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Secret Stockpiles

Arms Caches and Disarmament Efforts in Mozambique

By Gary Littlejohn

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AAs	Áreas de assembleia (Assembly Areas)
AIM	Agência de Informação de Moçambique (Mozambique News Agency)
CCF	Comissão de Cessar Fogo (Cease-fire Commission)
CCM	Conselho Cristão de Moçambique (Christian Council of Mozambique)
CTNAs	Centros de Tropas Não Acantonadas (Centres for Troops Not in Cantonment)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
FADM	Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique)
FIC	Força de Inteligência Comunitária (Community Intelligence Force)
FIR	Força de Intervenção Rápida (Rapid Intervention Force)
FOMICRES	Força Moçambicana para a Investigação de Crimes e Reinserção Social (Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reintegration)
FPLM	Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
GoM	Government of Mozambique
GPA	General Peace Accord for Mozambique (1992)
MDM	Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (Democratic Movement of Mozambique)
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance

ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (1992–94)
OR	Operation Rachel
PDD	Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (Party for Peace, Democracy and Development)
PRM	Polícia da República de Moçambique (Police of the Republic of Mozambique)
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAPS	South African Police Service
TAE	Transformação das Armas em Enxadas (Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares)
UD	União Democrática (Democratic Union)
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General

About the author

Gary Littlejohn is a former member of the editorial boards of the journals *Economy and Society, Review of African Political Economy, Journal of Southern African Studies,* and *Não Vamos Esquecer*. He has worked on various short-term consultancies for the Government of Mozambique, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, the Joint Economic Commission for Africa-FAO Agricultural Division (JEFAD) of the UN, the European Commission, the International Finance Corporation, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Africa Institute of Strategic Studies (US Department of Defense), and the Small Arms Survey. From 1982 to 1983 the author taught and was engaged in field work at the Centre of African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Mozambique. He has since returned to Mozambique more than a dozen times. Gary Littlejohn travels and lectures worldwide; he is fluent in Portuguese and French and has a working knowledge of Russian.

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Map 1 Mozambique
TANZANIA
L. Malawi
ZAMBIA
NIASSA
CABO DELGADO
Lichinga
Pemba
MALAWI
Lilongwe
Lurio
Nampula
NAMPULA
TETE
L. Cahora Bassa
Zambezi
Tete
ZAMBÉZIA
MOZAMBIQUE
Quelimane
ZIMBABWE
SOFALA
Chimoio
MANICA
Beira
INDIAN
OCEAN
Save
Limpopo
INHAMBANE
GAZA
Inhambane
SOUTH AFRICA
MAPUTO
Xai-Xai
Maputo
Mbabane
SWAZILAND
0 km 200
International boundary
Province boundary
Capital city
Province capital
Selected roads

Introduction

More than 20 years have passed since the peace process in Mozambique concluded in late 1994. The process was overseen by a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), which was carried out during the peace agreement between the Government of Mozambique and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance, RENAMO)[1] in October 1992 and which lasted until 9 December 1994.[2] The governing party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO), had been conducting lengthy, complex negotiations with RENAMO rebel forces for some time—negotiations which resulted in a ceasefire for the country on 4 October 1992 (Vines, 2013, p. 178). The General Peace Accord for Mozambique (GPA) provided for the disarmament of both parties and for the integration of reduced FRELIMO and RENAMO forces into a single national army.

The disarmament process that followed was fraught with difficulties, mainly arising from mistrust between the two signatories of the GPA. Despite various and repeated attempts, the process of arms collection was limited and there was considerable concern about hidden stockpiles guarded by RENAMO (Vines, 1998, pp. 192–93). One reason for this concern was the significant increase in armed crime in South Africa noted since 1989, which in part was attributed to arms leaking from the Mozambican conflict across the shared border (Vines, 1998, p. 203). Within Mozambique it was feared that armed conflict would reignite if political differences persisted. In response to certain disagreements with FRELIMO, many of which pertained to election processes, RENAMO periodically threatened to return to armed conflict. Such threats seemed credible because of RENAMO's hidden arms caches.

Although RENAMO initially fared well in national elections, its performance deteriorated over time, and periodically its leadership resorted to the threat of armed conflict as a means to secure high-level negotiations with the government. There was little armed conflict, however, until almost 20 years after the end of the peace process.

Eventually armed conflict broke out again in 2013 and continued into 2015, despite attempts by both parties and mediators to resolve the situation. Negotiations striving to contain or terminate the conflict were so drawn out that they fuelled the fear that the conflict would ultimately spiral out of control. Although a return to full-scale civil war seemed unlikely, the conflict nevertheless bore serious economic consequences (Hanlon, 2014a, p. 4) and threatened to disrupt presidential and parliamentary elections set for 2014. The absence of conventional democratic processes was believed to discourage foreign investment in Mozambique, thereby hampering future economic stability.

This Working Paper reviews disarmament efforts conducted during the ONUMOZ period of 1992–94. It considers three subsequent arms-recovery programmes carried out and describes the delicate nature of cooperation that took place between state and non-state agencies. The paper also assesses the implications of disarmament for Mozambique and the international community.

Background

The peace process, 1988–94

From 1987 to 1988 President Joaquim Chissano instituted a 'review of FRELIMO's economic, foreign and civil rights policies' (Rupiya, 1998, p. 14). In 1989, FRELIMO consequently renounced its ideology of Marxism–Leninism, announcing this decision at its party congress in July, thereby also facilitating an agreement that the West might be willing to support. Simultaneously, in 1988–89 a military stalemate was at play (Vines, 2013, p. 377). Following communication between the Mozambican government and the Catholic Church, in September 1988 Pope John Paul II embarked on a tour of southern Africa, including a visit to Mozambique. Prior to the pope's arrival in Mozambique:

> *Chissano met President P.W. Botha of South Africa at Songo in Tete Province and secured a pledge to abide by the earlier Nkomati Accord which this time was thought to have been largely honoured* (Rupiya, 1998, p. 14).

According to the Nkomati Accord of 1984, South Africa agreed to stop supplying arms and other support to RENAMO, and Mozambique in turn agreed to close down the military operations of the anti-apartheid African National Congress situated in Mozambique (Rupiya, 1998, p. 13). Notwithstanding promises, until 1992 South Africa continued to supply support to a large RENAMO base on the Mozambican–South African border at Nungwe.[3]

Nevertheless the above-mentioned diplomatic developments of 1988 had paved the way for a 'breakthrough in February 1989 when church leaders returned from talks in Kenya with a clear message' (Rupiya, 1998, p. 14), a message that negotiations with RENAMO could be successful. Talks held in Nairobi among Church leaders and RENAMO led to further direct negotiations between RENAMO and FRELIMO in Rome in July 1990, hosted by the

Sant' Egidio Catholic lay community (Vines, 2013, p. 377). In addition, the Constitution of Mozambique was changed in 1990 to accommodate a multi-party system (Macaringue, 2003, p. 139).

Meanwhile, by late 1988, although the South African government had largely ceased to supply RENAMO with weapons, freelance arms suppliers continued to do so[4] and mediation efforts proved difficult. Five rounds of talks in Rome had yielded only a partial ceasefire by December 1990, with an agreement that 'in return for the confinement of Zimbabwean troops along the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors, RENAMO would cease its attacks on … strategic trade routes' (Rupiya, 1998, p. 15).

