of those who misuse them. The key role of governments in this phenomenon needs to be scrutinized. Those states that choose to supply small arms to states or NSAs should assess whether the arms will be appropriately controlled, to prevent resulting misuse or re-transfer. If not, supplying states may well contribute to the global small arms problem.

The increasing transparency in the legal trade of small arms is a step in the right direction. By observing the national export reports for a number of countries—and the same top destinations come up over and over again—



Kalashnikov assault rifles and heavy machine guns for sale in open-air markets in Mogadishu, Somalia.

© Associated Press/Osman Hassan

major legal weapons flows can easily be identified. If these importing countries are in turn found to be sources of supply to the illicit trade, exporters should rethink the implications of their sales. Countries claiming to support the commercial arms trade can no longer turn a blind eye to the implications of their actions. Furthermore, the legal trade in small arms makes an insignificant contribution to the profitability of the arms industry as a whole. The key question is: How closely are governments and the international community willing to monitor and control the legal trade in small arms and light weapons in order to combat its knock-on illicit trade?

3. List of Abbreviations

APC	Armoured personnel carrier
BATF	US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
COMTRADE	UN Customs Database (Commercial Trade)
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
IMI	Israel Military Industries
IRA	Irish Republican Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MANPAD	Man portable air defence system
NRA	National Rifle Association
NSA	Non-state actor
OFO	Ordnance Factories Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PIP	Partnership for Peace
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAF	Small Arms Factory Group
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WSFA	World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities
WTO	World Trade Organization

3. Endnotes

- All the data in this section is based on the United Nations Statistics Division's COMTRADE Database (2001), and was obtained from the CD-ROM compiled by the International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO). The International Harmonized System customs code for 'military firearms' is 9301, for 'pistols and revolvers' it is 9302.
- However, this decline can be a result of other countries that do not submit their customs data on arms exports gaining a larger share of the export market. For example, Ukraine is a relative newcomer in the export of pistols, yet its exports are not included in the COMTRADE data.
- The USD figures in this section are rounded off to the nearest USD 100,000.
- For customs purposes this also includes exports from Luxembourg.
- The Philippines submitted data for only three years, but still made this top importer list over the five-year period. All the other countries listed submitted data for all five years.
- Again, it must be emphasized that this category of weapons also includes larger systems that do not fall under the category of small arms, such as missile launchers, howitzers, mortars, and guns.
- South Africa submitted its customs data on arms exports to the UN for the first time in 1999.
- Chile's data is available at <<http://www.mercantil.com>>
Thailand's data is available at <<http://www.customs.go.th>>
US customs data to 1999 is available at <<http://govinfo.kerr.orst.edu/impexp.html>>
- For an in-depth look at transparency in national arms export reporting, see Haug *et al.* (2002).
- This actually covers the exports from Rosvoorouzhnie and Promexport, the two former state exporting agencies that merged in November 2000 to become Rosoboronexport.
- The 20 countries are Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen and Zaire.
- For a more complete table of all multilateral embargoes since 1990, including excerpted text, please see the Small Arms Survey web site <<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>>.
- Correspondence with the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the United Nations, Geneva, 12 September 2001.
- Correspondence with the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the United Nations, Geneva, 12 September 2001.

15 This section on the conflict trade was provided by Neil Cooper.
 16 Interview with informed observer, June 2001.
 17 Discussion with Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Nonviolence International South East Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, June 2001; see also Chalk (2001).

18 Research for this section was conducted by Rafique al Islam during January–June 2001. Interviews were conducted with political party leaders, journalists, leaders of insurgency groups, insurgents, intelligence officers, gun dealers, and end-users.

3. Appendices

Appendix 3.1 Selected legal military small arms transfers, 1999–2001

The following sample of small arms transfers is presented to give the reader a better view of the international small arms trade. It is by no means a comprehensive list, but includes some significant military small arms transfers over three years. The terminology used for the type of weapon is as listed in the source documents.

Exporting country	Importing country	Quantity/type of weapons	Value of transfer	Date authorized or delivered
Bulgaria	India	Approximately 200,000 AK-47 assault rifles and its derivatives	n/a	Contract signed 31 October 2000
Russian Federation	Indonesia	4,000 AK-101 and AK-102 assault rifles	n/a	Delivered August 2000
	Indonesia	5,000 AK-101 and AK-102 assault rifles	n/a	Contract reported May 2001
	Bhutan	Over 1,000 AK-103 and AK-104 assault rifles	Approximately USD 1 million	Reported sale December 2000
	Mongolia	Small arms and ammunition	n/a	Reported sale February 2001
	Kyrgyzstan	2 train loads of small arms and ammunition	n/a	Delivered late 1999
	Uzbekistan	Small arms	Exchanged for cotton, gas, fruit, and vegetables	Contract signed 4 May 2001
United Kingdom	Sierra Leone	10,000 self-loading rifles	n/a	Delivered 1999
	Sierra Leone	4,550 self-loading rifles	n/a	Delivered 2000
United States	East Timor	1,200 M16 A2 assault rifles, 75 M203 grenade launchers	n/a	Announced June 2001
	Estonia	40,500 M14 rifles	USD 2.4 million (grant)	Authorized 1999 (delivery complete)
	Israel	10,000 M16 A1 rifles	USD 892,000 (grant)	Authorized 1999 (delivery complete)
	Latvia	30,500 M14 rifles	USD 2.1 million (grant)	Authorized 2000
	Lithuania	40,000 M14 rifles	USD 2.4 million (grant)	Authorized 2000 (delivery complete)

Sources: CAST (2001); Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA); Raghuvanshi (2000); United Kingdom (2001); United States.

