

Special Report

Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment

Manasseh Wepundi, Eliud Nthiga, Eliud Kabuu, Ryan Murray, and Anna Alvazzi del Frate

small arms survey

HARAMBEE

Kenya National Focal Point On Small Arms & Light Weapons

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Special Report
June 2012

Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment

Manasseh Wepundi, Eliud Nthiga, Eliud Kabuu, Ryan Murray, and Anna Alvazzi del Frate

A study by the Small Arms Survey and Kenya National Focus Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

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The Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and current contributions from the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Survey is grateful for past support received from the Governments of France, New Zealand, and Spain. The Survey also wishes to acknowledge the financial assistance it has received over the years from different United Nations agencies, programmes, and institutes.

The objectives of the Small Arms Survey are: to be the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence; to serve as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists; to monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) on small arms; to support efforts to address the effects of small arms proliferation and misuse; and to act as a clearinghouse for the sharing of information and the dissemination of best practices. The Survey also sponsors field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states and regions. The project has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

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The Kenya National Focal Point

The Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) on Small Arms and Light Weapons is a multi-agency initiative and a directorate within the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, and is located within the Office of the President. The KNFP was established in 2002 and became operational in 2003, bringing together various Government ministries, departments and Civil Society organizations in the management and control of small arms and light weapons in Kenya.

The KNFP has a vision of having *a peaceful, secure and prosperous society free of illicit small arms and light weapons for sustainable development, with a mission to manage and coordinate all actions in addressing the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in Kenya.*

The KNFP derives its mandate from the various international, regional and sub-regional legal instruments to which Kenya is a signatory and is responsible for liaison with states at sub-regional, regional and international level, as well as with relevant organizations, on all matters relating to their implementation. This includes developing policy guidelines and research; monitoring efforts to combat, prevent and eradicate illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; and coordinating collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons.

Noting the geographical spread of the small arms and light weapons problem in the country, the KNFP has established Provincial and District Task Forces (DTF) to focus on addressing this problem across Kenya. The DTF's mandate is to facilitate the implementation of the Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management at district and grass-roots levels, partnering with the district peace committees and community-based civil society organizations, to bring about an all-inclusive approach to conflict prevention, resolution and management. This is in tandem with the KNFP's core values of *responsiveness, cooperation and collaboration, inclusiveness, leadership, and integrity.*

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Finally, but no less importantly, we are grateful to all those involved in the data collection exercise; respondents from households, civil society organizations, and law enforcement agencies; and key informants and focus group participants. It is through their freely given participation that this precious base of data has become available.

Foreword

The Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security through the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) recently undertook a comprehensive national mapping and survey in line with its mandate to implement the Nairobi Protocol of April 2004 and United Nations Programme of Action of July 2001.

This national survey examined the status and the perceptions of small arms and light weapons in Kenya, with the findings giving the KNFP useful background information for the effective implementation of its Nation Action Plan and the Strategic Plan 2010/11–2014/15. The survey represents an important undertaking and complements other initiatives so far undertaken by the Government and other stakeholders in peace and security.

Numerous and long-standing armed conflicts among many states neighbouring Kenya have generated large numbers of arms and quantities of ammunition outside of state control. This availability and use of illicit small arms and light weapons continue to pose threat to peace in the country. In order to implement meaningful security-related initiatives, there is need for accurate data and relevant programming to counter this threat in a bid to reduce armed violence and foster development.

I therefore wish to thank the Small Arms Survey, a Geneva-based civil society organization, for the technical and financial support they provided in this study. Similarly, we are grateful to the Government of Denmark and other civil society actors who have partnered with us in other related projects and programmes in the 2010/11–2014/15 Strategic Plan.

However, there is still more to be done in the area of peace and security and, by extension, in tackling the problem of small arms in Kenya. The Government thus encourages more research and interventions in this area as recommended in the survey report.

E. Mutea Iringo, EBS
Ag. Permanent Secretary
Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security

Preface

A national arms mapping survey provides policy-makers and practitioners with evidence-based data upon which to base agendas and interventions.

A nationwide survey of this kind requires persistence, political commitment, expertise, goodwill, and substantial resources (both human and financial). We will leave it to the study's primary authors to acknowledge the numerous contributors not flagged here. We would, however, like to underscore the important role of the KNFP's inter-agency National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management in providing guidance and promoting transparency, as well as the generous funding from the Government of Denmark towards the success of this project. And, of course, we wish to thank Manasseh Wepundi, Eliud Nthiga, Eliud Kabuu, Anna Alvazzi del Frate, and Ryan Murray for their hard work and dedication. We finally thank the KNFP administration, specifically John Patrick Ochieng and the Secretariat, for their local support.

More often than not, surveys of this kind are undertaken on the cheap or do not represent best practice. The Government of Kenya has not approached this effort as 'ticking a box' to comply with guidelines or commitments set forth under the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, or the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol administered by the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA). The government is committed to using the information from this undertaking to inform its policies and programmes in the months and years ahead.

We hope that this exercise in cooperation and collaboration can serve as a positive case study for others to draw from as a point of reference, both within the RECSA region and further afield, including elsewhere on the continent and outside Africa.

David M. Kimaiyo, CBS, DSM
Director, KNFP/SALW

Eric G. Berman
Managing Director, Small Arms Survey

Abbreviations and acronyms

ASTU	Anti Stock Theft Unit
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CSO	Civil society organization
DTF	District task force
EAC	East African Community
FGD	Focus group discussion
HH	Household
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised explosive device
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KES	Kenyan shilling
KFS	Kenya Forest Service
KII	Key informant interview
KNFP	Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons
KPR	Kenya Police Reserve
KPRs	Members of the KPR
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
LEA	Law enforcement agent
Nairobi Declaration	Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
Nairobi Protocol	Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
National Action Plan	Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management
National Arms Mapping	National Mapping for Illicit SALW

NSC	National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management
PTF	Provincial task force
Programme of Action	UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons
RECSA Best Practice Guidelines	Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament for the RECSA Region
SLDF	Sabaot Land Defence Force
SRIC	Security Research and Information Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WPDC	Wajir Peace and Development Committee

Executive summary

Kenya has experienced the effects of small arms availability and misuse for many years, but the unprecedented violence that erupted after the December 2007 general elections placed the issue of small arms reduction higher on the national agenda. The government of Kenya started a number of important initiatives, such as the establishment of the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) as an interagency directorate within the Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security. Despite significant progress, law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms still face significant challenges.

The extent of illicit firearms and their distribution over the Kenyan territory were the object of the 2003 National Mapping for Illicit SALW, carried out by the KNFP, which informed the development of the Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management (KNFP, 2006). However, for the eight subsequent years there has been no study with national coverage, with most research on small arms in Kenya focusing on the northern parts of the country (North Rift, Upper Eastern, and North Eastern Province).

This joint study by the Government of Kenya and the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey aims to assess small arms proliferation in Kenya (mapping their location, sources, and movements) and the capacity of various actors involved in small arms control and peace-building efforts in the country. For this purpose, the study adopted a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods involving approximately 2,500 interviews with households, representatives of civil society organizations, law enforcement agents, and other key informants from 31 out of the 47 counties of Kenya. The geographical coverage of the sample specifically included all counties perceived as highly volatile (those where small arms are endemic, those with significant pastoralist communities who have propensity for small arms ownership to protect their livestock, emerging areas, and high-density urban areas with high crime levels), as well as representatives from areas considered to be of medium and low volatility.

The major findings of the study are the following:

- Between 530,000 and 680,000 firearms may be in civilian hands nationally.
- Despite an overall perception of a reduction in the number of firearms nationally, some zones, including areas such as Mt Elgon and Rift Valley, where important disarmament initiatives have been carried out, have recorded a significant increase in gun possession since 2003.
- The period of violence around the December 2007 elections has left its mark on the population, with the majority of household respondents stating that they feel the most insecure during election periods.
- Approximately 20 per cent of household respondents were victims of a crime or an act of violence over the year preceding the interviews, but twice as many felt that there is a likelihood of their being a victim of violence and/or crime in the next year.
- More than one-third of those who were victims of crimes were confronted with a firearm.
- There is a discrepancy between the views of law enforcement agencies and civil society organizations as regards the effectiveness of current efforts to reduce firearm proliferation and increase security, with the former being more optimistic than the latter.

Based on main findings above, the study provides a number of recommendations on monitoring and understanding the nature of the problem, changes to the institutional environment, measures to reduce access to small arms and light weapons and to deal with victims, and steps to address development using a more systemic approach.

This study is composed of five chapters. The first covers the background and introduces the study. The second and the third discuss findings based on surveys of households, law enforcement agents, and members of civil society organizations, as well as qualitative information based on statements from focus group discussions and key informant interviews on arms trends, sources, and movements, and ongoing efforts made by the government to limit the proliferation of firearms. The fourth chapter contains conclusions and recommendations, and the fifth describes in detail the methodology used in several of the study's components.

I. Introduction

The small arms problem in Kenya

Kenya has struggled with insecurity for a long time, largely as a result of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.[1] Both internal and external factors contribute to the firearms-related challenges facing the country. Domestically, social, economic, and political causes have contributed to the demand for and proliferation of small arms.[2] Long and continued political instability and armed conflicts in the countries neighbouring Kenya have also contributed to the small arms challenge facing Kenya, given its long and porous borders.

The effects of small arms availability and misuse have long been felt throughout Kenyan society. Pastoralist communities with relatively little police presence and numerous challenges (such as conflict over grazing and water access for their cattle) are greatly affected. This is especially so for communities in the North Eastern, Upper Eastern, and North Rift areas, which are believed to suffer excessively from high levels of illicit firearms and insecurity (Muchai, 2005, pp. 117–19). Urban centres like Nairobi, Mombasa, Eldoret, Thika, and Kisumu have also suffered from the illicit trade in small arms.

The unprecedented levels of armed violence that erupted after the December 2007 general elections in Kenya placed the problem of small arms higher on the national agenda. According to the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (also known as the Waki Report after the commission's chairperson, Justice Philip Waki), a total of 1,133 people died as a consequence of the unrest. More than 3,500 Kenyans suffered injuries and over 100,000 private properties were destroyed. The Waki Report observed that '[g]unshots accounted for 962 casualties out of whom 405 died' (CIPEV, 2008, pp. 345–46). These figures demonstrate the intensity of the violence, which was considerably more than the 779 deaths and 654 injuries experienced in the 1992 clashes (CIPEV, 2008, p. 304). Whereas the 1992

and 1997 clashes produced more than 600,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) (KHRC, 2011, p. 12), the total IDPs resulting from the 2007/08 clashes equalled this number (IDMC, 2008, p. 41).

The election-related violence of 2007/08, mass displacements, and widespread insecurity are believed to have fed a new demand for small arms, especially in central Rift Valley Province. Whereas many crude weapons were used to unleash the violence and resultant killings, there are reports of communities seeking to acquire—and obtaining—more sophisticated firearms. Alongside this growing demand are concerns about the potential proliferation of armed groups and the growth of existing organized gangs. This rearmament drive among communities, widely reported by the media, confirms the need to put in place well-founded arms control measures alongside peace-building efforts.[3]

The threat that the proliferation of small arms in Kenya poses to law and order and peace and security—both inside Kenya and in the wider region—was again underscored in December 2009 when Kenyan police uncovered 100,000 rounds of ammunition in a private residence in Narok, a town some 142 km west-north-west of the capital, Nairobi. More than 30,000 additional rounds[4] were later discovered at the same location. At the time of writing this report, many questions remained unanswered, but one thing was clear: many rounds of this ammunition were locally manufactured and originated from the Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation based in Eldoret (*Daily Nation*, 2010b; KOFC, n.d.). How the private businessman concerned obtained this ammunition is part of the ongoing investigation and court case. Moreover, it is widely believed that security sector personnel and government officials were involved in diverting materiel to the businessman or simply turned a blind eye to what he was doing. According to Kenyan media reports, these recoveries pointed to the likely existence of an intricate gun-running network that probably supplied markets in the region (*Daily Nation*, 2010b).[5] Initial leads pointed to the possible involvement of Kenyan security officers in arms-trafficking rings whose markets were alleged to be neighbouring countries, and organized criminal gangs and pastoralist communities in Kenya (Nation TV, 2010).

It was in this context that the current study was undertaken. But before proceeding, it is necessary to consider the historical and regional contexts of small arms proliferation.

Historical and regional developments

The proliferation of small arms in East Africa pre-dates 19th-century European colonialism. Gunrunning in the sub-region's hinterland was the result of an established trade that escalated raids for slaves, livestock, ivory, and other game trophies by Ethiopian raiders and Arab merchants (Wepundi, Ndung'u, and Rynn, 2011, p. 4). At that time, gun markets were found in Maji in south-western Ethiopia and ammunition was used as local currency (Mburu, 2002, pp. 4–5). The British sought to conquer and pacify the local resistance forces in the borderlands of Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Collins, 2006, pp. 16–22).[6]

Current challenges regarding urban insecurity and small arms proliferation in Kenya can be traced back to the Mau Mau anti-colonial struggle of the 1950s. Mau Mau fighters are believed to have introduced illicit firearms to the Nairobi Area and Central Province (Katumanga and Cliffe, 2005, p. 5).