With the limitations of the 1990 ceasefire, fighting intensified in 1991 in the far south of Mozambique.[5] From 1991 to 1992, drought—precipitated by mild El Niño conditions and felt most acutely in the middle of the country—was taking a toll on RENAMO forces. Food supplies ran low and people were effectively starved out; many adult men departed for Zimbabwe, leaving child soldiers behind to lead their encampments. Large numbers of women and children in turn moved to refugee camps along the Beira Corridor.[6] In the centre of the country, RENAMO had been partially contained both by Zimbabwean forces who had been defending the Beira–Mutare railway line since 1982 and by Tanzanian forces who had been operating in Zambézia Province from 1986 onwards.[7] The difficult circumstances RENAMO was facing, the sustained mediation efforts, and lengthy negotiations eventually led to the signing of the GPA in Rome on 4 October 1992.

As part of the GPA, ONUMOZ was established, during which the existing government was recognized as sovereign. The roots of many prevailing political problems in Mozambique can be traced to the end of the civil war and to the time of the ONUMOZ mission. ONUMOZ oversaw the disarmament process, which was fraught with difficulties. In addition to the disarmament that was seen to be integral to the termination of armed conflict, the GPA envisaged 'four phases: the ceasefire, the separation of forces, the concentration of forces into a new army, and demobilisation' (Vines, 2013, p. 378).[8]

President Joaquim Chissano receives the protocol for demobilization conducted under the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) held from 1992 to 1994; in Maputo, July 1994. Source: Sérgio Santimano/UN Photo

Demobilization proceeded fairly smoothly, owing to a desire of many troops to leave the armed forces. Disarmament was linked to the formation of a new army, and to the physical separation of forces into different places, referred to as Áreas de assembleia (Assembly Areas, AAs). A second designation was created for the locations of troops who did not comply with the requirement to enter the AAs. Such troops were located in areas known as Centros de Tropas Não Acantonadas (Centres for Troops Not in Cantonment, CTNAs), yet certain attempts were made to disarm them. The separation of forces into AAs and CTNAs, the disarmament itself, and the formation of the new army were all problematic processes as explained below (see 'The ONUMOZ period, 1992–94'). Elections held 27–29 October 1994 for a president and for deputies of the Assembly of the Republic were both won by FRELIMO. When its mandate ended on 9 December 1994, ONUMOZ then withdrew from Mozambique (UNSG, 1994, para. 1).

While the GPA was being signed in 1992, the Angolan peace process was disintegrating, after slow and ineffective progress.[9] Against this backdrop,

A Mozambican woman casts her ballot at a polling station in Catembe for elections held on 28 October 1994. Source: Pernaca Sudhakaran/UN Photo

FRELIMO was cautious about the outcome of the agreement and the uncertain effectiveness of the involvement of ONUMOZ. Certain British citizens living in Mozambique at the time reported that ONUMOZ was set up with limited funding and was thus eager to declare itself a success, precisely in contrast to the failure of the UN in Angola. ONUMOZ had held fairly fractious relations with the Government of Mozambique and had acted unilaterally at times.[10]

RENAMO's development as a political party

During the peace process, RENAMO faced the challenge of transforming itself essentially from a rebel force into a political party. Some of its members received basic skills training in political participation[11] and, accordingly, RENAMO fared well in the 1994 elections. In October 1994, it was the main opposition party in the national presidential and parliamentary elections.

From the elections of October 1999 to 2014, RENAMO electoral results have undergone a gradual long-term decline (Vines, 2013, p. 383) and with it, the prospects of it reaching political power peacefully have diminished. It has responded in part by challenging the organization and rules of the electoral process. To date RENAMO has not been the only political party to express their objections; various reports have circulated of FRELIMO using government resources to fund and otherwise logistically support election campaigns (Hanlon, 2014j, 2014l; Vines, 2013, pp. 383–90). Tables 1 to 3 summarize the electoral results for RENAMO from 1994 to 2014.

Despite its considerable success in the first multiparty elections, RENAMO did not build a strong organizational foundation for democratic political activity. Nor did it develop a defined strategy for the economic and social future of the country and any attempts to do so were reportedly stifled by existing heads, such as Afonso Dhlakama who has been in leadership since 1980 (Vines, 2013, p. 390). The failure to develop into a fully-fledged democratic party, coupled with the periodic abandoning of peaceful politics, led to a steady decline in votes for RENAMO.

Table 1 **Presidential elections in Mozambique, 1994–2014 (% of vote secured)**

Political candidate, party represented	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
Joaquim Chissano, FRELIMO	53.4	52.4	–	–	–
Armando Guebuza, FRELIMO	–	–	63.6	75.0	–
Filipe Nyusi, FRELIMO	–	–	–	–	57.0
Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO	33.7	47.7	31.7	16.4	36.6
Daviz Simango, MDM	–	–	–	9	6.4

Notes: – indicates the party did not participate in election in the year indicated.
Percentages given may not total exactly 100 due to rounding of numbers.

Sources: Hanlon (2014j, p. 2; 2014l, p. 1); Vines (2013, p. 383)

Table 2 **Parliamentary elections in Mozambique, 1994–2014 (% of vote secured)**

Political party	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
FRELIMO	44.3	48.5	62.0	74.7	55.7
RENAMO	37.8	38.8	29.7	17.7	32.9
MDM	–	–	–	–	8.5

Note: – indicates the party did not participate in election in the year indicated.
Sources: Hanlon (2014l, p. 2); Vines (2013, p. 384)

Table 3 **Number of parliamentary seats secured in Mozambique, 1994–2014**

Political party	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
FRELIMO	129	133	160	191	144
RENAMO	117	112	90	51	89
UD	9	–	–	–	–
MDM	–	–	–	8	17

Note: – indicates the party did not participate in election in the year indicated.
Sources: Hanlon (2014j, p. 3); Vines (2013, p. 384)

Dhlakama effectively withdrew from national politics, firstly by leaving the capital city of Maputo for Nampula, a provincial capital in the north of Mozambique, and then by moving to Saturnjira, close to the former guerrilla headquarters in Gorongosa District, Sofala Province (Vines, 2013, pp. 386–87). This retreat from participation in national, parliamentary politics, with the resulting loss of feedback on the impact of Dhlakama's decisions, probably

paved the way for what would become an armed confrontation between RENAMO and the Government of Mozambique in 2013 and 2014.

An electoral turning point for RENAMO occurred in 1999 (see Tables 1–3), when FRELIMO supporters, among others, expressed their suspicion concerning the presidential vote.[12] Accordingly FRELIMO adopted a more aggressive approach to the elections, with 'some irregularities in the 1999 and 2004 elections' (Vines, 2013, p. 383). In response RENAMO staged protests throughout Mozambique in 1999, on grounds of alleged electoral fraud. Elections, however, were only one of the challenges RENAMO faced. The party's difficulty integrating into the civil service at the local level had effectively deprived it of its patronage, as it refused 'to allow qualified government teachers and health personnel to come into its zones' (Manning, 1998, p. 185; cited in Vines, 2013, p. 384).

Although it received support from the Mozambican state, RENAMO did not manage it correctly and between 1999 and 2004, about half of the funds went unaccounted for (Vines, 2013, p. 384). The internal organization of the party was poor and as it lost seats, state funding declined. The party reacted by organizing various protests, generally regarding the elections. It also tended to obstruct parliament or to withdraw decisions from it, usually seeking high-level bilateral negotiations instead. Ineffectiveness in the party generated internal divisions, with members defecting to create new parties, the most successful of which was the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (Democratic Movement of Mozambique, MDM) (see Table 3). According to Vines, 'FRELIMO capitalised on these divisions' (2013, p. 385).

Since the return to armed violence in 2013 and as of mid-2015, RENAMO fared much better in elections and there was a higher voter turnout in 2014 than in the previous two elections (Hanlon, 2014j, p. 2). This may have raised RENAMO's expectations of further concessions, posing further challenges to resolving the current conflict. As of mid-2015, despite this apparent reversal of fortunes—including an improvement in parliament for MDM and a stable vote for RENAMO—FRELIMO remains dominant.