Appendix 3.2 Trends in worldwide small arms exports, non-military, 1995–1999 (Figure 3.2)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Pistols & revolvers	216,533	197,072	156,984	149,788	111,202
Hunting & sporting rifles	203,524	206,180	194,941	171,705	170,808
Shotguns & combination shotgun-rifles	197,485	245,198	209,594	237,356	221,657
Muzzle-loading firearms	29,423	25,549	21,541	20,888	20,829
Military firearms	249,768	631,521	599,337	709,268	409,933

Source: COMTRADE customs data (2001)

Appendix 3.3 Multilateral arms embargoes effective in 2001 (Table 3.7)

1	Human Rights Watch (2001a); The Economist (2001a); Lallemand (2001); West (2001).	45	Watt and Norton-Taylor (1999); Wood; Peleman (1999).	87	Bloch (2000); Xinhua (1999); Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst (2000).
2	Venter (1998).	46	UNSC (1998b); Berghezan (1997).	88	Indian Ocean Newsletter (2001); Coker (2001b); Xinhua (1999).
3	UNSC (2000a; 2000c; 2001a); Africa Confidential (1999); Tel Aviv Ha'aretz (2001).	47	UNSC (1997; 1998b); Wood and Peleman (1999).	89	Xinhua (1999).
4	UNSC (2000a; 2000c; 2001a).	48	Foreign Report (1998); Wood and Peleman (1999).	90	Indian Ocean Newsletter (2001).
5	UNSC (2000a); Human Rights Watch (1996; 1999).	49	CTI News Agency (1996).	91	UNSC (1999b); SIPRI (1999); Smith and Sagramoso (1999).
6	Human Rights Watch (1999).	50	UNSC (1996, 1997; 1998a); Human Rights Watch (1995); Wood and Peleman (1999).	92	UNSC (1999b).
7	UNSC (2000a); Human Rights Watch (1996; 1994).	51	UNSC (1997).	93	Berghezan (1997).
8	Tel Aviv Ha'aretz (2001).	52	Human Rights Watch (1995); Wood and Peleman (1999).	94	Mitevski (2000); Smith and Sagramoso (1999).
9	UNSC (2000a; 2001a).	53	Wood and Peleman (1999).	95	Josar (2001).
10	Human Rights Watch (1996; 1994).	54	Watt and Norton-Taylor (1999); Wood and Peleman (1999).	96	Berghezan (1997).
11	UNSC (2000c); Tel Aviv Ha'aretz (2001).	55	UNSC (1997).	97	Fuzes (2001); Berghezan (1997).
12	UNSC (2000a); Human Rights Watch (1994; 1999); Wood and Peleman (1999).	56	UNSC (1998b).	98	Berghezan (1997).
13	UNSC (2000a); Africa Confidential (1999); Human Rights Watch (1994, 1996; 1999); Venter (1998); Wood and Peleman (1999).	57	Human Rights Watch (1995).	99	Berghezan (1997).
14	UNSC (2000a; 2000b; 2001a).	58	Human Rights Watch (1995).	100	Bouveret and Elomari (2001).
15	Human Rights Watch (1999).	59	Human Rights Watch (1995).	101	Venter (1998).
16	UNSC (2000a); Africa Confidential (1999); Human Rights Watch (1999).	60	UNSC (1997).	102	Venter (1998).
17	Human Rights Watch (1999).	61	UNSC (1997).	103	Bouveret and Elomari (2001).
18	SIPRI (2001).	62	Interfax News Agency (1995).	104	Foreign Report (1993).
19	Bouveret and Elomari (2001).	63	UNSC (1996); Human Rights Watch (1995); Indian Ocean Newsletter (1994); Wood and Peleman (1999).	105	Far Eastern Economic Review (1992); Selth (1996).
20	SIPRI (2001).	64	UNSC (1996); Human Rights Watch (1995); Wood and Peleman (1999).	106	Wood (2000).
21	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (1999a).	65	UNSC (1997).	107	UNSC (2000b); Wood (2000); Leppard <i>et al.</i> (1999); Legg and Ibbs (1998).
22	Berry (2001).	66	UNSC (1998b).	108	Human Rights Watch (1998).
23	Berry (2001).	67	Indian Ocean Newsletter (1996; 1998).	109	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i> (2000).
24	Comaroni (2001).	68	UNSC (1997); Interfax News Agency (1995).	110	Berghezan (1997).
25	Berry (2001); Blank (2001).	69	UNSC (1998b); Evans (1996); Bevins (1997); Norton-Taylor (1995); Wood and Peleman (1999).	111	Rogers (1997); Howard (1997); Hadzhizade (1999); ITAR-TASS (1997); Iberia (1997); Interfax (1997); Banks (1996); Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment (1999).
26	Foreign Report (1993).	70	Human Rights Watch (1995).	112	Banks (1996).
27	Berry (2001).	71	UNSC (1997).	113	Foreign Report (1995).
28	UNSC (2000b); Human Rights Watch (2000; 2001b); UNSC (2000c).	72	UNSC (1997; 1998a).		
29	UNSC (2000c).	73	UNSC (1998b).		
30	UNSC (2000c).	74	Wood (2000).		
31	Farah (2001); UNSC (2000c).	75	Africa Confidential (2001).		
32	UNSC (2000c).	76	UNSC (2000b); Beeston (2000); Wood (2000); Human Rights Watch (2000).		
33	UNSC (2000c).	77	Wood (2000).		
34	UNSC (2000c).	78	Wood (2000).		
35	UNSC (2000c).	79	UNSC (2000b).		
36	Wood (2000); UNSC (2000c).	80	UNSC (2000b); Farah (2000); The Economist (2001); Beeston (2000); BBC News (2000); Wood (2000); Africa Confidential (2001; 2000a; 2000b); Human Rights Watch (2001a).		
37	UNSC (2000c).	81	UNSC (2000b).		
38	Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor (2001).	82	UNSC (2000b).		
39	UNSC (2000c).	83	Wood (2000); Leppard <i>et al.</i> (1999).		
40	Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor (2001).	84	UNSC (2000b); Beeston (2000); Wood (2000); Human Rights Watch (2000).		
41	UNSC (2000c).	85	UNSC (2000b); Wood (2000); Leppard <i>et al.</i> (1999); Legg and Ibbs (1998).		
42	UNSC (2000c).	86	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (2001); Agence France Presse (2001).		
43	Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor (2001); UNSC (2000c); Human Rights Watch (2001b).				
44	Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor (2001).				