The 1979 collapse of the Idi Amin regime led to vandalism of armouries in military barracks in northern Uganda, which fed small arms proliferation in North Rift. Similarly, the overthrow of Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam contributed to increased small arms flows to northern Kenya (Adan and Pkalya, 2005, pp. 47–48).

Somalia's long-running instability since the 1991 ousting of President Siad Barre has also contributed to the small arms problem in Kenya. The earlier Somali irredentist struggle, also historicised as the 'shifta' (or bandit) war of 1963–67, affected Kenya's North Eastern Province. The shifta problem only gradually diminished years later in the 1990s, while illicit firearms remained a concern in this region (Murunga, 2005, p. 148).

But the international dimensions of firearms prevalence in Kenya cannot be overlooked. Kenya has been vulnerable to illicit trafficking through the same channels used for legal arms shipments, with Mombasa's port being

one of the entry points used by smugglers (HRW, 2002, p. 9). Arms destined for neighbouring countries are recorded to have been diverted, and some of them have been linked to facilitating drug trafficking (Sabala, 2002, p. 38).

Border town centres documented as points of dispersion of small arms to Nairobi include Mandera, Moyale, El Wak, Lokichoggio, and Isiolo, located in the north-eastern and upper eastern regions of Kenya (Sabala, 2002, p. 38; HRW, 2002, p. 11). In fact, in 1997 the Kenya Police closed a market near Isiolo that was known as a small arms supermarket, but illegal small arms trade persisted (HRW, 2002, p. 11). Hence, in general terms, northern Kenya, confronted by the multiple challenges of underdevelopment, inter-ethnic resource-based conflicts, and proximity to war-prone neighbouring countries, has had the highest prevalence of small arms, with the highest estimations put at over 100,000 in 2003 (Wairagu and Ndung'u, 2003, p. 3).

Domestic causes of small arms proliferation

A weak and sometimes corrupt security architecture characterized by inadequate border control mechanisms and minimal police presence in vast parts of northern Kenya creates a favourable environment for illicit small arms trafficking, possession, and use (Kimaiyo and Nthiga, 2009, pp. 44–46). Kenya is ranked 154th worldwide and 35th in Africa in Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index and only beats Burundi in the East African Community (TI, 2010, p. 14).[7] While Kenya records an improvement in the 2011 East African Bribery Index as the fourth least corrupt country in East Africa, the Kenya Police was ranked as the most corrupt institution in the country and the fourth most corrupt in East Africa (TI-Kenya, 2011, pp. 2–3). While the variables used to determine these rankings are not specific to small arms, the fact that Kenyans do not perceive their police to be transparent is a basis for concern, given this law enforcement agency's centrality in enforcing security and arms stockpile management, among other roles.

Poor policing in vast parts of Kenya has catalyzed the permeation of a gun culture, especially among pastoral communities. The implication is that the Kalashnikov assault rifle has ceased to be just a gun and has become a

potent symbol of conflict and violence, as well as power.[8] In northern Kenya, the gun culture—or the value of firearms as a necessary possession among groups—has entrenched many people's view that firearms possession is an essential right. This has resulted in inter-ethnic arms races (Kamenju, Singo, and Wairagu, 2003, pp. 49–50).

Communities' marginal existence in underdeveloped parts of the country creates a demand for small arms as groups compete for scarce resources and protect their livelihoods. This, coupled with inter-ethnic rivalries that turn violent, for instance, through cattle-rustling raids, pushes communities to self-arm for security. Worse still, the government's failure to impose its presence through service provision and enhancing law and order in northern Kenya has cumulatively fed communities' essential need for firearms.

Weak governance structures influence insecurity and small arms proliferation. For instance, in listing the several factors contributing to the demand for small arms among pastoralist communities, Mkutu (2008, pp. 6–9) argues that the primary cause is poor governance, while among the secondary causes are weakening customary governance institutions, diminishing numbers of cattle, the need to pay bride price, and unemployment. However, there are other independent triggers, like cattle rustling, which is treated as a cultural problem among most pastoralist communities in Kenya and the Eastern Africa region.

Impact of small arms

Small arms play a significant role in determining the winners and losers of conflicts, and in the commission of crimes. Other than legitimate use for security management, misused or illicitly transferred small arms have only had negative effects on the communities affected and largely affect innocent people. They increase the severity of conflicts and extend their duration.

One of the major impacts of illicit small arms is the displacement of people, which is not only confined to hotspots of electoral violence in the central Rift Valley. Research in northern Kenya indicates that small arms-fuelled pastoralist violence had displaced more than 160,000 people by 2003 (Pkalya, Adan, and Masinde, 2003, p. 11). In two years, at a given period of

Source: Map No. 4187, rev. 1, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, January 2004

time, more than 200,000 people had been internally displaced by small arms-fuelled conflicts over resources or livestock (Adan and Pkalya, 2005, p. 39).

In the North Rift area, insecurity as a result of the prevalence of small arms use has fed a gun culture that has undermined entrepreneurial development and investments while contributing to cases of sexual violence (Kamenju, Singo, and Wairagu, 2003, pp. 71–79).

Small arms have inflamed low-intensity conflicts characterized by a high incidence of banditry, inter-ethnic clashes, and cattle rustling. This insecurity has implications for poverty and competition for resources as groups are displaced and/or flee to more secure places, increasing pressure on land and resources (Eavis, 2002, pp. 252–53).

According to the Kenya Police, on average 1,400 persons were killed every year between 2004 and 2009 (Kenya Police, 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 2010). Although statistical sources do not provide information on how many murders were committed with firearms, between 1994 and 2004 research found that there were over 3,000 deaths as a direct consequence of small arms-related conflict in northern Kenya (Adan and Pkalya, 2005, p. xii).

Research in 2002 showed that 83.7 per cent of Nairobi residents thought the number of firearms in the Kenyan capital had increased (Eavis, 2002, p. 253). A 2002 victimization survey demonstrated that 37 per cent of Nairobi's residents had been robbery victims in the previous year (Stavrou, 2002, p. 4). In 2010 the Kenya Police recovered 128 rifles, 60 pistols, 10 toy pistols, and 36,458 rounds of ammunition in normal police operations and recovered 1,064 firearms and 3,078 rounds of ammunition in a disarmament operation (Kenya Police, 2010). Despite the fact that in this period Kenya experienced post-electoral violence, most of these weapons were used to commit other types of crime. However, no major victimization survey results are available, with the exception of the cited Nairobi survey (Stavrou, 2002) and a national survey carried out by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2010).

The UNODC survey found that victims of crime tended more frequently to report incidents involving vehicles to the police. Notably, the three crimes most commonly reported to the police in 2010 were motor vehicle theft (93.8 per cent), motorcycle theft (77.8 per cent), and car hijacking (64.7 per cent). Other property crimes were reported less frequently (e.g. 45.5 per cent of

Table 1.1 Effects of small arms misuse on human development

Effects	Impacts on development	Indicators
Direct effects	Fatal and non-fatal injuries	• Lost productivity • Personal costs of treatment and rehabilitation • Financial costs at household, community, municipal, and national levels • Psychological and psycho-social costs
Indirect effects	Armed crime	• Rates of reported crime (homicide) • Community-derived indices of crime • Insurance premiums • Number and types of private security facilities
	Access to and quality of social services	• Incidence of attacks on health/education workers • Incidence of attacks on and closure of health/education clinics • Vaccination and immunization coverage • Life expectancy and child mortality • School enrolment rates
	Economic activity	• Transport and shipping costs • Destruction of physical infrastructure • Price of local goods, and local terms of trade • Agricultural productivity and food security
	Investment, savings, and revenue collection	• Trends in local and foreign direct investment • Internal sectoral investment patterns • Trends in domestic revenue collection • Levels of domestic consumption and savings
	Social capital	• Numbers of child soldiers recruited and in action • Membership of armed gangs and organized crime • Repeat armed criminality among minors • Incidence of domestic violence involving firearms or the threat of weapons • Respect for customary and traditional forms of authority
	Development interventions	• Incidence of security threats • Costs of logistics and transportation • Costs of security management • Opportunity costs associated with insecure environments and/or damaged investments

Source: Small Arms Survey (2003, p. 131)

victims reported bicycle theft and 21.7 per cent reported livestock theft), yet these crimes were reported more frequently than assault and most other personal crimes. For example, only one out of five victims of either assault or sexual offences admitted reporting them to the police. At a rate of 0.9 per cent, corruption was the least reported crime (UNODC, 2010, p. 4, Table 2).

Findings from the UNODC survey suggest significant under-reporting of crime and violence, and that the police may not be fully aware of the extent of the crime and violence. Police statistics for 2009 and 2010 show that most of the reported crimes were in Rift Valley Province, with Eastern and Central Provinces following (see Table 1.2). These statistics, coupled with reports on small arms trends in the country,[9] informed the initial designation of zones in northern Kenya as hotspots and others as being of medium to low volatility.

Table 1.2 Provincial/unit crime data, 2009 and 2010

Province/unit	2009	2010
Rift Valley	16,887	15,790
Eastern	8,431	7,625
Central	8,331	7,584
Coast	7,805	7,357
Western	7,234	6,731
Nyanza	7,358	6,354
Nairobi	3,984	5,097
North Eastern	872	1,003
Railways	129	180
Kenya Airport Police Unit	89	106
Total	**61,120**	**57,827**

Source: Kenya Police (2010, p. 16)

Security and disarmament interventions

The Government of Kenya has the primary responsibility of ensuring security through enforcing law and order. In the discharge of its mandate, the government has tempered coercive with voluntary disarmament approaches in attempts to mop up illicit firearms, especially in northern Kenya. Kenya

has implemented well over 50 disarmament operations in the past 100 years. During President Moi's 24-year tenure, it is believed that the head of state ordered over 20 disarmament operations among the Pokot alone (SIKOM PeaceNetwork for Development, 2010, p. 3).

Coercive measures were, however, fraught with concerns about human rights violations, with communities and civil society actors decrying the excessive use of force and torture. Some disarmament efforts, such as the 1984 Operation Wajir, have been described as massacres due to the number of deaths involved (Wepundi, Ndung'u, and Rynn, 2011, p. 7).[10]

The government modified its approach to accommodate human rights concerns and provide alternative livelihoods and options to the targeted communities by designing a disarmament and development programme dubbed Operation Dumisha Amani (Sustain Peace). This approach integrates development efforts such as rebuilding infrastructure and has an elaborate multi-actor strategy that involves local opinion leaders, civil society, and the media in confidence-building measures for disarmament. The first phase of this initiative began in 2005, and by 2006, 2,298 firearms and 4,418 rounds of ammunition had been recovered (KNFP, 2010a). The first phase did not achieve the targeted 50,000 firearms, and so a second phase began in 2010 with a voluntary phase in February of that year (Wepundi, Ndung'u, and Rynn, 2011, pp. 10–11).

Between February and August 2010 the operation had recovered 1,201 firearms, 1,665 rounds of ammunition, and 201 head of livestock (KNFP, 2010a). The persisting concerns about the inadequate provision of security and underdevelopment account for communities' unwillingness to surrender all of their firearms.

Whereas the government embraced the disarmament and development approach to firearms collection, it implemented two forced disarmament exercises in Mt Elgon district, in Bungoma and Mandera counties. The one implemented in Mt Elgon was codenamed Operation Okoa Maisha (Save Lives), whereas the initiative in Mandera was dubbed Operation Chunga Mpaka (Guard the Border). The former netted 103 assorted firearms and 1,155 rounds of ammunition, while the latter recovered 48 weapons and 1,200 rounds of ammunition. The two exercises were both bedevilled by claims of human

rights violations by the security forces (Wepundi, Ndung'u, and Rynn, 2011, pp. 10–11; HRW, 2008; 2009[11]). Despite this, the operations were viewed as successful in dismantling Mt Elgon's Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) and restoring peace in the two areas.[12]

The information provided by the Anti Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) exemplifies recent joint efforts by the Government of Kenya to recover firearms and ammunition.[13] Between 1 January 2010 and 31 July 2011 the ASTU recovered ten firearms with about 75 rounds of ammunition. Six AK-47s (two without ammunition), three G3s (two without serial numbers), and one SAR-80 were confiscated. Most ammunition was 7.6 mm (54 rounds), while the remaining 20 rounds were 5.56 mm.

Law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms have also faced challenges. This is mainly in the area of the inadequate physical presence of law enforcement officers, poor infrastructure, corruption, the scarcity of resources, and difficult terrain in the small arms and conflict hotspot areas. Some police security initiatives have equally posed blowback challenges. For instance, Bevan (2008, p. 17) observes that the Kenya Police supplies almost 50 per cent of the ammunition that circulates illegally in Turkana North in order to provide the Turkana with some defence against rival groups in Sudan and Uganda.