Disarmament and arms-recovery programmes

The ONUMOZ period, 1992–94

When the GPA was signed in 1992, peace was tenuous and considerable mistrust persisted between the signatories. Neither the government nor the opposition wished to surrender all their firearms (Rupiya, 1998, p. 16) and the ONUMOZ disarmament process proved problematic.[13] Problems included the disputes over the selection and location of the AAs, the reluctance of both sides to send their troops to be quartered in the AAs as defined by ONUMOZ, the handing in of old weapons, and the hiding of arms caches. Poor conditions in the camps led to mutinies and riots in the first half of 1994 (Vines, 2013, p. 379).

The creation of a new integrated army posed certain difficulties, too. In response, the Comissão de Cessar Fogo (Cease-fire Commission, CFF) introduced a mechanism with which to verify the existence of undeclared small arms and light weapons held in either caches or depots. This ultimately led to the verification of 754 locations, belonging to RENAMO and the government, both declared and undeclared (UNSG, 1994, paras. 12–13). The verification process enabled an assessment of the nature and scope of the arms caches. However, because ONUMOZ found it impossible to enforce a complete disarmament by the conclusion of its mandate (Rupiya, 1998, p. 16), not all arms caches were uncovered.[14]

According to Vines (2013, p. 381), head of ONUMOZ Aldo Ajello, 'admitted that disarmament was never his priority, as he believed this would undermine the peace process'. Similarly, disarmament appeared to be of low importance to President Chissano who feared that disarmament-related incentives would lure away too many of the soldiers in his forces and leave him exposed (Vines, 1998, p. 200).[15] Numerous arms caches had thus not

Head of ONUMOZ Aldo Ajello shakes hands with President of RENAMO Afonso Dhlakama after his demobilization, Maringué, August 1994. Source: Grant Neuenburg/UN Photo

been destroyed by 1994. The return of war in Angola following its elections in October 1992 may have affected prevailing attitudes in Mozambique, too.[16] Arms caches are by nature contentious, but even more so when elections are pending and political tensions are running high. Hunguana argues that, as a political party, RENAMO should have had no armed forces and that this 'mistake' stems from the incomplete implementation of the GPA (Hunguana, 2013).

By the end of the ONUMOZ mandate, many caches reported had not been verified by the CCF and RENAMO had halted all verification of its declared locations. Despite this, the Mozambican government declined a UN proposal to maintain a small team in the country in the post-ONUMOZ period, with which to complete the small arms and light weapons verification process (Vines, 1998, p. 195). Collections were carried out at both AAs and CTNAs. Troops were expected to arrive at AAs and hand over their weapons. Because

Table 4 **Arms collected by ONUMOZ, 1992–94**

Location, phase, or source of firearms	Totals
AAs and CTNAs (government and RENAMO)	104,606
Verification phase	46,193
Other source (e.g. unilaterally demobilized government troops, armed, paramilitary, private and irregular troops)	56,227
Total	**207,026**

Note: These figures are based on the Final Report of the Chairman of the CCF; they exclude 6,925 counted items (vehicles and heavy weapons) also collected.

Source: Berman (1996, p. 88)

both sides were reluctant to do this, ONUMOZ had to seek out troops who were assembled and housed, but not in the official AAs. Troops who were still expected to participate in disarmament were in the CTNAs. In total, the UN handed in 180,000 small arms and light weapons to the new Mozambican army, but destroyed only 24,000 (Vines, 1998, p. 194). Table 4 indicates a higher reported figure of arms submitted, however.

When figures for collections at the AAs and CTNAs include the 6,925 heavier items (i.e. those excluded from total in Table 4), they yield totals of 94,063 for government weapons and 17,468 for RENAMO weapons.

In an attempt to keep the peace process on track, certain creative responses were developed (Berman, 1996, p. 85). They included 'a Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) of monthly support for two years in cash' (Vines, 2013, p. 380) for each demobilized soldier and the verification phase of disarmament. While the verification phase recorded substantial additional military equipment, the process was noteworthy for highlighting its potential achievements, rather than its actual results (Berman, 1996, p. 85). The greatest weakness of ONUMOZ was that it did not effectively prioritize disarmament.

This reluctance may be explained as a result of the hostility shown by RENAMO towards the UN (Vines, 2013, p. 379).

During its term of activity, ONUMOZ hindered complete disarmament by effectively allowing RENAMO to maintain its bases in various parts of the country and by failing to collect all of their small arms. RENAMO in turn further impeded the process by handing in older models of weapons and withholding newer ones, this effectively serving as an 'insurance policy'.[17] Their newer weapons were stored in caches that were hidden, sometimes underground. Such a tactic is feasible in a large country with a widely dispersed population.

Operation Rachel: reducing the arms caches

Within months of the October elections, the Government of Mozambique embarked on a series of operations in collaboration with the South African Firearms Investigation Unit of the South African Police Service (SAPS), in an effort to collect and destroy arms originating in Mozambique (Vines, 1998, p. 202). These missions were referred to collectively as Operation Rachel.[18] To this end, President Nelson Mandela and President Chissano signed an agreement in March 1995 (Hennop, 2006, p. 24).

South Africa was motivated by its rising armed crime and by intelligence received by the SAPS who suggested that arms were leaking from Mozambique into South Africa (Vines, 1998, p. 203). With the demise of apartheid, cooperation between the two governments became smoother. Between 1995 and 2008 there were 28 such missions, including certain sub-operations. Despite a hiatus between the 27th mission in October 2006 and the 28th in November 2008, the latter was the second-largest mission conducted to date (see Table 5).

Because such operations were intelligence-led, neither the intelligence sources nor the locations of the arms caches were publicly disclosed. This served to avoid jeopardizing any future arms-recovery operations. Some data was released by a now defunct South African NGO, *SaferAfrica* (Hennop, 2006);

Table 5 **Arms and ammunition collected under Operation Rachel, 1995–2008**

Year	Small arms collected	Ammunition collected
1995	1,127	23,153
1996	488	136,639
1997	5,683	3,000,000
1998	4,693	155,314
1999	12,036	3,315,106
2000	2,415	83,276
2001	3,930	486,000
2002	4,930	11,004,018
2003	1,637	2,200,001
2004	2,453	2,100,038
2005	3,189	1,666,808
2006	3,170	300,000
2008	6,124	7,000,000
Total	**51,875**	**31,470,353**

Sources: Hennop (2006, p. 25); unpublished data supplied by FOMICRES (2008)

Tables 5 and 6 incorporate data provided confidentially in 2008 by FOMICRES, otherwise unpublished. Consequently, although most of the data in Table 6 was published by *SaferAfrica* in 2006, the table also contains data through to 2008.