3. Bibliography

- Africa Confidential*. 1999. 'Deadly Diamonds.' Vol. 40, No. 8. 16 April.
- . 2000a. 'Liberia/Sierra Leone: Godfather to the rebels.' Vol. 41, No. 13. 23 June.
- . 2000b. 'Liberia: Cross-border crisis.' Vol. 41, No. 15. 21 July.
- . 2001. 'Minimal Contracts.' Vol. 42, No. 13. 29 June.
- Africa News*. 2001. 'Eritrea; Ukraine Denies Arms Shipment.' 16 May.
- Agence France Presse. 2001. 'Fledgling Somali government accused of illegally importing arms.' 19 February.
- Ahmed, Tofail. 2000. 'Cox's Bazar a new route of arms trafficking.' *Daily Janakantha*. 16 January.
- Alao, Abiodun and Funmi Olonisakin. 2000. 'Economic Fragility and Political Fluidity: Explaining Natural Resources and Conflicts.' *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 7, No. 4. Winter, pp. 23–36.
- Albania, Republic of. 2001. 'Regarding Some Information on Weapons Collected and Problematic Areas.' Tirana: Ministry of Public Order, General Directory of Police. 13 November.
- Armada International*. 2001. 'News.' March, p. 10.
- Australia. Department of Defence. 2001. *Annual Report Exports of Defence and Strategic Goods from Australia 1999–2000*. Canberra: Directorate of Strategic Trade Policy and Operations, Industry Division, Department of Defence. May. <<http://www.dmo.defence.gov.au/id/export/ar2000.pdf>>
- Austria. Bundesministerium für Inneres. 2000. *Report on the Export of Arms by the Republic of Austria for the year 1999, pursuant to paragraph 8 of the operative provision of the EU code of Conduct on Arms Exports*. Vienna: Bundesministerium für Inneres.
- Bangkok Post*. 1989. 'Why the Weapons War May be Unwinnable.' 1 July.
- . 1993. 'Wimol: Arms Belong to "a Third Country".' 9 December.
- Banks, Tony. 1996. 'Azeris want new look at Tashkent accord.' *Jane's Defence Weekly*. 18 December, p. 15.
- BBC News. 1999. 'World: Middle East Egypt Jails Arms Smugglers.' 30 September. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world>>
- . 2000. 'Liberia selling arms for diamonds.' 6 July. <http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_821000/821726.stm>
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 1997. 'Communist rebels retreat as army takes camp.' 5 August.
- . 1998. 'Russian aircraft delivers Macedonia's arms purchases.' 4 May. Original source: MIC news bulletin, Skopje, in English, 29 April 1998.
- . 1999a. 'Belarus president denies supplying arms to Iraq.' 20 February.
- . 1999b. 'President orders "sustained all-out war" against communists.' 5 November.
- . 2001. 'Government denies delivering arms to Somalia.' 8 February.
- Beeston, Richard. 2000. 'Britons named in UN report on "blood diamonds".' *The Times*. 22 December, p. 14.
- Belgium. 2001. *Rapport du Gouvernement au Parlement sur l'application de la loi du 5 août 1991 sur les importations, les exportations et les transferts d'armes, de munitions et de matériel pouvant servir à un usage militaire ainsi que les technologies y afférentes*. July. <<http://www.diplobel.org/news/rt/index.htm>>
- Berdal, Mats and David Keen. 1997. 'Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications.' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*. Vol. 26, No. 3. Special Issue: War Endings: Reasons, Strategies and Implications, pp. 795–818.
- Berghezan, Georges. 1997. *Ex-Yugoslavie: L'embargo sur les armes et le réarmement actuel*. Les Rapports du GRIP. Brussels: GRIP.
- Berman, Eric. 2000. *Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement*. Occasional Paper No. 1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Berry, Jessica. 2001. 'Iraqis Step Up Secret Russian Weapons Trade.' *London Sunday Telegraph*. 25 February.
- Bevins, Anthony. 1997. 'Foreign Office let arms through.' *Independent*. 22 January.
- Blank, Stephen. 2001. 'Russia seeks to profit from Iranian rearmament.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*. 1 April.
- Bloch, George. 2000. 'No compromise for Eritrea and Ethiopia.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*. 1 January.
- Bouveret, Patrice and Belkcm Elomari. 2001. *Ventes d'armes de la France: Tour du monde des pays acquéreurs, rapport 2001*. Lyon: Observatoire des transferts d'armements.
- Boyne, Sean. 1996. 'Uncovering the Irish Republican Army.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*. 1 August.
- Brooke, Micoöl. 2000. 'South-East Asian targets for Russia's Igla and Kilo.' *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*. June/July, p. 34.
- Business World*. 1998. 'Guerrillas kill army officer.' 20 February.
- . 1999. 'Rebels hostage Agusan mayor.' 11 May.
- . 2000. 'NPA rebels attack post.' 22 August.
- . 2001. 'Seven NPAs killed.' 26 June.
- Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 2000. *Export of Military Goods from Canada Annual Report 1999*. Ottawa: Export and Import Controls Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. September. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/~eicb/export/milit_tech-e.htm>
- Canada. Department of Justice. 1995. *Report of the Smuggling Work Group*. Ottawa: Department of Justice.
- . 1997. *Firearms Recovered By Police: A Multi-Site Study*. Daniel Antonowicz Consulting. Ottawa: Department of Justice. July.
- Carrell, Sverin. 2001. 'Stolen Army Weapons Used by London Yardie Drug Gang.' *Independent*. 5 August.
- Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow (CAST). 2001. *Deliveries of Russian Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. August.
- Chakma, Budhahit. 2000. 'The rebels of Myanmar are active along Naikongchari and Thansi border. Weak groups are selling out arms.' *Daily Prothom Alo*. 25 November.
- Chalk, Peter. 1999. 'The Tamil Tiger Insurgency in Sri Lanka.' In Abdel-Fatau Musah and Niobe Thompson, eds. *Over a Barrel: Light Weapons & Human Rights in the Commonwealth*. New Delhi: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, pp. 65–91.