Operation Dumisha Amani envisaged the commencement of a joint disarmament programme with Uganda and Ethiopia. Negotiations and joint plans began with Uganda, but they were interrupted by national elections in Uganda and Kenya in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The talks are still in progress, with recent efforts focusing on joint Kenyan–Ethiopian disarmament campaigns.

Another government effort to manage security challenges has been the establishment and deployment of members of the Kenya Police Reserve (KPRs). The communities in which they exist consider KPRs to be necessary, but their recruitment and management are seen to be flawed. KPRs are voluntary officers who are attached to the police and are called upon if and when need arises to respond to problematic security situations. Although they play a noble role, some have privatized the small arms given to them by the government and allegedly use them for criminal ends (Ndung'u, 2010, pp. 6–7).

It is perceived by the public that the recruitment and deployment of the KPRs is politicized, uncoordinated, and highly controversial. In some cases it has been reported that the Kenya Police and Administration Police are in competition, and the ensuing uncoordinated approach to controlling security management efforts in some districts has compromised security and hampered community policing initiatives, severely blunting the KPR role (Ndung'u, 2010, pp. 14–16). These obstacles represent serious impediments to the full implementation of the Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management (National Action Plan), as well as regional and international commitments such as the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Protocol); the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Programme of Action); and the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.

Achievements and challenges

The Government of Kenya has realized some significant milestones in addressing the endemic challenge of illicit small arms. The establishment of the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) as an interagency directorate within the Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security has ensured an inclusive multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder approach to small arms management. The KNFP is mandated to coordinate all action in addressing small arms issues in Kenya.

In its current Strategic Plan 2010/11–2014/15, the KNFP is committed to its vision for the realization of a 'peaceful, secure and prosperous society free of illicit SALW [small arms and light weapons] for sustainable development' (KNFP, n.d.) This will be realized through stockpile management, the undertaking of relevant capacity building among law enforcement agencies and other players in small arms, awareness raising on the dangers of illicit small arms, and institutional capacity strengthening for mitigating small arms challenges.

The KNFP's mandate is derived from the 15 March 2000 Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Declaration), which called on the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa states to strengthen or establish national mechanisms to deal with the problem of illicit small arms and implement the declaration. The Nairobi Protocol (2004) legally bound states to this requirement under Article 16 on transparency, information exchange, and harmonization. Government–civil society cooperation is equally guaranteed by both the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol (Article 2c).

As a national institution, the KNFP is also guided by other international and continental instruments, specifically the Programme of Action and the Bamako Declaration on the African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2010).

Immediately after its formation, the KNFP undertook the national arms mapping in 2003, which informed the development of the National Action Plan to combat illicit arms in the country. The plan's strategy was spelt out in ten themes: institutional framework, policy and legislation, stockpile management, public education and awareness, international and regional cooperation and information exchange, border control and refugees, human development planning, training and capacity building, research, and critical areas of support (KNFP, 2006, pp. 40–55). These guided and informed KNFP activities for six years. However, some of the provisions were not fully achieved or implemented, curtailed mainly by a lack of resources.

Institutionally, the establishment of a functional directorate and the formation of the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (NSC) can be considered key KNFP achievements. It has developed the five-year Strategic Plan 2010/11–2014/15, as well as a monitoring and evaluation strategy. At lower levels, the KNFP has established and trained 8 provincial task forces (PTFs) and district task forces (DTFs) in 53 of the over 200 districts in the country. But the success of PTFs and DTFs is constrained by inadequate follow-up, a lack of resources to implement small arms work plans, and the shuffling of administrators.[14]

The KNFP has also facilitated the drafting of the National Small Arms Policy, which was finalized and submitted to the minister of provincial administration and internal security in December 2009.

In stockpile management, while disarmament operations such as Okoa Maisha and Dumisha Amani are entirely overseen by independent command chains, the KNFP coordinates efforts to publicly destroy recovered arms. By March 2010 Kenya had destroyed over 25,000 illegal arms and 50,000 rounds of ammunition (KNFP, 2010b, p. 9). The KNFP has acquired five firearms-marking machines[15] and by May 2011 had marked over 60,000 firearms (KNFP, 2011, p. 2). It has also overseen the improvement of data records, and the installation of software for tracking brokerage and trade in arms. Marking government firearms has strengthened identification and traceability, significantly reducing the misuse of these firearms.

On the research front, the 2003 National Mapping for Illicit SALW (National Arms Mapping) has been KNFP's major research project, and this informed the development of the Kenya National Action Plan (KNFP, 2006). However, for the eight subsequent years, there has been no similar research, although several studies have been conducted at the regional level, e.g. the 2010 North Rift Disarmament and Alternative Livelihood Survey, which was commissioned by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).[16]

Internationally and regionally, in addition to participating in international Programme of Action and regional RECSA conferences, the KNFP has played a strategic role in pushing for tough global controls on arms trade by co-sponsoring and lobbying for the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, together with six other like-minded states (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, and the United Kingdom) (Saferworld, 2011, p. 11).

However, despite acknowledging the support of multiple development partners,[17] the KNFP is constrained by limited financial, institutional, and human resources. This is considered a major reason for its inability to fully implement its National Action Plan (designed to run from 2004 to 2009) (Saferworld, 2011, p. 15).

The PTFs' and DTFs' capacity is also limited, as they are not able to effectively bridge the gap between local- and national-level initiatives. Further, the

KNFP is confronted by bureaucratic challenges and competing national priorities. And when it comes to small arms issues, disarmament operations are sometimes triggered by larger political and security considerations beyond the preserve and/or control of the KNFP (Saferworld, 2011, pp. 15–16). The most strategic solution for the KNFP in this regard is to lobby for the adoption of the National Small Arms Policy and the finalization and enforcement of the Development and Disarmament Policy Framework. This way, regardless of the overarching political and security motivations for any arms control initiative, it would be within the confines of existing policy frameworks.

Objectives for the National Arms Mapping project

Most research on small arms in Kenya focuses exclusively on northern Kenya (defined as North Rift, Upper Eastern and North Eastern Province).[18] The KNFP's 2003 National Arms Mapping project was the first and only real comprehensive countrywide study.

Between 2003 and 2011, there has been no similar endeavour, apart from RECSA/ISS research on practical disarmament.[19] In a nutshell, there has been a major gap in regular empirical research on small arms and security trends in Kenya as a whole.[20]

The implication has been that, even in arms control initiatives, few empirical studies exist with verifiable estimation on the number of illicit civilian firearms in the country. A study conducted by the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) estimated that 127,519 males aged 15 years and above in North Rift were presumed to be armed with at least one gun each (Kamenju, Singo, and Wairagu, 2003, pp. 68–69). Practical Action estimated the number of arms in a number of Kenya's pastoralist districts[21] to be 172,995, while at the same time observing that the SRIC estimate was conservative (Adan and Pkalya, 2005, pp. 50–51).[22] Approximations of the number of arms in other parts of the country are hard to come by, save for Mkutu (2008, p. 4), whose estimation of small arms circulating in Nairobi was 5 million in 2000. Another study put the number of illegal guns in Nairobi at 5,000, translating to one in 560 Nairobi residents owning a firearm (Sabala, 2002, p. 36).[23] All these are estimations of small arms in parts and not all of the country.

The 2003 KNFP survey found that 6 per cent of Kenyan households had access to small arms. Provincially, this represented 6 per cent in Central, 4 per cent in Coast, 7 per cent in Eastern, 6 per cent in Nairobi, 5 per cent in North Eastern, 6 per cent in Nyanza, 5 per cent in Rift Valley, and 7 per cent in Western (KNFP, 2006, p. 16). But indirect questions regarding indicators of small arms, such as knowledge of someone with a gun or frequency of gunshots in one's vicinity, revealed that a higher proportion of the population nationally (8 per cent) had experienced small arms presence in their areas (KNFP, 2006, p. 17).

A key component towards effective stockpile management, which has been articulated in the KNFP Strategic Plan 2010/11–2014/15, is a new undertaking of comprehensive national small arms surveys and mapping in Kenya. This is aimed at estimating the possible number of illicit arms in the country, establishing arms movement and trends, and informing the process for future local and regional initiatives, including disarmament efforts, among others.

This survey is a joint partnership between the Government of Kenya and the Small Arms Survey of Geneva. The main objectives of the study are to:

i. assess the number of illicit small arms in Kenya;
ii. identify the sources and prevalence of small arms, and their movement in and out of Kenya;
iii. assess the capacity of various actors involved in small arms control and peace-building efforts in the country;
iv. assess the role and use of information on illicit small arms and linkages to early warning and response mechanisms in conflict transformation;
v. assess the effect of insecurity as a result of the use of illicit small arms, especially among the pastoralist communities, on food insecurity, poverty, and livelihoods, among other related concerns; and
vi. highlight lessons learned in the past survey that can inform future efforts to address the problem of illicit small arms.

Methodology and scope

The KNFP and Small Arms Survey established a survey team entrusted with the development of a comprehensive national survey framework. Counties in Kenya were categorized into one of three levels of volatility: high (hotspots), medium, and low (others). For the purposes of this research, volatile counties were defined as those tending or threatening to break out into open violence, where crime is common and insecurity is very high. A county's level of volatility was determined based on numerous sources, in addition to local awareness. Defining counties by their level of volatility informed the sampling process and served as an independent variable during the data analysis (see Map 1.2 and section V).

A stratified, purposeful random sampling approach was adopted, which covered 31 of 47 counties, specifically including all those perceived to be small arms endemic, emerging areas, and those with high urban crime, as well as those with significant pastoralist communities who have a propensity to arm themselves to protect their livestock. They include Tana River, Marsabit, Isiolo, Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Turkana, West Pokot, Baringo, Samburu, Laikipia, Elgeyo-Marakwet, and Trans-Nzoia. Nairobi was also considered among the high-volatility counties.

Three types of questionnaire were administered: one targeting households (HHs), another law enforcement agents (LEAs), and a third civil society organizations (CSOs). In addition to the 1,873 HHs surveyed, data was supplemented by information from about 336 LEAs, 178 members of CSOs, 18 focus group discussions (FGDs), and key informant interviews (KIIs). Data collection instruments for the HH, LEA, and CSO surveys were very similar to one another, while the FGDs relied on guidelines based on the same themes. As mentioned earlier, FGDs were conducted with greater attention given to areas that are known for illicit arms problems, such as parts of Western Kenya, Central, and North Rift; Upper Eastern; and North Eastern Province; and three major urban cities of Nairobi, Mombasa, and Nakuru.

Fieldwork was conducted between April and July 2011. Full information on sample characteristics, including distribution by county, sex, and age, is presented in section V of this report.

II. Small arms and perceptions of security

Introduction

An assessment of the present small arms dynamics in Kenya reveals a persisting vulnerability to the scourge of small arms. Results indicate that the country's borders remain porous, with factional fighting in Somalia spilling over into Kenya. The current Kenyan military offensive against al-Shabaab has particularly made bordering regions in the country, such as Mandera and Garissa, vulnerable to attacks. Grenade, landmine, and improvised explosive device (IED) explosions have recently been reported in these areas.[24] Respondents' worry about the possibility that some Somalis seeking refuge in Kenya are facilitating arms trafficking[25] and the permeability of Kenya's borders underscores the need for more investment in strengthening border control mechanisms and providing the police and other law enforcement agencies with adequate training on crime management.[26]

This study demonstrates the complexity of the arms situation—in some areas arms ownership is inextricably tied to community and livelihood security; while in mostly urban centres illegal gun possession is mainly connected to criminality.[27]

This section covers arms trends (including the perceived extent of small arms in Kenya), and arms sources and movements.

The findings presented here are based on surveys of HHs, LEAs, and CSOs. Furthermore, this section of the report includes qualitative information based on statements from FGDs and KIIs, which are referenced as appropriate.

Small arms trends and extent

Perceived causes of small arms demand[28]

The motivation for firearms possession is predominantly defensive—with a majority of HH respondents citing the need for protection from various perceived dangers. The need to guard property, especially livestock in pastoralist

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

areas, ranked as the most significant justification for firearms ownership, as shown in Table 2.1. The protection of one's community from neighbouring clans and/or communities and defending the village were equally significant factors. Other important reasons mentioned for ownership of firearms were fear of future conflict and personal protection (in particular for HH respondents). Furthermore, a relatively large portion of LEA respondents (14.7 per cent) mentioned that in their opinion firearms may be owned as part of a tradition or with the intention to conduct criminal activities.