Because the data in Table 6 is incomplete, it does not correspond precisely to Table 5. It does indicate, however, the timeframe of relatively small missions and their geographical reach. These smaller missions illustrate the ambitious nature of Operation Rachel, which covered several provinces at once at times, and which lasted for more than 13 years. The figures provided illustrate that, while some success was achieved over a long period in recovering those arms not collected during the ONUMOZ mission, large numbers of arms still went unaccounted for.[19]

Under Operation Rachel, members of both countries' police forces (the SAPS and the PRM) load the contents of a weapons cache discovered in Northern Mozambique onto a truck; they include AK-47 automatic rifles and ammunition, RPG-7 rockets and launchers, mortars, and landmines; August 2003. Source: Halden Krog/EPA

Table 6 **Operation Rachel missions: timing, arms collected, and location, 1995–2008**

Title of Operation Rachel (OR)	Date	Number of small arms collected	Provinces as provided
OR I	November 1995	1,127	Maputo, Gaza
OR II	September/October 1996	488	–
OR III	July/August 1997	5,683	Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Manica
OR IV	October 1998	4,388	Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Manica, Zambézia
OR V (1)	February 1999	446	Gaza
OR V (2)	April 1999	4	Gaza
OR V (3)	July 1999	998	Maputo
OR V (4)	October 1999	866	Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane
OR VI (1)	October 1999	151	Maputo, Sofala
OR VI (2)	June 2000	362	Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane
OR Ad Hoc 1	July 2000	4	Gaza
OR VI (3)	July 2000	180	Gaza
OR Ad Hoc 2	–	12	–
OR VI (4)	–	448	–
OR VI (5)	–	381	–
OR Ad Hoc 3	March 2001	11	Gaza
OR VII (1)	May 2001	1,452	Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Manica, Tete
OR Ad Hoc 4	July 2001	72	Maputo
OR VII (2)	September 2001	2,495	Maputo, Manica, Sofala, Tete, Niassa, Cabo Delgado
OR VIII (1)	May 2002	2,247	Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Zambézia, Tete, Nampula, Cabo Delgado
OR VIII (2)	–	2,566	–

OR IX	August 2003	1,598	Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Zambézia, Tete, Nampula, Cabo Delgado
OR X (1)	May 2004	256	Maputo City, Maputo Province
OR X (2)	October 2004	1,741	Nampula, Cabo Delgado, Zambézia, Gaza, Tete, Niassa, Maputo City, Maputo Province
OR XI (1)	October 2005	3,174	Nampula, Zambézia, Gaza, Tete, Niassa, Maputo, Sofala, Inhambane
OR XI (2)	November 2005	15	Gaza, Maputo
OR XII (1)	October 2006	3,070	Nampula, Zambézia, Gaza, Tete, Niassa, Maputo
OR XII (2)	November 2008	6,798	–
Total	**28 operations**	**41,033**	**–**

Note: – indicates no data is available.
The definition of small arms used in this table excludes items such as ammunition, RPG rockets, hand grenades, and detonators. With the exception of OR XI (2), in all operations in which only small quantities of small arms were collected, more than a million rounds of ammunition and other ordnance were nonetheless collected.

Sources: Hennop (2006, p. 25); unpublished data supplied by FOMICRES (2008)

The delicate nature of arms recovery is evident in that the government was willing to collaborate with the Mozambican NGO, Transformação das Armas em Enxadas (Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares, TAE) (Faltas and Paes, 2004, p. 30).[20] Such cooperation may have come about because the national police, the Polícia da República de Moçambique (Police of the Republic of Mozambique, PRM) was considered not entirely reliable (Faltas and Paes, 2004, p. 9), and TAE had access to intelligence that was not available to the police. It is noteworthy that in addition to more than a million rounds of ammunition collected during Operation Rachel (see note to Table 6 above), TAE collected a further substantial number of rounds of ammunition.

Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares (TAE)

TAE, which was established by the Christian Council of Mozambique, shared in (and thereby also became key to) the source of core information on arms locations in the country. Because most of this intelligence information pertained to RENAMO-held arms caches, RENAMO felt singled out.[21] Militias formerly armed by the government had already voluntarily disarmed after the ceasefire and during the ONUMOZ period, at least in urban areas. While

Table 7 **TAE arms collection totals, October 1995 to October 2003**

Type of arm collected	Total
AKM	4,671
Pistols (various)	754
MG	41
PPX	561
Bazooka	150
Mortars (various)	116
Machine guns PK	77
Machine gun components	32
Mauser	283
G3	186
Semi-automatics	263
Grenade launchers	50
Rifles	520
FBP	109
M20	32
ZG1	5
Total	**7,850**

Source: Faltas and Paes (2004, p. 18)

small quantities of arms are possibly still to be found in rural areas, the focus on RENAMO arms caches to the exclusion of other parties was understandable under the circumstances.[22] This is because non-RENAMO arms distributed to civilian militias in the countryside were probably scattered, poorly maintained, and largely not very useful. The RENAMO arms caches have probably been preserved in oil to prevent them from rusting and are guarded by those who are loyal to RENAMO. Such arms might be sold into South Africa or used for political armed conflict in Mozambique.

TAE and Operation Rachel were both established in 1995 and they soon evolved to work in a complementary manner. However, within the TAE, personnel from Força de Inteligência Comunitária (Community Intelligence Force, FIC) took the lead as partners of the TAE in the weapons collection process.[23] Although resources were limited, support of civil society for small arms and light weapons interventions in Mozambique was still considerable; this was the first disarmament project ever to have been run by civil society in the country. TAE's objective was to use a creative and peaceful disarmament initiative to promote a culture of peace (Faltas and Paes, 2004, p. 14). From 1995 to 2003, the efforts of TAE had resulted in the collection of thousands of firearms (see Table 7). The project exchanged firearms collected for tools or goods needed locally and then destroyed the weapons. In some cases, local artists created metal sculptures from the remains of firearms.

From 2003 onwards, financial constraints rendered the TAE less active. These constraints impinged on its ability to provide development incentives, such as village wells in exchange for arms. Following a critical report (Faltas and Paes, 2004), TAE was reorganized and its personnel changed, largely in response to the critical evaluation carried out in 2004.[24] TAE responded positively to the evaluation by improving its record keeping and reducing its staff by 2006. This staff reduction essentially consisted of the FIC staff leaving their partnership with TAE and operating independently. Despite the TAE initially showing resilience and sustaining its relationships with international partners,[25] it has since come to a near standstill.[26]

International donors who view Mozambique as an example of post-conflict success (in terms of disarmament and demobilization and the technical processes therein) have since withdrawn their support. TAE had been a successful civil society initiative, yet the problems resulting in part from its response to the critical report led to its effectiveness waning as funding was reduced. This regrettable outcome indicates that civil society participation in arms reduction is not merely delicate, but that it is a political process with an easily jeopardized outcome.

The Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reintegration (FOMICRES)

Prior to the 2006 reorganization of TAE, FIC started recording its collection figures separately while still in partnership with TAE (see Table 8). As it separated more formally from TAE in 2006, it was renamed Força Moçambicana para a Investigação de Crimes e Reinserção Social (Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reintegration, FOMICRES).[27]

Because of the favourable intelligence links that FOMICRES fostered with RENAMO,[28] it was able to continue with arms collection and remained successful. The figures in Table 8 cover the arms collection over the transitional period of 2003 to 2004.

Summary of disarmament

To calculate the possible scale of the RENAMO arms caches never disclosed, one can deduct from the estimates of small arms distributed during the conflict period the numbers of such arms officially recovered later on. The three programmes, ONUMOZ, Operation Rachel, and TAE, supplied the figures informing Table 9, which summarizes the arms collection and destruction conducted during and after the ONUMOZ mission.

Table 8 **FIC/TAE arms collection totals, October 2003 to December 2004**

Type of armament	Total
AKM	465
Pistols (various)	77
MG	6
PPX	100
Bazooka/RPG 7	34
Mortars (various)	10
Machine guns PK	15
Machine gun parts	8
Mauser	92
G3	43
Semi-automatics	215
Grenade launchers	0
Rifles	48
FBP	49
M20	2
ZG1	0
Total arms collected	**1,164**

Note: After 2004, FOMICRES took on further peacebuilding activities and crime reduction in the cities. Its peacebuilding work meant that it retained its sources of information within RENAMO. (Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES, Maputo, April 2013.)