- ___ 2001. 'Light arms trading in SE Asia.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*. 1 March.
- Christian Aid. 2001. *The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan*. March. <<http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/0103suda/sudanoil.htm>>
- Claiborne, William. 1987. 'South Africa, Mozambique Form Commission to Probe Massacre.' *Washington Post*. 7 August.
- Clark, Dave. 2001. 'Arms Dealers Hover as Macedonia Struggles with Rebels.' *Agence France Presse*. 10 May.
- Coker, Margaret. 2001a. 'Illegal Soviet Weapons Fuel Wars Around World.' *AJC Newspaper Online*. 8 July.
- ___ 2001b. 'Somalia: Amid war, famine, selling guns "guarantees my family will be fed".' *Access Atlanta*. 9 July.
- Comaroni, Bogdan. 2001. 'Romanian Daily Says Weapons-Sales-to-Iraq Allegations Reemerge as NATO Expands.' *Ziua*. FBIS Translated text. 19 June.
- Conteras, Joseph. 1996. 'Locked in a Box.' *Newsweek*. 14 October.
- Cooper, Neil. 2001a. *Conflict Trade and Arms Acquisitions*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- ___ 2001b. 'Conflict Goods: The Challenges for Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention.' *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 27.
- Council for a Livable World. 'Russia sold Mic-29s to Sudan.' Arms Trade Newswire. 4 January. <<http://www.clw.org>>
- CTI News Agency. 1996. 'Company denies exporting arms to Rwanda and Zaire.' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 18 November.
- Czech News Agency. 2001a. 'Weapons detained in Bulgaria exported by Thomas CZ-BTV.' 1 May.
- ___ 2001b. 'Czechs attempted to smuggle weapons to fighting in Eritrea.' 9 May.
- ___ 2001c. 'UN Investigating Case of Detained Plane with Czech Weapons.' 30 May.
- ___ 2001d. 'Mysterious plane carrying Czech weapons leaves Bulgaria.' 6 June.
- Czech Republic. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2001. *The Czech Republic and Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Prague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The Daily Janakantha*. 1999. 'Illegal Fire-arms Sneaked Through the Northern Border.' 29 April.
- ___ 2000. 'Safe shelter of fundamentalist in deep forest: Hot trading of arms and drugs going on.' 25 August.
- The Daily Manabjamin*. 2001. 'Brisk trading of arms in Dhaka.' 15 January.
- Davis, Anthony. 2001a. 'Pakistan in quandary over new sanctions against the Taliban.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*. 1 February.
- Deocadiz, Christina. 1998. 'Guerrillas raid armoury.' *Business World*. 7 January.
- Deutsche Presse-Agentur*. 2000a. 'Deutschland begann mit Rüstungshilfe für Mazedonien.' 13 January.
- ___ 2000b. 'At least six communists rebels killed in southern Philippine clash.' 9 February.
- Dudkevitch, Margot. 2001. 'Jordanian Held for Arms Smuggling.' *Jerusalem Post*. 23 April.
- The Economist*. 2001. 'Sierra Leone and Guinea: Fuelling Africa's Wars.' 13 January.
- Evans, Andrew. 1996. 'Government "knew of Rwanda arms claims 11 months ago".' Press Association Newsfile. 2 December.
- Evans, Michael, Matthew Bayley, and Stewart Tendler. 2000. 'Raiders Steel 35 Guns From Army Barracks.' *The Times*. 13 April.