Table 2.1 Reasons for firearms ownership as perceived by HHs and LEAs (%)

Reasons	HHs	LEAs
Protection of property	29.5	18.5
Personal protection from other clans	16.2	8.2
Personal protection from gangs, criminals	14.5	19.8
Protection of village	10.4	12.0
Fear of future conflict/instability/war	10.4	11.7
Personal protection from wildlife	8.7	2.6
Part of work equipment	3.5	5.6
Protection at work	1.7	4.5
Part of tradition/criminal activities	1.7	14.7
Hunting	1.7	1.6
Valued family possession	1.7	1.0

Note: columns may not add up to 100 per cent because of rounding.
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 2.1 Perception of firearms ownership for community protection, by county volatility and groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 2.1 shows that in the high-volatility[29] areas sampled, the need to own firearms for community protection was rated significantly higher by both CSO respondents and LEAs as compared to respondents in medium- and low-volatility areas.

Considering that communities, particularly in arid and semi-arid areas, have a history of inter-group rivalry, firearms are essential weapons for fighting off inter-group attacks. In the said hotspots, LEAs rated 'protect the community' slightly marginally higher than 'fear of future conflict' as motivation for arms ownership.

Associated concerns fuelling demand for guns include seeking protection from gangs and the fear of possible war or instability. There are also cultural motivations for arms ownership: 1.7 per cent of HH respondents indicated gun ownership as part of tradition, while in Turkana an LEA observed that among pastoralist communities there is 'the motivation to rustle for pride and dowry'.[30]

Another dimension is the generational aspect of gun ownership—there are cases where members of the younger generation inherit firearms that belonged to their parents.[31] Indeed, another 1.7 per cent of respondents considered ownership as a valued family possession. This value that is ascribed to the gun has a deeper meaning derived from the fact that with it one is able to protect one's family and property in a context of minimal government presence. The gun therefore defines groups' identities, safety, and survival. In this way, it is a valuable family asset.

Livestock rustling and inter-ethnic conflicts still persist in northern Kenya, and this feeds the quest for arms, since it builds communities' self-defence capabilities. In the North Rift region, pastoralist communities are often locked in intense resource-based conflicts as groups seek to access and control water and pasture.

On another note, the ubiquity of the gun especially in pastoralist areas and the government's failure to collect all illicit arms have fed perceptions of impunity. Hence, some choose to own a gun because it is the order of the day anyway. 'Since others have arms and nothing has been done to them, then we buy guns too', observed one Samburu respondent.[32]

There are also criminal motivations for arms ownership in both pastoralist and urban areas. Some of the offences committed using guns in pastoralist

areas include cattle theft and highway banditry. In urban areas illicit arms are most used in violent robberies and carjackings (NTA, 2009, p. 19).[33]

In some pastoralist communities, it is relatively common to consider that a *moran* (warrior) must kill to be recognized as a brave warrior. Among the Turkana, *morans* have their bodies tattooed for every killing committed.[34] But this is not the only meaning to tattooing: it is also used for cleansing—it is believed that by spilling warriors' blood through the tattoos, curses that may follow them for deaths they have caused are broken. The gun has in this way also influenced views on masculinity—perceptions of bravery, heroism, and even manhood are pegged on successful cattle raids and defence of one's community among pastoralists. This creates a strong demand for the gun.[35]

Box 2.1 Excerpts from FGD, Mandera, 19 July 2011

Question: Why do people from this area acquire firearms?

- Unstable neighbours attack us. We have to defend ourselves.
- Pastoralists' communities come with arms. They might attack us.
- There is inadequate government security. It is now upon us to protect ourselves.
- Our clans are often at war at the slightest trigger. We have to be prepared all the time to defend our clan.
- We must protect ourselves and [our] property.
- It is now a commercial and viable business. Trafficking is a profitable business. It is for trade.
- We want to feel a sense of security so we buy [guns] and just keep [them].
- We take from those running from war in Somalia. We can't throw them away.
- It's also for prestige. The rich must have [guns] to protect themselves.
- When we fight we keep the arms we recover.

Estimates of household firearms ownership

When asked directly, 'Do you or anyone in your household own any firearm?' only 2.7 per cent of HH respondents admitted to owning a firearm. This is a significant reduction—by half—of the proportion households owning guns since 2003, when there was a 6 per cent ownership rate (KNFP, 2006, p. 16). It is difficult to attribute this decrease to successful arms collection initiatives and reduction in demand for firearms. For this to be possible, hundreds of thousands of firearms should have been collected since 2003,

considering that with the current firearms ownership rate alone there could be a minimum of roughly 210,000 households owning at least one firearm.

Unfortunately, there is no well-kept and systematic database on annual firearms collection figures since 2003 (when the last firearms mapping survey was conducted). However, data acquired from the Central Firearms Bureau indicates that in 2010 alone 1,411 guns and 17,997 rounds of ammunition were recovered. On the other hand, data from the ASTU indicates that in the period between 1 January 2010 and 31 July 2011, ten guns and 74 rounds of ammunition were recovered.[36] It is not clear if the Central Firearms Bureau's statistics are inclusive of those provided by the ASTU. But importantly, the failure to access systematic information on firearms collection over the last eight years exposes an important gap that needs to be addressed.

It is therefore likely that fewer owners in 2011 than in 2003 were likely to admit to possession of firearms, given the high chance that they are illicit. There have been several largely coercive disarmament operations in the recent past, including the most recent wave of Operation Dumisha Amani that began in 2010. It is possible that respondents were conscious of the possible repercussions of portraying their areas as having significant firearms-prevalence rates. There has been a history of forceful disarmament operations in North Eastern Province that have been described as massacres—the most recent was Operation Chunga Mpaka (Guard the Border) in Mandera in 2008 (Wepundi, Ndung'u, and Rynn, 2011, p. 11).

The counties where respondents admitted firearms ownership are mostly inhabited by pastoralist communities, except Bungoma, where 11 of 86 respondents (13.3 per cent) confirmed owning guns. It is in Bungoma county's Mt Elgon district that armed SLDF militia were fighting for land in the Chepyuk Settlement Scheme. The 2008 military-led Operation Okoa Maisha thwarted the militia threat and recovered guns, but from the present findings, perceptions of civilian arms ownership in the county appear to persist.

The pastoralist-inhabited counties with positive responses on firearms presence include Baringo, Isiolo, Laikipia, Samburu, Tana River, and Turkana. The presence of firearms in counties like Nairobi, Mandera, and Garissa was denied, despite the fact that, for example, in a 2002 Nairobi victimization survey 3 per cent of all respondents admitted that on occasion they carried a

firearm (Stavrou, 2002, p. 37). In addition, the current al-Shabaab-fuelled insecurity in north-eastern Kenya only confirms the permeability of the country's borders and the possibility that the arms problem in that borderland region is more serious than acknowledged by respondents. Sensitivities surrounding the implications of admitting arms ownership are likely to have driven many respondents in some areas to be less forthcoming about the extent of arms possession.

An aggregation of affirmative responses on gun ownership in counties into larger regional units of analysis shows that the highest proportion of household respondents in North Rift admitted to having guns. Thirty of 266 respondents in the region (11.3 per cent) confirmed this (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Responses to question: 'Do you or anyone in your household own any firearms?' (%)

Region	Yes
North Rift	11.3
Western	10.4
South Rift	1.5
Coast	1.7
Nyanza	0.8
Upper Eastern	3.7
Central	—
Central & lower Eastern	—
Nairobi	—
North Eastern	—
Average in the surveyed areas	2.7

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Public perceptions

In Nairobi's Kibera and Kayole residential areas, respondents expressed concerns about the involvement of youthful gangs in crime. 'The perpetrators are networked. Those from Kibera will be facilitated by others elsewhere in Nairobi to execute crime there, and in return these accomplices will commit their crimes here in Kibera. It is a kind of criminal exchange programme.'[37]

Reliance on both crude weapons and firearms is another dynamic. In more sedentary communities like that in Meru, armed robberies are mainly carried out with the use of bladed and crude weapons.[38] However in Nakuru, the usage of crude weapons and firearms has contributed to serious cases of crime, especially robberies. The failure of the police to stamp out the problem is contributing to increasing public disillusionment.[39]

When indirectly asked, 'In your opinion, how many households own guns/firearms in your area?', it is observable that there is a slight but significant trend among all areas, indicating lower firearms possession as volatility decreases. That is, the lower the volatility level of an area the less the proportion of respondents perceiving local arms prevalence (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Perception of local firearms ownership,* by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



* Mean perception score on a scale of 1 = very few to 4 = most/almost all.
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Although very few respondents admitted ownership of firearms in some regions, during FGDs participants more openly acknowledged the presence of illicit arms. In Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Lokichoggio, West Pokot, Baringo East, and Samburu, which are predominantly inhabited by pastoralists, respondents acknowledged a significant arms possession rate that was much higher than depicted in the HH survey.

In Samburu, for instance, FGD participants estimated 10,000 firearms to be in civilian hands and 3,000 arms owned by KPRs.[40] In Mandera, the focus group respondents' estimation of gun ownership in North Eastern was 20 per cent of households. According to them, there has been a reduction in firearms prevalence since inter-clan rivalries have subsided, and with this arms demand has also dropped. The last time there was major clan fighting was in 2008, and this violence invited a coercive disarmament exercise by the government dubbed Operation Chunga Mpaka.[41]

In Marsabit, respondents estimated that only a few people have arms. According to them, reported illicit firearms use around Marsabit Central accounts for the isolated cases of banditry in the area. Some of these criminal activities are alleged to be perpetrated by KPRs.[42]

Respondents in Turkana's Lokichoggio acknowledged the presence of arms in the area and even gave a higher estimation of arms than in other areas. They thought that firearms possession is high across all age groups, including children in some cases.[43] According to FGD respondents, the vulnerability of communities to multiple raids from rival communities in Kenya (especially the Pokot), Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia explains the high demand for firearms.[44]

There appears to be a variety of sophisticated firearms in Turkana. One respondent noted, *'Kuna ile unaweka kwa mshipi na inanyesha risasi na ingine kwa mabega na ni kama bomu'* (There is one that has bullet belts and it rains bullets and another that you put on the shoulders and looks like a bomb). This implies the possibility of the presence of machine guns and other sophisticated weapons in Turkana.[45]

It is also possible that a relatively small number of arms are responsible for the majority of incidents. This was suggested in Migori, where the view was expressed that only about 15 illicit guns were circulating in the area and were being used in almost all incidents of armed violence or thefts.[46]

There is a close inter-relationship between insecurity and increased desire for firearms ownership for protection and defensive purposes. For instance, there is concern that cycles of electoral violence could be feeding demand for guns in some areas.[47] As confirmed by survey results (see Table 2.1), in pastoralist areas a gun is considered the only option for self-defence and the

protection of family and property. This reinforces the feeling that guns are prevalent in Turkana.[48]

A national estimation of illicit small arms is a challenging task in any research. On the basis of the data collected on self-reported ownership (based on HH respondents' responses only) it is possible to establish that approximately 2.4 per cent of Kenyan HHs (including those located in counties not covered by the survey[49]) owned at least one firearm. On the basis of responses to the question 'In your opinion, how many households own firearms in your area?', which was present in the questionnaires for each population group (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs), it can be estimated that the proportion is higher than the direct ownership rate reported by HH respondents. Such 'high' estimates are different depending on the group of respondents (revealing different levels of awareness of the problem) and county volatility.

Table 2.3 Estimation of HH firearms possession across Kenya (figures rounded to the nearest 10,000)

		Self-reported		Opinion about how many HHs own firearms in the area					Average	
County volatility	Total number of HHs*	%	Self-reported count	HHs	LEAs	CSOs	Highest estimate	Highest estimate count	Average	Average count
High	2,159,115	4.7	100,000	13.3%	20.9%	16.8%	20.9%	450,000	12.8%	280,000
Medium	2,389,231	1.0	20,000	4.6%	5.1%	11.5%	11.5%	270,000	6.3%	150,000
Low	1,571,364	2.4	40,000	10.2%	7.5%	7.9%	10.2%	160,000	6.3%	100,000
Sub-total	6,119,710	2.7	170,000	9.1%	14.5%	12.4%	14.5%	890,000	8.6%	530,000
Not surveyed	2,648,244	1.6	40,000	6.5%	6.1%	9.9%	9.9%	260,000	5.8%	150,000
Total	**8,767,954**	**(2.4)****	**210,000**				**(13.1%)****	**1,150,000**	**(7.8%)****	**680,000**

* See the discussion below on sampling.

** These percentages were recalculated on the basis of the total numbers obtained; see Appendix 2.

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Table 2.3 shows the results of both the direct question on self-reported ownership (addressed only to HHs) and qualitative data collected from HHs, LEAs, and CSOs. Qualitative data provided significantly higher estimates than self-reports and indicates that the prevalence of firearms could be more than

five times higher than self-reports. All groups of respondents consistently indicated that they perceived that ownership rates were much higher than HH respondents' self-reports. Accordingly, the number of illicit firearms in the entire country could be estimated to be between a minimum of 210,000 (based on self-reports) and 1,150,000 (based on the highest estimates of all groups). While this margin may appear large, it reflects the wide discrepancy between self-reports and perceptions of HH and CSO respondents, and LEAs. The procedure used for assessing the number of firearms included a first step based on the 31 counties sampled in the survey and consisted of applying the percentages found in the sample to the total number of HHs.[50] Owing to the representative sampling[51] employed by the survey, a conservative rate (based on medium- and low-volatility regions) was subsequently applied to the number of HHs in the remaining non-sampled 16 counties. Table 2.3 shows that the estimates resulted in a range between a minimum of 170,000/ 210,000 (self-reports, excluding/including non-surveyed counties) and a maximum of 890,000/1,150,000 (high estimates), with an average count of roughly 530,000/680,000 households owning at least one firearm (see section V for a description of the method used).