Source: unpublished data provided by FOMICRES (2008)

Table 9 **Small arms distribution to RENAMO and subsequent collection in Mozambique**

Small arms distributed	Number of items
Distributed to RENAMO combatants	48,000–105,000
Small arms collected	**Number of items**
Collected by ONUMOZ, 1992–94	207,026
Collected by Operation Rachel, 1995–2008	51,875
Collected by TAE, 1995–2003	7,850
Collected by FOMICRES, 2003–04	1,164
Total collected	**267,915**

Note: This table gives the highest published estimate of the total number of firearms distributed to militias. This may be an overestimate, since the population of Mozambique in 1980 was 12.1 million, and more than half were under 18. The table indicates the upper limit of the range of estimates on this number, and therewith, the worst-case scenario.

Sources: Berman (1996, p. 88; see Table 4); Faltas and Paes (2004, p. 18; see Table 7); Leão (2004, p. 98); unpublished data provided by FOMICRES (2008; see Tables 5 and 8)

Vines estimates that ONUMOZ collected arms totalling 204,000, of which 180,000 were handed over to the new army and 24,000 destroyed (Vines, 1998, p. 194). Since only 40 per cent of RENAMO locations officially declared were ultimately visited during the ONUMOZ mandate (Vines, 1998, p. 195), one may assume that RENAMO handed over only a proportion of their arms, presumably the most obsolete ones. Assuming that the 24,000 arms destroyed came predominantly from RENAMO, it is likely that of the 48,000–105,000 RENAMO arms *not* collected during the ONUMOZ period, between 24,000 and 81,000 remained hidden in their original caches. This resulting estimate is derived from subtracting 24,000 from the estimate of total arms originally distributed (see Table 9).

The sum of the TAE, FOMICRES, and Operation Rachel collection figures indicates that 60,889 arms were collected after the ONUMOZ period. This in turn suggests that as many as 20,111 arms (81,000 minus 60,889) may

still be in the possession of RENAMO. Even if the numbers of arms once distributed to militias and RENAMO are overestimated, considerable hidden caches appear to linger on in the country. Neither the locations of arms collection points nor the caches themselves have been made public. TAE and Operation Rachel were politically sensitive programmes and therefore reliant upon intelligence regarding specific caches, sometimes at short notice. Operation Rachel provided its data regarding location figures by province only, not by specific location (see Table 6).

Further details on locations of arms caches

Information obtained by the author during fieldwork in 2014 makes it possible to infer district locations of the largest arms caches under RENAMO control.[29] The five districts with the largest known caches all lie in Sofala Province: Maringué, Gorongosa, Nhamatanda, Buzi, and Chibavava (see Map 2). At times, the town of Maringué, in Maringué District, has functioned as Dhlakama's headquarters.[30]

On his visits to RENAMO sites over the years, Albino Forquilha, director of FOMICRES, reports having seen anti-aircraft weapons.[31] This would imply that RENAMO has a greater military capacity and owns more sophisticated weaponry than is generally assumed. For example, recalling his meeting with Dhlakama in Nampula in September 2010, Vines described Dhlakama's guard of honour as being poorly dressed and brandishing old arms (Vines, 2013, p. 392). This seems to suggest limited resources. Similarly, Paul Fauvet, a British journalist based in Mozambique, has expressed the view that RENAMO may have hundreds of troops in the centre of the country, rather than thousands.[32] Despite such impressions, evidence nevertheless suggests that large arms caches in Sofala Province have been and are still successfully hidden by RENAMO for at least 20 years. In addition, it seems likely that some recent armed attacks in 2013 and 2014 in Mozambique have been wrongly attributed to RENAMO,[33] possibly as a cover for criminal activity.



Since neither Operation Rachel nor any subsequent mission has collected arms from the substantial caches to be found in the five Sofala Districts, even though Sofala Province was often listed when large numbers of arms were collected (see Table 6), the scale of these caches cannot be gauged. Nevertheless, according to Fauvet, the presence of reportedly large caches shows that—whatever tensions persist between the neglected RENAMO military in the countryside and the political leadership in the cities—the military has remained fundamentally loyal in protecting the locations of their arms caches.[34]

The intelligence sources that fed Operation Rachel and TAE are unlikely to have come from the SAPS. They were more likely to have been of Mozambican origins, especially those associated with FOMICRES.[35] Decades earlier, in 1981, the intelligence functions of the SAPS had been transferred to the South African Defence Force (SADF), at least initially (Sanders, 2006, p. 150), and so consequently the SAPS intelligence contacts were probably to all intents and purposes no longer reliable.

Arms recovery operations subsequently carried out in collaboration between Mozambique and South Africa, such as Operation Rachel, focused primarily on collecting weapons found in RENAMO caches. This is borne out by the evidence that at times Operation Rachel staff also seized radio and other telecommunications equipment, which could only have belonged to RENAMO.[36] It is known that unlike other parties, such as FRELIMO and civilian militias, RENAMO owned sophisticated radio equipment.

The fact that such equipment was available to RENAMO implied that RENAMO had the capability rapidly to mobilize and coordinate its forces for any renewed armed conflict. Dhlakama mentioned on occasion that he had the means available to mobilize soldiers, should he so wish. For example, in February 2007 he claimed that in the Zambézia Province alone he could mobilize 5,000 soldiers; the implication being that sufficient weapons to equip them were hidden, but available (*Canal de Moçambique*, 2007). In 2009, researcher Nikkei Wiegink was informed by a RENAMO source that it had 3,000 former combatants in Maringué District, Sofala Province.[37] This constitutes a considerable number of potential combatants within a single district, and indicates that the hidden arms in the same district would have been readily usable by a substantial force, presumably at fairly short notice.

Prevailing concerns

RENAMO split

In May 2009, Dhlakama moved to the northern city of Nampula, effectively demonstrating his disconnection from parliamentary politics, yet claiming he would thus be closer to the electorate (Vines, 2013, p. 386). His move north was prior to the national elections of October 2009 and may have stemmed from the establishing of two breakaway parties, the Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (Party for Peace, Democracy and Development, PDD) in 2004 and the MDM in March 2009. The MDM held a strong base in Beira, the second-largest city in Mozambique, which might otherwise be suitable political territory for RENAMO.

Following alleged attempts in December 2011 and April 2012 to repair the situation through meetings with the new President Armando Guebuza, Dhlakama left Nampula in October 2012 for Saturnjira, Gorongosa, situated near the former guerrilla base of Casa Banana. He later mentioned that he was training up his supporters for renewed conflict (Vines, 2013, p. 387). Sofala was the RENAMO heartland and held a concentration of former combatants, as supported by evidence on the main arms caches (see Map 2). A core group of older former combatants was living at Saturnjira and Dhlakama had maintained links with his mid-level commanders.

In late 2012, Dhlakama agreed to talks between the government and RENAMO in Maputo, although there was little progress from December 2012 onwards. Talks were stalled as the government moved its armed forces to near Saturnjira early in April 2013, doubtless causing tensions to rise (Littlejohn, 2013). In early April 2013, open conflict broke out between government forces and RENAMO forces in this region (Vines, 2013, p. 287).[38] Thereafter political developments were intertwined with the conflict to some extent.

Despite politics being overshadowed by violence, for a time the violence itself took place within a fairly contained and sparsely populated geographical area. This factor, combined with the determination of other political parties (including FRELIMO) to carry on with local and national elections, suggests that the effect of the violence on the elections was also limited. This weakened RENAMO in its negotiations. Yet when violence became more widespread in January 2014, the government embarked on more serious negotiations.