- Faiola, Anthony. 2001. 'Menem Under House Arrest for Weapons Sales.' *International Herald Tribune*. 8 June.
- Farah, Douglas. 2000. 'Liberia Bolsters Support for Rebels in Sierra Leone.' *International Herald Tribune*. 21 June.
- ___ 2001. 'Arms Flow Into Liberia/Fighting Threatens to Draw in Ivory Coast: In West Africa's Borderlands, Wars Start to Flare Up Again.' *International Herald Tribune*. 7 August.
- Far Eastern Economic Review*. 1992. 'Portuguese Men-of-War.' 12 November.
- Financial Times*. 2001. 'Argentine Court Releases Menem.' 21 November.
- Finland. Ministry of Defence. 2001. *Export of Defence Materiel*. Helsinki: Ministry of Defence. <<http://www.vn.fi/plm/ekvas.htm#puolu>>
- Foreign Report*. 1993. 'Britain's Iraq-gate "Scandal".' 11 November.
- ___ 1995. 'The New Arms-Trader: Ukraine.' 6 April.
- ___ 1998. 'Small is nasty.' 15 October.
- France. Ministère de la Défense. 2000. *Rapport au Parlement sur les exportations d'armement de la France en 1999*. Paris: Ministère de la Défense. December. <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/d82/index.html>>
- ___ 2001. *Rapport au Parlement sur les exportations d'armement de la France en 2000*. Paris: Ministère de la Défense. December. <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/d118/accueil.htm>>
- Fuzes, Oszkar. 2001. 'East-Bloc Connections Fuel War.' World Press Review On-Line. 28 June.
- Garcia, Cathy Rose A. 1999. 'Rebels increasing in Central Visayas.' *Business World*. 9 July.
- Germany. Bundesregierung. 2000. *Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahr 1999 (Rüstungsexportbericht 1999)*. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie. <<http://www.bmwi.de/Homepage/Politikfelder/Au%dfenwirtschaft%20%26%20Europa/Exportkontrolle/Exportkontrolle.jsp>>
- ___ 2001. *Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahr 2000 (Rüstungsexportbericht 2000)*. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie. <<http://www.bmwi.de/Homepage/Politikfelder/Au%dfenwirtschaft%20%26%20Europa/Exportkontrolle/Exportkontrolle.jsp>>
- Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara. 2000. 'What's Legal? What's Illegal?' In Lora Lumpe, ed. *Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms*. New York: Zed Books Limited, pp. 27-52.
- Global Witness. 1998. *A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict*. London: Global Witness. <<http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/Angola/title.htm>>
- ___ 2001. 'The Role of Liberia's Logging Industry on National and Regional Insecurity.' Briefing to the United Nations Security Council. January. <<http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/press/gwliberia.htm>>
- Godnick, William. 2001a. *Small Arms Transfers in Central America*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- ___ 2001b. *Stockpiles/Inventories*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Goldenberg, Suzanne. 2000. 'Guns for sale—how stolen Israeli weapons arm Fatah's fighters.' *The Guardian*. 16 December.
- Grynber, Roman and Roy Mickey Joy. 2000. 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO.' *Journal of World Trade*. Vol. 34, No. 6, pp. 159-73.
- The Guardian*. 2001. 'Scot held hostage in Colombia tells of will to survive.' 26 April.