Perceived modes of small arms acquisition

Respondents perceived criminals as the main firearms owners: 29.5 per cent of LEAs and 34.8 per cent of CSO respondents thought that almost all criminals have guns.

KIIs and FGDs implicated the youth, either organized as criminal gangs or as warriors, in gun possession. Given the contextual reality of clan or ethnic conflicts in northern Kenya, identity-based affinities are obstacles to security management. This is because reporting a gun owner from one's own community is considered as weakening one's group.[52]

Firearms are mainly bought from traffickers, with 57.6 per cent of HH respondents, 77.4 per cent of LEAs, and 61.6 per cent of CSO respondents confirming this. A sizeable percentage of respondents (21.9 per cent) were under the impression that firearms are supplied by the police. This data did not match the perceptions of LEAs and CSO respondents. Only very few of them were of the opinion that arms are given by those who have firearms or

by political leaders (6.3 per cent and 9.7 per cent, respectively). The findings also show that hiring firearms from security officers contributes minimally to illicit firearms use, with no HH respondents holding this view, and only 2.7 per cent of LEAs and 5.1 per cent of CSO respondents citing the security forces as sources of firearms.

The networks of dealers and suppliers are discreet, but the players are known by the communities. They are believed to have their own contacts who scout to identify those interested in buying firearms.[53]

In the Rift Valley Province, respondents talked of a known gunrunner who uses private transport in trafficking arms from Garissa to Nakuru. Sometimes the arms are concealed in sugar or other consignments.[54] It was in Nakuru, Samburu, and Trans-Nzoia that the strongest suspicions of some police officers' complicity in crimes emerged. This underscores the need for stronger accountability and control measures for law enforcers to curb the incidence of some of them engaging in crime.[55] In Samburu there were concerns about uncollected British Army munitions, with claims that some community members get arms and ammunition from British Army training camps.[56] Some are given as presents after completion of training and on some occasions caches of ammunition are sold at very low prices.

This information was corroborated by interviewees and FGD participants, who stated that that there are lapses in accounting for arms and ammunitions brought into the country and those used during armed forces and police training. At times officers are unable to account for ammunition that they claimed to have expended in combat, when in reality they had sold or given it to communities.[57]

In most cases, there is inter-community arms trade, depending on the season and timing of various events or activities. During conflict there is a heavy demand and prices go up, while the reverse is also true.

Another means of arms possession that was cited is seizure of arms from enemies. Sharing is also common among a small proportion, indicating that some firearms are hired from security personnel. This is common in urban areas.

But households report significantly more difficulty in acquiring firearms in all three kinds of area.[58] There is a significantly positive trend whereby

increasing security (decreasing volatility) relates to increasing difficulty in procuring a firearm, for all three survey populations. This trend is the strongest among the HH population (see Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Perception of ease of firearms acquisition,* by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



* Mean perception of acquisition score on a scale of 1 = easy to 3 = difficult.
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

According to FGD participants, at Mandera there was a time when firearms could be freely bought at the market.[59] There are also tales of bravado and impunity in relation to firearms acquisition.[60]

An important indicator of the level of prevalence of arms is what respondents consider to be the most common types of weapon. All groups of respondents (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs) cited crude and bladed weapons as the most common (see Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7). Significantly more bladed weapons are reported by households in medium-volatility areas than acknowledged by LEAs or CSO respondents. Conversely, handguns are reported notably more by LEAs and CSO respondents than HH respondents. Instead, HHs report significantly more handguns in hotspots than in both medium- and low-volatility areas.

Figure 2.4 Percentage of respondents indicating that bladed weapons are common in their area, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 2.5 Percentage of respondents indicating that handguns are common in their area, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 2.6 Percentage of respondents indicating that rifles/shotguns are common in their area, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 2.7 Percentage of respondents indicating that automatic weapons are common in their area, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Furthermore, HH respondents reported significantly more rifles/shotguns in high-volatility areas than in the two other less insecure areas. But CSO respondents reported appreciably more of the same arms in high- and medium-volatility areas than did HH respondents. In all areas, LEAs and CSO respondents reported considerably more rifles/shotguns than HH respondents.

Similarly, HH respondents reported notably more automatic weapons in hotspots than in medium-and low-volatility areas. LEAs and CSO respondents, on the other hand, reported more automatic weapons in all the three areas than HH respondents. In addition, LEAs and CSO respondents reported many more automatic weapons in hotspots than in medium- and low-volatility areas.

These results may either suggest that LEAs and CSO respondents were more forthcoming about this information, or that HH respondents were not exposed to the presence and use of firearms to the same extent, thus providing lower estimates. However, an interesting finding is that in hotspot areas all groups of respondents indicated that automatic weapons were more common than handguns, thus confirming the high prevalence of such firearms.

Indeed, during interviews and FGDs, the AK-47 was cited as the most extensively used type of firearm in perpetrating crime and violence in all

parts of the country, with the G3 rifle associated with the government arsenal (Table 2.4). However, the availability of other types of weaponry depended on area and source. For instance, in the Upper Eastern Province participants mentioned firearms commonly found in Ethiopia such as the FN and M16.[61]

Table 2.4 Some common types of firearm/weapon cited in FGDs

Mandera	AK-47s, G3s, grenades, bombs
Marsabit	AK-47s, G3s, Mark 4s, M16s, FNs
Lokichoggio	AK-47s, Mark 4s, HK11s, hand grenades, LPG guns, MANPADS*
West Pokot	AK-47s, G3s, LPG guns, home-made guns
Samburu	AK-47s, G3s, M16s
Migori	AK-47s, home-made guns
Kilifi	AK-47s, LPG guns
Mombasa	AK-47s, pistols, short guns

* Man-portable air defence system(s).
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Arms possession is clandestine and hence most LEAs and CSO respondents regarded modes of firearm storage as an individual secret, as presented in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Respondents' perceptions of where firearms are stored (LEAs and CSOs)

Storage	LEAs	CSOs
It's an individual secret	66%	56%
In houses	20%	25%
In gardens	5%	4%
In secret community armouries	5%	2%
Do not know	4%	13%

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

However, in pastoralist areas herders in grazing fields are more likely to be seen carrying arms. This underscores the great value attached to livestock as the main source of livelihood for these communities. But it also confirms the extent of inter-group hostility as a feeder of firearms proliferation. For

instance, in Samburu North, where at the time of the survey there were tensions among the Samburu and neighbouring Turkana and Pokot communities, *morans* herding livestock walked with firearms.[62]

Indicators of the perceived impact of small arms

In considering indicators of the impact of small arms, the survey focused on an examination of forms of insecurity perpetuated by small arms, gun deaths, and injuries.

Gun deaths and/or injuries

Whereas a majority of LEAs (57.1 per cent) and CSO respondents (47.5 per cent) hold that there are between one and five victims of gun deaths or injuries per month, a significant proportion felt there are no deaths or injuries (31.1 per cent among LEAs and 35.0 per cent among CSO respondents) (Table 2.6).

Table 2.6 Respondents' perceptions of the frequency of firearms-related deaths or injuries (LEAs and CSOs)

	LEAs	CSOs
1–5 victims per month	57.1%	47.5%
No deaths or injuries	31.1%	35.0%
6–10 victims per month	6.0%	8.5%

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Small arms impact

There is a predominant perception among HH respondents, with an average of 30.7 per cent of responses, that illicit small arms are directly responsible for increased human insecurity. This insecurity in some parts of the country is known to feed an arms race. For instance, with the drought situation in northern Kenya earlier in 2011, communities lost their livestock and this pushed them to seek to restock their herds through raids. In some other regions that experienced post-2007-election chaos, there is an improved

sense of security and a decrease in the incidence of crime, as indicated by Kenya Police crime statistics (Kenya Police, 2008). This improvement can be partly credited to local peace-building and security management initiatives through peace committees and task forces to deal with small arms and light weapons.

With the gun culture in pastoralist areas, sometimes community members resort to the gun in low-level squabbles. For instance, during the FGD in Samburu it was said that sometimes the *morans* go to the extent of using guns (AK-47s) to resolve their differences over girlfriends.[63] In Marakwet insecurity is high—there are cases of armed youths robbing those who have just sold their cattle or anyone suspected of having money on them.[64]

Some indicators of human insecurity include armed violence and its direct impacts (deaths and injuries), property loss and/or damage, food insecurity, unemployment, sexual violence, and displacement. There is a predominant perception that armed violence has reduced, as have cattle raids.

Small arms sources and movements

LEAs and CSO respondents were more forthcoming on firearms sources and movements than households. But they were all unanimous in reporting that the main sources of illicit firearms into Kenya are its neighbouring countries. Respondents' recollections traced firearms availability among communities as early as the 19th century, when the first firearm was acquired by the Somalis in what is now North Eastern Province or Turkana in North Rift.[65]

It is, however, useful to observe that whereas the proportion of HH respondents viewing neighbouring countries as sources was less than LEAs or CSO respondents, this is the reverse for perceptions on gunrunners. Thus, a larger proportion of HH respondents than LEAs and CSO respondents was of the view that arms were from illegal arms traders—who may also operate transnationally—within medium-volatility areas (see Figures 2.8–2.10).

Somalia is perceived to be the main source of most arms in Kenya, but firearms are thought to come from Ethiopia, Uganda, and Southern Sudan as well. Respondents in south Nyanza and south Coast perceived Tanzania as contributing minimally to the firearms problem.

Figure 2.8 Percentage of respondents indicating neighbouring countries as the main source of illicit firearms and ammunition in their area, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 2.9 Percentage of respondents indicating gunrunners/illegal arms traders as the main source of illicit firearms and ammunition in their area, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Arms traffickers are said to use animals such as donkeys to transport firearms. Another method of concealment involves hiding firearms in cargo and/or livestock trucks transporting these goods to urban centres for sale. Some of the cargoes in which firearms are hidden include sand, charcoal, and cooking fat. Respondents observed that gunrunners use their connections in Somalia or border towns—like Mandera and Garissa—to discreetly move firearms to targeted destinations.[66]

Figure 2.10 Percentage of respondents indicating government stockpiles (police, military) as the main source of illicit firearms and ammunition in their area, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Lastly, LEAs in medium- and low-volatility areas were silent on the possibility of government stockpiles being sources of firearms (Figure 2.10). But LEAs from hotspots acknowledged this probability (1.6 per cent). This is probably due to a high incidence of cases of use of licit weapons for crime.[67] Whereas between 4.2 and 6.9 per cent of HH respondents across the board mentioned government stockpiles as sources, the highest percentage was observed by CSO respondents in low-volatility areas (8.1 per cent). CSO respondents in medium-volatility areas did not share this view.

Table 2.7 is a summary of the regions and the main sources of small arms and some of the routes and means used to get these small arms into the region. These were described during the FGDs in all the said regions.