In the presidential elections of October 2014, FRELIMO candidate Filipe Nyusi won 57 per cent of the vote and Dhlakama came second with 37 per cent. FRELIMO also secured a majority of parliamentary seats (Hanlon, 2014j, pp. 1, 3). The MDM, which had formerly split from RENAMO, won 6 per cent of the presidential votes. According to Hanlon (2014j, p. 1) 'the election was again overshadowed by misconduct and unfairness, and there were problems in at least 12% of polling stations'. While such electoral difficulties hindered national reconciliation, they point to a remarkable resilience in the political support of RENAMO—despite it having boycotted the election process in 2013 (Hanlon, 2014j, p. 4) and Dhlakama refusing to leave his headquarters for a part of 2014. The electorate seemingly did not wholly blame RENAMO for the recent violence. What else might have prompted that violence?

Violence of 2013–14

In early April 2013, 'nine people were killed in a confrontation between RENAMO supporters and the government in Muxúnguè, Sofala Province' (Vines, 2013, p. 387). The context for this confrontation was police suspicion concerning Dhlakama's move to Saturnjira, no doubt exacerbated by his claims of training military personnel. FRELIMO had sent a large number of the Força de Intervenção Rápida (Rapid Intervention Force, FIR), a paramilitary police force reporting to the Ministry of the Interior) in an attempt to physically surround his base. Tensions had been mounting for several

Local civilians flee after gunmen attacked a local police station in Maringué, 22 October 2013. Source: Andre Catueira/EPA

months. Dhlakama had taken up residence on top of a mountain, reachable only by a winding road, and around which several villages were scattered. It was nigh impossible for a large military force to approach the location undetected by villagers who would then alert others. Accordingly, although an attempt by the FIR to arrest Dhlakama on the grounds of being in possession of illegal arms failed, not far away about 15 RENAMO members were successfully arrested and held in a police station on 4 April 2013 (Vines, 2013, p. 387). The next day the police station was subject to a retaliatory attack in which the RENAMO members held captive were rescued, allegedly by fellow RENAMO forces (Littlejohn, 2013).

In an interview Dhlakama claimed that RENAMO generals had threatened to assassinate him if he did not order the rescue operation attack on the police station. Vines believes this claim to be untrue. Rather he maintains it 'is more likely that he realized that he [Dhlakama] had admitted to the press that he had instigated a crime' (Vines, 2013, p. 387).

A fortnight later, on 18 April, two members of parliament from RENAMO paid a visit to Dhlakama. They were arrested, allegedly without a warrant, and jailed overnight by the PRM. One of the pair was the Secretary-General of RENAMO, Ossufo Momade. According to an official account broadcast on the radio, the pair had refused to yield to a police road block and, when PRM officers attempted to halt them, the former had brandished arms (Littlejohn, 2013). This confrontation, the media coverage it garnered, and its political repercussions set in motion a series of events which were felt well into 2014. By July 2013, mediators employed to broker the difficulties and to help clarify RENAMO's demands suggested the government might make certain concessions (Hanlon, 2013a, p. 1). Dhlakama responded:

> *[F]our issues needed to be resolved: electoral law, making the civil service non-party, issues around the military, and finally a fairer share of the wealth of Mozambique* (Hanlon, 2013a, p. 2).

At the same time, road traffic on the N1, the main road running north to south through Mozambique and which passes through Sofala Province in the vicinity of significant RENAMO-held arms caches, was down by 30 per cent. This implies that people were afraid to travel in the area. Rail traffic was also said to be suffering 'enormous losses' (Hanlon, 2013a, p. 2), presumably because trains were not running for fear of assault. Reports of ongoing intransigence on both sides in August 2013 prevailed, with a series of conflicts ensuing. RENAMO carried out a raid on a railway station in Sofala Province on 12 October, a military confrontation took place on 21 October (Hanlon, 2013b, p. 1), and government forces attacked RENAMO headquarters in the same month.

By 27 October 2013, a RENAMO member of parliament had been killed in Saturnjira and confrontations on the N1 had left one person dead and ten injured (Hanlon, 2013c, pp. 1–2). On 30 October, RENAMO started to reoccupy formerly abandoned bases in Nampula Province. These bases were then subject to military action by government forces. The Maringué base

in Sofala was captured by government forces, while RENAMO again conducted attacks on the N1 road.

When RENAMO refused to attend talks, the search for intermediaries resumed (Hanlon, 2013d, pp. 1–2). By 7 November, RENAMO had launched a counter-attack in Sofala Province, killing eight soldiers and raiding a health post (Hanlon, 2013e). By 15 November, further raids by RENAMO had taken place in Sofala and Nampula, and Dhlakama proposed his core terms for peace talks.[39] His terms were: government troops were to withdraw to their former positions, national and international mediators would be agreed upon, and local elections would be postponed (Hanlon, 2013f, p. 1).

In January 2014, RENAMO attended talks in Maputo, after agreeing with the government on appointing two observers or mediators to facilitate negotiations. Meanwhile, geographically widespread fighting continued, with banks warning the media of the economic impact of the violence (Hanlon, 2014a, pp. 1–4). By March 2014, it was evident that both the conflict and the talks were continuing simultaneously. A pivotal matter of the talks was how RENAMO officers and soldiers might be integrated into the national army (Hanlon, 2014b, p. 1). Related negotiations prevailed for several months and different issues were tackled with international mediators against the backdrop of periodic conflict.

In early April, there was a de facto government acceptance that RENAMO could keep its soldiers as operational forces until after the election (Hanlon, 2014c, p. 1). Despite this concession, by 8 May, after instigating further raids on the N1 road, RENAMO unilaterally announced a ceasefire (Hanlon, 2014d, p. 1). By 9 May, Dhlakama had registered his candidacy for the presidential elections set for October 2014 (Hanlon, 2014e, p. 2). Toward the end of May, further battles took place in the Gorongosa area (Hanlon, 2014f, p. 1). Each party blamed the other. By June, Dhlakama was threatening to divide the country and verbally criticizing religious leaders, one of whom was a former mediator (Hanlon, 2014g, p. 3). By July, assaults on the road had ceased and the nomination papers for Dhlakama's presidential candidacy had been signed and submitted (Hanlon, 2014h, p. 1). By early September, Dhlakama and Guebueza convened, the presidential election campaign was

confirmed, and negotiations regarding the army and other demands put forward by RENAMO continued (Hanlon, 2014i, p. 1).

In talks between RENAMO and FRELIMO, an outstanding matter was the future recognition of political party representation within the national armed forces (Hanlon, 2014k, p. 1).[40] In late 2014, both sides were disputing access to the RENAMO-held area of Gorongosa, but by July 2015 the scene of conflict had moved to a RENAMO military base near Zobue, not far from Moatize, in Tete Province (Hanlon, 2015). Claiming that he won the recent presidential election, Dhlakama has been demanding a caretaker government in which Filipe Nyusi does not function as president, and a restructuring of the military, which is unlikely to occur. As Hanlon (2014k, p. 2) writes, 'the only thing which can be predicted is months of negotiation and confrontation, probably including military action'. In late 2014, RENAMO had still refused to demobilize before all issues were settled (Hanlon, 2014k, p. 1). As of mid-2015, the outcome of these lengthy negotiations, including on 'political parity' within the armed forces, is unknown: they were stalled in late July 2015 and fighting continued (Hanlon, 2015).

FRELIMO's difficulty in governing

As the ruling party, FRELIMO faces mounting problems of governance, apparent in the strikes and riots occurring across the country regarding wages, food, water, and electricity. Government capacity to solve problems may be further undermined if revenues decline, as happens when oil and gas prices drop. Revenues from mineral exports are linked to government income, too. Coal exports have declined rapidly; in 2014, a large Brazilian mining company suffered considerable losses in the Moatize coal mine in Tete Province.[41] These losses can be attributed to market conditions in the global economy as much as they can to the disruption of transport triggered by RENAMO-related conflict.