- Gunaratra, Rohan. 2000. 'Sources of Arms Supplies to the LTTE: Successes and Failures of the Sri Lankan State.' In Dipankar Banerjee, ed. *South Asia at Gun Point*. Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies.
- Hadzhezade, Asya. 1999. 'The Truce is Being Violated.' *Defence and Security*. 21 June.
- Harel, Amos. 2001a. 'PA Smuggled Arms Via Sea, IDF Suspects.' *Ha'aretz*. 29 January.
- . 2001b. '1,000 Rockets Caught on the Way to Palestinians.' *IMRA*. 4 February.
- Haug, Maria, Lora Lumpe, Nicholas Marsh, and Martin Langvandslien. 2002. *Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency*. Occasional Paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Henno, Ettienn. 2000. 'Illegal Firearms in Circulation in South Africa.' In Virginia Gamba, ed. *Society Under Siege: Managing Arms in Southern Africa*. Towards Collaborative Peace Series, Vol. 3. Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 61–76.
- Hosain, Syed Anwar. 1999. *War and Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts—Retrospect and Prospect*. Dhaka: Osman Gani.
- Howard, Glen E. 1997. "Scuds" Threaten Shaky Stability.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*. 1 June.
- Human Rights Watch. 1994. *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections*. New York: Human Rights Watch. November.
- . 1995. *Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity, International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide*. Vol. 7, No. 4, May.
- . 1996. *Angola: Between War and Peace: Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses Since the Lusaka Protocol*. Vol. 8, No. 1, February.
- . 1998. *Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan*. Vol. 10, No. 4, August.
- . 1999. *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*. New York: Human Rights Watch. September.
- . 2000. *Neglected Arms Embargo on Sierra Leone Rebels*. Briefing paper. New York: Human Rights Watch. 15 May.
- . 2001a. *Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War*. Vol. 13, No. 3(C), July.
- . 2001b. *No Questions Asked: The Eastern Europe Arms Pipeline to Liberia*. Briefing paper. New York: Human Rights Watch. 15 November.
- Iberia. 1997. 'Defence Minister Said Involved in Arms Smuggling.' 28 January.
- Ibrahim, Syed Md. 2001. *Parbatty Chattagram: Shantiprakria-o-Poribesh-Paristhiti Mullayan*. Dhaka: Ahmed Mahmudul Hoque of Mowla Brothers.
- The Independent* (Bangladesh). 2000. 'Smugglers using names of foreign mission!' 1 October.
- . 2001. 'Arms and Politics.' 21 March.
- India. Ministry of Defence. *Defence Production and Supply*. <<http://www.mod.nic.in/product&supp/welcome.html>>
- The Indian Ocean Newsletter*. 1994. 'The Seychelles: Caught red-handed.' 16 July.
- . 1996. 'Uganda: The Banyamulengue File.' 21 December.
- . 1998. 'Private arms trade.' 28 February.
- . 2001. 'Ethiopia: War moves from north to south.' 10 February.
- Interfax*. 1997. 'Yeltsin Sacks Officials Involved in Arms Sales to Armenia.' 23 October.
- Interfax News Agency. 1995. 'Foreign Relations: Foreign Ministry denies reports of arms sales to Rwanda.' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 22 June.
- Ireland. Department of Enterprise, Trade & Employment's Export Licensing Web Site. Military Statistics. <<http://www.entemp.ie/export/statistics.htm>>
- Irrawaddy*. 2000. 'Burmese sink Tamil boat.' June.
- Italy. Camera dei Deputati. 2000. *Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo dell'esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento nonché dell'esportazione e del transito dei prodotti ad alta tecnologia, Anno 1999*. Rome: Chamber of Deputies' Stationery Office.
- ITAR-TASS. 1997. 'Yerevan Doubts Rodionov Statement on Illegal Arms Shipments.' 14 March.
- . 2001. 'Plane carrying Czech-made weapons arrives in Georgia, Bulgaria apologizes.' 7 June. <FBIS-SOV-2001-0607>
- Jane's Information Group. 2001. *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*. January–April.
- Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst*. 2000. 'Uneasiness about Somalia's destabilising role.' 1 April.
- Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*. 1999. 'Azerbaijan.' 16 July.
- Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*. 2000. 'Sri Lankan guerrillas campaign at sea as well as on land.' 1 September.
- . 2001. 'United Nations exposes illegal arms sales.' 1 January.
- Johnson-Thomas, Brian. 2000. 'Anatomy of a Shady Deal.' In Lora Lumpe, ed. *Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms*. London: Zed Books.
- Josar, David. 2001. 'U.N. Police Intercept Weapons Shipment at Border Post in Western Kosovo.' *European Stars and Stripes*. 18 June.
- Joseph, Kate. 2001. *End-User Certificates*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Kramer, Katherine. 2001. 'Legal to Illegal: Southeast Asia's Illegal Arms Trade.' *Kasarinlan: A Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*. Vol. 16, No. 2.
- Kusovac, Zoran. 2001a. 'Macedonia Teeters on the Brink of Disaster.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*. Vol. 13, No. 6. 1 June.
- . 2001b. 'Macedonian Arms Steps Up Arms Procurement.' *Jane's Defence Weekly*. Vol. 35, No. 18. 2 May.
- Lallemand, Alain. 2001. 'The Darra Tribe, The Taliban Arsenal—A Region Close to the Frontier Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Specializes in Copying Foreign Weapons on a Large Scale.' *Le Soir*. 26 September.
- Legg, Thomas and Robin Ibbs. 1998. *Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation*. Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 27 July. London: The Stationery Office.
- Leppard, David, Chris Hastings, Carey Scott, and Brian Johnson-Thomas. 1999. 'British firms arming Sierra Leone Rebels.' *Sunday Times*. 10 January.
- Loeb, Vernon. 2001. 'Jet Purchase, Bin Laden Linked.' *Washington Post*. 15 February, p. 20.
- Luft, Gal. 1999. 'The Palestinian Security Services: Between Police and Army.' *MERIA Journal*. June. <<http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/1999/issue2/jv3n2a5.html>>