Table 2.7 Trafficking routes and means of transportation

Region	Main source	Means*	Routes
Nairobi	Somalia, Uganda, Sudan	Road, rail, government vehicles, individuals	Garissa–Eastleigh Lodwar–Eldoret–Nakuru Mombasa–Nairobi Maralal–Nyahururu–Nairobi Ethiopia–Moyale–Isiolo–Nairobi
Central Kenya	Somalia, Uganda, Sudan	Road, individuals	Isiolo–Nyeri Nairobi–Thika Nairobi–Kiambu
Coast	Somalia, Tanzania	Road, ship, boats	Lunga Lunga–Mombasa Kiunga–Lamu–Malindi–Mombasa Ocean–various ports & homes–Mombasa
North Eastern	Somalia, Ethiopia	Road, people, animals	Somalia–Mandera Somalia–Garissa Mandera–Wajir Ethiopia–Mandera–Wajir
Upper Eastern	Somalia, Ethiopia	Road, animals, traders, government vehicles	Moyale–Marsabit–Isiolo Garissa–Isiolo–Marsabit
North Rift/ Western	Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda	Road, traders, community to community	Sudan–Lokichoggio–Lodwar–Kapenguria–Eldoret Ethiopia–Maralal–Nyahururu Kapenguria–Tot–Kapedo Uganda–Lodwar Uganda–Kapenguria–Kitale–Bungoma
Central Rift	Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda	Road, traders, community to community	Kitale–Eldoret–Nakuru Nairobi–Naivasha–Nakuru Nyahururu–Nakuru
South Nyanza	Tanzania	Road, traders, community	Tanzania–Isebania–Kisii

* Small arms are hidden in cargo, dead animals, charcoal, etc., or on the persons of individuals.
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Cost of small arms

The level of knowledge about the cost of small arms among respondents varied (Table 2.8). It is also possible that there was inhibition among some respondents who may have thought they would be implicating themselves by estimating the cost of small arms. But, generally, gun and ammunition prices depended on how far away the place was from the arms source.[68]

Table 2.8 Estimated cost of firearms (KES*)

Area	Type & cost of firearm	Cost of ammunition (per bullet)
Mandera	AK-47: 35,000 G3: 25,000	
Marsabit	G3: 40–60,000 AK-47: 60,000	100–150
Lokichoggio	AK-47: 4–6 cows (30,000–60,000)	
Samburu	G3: 50,000–70,000 AK-47: 30,000–40,000 M16: 45,000	G3: 50 AK-47: 150
Tana River	AK-47: 30,000–40,000	
Mombasa	Pistol: 15,000 AK-47: 30,000 Hire of pistol: 3,000	
Garissa	AK-47: 10,000–40,000 (or a bull or two, depending on bull's size)	A bullet costs KES 5; the more one purchases, the lower the unit cost
Nakuru	Past daily rate for gun hire was 3,000, but cost may have gone up	
Nairobi	Hiring rates depend on the use for firearm, e.g. Use in residential area: 25,000 For business person: 50,000 For robbing a big premises: 70,000 Hiring handcuffs: 2,000 Cost was higher when bank robberies were more common	
Mt Elgon	AK-47: 15,000–40,000	
Trans-Nzoia	AK-47: 15,000–45,000 There are cases of gun hire	

* KES 84 = USD 1 in April 2011.
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Considering that income levels among communities are low, the cost of arms is high, and this re-emphasizes the lengths communities will go to to ensure their security, especially in pastoralist areas. There are also attendant maintenance costs, such as servicing and ammunition needs.

Small arms, crime, and violence: a victimization survey

General views

Within the overall study was a victimization survey of people's experiences of armed violence, crime, and, specifically, gun violence. The study found that security has comparatively increased in low-volatility areas as compared to medium- and high-volatility zones (Figure 2.11). Security dynamics in hotspots are influenced by multiple factors, including the weather, inter-ethnic relations, culture, and politics. The multiplicity of threats to groups in volatile areas explains lower confidence about security among residents.

Figure 2.11 HH respondents' perception of security in 2011 compared to one year previously,* by county volatility



* Mean perception of security score on a scale of 1 = worse and 3 = better.
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Forty-two per cent of HH respondents felt there is a likelihood of their being a victim of violence and/or crime in the next year. An examination of perceptions of individual and community safety reveals that people feel most unsafe during electioneering periods, with 48.4 per cent of HH respondents holding this view. The survey also found that a significant proportion (42.5 per cent) of HH respondents feel unsafe when they are outside their homes at night and more than one-third (37.2 per cent) even when they are at home in the night. However, it is apparent that there is a predominant feeling of safety among HH respondents, regardless of the time or place (see Table 2.9).

Table 2.9 Perceived HH safety levels (various times and places)

Context/time of day or night	Unsafe	Safe
Safety outside home during the day, during political campaigns	48.4%	50.0%
Safety outside home at night/in darkness	42.5%	57.2%
Safety in home at night/in darkness	37.2%	62.7%
Safety outside home during the day, during festivities	26.5%	72.6%
Safety outside home during the day, at harvest time	23.0%	75.5%
Safety outside home during the day, during the rain season	19.9%	79.0%
Safety outside home during the day, during the dry season	16.3%	82.6%
Safety walking alone from home to the market during the day/in daylight	13.9%	86.0%
Safety walking around the marketplace during the day	13.9%	85.7%
Safety outside home during the day, less than a 1-minute walk from home	10.9%	89.0%
Safety inside home, during the day/in daylight	8.8%	91.2%

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Victimization

As expected, HH respondents in low-volatility areas were significantly less frequently exposed to the risk of crime victimization compared to those in medium- and high-volatility areas (Figure 2.12).

Figure 2.12 Experience of crime victimization among HH respondents in 2011, by county volatility



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

In general, 21.1 per cent of HH respondents had been victims of crime or violence in the previous year. Of these victims, 46.8 per cent experienced it once, while 53.2 per cent had two or more such encounters. Fewer incidents are found as security increases (see Figure 2.12): the higher the volatility of the area, the more likely it was that HH members reported having been victims. This contradicts data from Kenya Police crime reports, which appear lowest in north-eastern Kenya (Kenya Police, 2010, p. 2).

The majority of crimes reported in low-volatility areas took place at home. Incidents in high-volatility areas were distributed across locations, with approximately one-third occurring at home, another third on the road/street, and 18 per cent on private land. Crimes in medium-volatility zones mostly occurred on the road or a street. Crimes on private land almost exclusively occurred in high-volatility areas. Groups in medium- and low-volatility areas are mainly sedentary and have a higher rate of urbanization, and are therefore highly prone to crimes in homes or in streets and/or the road (Figure 2.13).

Figure 2.13 Location of crime experienced by HH respondents, by county volatility



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

The majority of crime and violence incidents experienced or witnessed by respondents led to death and/or injury (60.9 per cent). Based on these responses, a quantification of the number of those harmed reveals that hundreds have been injured or killed. In total, HH respondents admitted that

264 members of their HHs had suffered injury and 260 others had been killed due to crime and/or violence.

The incidents occurred mostly at night, according to 65.4 per cent of respondents that were victims. Only 34.6 per cent of respondents were victims of daytime crimes or violence. In most cases victims did not know their attackers (62.6 per cent). Only 35.7 per cent of victims knew their attackers by name or by sight.

The most frequent type of crime experienced by HH respondents was robbery/theft, accounting for 61.2 per cent of cases; followed by cases of threat and/or intimidation (20.9 per cent); and assault, beating, shooting, or fighting (14.0 per cent; see Table 2.10). The most serious cases, those in which the victim was killed, accounted for 15.6 per cent, including intentional killing (7.1 per cent), revenge killing (5 per cent), and unintentional killing (3.5 per cent).

Table 2.10 Type of crime or violence experienced (multiple responses)

Type of incident	% of cases
Robbery/theft	61.2
Threat/intimidation	20.9
Assault/beating/shooting/fighting	14.0
Gang violence	8.1
Intentional killing	7.1
Revenge killing	5.0
Inter-clan fighting	3.8
Unintentional killing	3.5
Rape/sexual assault	3.3
Domestic violence	2.2
Other	1.9
Drug dealing	1.6
Kidnapping	0.7

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

In total, more than one-third of victims of crime or violent encounters were confronted with a firearm (Figure 2.14). Among firearms, automatic weapons

were the most frequently used (16.8 per cent), followed by handguns (14.5 per cent). Bladed and traditional weapons were mentioned in approximately one-quarter of cases, while in 19 per cent of cases no weapon was used.

Figure 2.14 Weapons used in incidents of crime or violence



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

The vast majority of HH victims of crime or violence (85.5%) made the incident(s) known to the relevant authorities. Incidents were most frequently reported to the police (in 64 per cent of cases) and provincial administration (in 21.5 per cent of cases). In a few cases, the reports were made to family members (in 4.6 per cent of cases) or traditional leaders (in 4 per cent of cases; see Table 2.11).

Table 2.11 To whom crime/violence incidents were reported

Institution/actor	% of cases
Police	64.0
Provincial administration	21.5
Family	4.6
Traditional leaders	4.0
Neighbours	2.7
Friends	1.0
Religious leaders	0.6
Military	0.6
Vigilantes	0.4
Private security providers	0.3
Do not know	0.3

Note: the total of the right-hand column may not correspond to 100 per cent due to rounding.
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Despite this initial reliance on law enforcement agencies, more than one-quarter of the interviewed victims who reported incidents to the police (26.8 per cent) said there was no response from law enforcers. Another significant 26.2 per cent of respondents said that law enforcers were still working on the case. Only 13.7 per cent said there was formal punishment, while 10.6 per cent said there was informal punishment (including mob justice).

Some 17.5 per cent of victims did not report the crimes to anyone. Among the reasons they gave for not reporting, the majority cited their lack of confidence in the police or authorities (40.6 per cent; see Table 2.12).

Table 2.12 Reasons for not reporting crime or violence incident

Response	% of cases
No confidence in the police/authorities	40.6
I solved the problem myself	26.2
Other	25.9
The police/authorities are far away or non-existent	4.1
Do not know	1.3

Note: the total of the right-hand column may not correspond to 100 per cent due to rounding.
Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

These findings point to the need to strengthen formal and local capacities for managing security in ways that guarantee justice and minimize casualty rates. These capacities include early warning and response mechanisms, and the necessary security architecture. This forms the basis of analysis in the next section.

III. Kenya's small arms control capacities

Introduction

An important function of this study was to assess how different parts of Kenyan society perceive the ongoing efforts made by the government to limit the proliferation of firearms. Respondents were asked to express their opinions on a variety of aspects related to the overall security situation and how Kenya is performing in controlling it, both internally and at its borders, through legislation, law enforcement, awareness campaigns, and other initiatives.

Analysis was based on responses from the surveys of HHs, CSOs, and LEAs, as well as FGDs and KIIs. The same approach based on the volatility of counties used in other parts of the report was used here (see sections I and V).

Overall success in controlling illicit small arms

Respondents were asked to assess the level of success of government in controlling the proliferation of illicit small arms in the past several years. Whereas 75.5 per cent of LEAs rated government arms control initiatives as successful, a lower proportion of CSO respondents (55.9 per cent) gave a similar verdict. While 42.4 per cent of CSO respondents felt government efforts have been unsuccessful, only 24.2 per cent of LEAs share this view (see Figure 3.1). Considering that LEAs are government officers, the views of CSO respondents are bound to be more critical. For instance, community representatives during FGDs cited concerns about the government's failure to stem the involvement of rogue police officers in crimes and gunrunning and the contribution of KPRs to insecurity.[69]

Figure 3.1 Percentage of respondents believing that Kenya has succeeded in controlling small arms in the past five years, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

A similar question assessing perceptions on the effectiveness of arms control instruments yielded a comparable response pattern (Figure 3.2). While the views of law enforcers were equally split between those who considered the instruments effective (49.7 per cent) and those who considered them weak (48.2 per cent), the majority of CSO respondents (71.1 per cent) felt that the arms control regime is weak.

Communities are cautious in their assessment of the government's performance in arms control efforts. To them, persisting insecurity and arms challenges are an indictment of the government: the state is perceived as not having done its best due to weak mechanisms and policy frameworks. The government is viewed as either unwilling to conclusively deal with the small arms menace or as failing to deploy sufficient security personnel to enforce law and order.

In some regions, law enforcers decry the minimal resources available to them to manage security and control illicit arms. For example, in north-eastern Kenya, where the fluid security situation demands continuous and extensive police patrols, there is a vehicle shortage. Police sometimes have to share vehicles and this hinders their ability to comprehensively cover the area. The poor state of the roads also means that without appropriate vehicles, patrols are restricted to more accessible areas.[70] The vagaries of the weather, such as rains, often cut out some areas, such as Hulugho—a border

area frequently mentioned by focus group respondents as an entry point for small arms, smuggled goods, and al-Shabaab militants.[71]

Some respondents underscored the need for appropriate disarmament measures and arms control efforts to permanently resolve small arms problems. In North Rift, especially around the greater Samburu and adjacent Pokot areas in the Suguta Valley, respondents' views are informed by the inter-ethnic rivalry between the two communities. The Pokot are painted as expansionist and aggressive, and are considered to have displaced everyone. In this sense, a targeted disarmament action is recommended.[72] However, it should be remembered that targeted arms collection exercises have been reasons for the failure of many of such initiatives in northern Kenya (Wepundi, Ndung'u, and Rynn, 2011, pp. 10–11).

Figure 3.2 Percentage of respondents rating arms control instruments in Kenya as weak or effective, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Arms control initiatives are as much dependent on political goodwill as they are on the enforcement of appropriate legal and policy frameworks. However, Kenya is yet to implement a national policy on small arms and light weapons. The country equally needs to ensure a comprehensive review of small arms and light weapons-related policies and laws with a view to fully aligning them to sub-regional arms control instruments and best-practice guidelines.

Specifically, under the RECSA, relevant instruments and guidelines include the Nairobi Protocol and the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament for the RECSA Region (RECSA Best Practice Guidelines), among others.

There is also the Programme of Action and other international standards. One other instrument that has not received much attention is the Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa, to which Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda are signatories. Once in force, the instrument would bind states to taking regional action to stamp out cattle rustling.