Mozambican election results themselves indicate that the legitimacy of FRELIMO is weakening, an echo of which is felt in the trouble the PRM faces in maintaining law and personal security. Longstanding public mistrust

toward the PRM can explain why TAE and FOMICRES acted as sources of intelligence during Operation Rachel, instead of the police; this mistrust was a matter of ongoing press reporting in 2007 and intermittently has been a matter of media debate since then. In early 2015, the lack of confidence in the PRM made front-page news. News coverage addressed the way police handled demonstrations triggered by the assassination of a prominent lawyer who favoured constitutional change (Álvaro, 2015, pp. 1–4).

Police and armed forces: difficulties in upholding the law

The PRM, whether or not in collaboration with the FIR, has displayed organizational weakness for some years. The Mozambican press has published articles accusing certain members of the PRM of being involved with organized crime gangs, with considerable criticism from the press from September 2006 to September 2007 (Littlejohn, 2008). Although overall performance may have improved since the subsequent removal of former Minister of the Interior, Jose Pacheco, public criticism remains (Hanlon, 2013e).

The FIR is effectively a paramilitary force, which adopted an active role in the conflict of April 2013. Consequently, although Mozambique has low levels of violent crime compared to certain neighbours, such as South Africa, crime levels have little to do with the PRM. For example, a series of criminal kidnappings occurred in the 2013–2014 conflict, and several months passed before it came to an end. More importantly, when the PRM plays a role in suppressing public strikes or demonstrations, it is no longer seen as impartial.

Surveys conducted by FOMICRES reveal that rates of violence, including armed violence, are increasing in Mozambique. Key contributing factors are growing unemployment and, with it, the cost of living.[42] Economic growth has largely failed to create new jobs. One feature of public violence is the return of *lixamento* (lynching), a practice in which an alleged criminal is caught by a group of civilians and burnt to death; it comes into play as mob justice when law enforcement, especially that of the PRM, is perceived to be ineffective.

Low tax revenues for government translate into limited expenditure on its armed forces. Consequently the Government of Mozambique has

struggled to develop and implement a long-term strategy for its armed forces. Numbers of armed forces personnel have been substantially reduced and, although training facilities exist, little staff or doctrinal reorganization has occurred (Macaringue, 2003, p. 144). Despite fairly dramatic changes in the country's economic structure and performance since the departure of ONUMOZ, the military response has been passive—undertaking limited training or re-equipment.[43] With the future of the army as one of the key contentious matters between RENAMO and FRELIMO, the stagnation of government policy highlights the difficulties FRELIMO faces.

At the time of the incident at Saturnjira that set off open conflict on 3 April 2013, it was rumoured that the FIR members ostensibly involved in this incident were in fact members of Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique, FADM), an armed force led by General Paulino Macaringue. General Macaringue denied this in a public statement on 7 April 2013. The general argued that the involvement of the FADM would have constituted the start of another civil war, whereas the involvement of the FIR was a civil matter (relating to a suspected crime, namely the possession of illegal arms).[44] This claim aligned with Macaringue's earlier views, expressed before he took charge of FADM (Macaringue, 2003, pp. 148–50), which indicated that at this time he was not avoiding involvement in a politically charged situation, but consciously adhering to the Constitution for reasons he had previously elaborated. He proposed that the role of armed forces be redefined, as they had been in some other countries following the post-apartheid changes of the 1990s in southern Africa (Macaringue, 2003). Soon after the armed incident in April 2013, however, he was effectively removed from his position, although technically his contract was not renewed.[45]

Aside from RENAMO's demand for what amounts to equal distribution of personnel from each political party within the armed forces, a failure to address the future of the forces has left them much reduced since 1992 (Macaringue, 2003, p. 142). Little has changed in their doctrine or organization. New thinking on this topic is called for in the FRELIMO–RENAMO negotiations.

Conclusions

ONUMOZ's missed opportunity on disarmament

ONUMOZ missed a vital opportunity to disarm RENAMO completely—a stance supported by data in the Tables of this Working Paper, as well as the statements of former head of ONUMOZ, Aldo Ajello, and former President Chissano. This failure is much graver than perceived at the time of the mission, as RENAMO has ultimately retained much larger caches of arms than was previously thought. Because of the events in Angola, which had resulted in a return to war, ONUMOZ and FRELIMO both felt that insisting on full disarmament would jeopardize the entire peace process. The matter since resurfaced, bearing adverse effects on the economy and on political life, not to mention potential loss of life. Because trust in government has declined since the ONUMOZ period, pursuing disarmament in the future will be extremely challenging. Dhlakama's guerrilla mentality, seeking to strike bargains at a personal level with the leadership of FRELIMO outside institutional frameworks such as the Parliament or the National Electoral Council, has perpetuated his reliance on armed forces. The government response has been ineffective, of which the enduring conflict that started in 2013 is a consequence.

Operation Rachel and post-conflict arms recovery

The efforts to recover and destroy arms carried out by Operation Rachel, TAE, and FOMICRES have eliminated only a small percentage of the wartime weapons (see Tables 5 to 8). Even with incomplete estimates, it is certain that very large stockpiles existed and that disarmament had a limited effect on them. This failure set the scene for the conflict of 2013–15, which may flare up in future regarding elections and faltering negotiations. The possession

Demobilized soldiers, in Sofala, January 1994. Source: Sérgio Santimano/UN Photo

of substantial hidden arms caches meant that recourse to violence could be sustained as a realistic possibility within the RENAMO leadership. Weapons hidden in arms caches are predominantly in Sofala Province and not in circulation per se (see Map 2). Thus although some RENAMO bases have been held by government forces, weapons remain undiscovered.

Post-war initiatives, such as Operation Rachel and TAE, have demonstrated that when ongoing efforts are not made to detect and recover arms held in secret caches, conflict may flare up again shortly. Such efforts, and these poorly supported by the international community, contain important lessons regarding community involvement and cooperative relations between state and civil society.

DDR and integration of the two armies

The difficulties of integrating FRELIMO and RENAMO forces within a single army, the FADM, have been highlighted by the resurgence of open conflict. Not all armed force members were fully in favour of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Many members of the former FRELIMO army, objecting to their living conditions at that time, did not wish to remain there in the AAs. Those that did remain in the army almost certainly felt that they were better trained than those from the RENAMO force, and thus that they were more eligible for promotion. More importantly, although RENAMO did contribute forces to the new army (FADM), they may have been marginalized. Certain officers loyal to FRELIMO almost certainly feared that the RENAMO intake would form the core of an armed coup against the government.

The challenge of addressing DDR in other or future UN or African Union peacekeeping missions is evident from the difficult experience described in this Working Paper. The involvement of civil society in disarmament after the ONUMOZ period shows that DDR is not a purely technical process; it draws upon active participation from both parties to the conflict, and can also include participation from civil society in a post-conflict period. Much

of RENAMO's arms were collected during the ONUMOZ period, and many RENAMO personnel were integrated into the new army, the FADM. One of the most senior figures in the FADM at the time of the outbreak of conflict in 2013 was formerly in RENAMO. Although the conflict was not yet resolved in mid-2015, it is clear that it is limited mainly to Sofala Province, with an overspill into a nearby part of Tete Province. The geographical limits on this conflict correspond to the areas where the largest RENAMO arms caches were hidden.