- . 2000. 'Palestinian Military Performance and the 2000 Intifada.' *MERIA Journal*. December.
<<http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a1.html>>
- Lugo, Leotes Marie T. and Cathy Rose A. Garcia. 1999. 'Insurgents to release one hostage today.' *Business World*. 5 April.
- Lumpe, Lora. 1997. 'The US Arms Both Sides of Mexico's Drug War.' *Covert Action Quarterly*. No. 61. Summer, pp. 39–46.
- The Manila Times*. 2000. 'Philippines: Fifty Communist rebels storm town hall, seize firearms.' 25 December.
- Mariani, Bernardo and Angus Urquhart. 2000. *Transparency and Accountability in European Arms Export Controls: Towards Common Standards and Best Practice*. London: Saferworld. December.
- Miller, Derek. 2001a. *Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Middle East*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- . 2001b. *Understanding Small Arms Transfer Dynamics*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Mitevski, Robert. 2000. 'When Are We Going to Say "Farewell to Arms"?' *Skopje Dnevnik*. 8 May.
- The Nation* (Thailand). 2001a. 'Light thrown on arms scams in the military.' 18 April.
- . 2001b. 'Army officers to be held liable for men's crimes.' 20 April.
- . 2001c. 'Police seize weapons cache.' 11 May.
- Netherlands. Ministry of Economic Affairs. 2001. *The Netherlands Arms Export Policy in 2000*. The Hague: Ministry of Economic Affairs.
<http://www.ez.nl/beleid/ext_frame.asp?site=handelspolitiek/hpinx01.htm>
- Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. 2000. 'Swiss Police uncover secret weapons deal.' 30 August.
- Norton-Taylor, Richard. 1995. 'Nigeria arms deals "breach EU Embargo".' *Guardian*. 28 August.
- Norway. Utenriksdepartementet. 2000. *Eksporten av forsvarsmateriell frå Noreg i 1999*. Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet.
<<http://www.odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/publ/stmeld/032001-040006/index-hov007-b-n-a.html>>
- Pakistan News Service. 2001. 'Russia Delivering Weapons to Northern Alliance.' 9 October. <<http://www.paknews.com>>
- Parreño, Disaell Y. 1995. 'Danao City big supplier of Yakuza guns.' *Manila Chronicle*. 21 January.
- The Philippine Star*. 2001. 'Philippine military chief says talks with rebels continue despite Samar raid.' BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 14 February.
- Phongpaichit, Pusak, Sungsidh Piriyarangsarn, and Nualnoi Treerat. 1998. *Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja: Thailand's Illegal Economy and Public Policy*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.
- Portugal. 2000. *Relatório Estatístico sobre exportações e importações de bens e tecnologias militares realizadas em 1999*. Lisbon: Ministério da Defesa Nacional, Direcção Geral de Armamento e Equipamentos de Defesa.
- Pravda*. 2001. 'Ukraine to Suspend Arms Supplies to Macedonia.' 31 July. Internet version.
<<http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2001/07/31/11328.html>>
- Raghuvanshi, Vivek. 2000. 'Bulgaria to Supply AK-47's to Indian Government.' *Defense News*. 20 November, p. 40.
- Rangel Suárez, Alfredo. 2000. 'Parasites and Predators, Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia.' *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 53, No. 2. Spring, pp. 577–601.
- Rashid, Ahmed. 2001a. 'Afghanistan: Ending the Policy Quagmire.' *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 54, No. 2. Spring, pp. 395–410.
- . 2001b. 'The Taliban: First, the War.' *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 2 August.
- Rodan, Steve and Arie O'Sullivan. 1998. 'PA Smuggles Arms Via Sinai Tunnels.' *Jerusalem Post*. 6 June.
- Rogers, Marc. 1997. 'Russian Minister Reveals Arms-to-Armenia Secret.' *Jane's Defence Weekly*. 5 March.
- Selth, Andrew. 1996. *Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces since 1988*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 113. Canberra: Australian National University.
- Slovak Republic. Ministry of Economy. 2000. *Export of Military Production in 1997 to 1999*. Bratislava: Ministry of Economy.
- Small Arms Survey. 2001. *Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, Chris and Domitilla Sagramoso. 1999. 'Small Arms Trafficking May Export Albania's Anarchy.' *Jane's Intelligence Review*. 1 January.
- Sobelman, Daniel. 2001. 'Jordan Nabs Arms Smuggler Heading for West Bank.' *Ha'aretz*. 17 July.
- South Africa. Department of Defence. Directorate Conventional Arms Control. 2000. *South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms 1997-1999*. Pretoria: Department of Defence. <<http://www.mil.za/SecretaryforDefence/Frame/Frame.htm>>
- South Korea. Department of Defence. White Paper. 1998. <http://www.mnd.go.kr/mnden/sub_menu/w_book/1998/ref/appendix36.htm>
- Spain. Departamento de Aduanas e Impuestos Especiales. Ministerio de Hacienda. 2001. *Exportaciones Realizadas de Material de Defensa for Categorías de Productos*. Madrid: Departamento de Aduanas e Impuestos Especiales.
- Steinberg, Gerald and Human Security Research Group. 2001. *Israel and the Palestinian Authority*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2001. *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sullivan, Kevin. 1998. 'Kalashnikovs at the Corner.' *The Nation*. 2 August.
- The Sunday Times*. 2000. 'Malaysia identifies 44 Islamic Cults.' 9 July.
- Sventsitskiy, Ivan. 2001. 'Federal Forces Arming Gunmen.' FBIS translated text, CEP20010518000210. 17 May.
- Sweden. Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Strategic Export Control Division. 2000. *Swedish Arms Exports in 2000: A Government Report*. Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- Switzerland. Federal Department for Economic Affairs. 2001. *Ausfuhr von Kriegsmaterial im Jahr 2000*. 6 February.
<http://www.seco-admin.ch/seco/pm.nsf/ZeigePM_IDString/ESWH_KMAT_Ausfuhr2000?OpenDocument&l=en>
- Tang, Edward. 2001. 'Military Rouges.' *The Strait Times*. 16 May.
- Tel Aviv Ha'artz*. 2001. 'Israeli Businessmen Suspected of Selling arms to Angolan Rebels.' 19 March.
- The Toronto Star*. 2001. 'Afghan rebels expecting arms from Russia, Iran.' 3 October. <<http://www.thestar.com>>
- United Kingdom. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2000. *Focus International, Western Sahara: Moving the Peace Process Forward*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