Figure 3.3 Respondents' awareness of at least one international protocol on arms control, by groups (CSOs and LEAs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

The level of awareness of these instruments among LEAs and CSO respondents is relatively low. An analysis among both groups reveals that LEAs are generally more aware of an international or regional protocol than CSO respondents (see Figure 3.3). More than half of the latter are not aware of any international or regional protocols signed relating to small arms (see Figure 3.3). This may point to the possibility that since they are diverse, members of CSOs whose mandates concern issues other than peace and security are less likely to know about small arms management instruments and issues. In this case, it would be necessary to have a broad target group for small arms and light weapons awareness-raising and capacity-building initiatives.

Border control mechanisms

Kenya is geopolitically strategic—it is a key business hub and transit point for many Eastern and Central African countries. The country also hosts refugees from neighbouring countries as a result of conflict and civil wars over the years. This, coupled with the itinerant nature of most borderland communities, makes border security a priority in order to resolve insecurity and reduce crime.

The challenge of border porosity is a shared regional concern. Small arms trafficking has been known to occur around borderlands and this has fed perceptions of neighbouring countries being sources of arms.

Respondents were asked to rate Kenya's border control mechanisms: 65.3 per cent and 79 per cent of LEAs and CSO respondents, respectively, rated them as weak. Only a small number of respondents—34.4 per cent of law enforcers and 20.5 per cent of CSO—indicated that the controls were effective.

Figure 3.4 Percentage of respondents who believe selected cross-border crimes are common, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

A key indicator of insecurity is the incidence of cross-border crimes. Drug trafficking, motor vehicle thefts, and the challenge of illegal immigrants are perceived by respondents to be very common. A significant pro-

portion of responses rated poaching as rare. Some of these crimes are avenues through which guns are trafficked.

The challenge of ensuring border security is compounded by the transnational identities and nomadic nature of borderland communities. For instance, Kenyan Somalis are related to Somalis across the border. Kenya's Borana and Gabbra communities in Marsabit are related to Ethiopia's Oromo ethnic group. The Karamoja cluster groups straddle Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan. To the south, Kenya and Tanzania have the Maasai and Kuria communities on both sides of the border. To the west, Kenya's Sabaot and Uganda's Sebei are related. Among the pastoralist communities, crossing another country's border in search of water and fodder is common. But these cross-border affinities are sometimes used by communities in cross-border arms acquisition activities (Farah, Aisha, and Daud, 2005, p. 8).

Concerns about border porosity therefore feed views on Kenya's safety in the light of the small arms problem. Asked to rate their perceptions of Kenya's safety with respect to this problem, 67.3 per cent of LEAs felt it was unsafe, compared to 73.4 per cent of CSO respondents.

Hence, although it is costly to have comprehensive border control mechanisms, they are needed in order to combat organized cross-border crime and small arms trafficking, among other crimes. But any border control efforts would have to contend with the transnational identities of groups along the frontiers. The fact that some community members' kinship ties know no borders means such groups would always have connections to multiple countries. This will be a continual basis for local group efforts to boost their defensive and offensive capacities against perceived threats.

Mitigating the challenge of illicit small arms

The survey sought the opinion of respondents on several measures that have been applied in addressing the challenges of illicit small arms. Common approaches include disarmament, awareness raising, arrest and prosecution, and the possible establishment of a specialized police unit to deal with small arms.

Disarmament

A higher percentage of LEAs (44.6 per cent) than CSO respondents (34.5 per cent) were aware of government disarmament efforts. This compares with only 13 per cent of HH respondents. Still, the vast majority of respondents indicated that they were not aware of any disarmament efforts in their areas (Figure 3.5). This could be informed by the fact that the most recent disarmament efforts (e.g. Operation Dumisha Amani) have mainly focused on the North Rift region, with some focus on Upper Eastern.

Figure 3.5 Percentage of respondents who are aware of local disarmament campaigns, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

A probative analysis of the responses demonstrates a trend of more knowledge of disarmament operations among respondents in hotspots than is the case in medium- and low-volatility areas. In fact, a significantly greater percentage of LEAs reported awareness of a local disarmament campaign in high-volatility areas than both CSO and HH respondents. Similarly, a significant greater percentage of CSO interviewees were more conscious of disarmament in their areas than were HH respondents.

This finding calls into question the extent of community involvement in disarmament initiatives. While the government's disarmament and development approach (specifically, Operation Dumisha Amani) is said to adopt

comprehensive media, civil society, and community engagement strategies, it appears that the level of local community participation is unsatisfactory. A lot more needs to be done to address the knowledge gap on arms control initiatives among LEAs, CSOs, and HHs.

It is also imperative to underscore the fact that mere arms recovery should not be the aim of disarmament operations. Instead, there should be attendant gains in a reduction of supply and demand factors feeding arms proliferation—including, but not limited to, boosting security in affected areas. In this regard there were mixed feelings on the effect of disarmament on security, with the majority of HH respondents (54.7 per cent) indicating that security has increased due to disarmament; 19.1 per cent felt that security dynamics have remained the same as a result, while 26.2 per cent felt that security has decreased (Table 3.1). However, FGD respondents expressed support for comprehensive disarmament exercises.[73]

Table 3.1 Impact of disarmament on security of the population

Impact	% of population
Decreased	26.2
Stable	19.1
Increased	54.7
Total	100.0

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Considering the reality that close to one-third of respondents felt that insecurity had risen after disarmament, it is understandable that levels of community cooperation during disarmament activities differ across different groups of respondents. Among those who were aware of disarmament activities, 61.3 per cent of LEAs and 68.3 per cent of CSO respondents indicated that communities cooperated with these activities (Figure 3.6).

A second reaction relates to instances of communities giving up some, but not all, of their arms: 65.0 per cent of CSO respondents and 49.3 per cent of LEAs confirmed this. However, there is some degree of increased awareness of the dangers of illicit arms possession and use, according to the views of 36.7 per cent of LEAs and 21.7 per cent of CSO respondents (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6 Percentage of respondents who agreed with selected statements about the outcome of local disarmament campaigns, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Those involved in the disarmament exercise are usually community leaders and some members of civil society who work closely with the provincial administration in persuading and identifying those with arms. In all cases the Kenya Police and the Administration Police are involved, except in areas where the security dynamic is complex. Where there are armed groups, such as Mt Elgon's SLDF, the army intervenes. In many cases, the Kenya Army is equally mobilized in some areas for the purposes of cordoning target areas while the police and provincial administration move in. In most cases, the bigger a disarmament operation, the more the number of security agencies involved, including the military. The Kenya Forest Service (KFS) and Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) have also been involved and often recover arms and hand them over to the police (KNFP, 2006, p. 34).[74]

Frequent complaints have been made about law enforcement officers' hiring out guns and selling ammunition. This problem is partly fed by inadequate recordkeeping of the government's arms stockpiles. The computerization of these records is a recent initiative but not all police stations have adopted this.

Figure 3.7 Percentage of respondents believing that government keeps proper records of its arms, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Asked to state whether they believed government keeps proper records of its stockpiles, 83.3 per cent of LEAs reported that they trusted the records, but a significant 11.6 per cent did not, while 5.1 per cent were not sure. This is in contrast to 35.3 per cent of CSO respondents who believed the government does not keep proper records (Figure 3.7).

The Kenyan government has embarked on a programme to mark all its arms and ammunition to ensure effective stockpile management. This is expected to enhance accountability in the use of government-owned firearms (KNFP, 2011, pp. 1–2).

Some of the licit arms that are abused are those issued to KPRs. Hence, there are concerns about KPRs' accountability and professionalism in the management of arms and ammunition. Some KPRs allegedly use their arms for carrying out criminal activities or hire them to those involved in banditry or raiding neighbouring communities. For instance, in Marsabit such suspicions were rife.[75]

It is also not clear whether KPRs' arms are given back to the government. It is generally known that the saying 'KPRs never die' means that there is no record even of those who die and their arms are never surrendered to the government. Some are inherited or taken over by a member of the

community, raising the question of the efficacy of the administration and control of arms given to KPRs.[76]

The poor supervision of KPRs creates grounds for misuse and abuse of their role. The institution of the KPR is also seen to be politicized and, as such, rules and procedures on its members' recruitment are flouted. Although KPRs are meant to operate like any other regular police formation under an officer commanding station and are supposed to be equipped, supervised, trained, and motivated to work for the specific community, the process and procedures are largely ignored.[77]

However, in some areas like the greater Samburu and Turkana, KPRs are appreciated. Some respondents observed that the low numbers of regular security officers do not provide adequate security for them. But to compound the politics around KPRs, whereas the Samburu have them, their neighbouring Pokot community does not. This reinforces perceptions that KPRs are biased, ethnic, and politicized.[78]

Awareness creation on small arms

Respondents were asked whether they had witnessed any awareness-raising initiatives on issues pertaining to small arms; 60.5 per cent of CSO respondents and 40.5 per cent of LEAs, respectively, said they had not attended, been involved in, or seen any awareness-raising efforts (see Figure 3.8).

There have been some awareness-raising efforts by the provincial administrations, the KNFP, and civil society actors (especially under the Kenya Action Network on Small Arms) to advance education on issues of small arms and light weapons. Among the means of communicating and creating awareness on these issues, chiefs' *barazas* (public meetings) and workshops were cited as having been used most frequently (see Figure 3.9) and rated as effective (see Figure 3.10). *Barazas* were rated as effective by LEAs and CSO respondents (96.1 per cent and 94.4 per cent, respectively). Workshops ranked as the second-most-effective method. Documentaries, brochures, and newspapers were generally rated as less effective.

Figure 3.8 Percentage of respondents who have attended/been involved in/seen any materials creating awareness on small arms and light weapons, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 3.9 Percentage of respondents who referred to various means of awareness raising, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 3.10 Percentage of respondents who rated various means of awareness raising on small arms and light weapons issues as effective, by groups (CSOs and LEAs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Respondents were asked to specify which categories were to be considered as most important groups to target for campaigns against small arms. The youth and criminal gangs were given high priority, followed by CSOs—who can disseminate information using various means—elders, and *morans*. These gangs are believed to be the primary perpetrators of firearms-related crime and violence, and targeting them is part of a frontal approach to resolving the arms problem.

However, in some FGDs—especially among pastoralists[79]—participants suggested that children should be taught the dangers of small arms and be used as a means of influencing their communities. Respondents thought that being shown a different type of life through interaction with other communities in a formal environment like school would be most appropriate. A school-based curriculum on peace building and the dangers of firearms would be useful towards this end.

Arrest and prosecution

Successfully prosecuting cases involving arms-related crimes and violence is central to resolving the impunity around illegal arms possession. One FGD participant provided an example of a deep-rooted gun culture in Lokichoggio: 'In one chief's *baraza* attended by the DC [district commissioner], some community members came with their guns and gestured to indicate to the DC that what they needed were bullets for their guns and not the security and development issues he was talking about.'[80]

The draft National Policy on SALW prepared by the KNFP provides for illegal firearms possession to be treated as a crime. Article 4(3) of the Firearms Act has provisions which prescribe a penalty of between seven and 15 years' imprisonment for illegal firearm and/or ammunition possession (Kenya, 1954). But although there are laws to punish illicit arms possession, the prosecution of arms-related cases is sometimes hampered by ineffective investigations, which contribute to failure to convict.

Most of those who had confidence in the government's competence in prosecuting arms-related crimes were from hotspots, constituting 28.7 per cent of HH respondents, 32.8 per cent of LEAs, and 29.2 per cent of CSO respondents (Figure 3.11). Findings indicate that CSO respondents from

medium- and low-volatility areas were least likely to hold this view. Considering that most courts are found in medium- and low-volatility areas, their pessimism about prosecutorial competence—historically one of the roles of the Kenya Police—points to the need for strengthening of cases brought before the courts. This can be achieved only by conducting thorough investigations, knowledge of relevant laws, and skills in building watertight cases.

Figure 3.11 Percentage of respondents indicating that arms-related crimes are competently prosecuted, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

It is, however, useful to underline that a lot more CSO respondents and LEAs in hotspots were less positive about prosecution—they believe that there is lack of competence on this issue. In fact, 56.8 per cent of CSO actors from low-volatility areas were agreed on this.

A higher proportion of HH respondents than LEAs and CSO respondents agreed on the need to invest more resources in boosting prosecutorial efficiency and competence. The successful prosecution of small arms-related cases is an underpinning solution to injustices perpetrated with the gun. Demonstrable retributive and/or punitive measures against convicted perpetrators of small arms-related cases are a key approach to reducing arms demand. It is therefore urgent to have in place both the competency and adequate resources necessary for the successful prosecution of these cases. On average, 44.9 per cent of CSO respondents, 36.1 per cent of HH respondents,

and 25.1 per cent of law enforcers interviewed thought there is lack of competence in the prosecution of small arms-related cases.