Although many people are still loyal to RENAMO in this part of Mozambique, others have found new lives within the civilian economy. Primarily for this reason, RENAMO is no longer influential enough to initiate conflict on a national scale again, in contrast to the prevailing, geographically limited conflict (centred on Sofala Province), which has been running from 2013 to mid-2015. This inability to ignite nationwide conflict is ultimately an indicator of the relative success of DDR conducted during the ONUMOZ period, despite the weaknesses and obstacles mentioned in this Working Paper. It indicates that DDR was not unsuccessful per se; it was merely incomplete. Completing it will require further political commitment within Mozambique.

Endnotes

1 The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), as it was originally referred to by the Rhodesian security services, was renamed Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance, RENAMO) once taken over by the apartheid-era South African military intelligence (Vines, 2013, p. 376).

2 More specifically, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 797, which was adopted in December 1992 (UNSC, 1992b).

3 Nungwe, like most locations of RENAMO bases, is generally not to be found on maps. It is situated in the Lebombo mountains, north of Ressano Garcia, and about 1.5 km from the South African border. When Mozambican forces tried to seize Nungwe in 1992, the South African Defence Force (SADF) may have used chemical weapons to drive them off. Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor of the English service of Agência de Informação de Moçambique (Mozambique News Agency, AIM), interviewed soldiers who survived this attack, and a cautious UN report (UNSC, 1992a, p. 11) confirmed that their symptoms were consistent with exposure to a chemical agent. This was the only alleged use of chemical weapons during the Mozambican war with RENAMO. (Author correspondence with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 5 February 2015.)

4 The services of at least one independent South African arms supplier—who reported using a Douglas DC3 aeroplane in Manica and Sofala Provinces to the south of the Beira Corridor from late 1988 onwards—were confirmed by the supplier himself in an author interview. By then, the interviewee had ceased to supply arms but had been employed by the UN to help plan food aid to RENAMO, because he knew the locations of rebel camps. (Author interview with an anonymous South African arms supplier, Manica Province, 30 March 1993.)

5 Even with intense fighting in the far south of Mozambique, not far from the capital city of Maputo, the logistical problems of supplying the government troops continued. (Author interview with a soldier of the Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique, FPLM), Maputo Province, September 1991.)

6 This displacement was observed by a joint World Food Programme (WFP)/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food and Crop Assessment Mission to Angola and Mozambique held in March 1993. The mission, in which the author participated, involved participants visiting various RENAMO bases in Manica and Sofala Provinces, down to the south of the Beira Corridor, in order to arrange food aid for RENAMO. From 1990 to 1992, there were very clear traces of a reduction in the cultivated areas of RENAMO farms, which interviewees ascribed to the drought. The mission arranged a visit to refugee camps along the Beira Corridor, too. (Author interviews with RENAMO personnel in bases in Manica and Sofala, south of the Beira Corridor, March 1993.)

7 Author correspondence with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 5 February 2015.

8 The army was named the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM). The problems of integrating troops into this army continued in some respects until the present day.

9 Author interviews with Angolans and foreign members of the National Electoral Council, in Luanda, July 1992.

10 Author interviews in March 1993 with British citizens who were living in Mozambique at the time of the interview.

11 Author interview with an anonymous South African, a former small arms supplier who piloted a helicopter in Chimoio, Manica Province, during the WFP/FAO mission of 30 March 1993.

12 Confidential communication with author, 1999.

13 For further details, see Vines (2013, pp. 378–82).

14 For a further critique on the weaknesses of the ONUMOZ mission, see Gamba (1996, pp. xv–xx).

15 Indeed, in the early 1990s the Southern African Conference of Bishops sought to persuade both parties who subsequently signed the GPA to surrender arms via an initiative called Food for Guns, envisaged as a confidence-building measure to take place prior to a full peace agreement. The effort was reportedly vetoed by President Chissano, who allegedly declined it fearing that if too many of his soldiers took part, his negotiating position would be weakened. (Confidential communication with the author, 1992.)

16 For an assessment of the impact of the developments in Angola upon UN thinking regarding Mozambique, see Berman (1996, pp. 31–39).

17 Interview evidence of RENAMO's tactics and details of the difficulties experienced by ONUMOZ appear in Vines (1998, pp. 192–93).

18 For an account of the challenges inherent to arms collection and a description of cooperation between the two countries pertaining to Operation Rachel, carried out from March 1995 to August 1997, see Vines (1998, pp. 197–205).

19 Vines refers to an Interpol estimate that 1.5 million AK-47s were distributed to the civilian population during the war (Vines, 1998, p. 192).

20 The name of the NGO, Transformação das Armas em Enxadas (meaning 'Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares') stems from the biblical phrase 'swords into ploughshares' and implies the exchanging of arms for development tools (Faltas and Paes, 2004, p. 7).

21 Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Director of Força Moçambicana para a Investigação de Crimes e Reinserção Social (Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reintegration, FOMICRES), Maputo, 17 October 2007.

22 Author interview with a senior staff member of TAE, Maputo, October 2007.

23 FIC was established in 1995. See FOMICRES (n.d.a).

24 Author interview with a senior staff member of TAE, Maputo, October 2007.

25 Author interview with a senior staff member of TAE, Maputo, October 2007.

26 In June 2014, its offices had apparently been closed when the author attempted to visit.

27 Author interviews with TAE and FOMICRES, and a separate focus group discussion with TAE, the Conselho Cristão de Moçambique (Christian Council of Mozambique, CCM), and the Centre of Public Integrity, held in Maputo, 24 October 2007. FOMICRES was formally established on 25 May 2006. See FOMICRES (n.d.b). In 2012 FOMICRES changed its designation to Promoção da Paz, Prevenção do Crime e Reinserção Social (unofficially translated as: Promotion of Peace, Crime Prevention and Social Reintegration), but the NGO still refers to itself by the acronym FOMICRES.

28 That most of the permanent staff members at FOMICRES were former members of RENAMO was mentioned to the author at a group meeting with FOMICRES, held in Maputo, 18 April 2013. Of the four other NGOs invited, only BRAVIM, a humanitarian mine action NGO, attended this meeting.

29 Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES, Maputo, 17 June 2014.

30 Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES, Maputo, 17 June 2014. The director has paid numerous visits to RENAMO areas over the years.

31 Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES, Maputo, 17 June 2014.

32 Author interview with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 18 June 2014.

33 Author interview with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 18 June 2014.

34 Author interview with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 18 June 2014.

35 This inference is based on author interviews with FOMICRES staff between 2007 and 2014, including a group interview on 18 April 2013, in Maputo.

36 Author interview with senior staff member, TAE, Maputo, 17 October 2007.

37 RENAMO has no register of its former combatants and may exaggerate its numbers (author communication with researcher Nikkei Wiegink, March 2015). For an anthropological account of combatant attitudes to returning home, see Wiegink (2013).

38 This attack on the police station was a response to the capture or arrest of RENAMO personnel on 3 April 2013 (Littlejohn, 2013).

39 Although the precise timing is unknown, according to Forquilha, when Dhlakama contacted his former foreign supporters, they indicated they were no longer willing to provide support. (Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES, Maputo, 17 June 2014.)

40 RENAMO's goal has been an explicit recognition of one-for-one parity, such that, for example, if a military commander came from FRELIMO, his deputy should come from RENAMO. FRELIMO's goal has been merit-based promotion only, as opposed to the politicization of career paths in the armed forces.

41 Author interview with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 18 June 2014.

42 Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES, Maputo, 19 April 2013.

43 Author interview with member of the Mozambican navy, Abuja, Nigeria, March 2005.

44 Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES, Maputo, 19 April 2013.

45 Author interview with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 18 June 2014.

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