- . 2001. *Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2000*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. July.
<<http://files.fco.gov.uk/npd/annualreport4/fullreport.pdf>>
- United Nations. 1999. *United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation Database Update*.
<<http://www.ifs.univie.ac.at/uncjin/mosaic/firearms/index.htm>>
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 1996. *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)*. S/1996/1995 of 14 March.
- . 1997. *Third Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)*. S/1997/1010 of 24 December.
- . 1998a. *Interim Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)*. S/1998/777 of 18 August.
- . 1998b. *Final Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)*. S/1998/1096 of 18 November.
- . 1999a. *Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to the resolution 985 (1995) concerning Liberia*. S/1999/1301 of 31 December.
- . 1999b. *Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1160 (1998)*. S/1999/216 of 4 March.
- . 2000a. *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*. S/2000/203 of 10 March.
- . 2000b. *Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone*. S/2000/1195 of 20 December.
- . 2000c. *Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions*. S/2000/1225 of 21 December.
- . 2001a. *Addendum to the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA*. S/2001/363 of 11 April.
- . 2001b. *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. S/2001/357 of 12 April.
- . 2001c. *Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, Concerning Liberia*. S/2001/1015
- United Nations. Statistics Division. 2001. 'COMTRADE/The Personal Computer Trade Analysis System (PC-TAS) CD-ROM.' New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF). 2000. *Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers*. Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury, June.
- . 2001. 'ATF and the Firearms Industry Partner to Educate the Public as to the Illegality of "Straw Purchasing" Firearms.' *ATF News*. 26 April.
- United States. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Excess Defense Articles (EDA).
<<http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/eda/search.asp>>
- United States. Department of State. 1996. 'Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.' *Federal Register*. Vol. 61, No. 135. 12 July, pp. 36625–26.
- . 1998. 'Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to Indonesia.' *Federal Register*. Vol. 64, No. 198. 14 October, pp. 55805–06.
- . 2001. 'Defence Trade Controls—Embargo Reference Chart.' <<http://www.pmdtc.org/country.htm>>
- United States. General Accounting Office (GAO). 2001. *Information on U.S. Weapons Deliveries to the Middle East*. Washington, DC. September.
- Varouhakis, Miron. 2001. 'Ethnic Albanians Have Advantage.' *Kathimerini (Athens, English Edition)*. Internet Edition. 13 June.
- Venter, Al. 1998. 'African greets gun-runners with open arms.' *International Defence Review*. 1 August.
- Villanueva, Ruffy. 2001. 'Aguinaldo slay claimed by NPA.' *Business World*. 14 June.
- Viva Rio. 2001. *As Exportações Brasileiras de Armas Leves 1989-2000*. Background paper. Small Arms Survey. Geneva. November.
- Watt, Nicolas and Richard Norton-Taylor. 1999. 'Blair Challenged on arms supplies for African rebels.' *The Guardian*. 11 February.
- Weiner, Tim and Ginger Thompson. 2001. 'U.S. Guns Smuggled Into Mexico Aid Drug War.' *New York Times*. 19 May.
- West, Julian. 2001. 'Taliban Receives Arms Via Pakistan.' *Washington Times*. 6 November.
- Wilkinson, Tracy. 2000. 'Palestinians' Gun Culture Poses Political, Social Perils; Mideast: Proliferation of Weapons Frustrates Efforts at Law and Order—and Leaves Civilians Living in Fear.' *The Los Angeles Times*. 18 August.
- Wood, Brian. 2000. 'Arms and related support for the rebels in Sierra Leone.' Testimony to the United Nations Committee on Sierra Leone. 31 July–1 August.
- Wood, Brian and Johan Peleman. 1999. *The Arms Fixers—Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents*. PRIO Report 3/99. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
- World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA). 2001. *The Facts*. Rome: World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities.
- Xinhua*. 1999. 'Weapons Flowing into Somalia.' 21 February.
- . 2001. '14 Rebels Killed in Clash With Troops in N. Philippines.' 15 January.

Acknowledgements

Main contributors

Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), Neil Cooper, William Godnick, the Human Security Research Group, Rafique al Islam, Aaron Karp, Derek Miller, Gerald Steinberg, and Viva Rio.