Another 21.2 per cent of LEAs, 8.1 per cent of HH respondents, and 13.1 per cent of CSO respondents cited a lack of resources as the reason for the ineffective prosecution of small arms-related cases (see Figure 3.12). However, this perception is mostly expressed by respondents of all groups in the low-volatility counties. Further, the fact that some unprincipled security/police agents are suspected of collusion with criminal groups means that members of the public are not entirely confident of the abilities of law enforcement agencies.[81]

Figure 3.12 Percentage of respondents believing that the problem with the prosecution of arms-related crimes lies in lack of resources rather than competence, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 3.13 Percentage of respondents indicating there is no prosecution of small arms-related crimes in their area, by county volatility and groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Finally, a higher proportion of respondents from medium-volatility areas than from high- and low-volatility areas were of the view that there were no prosecutions of small arms-related cases in the area (Figure 3.13). The medium-volatility areas are more likely to experience cases of the use of crude and bladed weapons, such as incidents of Mungiki-fuelled violence in central Kenya.[82] That there is a perception of fewer prosecutions of firearms-related cases in medium- than in low-volatility areas is probably confirmation of the contribution of areas like Bungoma county's Mt Elgon district to gun problems and attendant prosecutions.

Asked if they were aware of any arrests relating to illicit arms, 34.4 per cent of LEAs and 43.8 per cent of CSO respondents confirmed knowledge of arrests. But 63.8 per cent of LEAs and 54 per cent of CSO respondents were not aware of such arrests.

Regarding the administration of justice, respondents were asked if they knew about judgments made in the previous year on cases relating to small arms. Among LEAs, 80.7 per cent did not know about such judgments, compared to 19.3 per cent that were aware of them. The majority of LEAs and CSO respondents considered judicial competency in prosecuting small arms-related cases as either below average or average: 18.8 per cent of LEAs and 35.1 per cent of CSO respondents considered the competency to be below average, with 65.7 per cent of LEAs and 51.7 per cent of CSO respondents being of the view that there is average judicial competency to prosecute.

Table 3.2 presents data for the period 2010/11 by province in which there were 195 arrests and 57 prosecutions, resulting in 54 convictions and 3 acquittals. The crimes involved 516 weapons and 9,350 rounds of ammunition of various calibres. The cases that were not prosecuted are still under investigation. This data demonstrates that Rift Valley had the most convictions in firearms-related prosecution, while Nyanza had the least, and Western and Central tied at second last. North Eastern, Coast, and Eastern are in the second tier of the most convictions. This roughly mirrors the perceptions on prosecutions, with high-volatility areas having the most prosecutions.

Table 3.2 Cases involving firearms/ammunition use by criminals in one year and outcomes of cases (2010/11)

Province	Rifles	Pistols/ revolvers	Total*	No. of arrests	No. of convictions	No. of acquittals
Nairobi Area	22	135	157 (666)	10	3	0
Rift Valley	66	43	109 (712)	65	24	0
Central	38	51	89 (320)	6	2	1
Eastern	46	19	65 (4,139)	50	6	1
North Eastern	32	0	32 (3,396)	29	9	0
Coast	11	17	28 (18)	24	7	0
Nyanza	7	3	10 (99)	4	1	0
Western	9	7	16	7	2	1
Grand total	**231**	**275**	**506 (9,350)**	**195**	**54**	**3**

* Figures in brackets indicate rounds of ammunition seized.

Source: Small Arms Survey interview at Criminal Investigation Department (CID) headquarters, Nairobi, 23 August 2011; used with permission

Specialized police unit

Respondents were asked if the formation of a specialized police unit could improve small arms reduction efforts (Figure 3.14). A total of 74.6 per cent of LEAs and 82.4 per cent of CSO respondents supported this view, while only 23.9 per cent and 17 per cent disagreed, respectively.

Similarly, the study sought to measure views on improving police training in arms control issues: 88 per cent of LEAs and 82.4 per cent of CSO respondents were positive on this. Beyond holding KNFP-facilitated awareness-training exercises at the Kenya Institute of Administration and the Administration Police Training School Embakasi, there is a need for more specialized training activities on border control mechanisms, stockpile management, best practice approaches to disarmament, and international and national arms control instruments, among other measures. Such initiatives should target all law enforcement agencies, even through institutions such as the Kenya Police College, CID Training School, Police Academy, and Administration Police Colleges.

But the failure of law enforcers in arms control efforts is partly blamed on their lack of collaboration with the community. Whereas 76.5 per cent of LEAs thought the level of cooperation between the police and community was good,

a smaller proportion of CSO respondents (58.2 per cent) shared this view (Figure 3.15). But the provincial administrations have the highest approval rating on their collaboration with the community: 89.8 per cent of LEAs and 85.8 per cent of CSO respondents thought that administrators have good collaboration with the community.

Figure 3.14 Percentage of respondents indicating there is a need for a specialized police unit on small arms, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 3.15 Percentage of respondents who believe that there is good cooperation between law enforcement agencies and the community, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Early warning system

An efficient early warning system is reliant on strong partnerships among all relevant stakeholders; a working communication and feedback mechanism; and, more importantly, an effective and functional early response capacity. Unfortunately, many respondents complained about the failure of law enforcement agencies to respond to information given to them. Tip-offs on imminent raids and/or crimes are also ignored.[83] However, in some cases, the warnings are given, but the government lacks adequate resources to prevent or pre-empt the crimes. In other cases, government responses are reactive rather than proactive.[84]

Based on respondents' views, it is essential that the existing early warning infrastructure be strengthened. This should be by, for instance, having a cooperative arrangement between the NSC and KNFP on the former's national early warning and early response platform. In such an arrangement, the KNFP would bring its expertise on small arms and light weapons issues, and monitors would have to undergo appropriate training. It is important to have a foolproof system that does not compromise the security of monitors, law enforcers, and any other actor. But there would have to be confidence-building efforts to encourage members of the public to be more forthcoming with early warning information.

Asked to rate how the public should be involved in providing information on firearms to the government or law enforcement agencies, the use of telephone facilities was viewed as effective (Figure 3.16). The sending of SMSs (text messages via cellular/mobile phones), the establishment of monitors to collect and disseminate information, and the use of DTFs rank equally highly in preference. E-mails are the most ineffective due to limited Internet availability, especially in rural areas.

Challenges faced in combating illicit small arms and light weapons

The survey sought to know respondents' views on the various challenges faced by law enforcement agencies in addressing issues related to small arms and light weapons. Both CSO respondents and LEAs had identical views on many issues.

Figure 3.16 Percentage of respondents who consider various methods of communication as effective, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



* Specific monitors to collect and disseminate information.

** District task forces for information gathering/dissemination.

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 3.17 Percentage of respondents who consider challenges faced by law enforcement agencies as significant, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

LEAs and CSO respondents considered the under-staffing of the police service, insufficient resources, lack of motivation, and corruption as the most pressing challenges. There are also challenges of lack of coordination among law enforcement agencies; limited experience among personnel, some of whom are poorly trained; and few courts and police stations (see Figure 3.17).

Respondents in FGDs and interviews confirmed these views. The most recounted challenge was the lack of personnel to provide security. Underdeveloped infrastructure contributes to the failure to combat rustling and banditry. For instance, the Suguta Valley lies in the areas between the Samburu and Pokot, and it is inaccessible by road. The difficult mountainous terrain has hindered security officers' efforts to combat cattle rustling and small arms proliferation. The area can be accessed on foot only, meaning that once rustlers drive livestock down the valley security officers cannot reach them. This is also affected by the fact that some law enforcers' lives have previously been lost in earlier security operations in the area.[85]

The prevalence of small arms in the sub-region is itself a challenge. Against the backdrop of inter-ethnic rivalries among communities in northern Kenya and neighbouring countries (Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda), small arms demand persists. Arms therefore become necessary tools for guaranteeing security. In North Rift, the Pokot and Turkana are vulnerable to attacks from armed warriors of the Toposa and Merille of South Sudan and Ethiopia, respectively. In the north-east, the Kenyan Somali community is not spared the spillover effects of Somalia's factional fighting.[86]

Public perception of the success of small arms control initiatives

Respondents were asked to rate whether the government was winning the war against the proliferation of illicit small arms. LEAs predominantly felt that the government is winning, with 59.6 per cent holding this view. But CSO respondents were more reserved, with only 30.6 per cent holding that the government is winning (Figure 3.18). A lot more needs to be done to win the war on illicit small arms, considering the magnitude of the challenges that have to be overcome.

Figure 3.18 Percentage of respondents who believe that Kenya is succeeding in controlling illicit small arms, by groups (LEAs and CSOs)



Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

The discrepancy of views between groups of respondents in Figure 3.18 highlights the importance of involving different stakeholders in assessing progress on small arms control. Indeed, while LEAs feel that their efforts are bringing about a radical improvement in the firearms situation, the majority of representatives of CSOs (approximately two-thirds) did not believe that the government is winning. This indicates that in the view of civil society the government could do more to reduce crime and violence, increase security, and limit the proliferation of firearms.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions

Eight years after the 2003 mapping exercise, this study provides the first comprehensive assessment of small arms prevalence and perceptions of security in Kenya. The major findings of the study are the following:

- While the 2003 survey found that on average 6 per cent of HH respondents owned arms, this survey found that only 2.7 per cent of HH respondents—a significantly smaller proportion—reported owning at least one illicit firearm, which translates into an estimated minimum of 210,000 illicit arms in civilian hands nationally. The reasons for this reduction can be multiple. Firstly, it may be a reflection of gains made in government and civil society arms reduction efforts.[87] Secondly, it is possible that, considering the number of largely coercive disarmament operations in several areas from 2003 to date, respondents were more reluctant to admit gun ownership for fear of self-implication. Under-reporting is a possibility that should be taken into account. For this reason, responses to the questions on the perceived prevalence of firearms provided by all groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs) were used to generate 'high' estimates that indicated that the number of HHs owning firearms may be more than 1.1 million. As self-reports are likely to underestimate and perceptions to overestimate these numbers, the reality may be somewhere in between. Findings suggest that, if the most conservative estimates from the survey are applied to the entire territory of Kenya, the number of firearms may be between 530,000 and 680,000.
- The study identified new arms trends. Despite the drop in the perceived number of arms nationally, some zones have recorded a significant increase in gun possession since 2003. The prevalence rate in Western Province went up from 4 per cent to the current 10.4 per cent. Similarly, Rift Valley's proportion of arms owned increased by a margin of 6.8 per cent. This finding

underscores the need to re-examine the effectiveness of government approaches to disarmament. Inasmuch as Operation Okoa Maisha in Mt Elgon recorded gains in dismantling the SLDF militia, reducing insecurity, and recovering arms, the persisting view that firearms are available in the area is a wake-up call. The same can be said of Operation Dumisha Amani, which has predominantly focused on Rift Valley.

- The period around the December 2007 elections has left marks on the population: the majority of household respondents feel the most insecure during election periods. More than 40 per cent of HH respondents felt there is a likelihood of their being a victim of violence and/or crime in the next year.
- There is a discrepancy between the views of LEAs and CSO respondents regarding the effectiveness of current efforts to reduce firearm proliferation and increase security. While the former tend to be more optimistic, the latter expressed a more reserved opinion.

Accomplishments in arms control and security management initiatives point to the centrality of bottom-up dialogical approaches of a multi-stakeholder nature. The north-eastern region, whose history of insecurity was fuelled by a Somali secessionist attempt in early post-independence Kenya, is often cited as a success story in armed violence reduction programmes. Such efforts involved the use of local elders, women representatives, local administrators, and law enforcers in joint non-coercive efforts to establish peace and manage small arms and light weapons.[88]

An often-celebrated achievement is the work of the Wajir Women for Peace Group that kick-started local initiatives to end local firearms-fuelled violence in Wajir. This process catalyzed the formation of a more inclusive multi-clan Wajir Peace Group, which brokered a local peace pact—the Al Fatah Declaration. The process later gave birth to the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC)—a local peace structure that became integrated as a sub-committee of the government's District and Development Committee in 1995. This heralded the creation of local peace committees for violence reduction and security management, initially in northern Kenya, but later countrywide. The committees were useful in utilizing traditional conflict

resolution methods, such as passing binding peace agreements based on community norms that have contributed to the current stability.

As a matter of fact, Interpol recently rated Garissa—the north-eastern region's main town—as the safest town in East and Central Africa (Astariko, 2011). Incidents of crime and the use of arms in North Eastern Province have reduced in number, and local efforts have established a mediated state—relative stability born from initiatives grounded in government–civic partnerships.[89] Despite this stability in North Eastern, communities remain wary of the threat of spillover effects of the war in Somalia. The biggest concerns about the region are now the threat of al-Shabaab infiltration and the use of the region as an arms corridor to other parts of the country. Recent reports about suspected al-Shabaab grenade attacks on civilian targets in Garissa in response to the ongoing Kenyan pre-emptive incursion into Somalia confirm these fears.[90]

Other regions such as Upper Eastern and North Rift are still grappling with small arms-fuelled insecurity. Inter-community rivalries persist, some of which are with cross-border groups (from Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda).

Among the reasons for inter-group rivalry are the cattle rustling and boundary disputes that inform many inter-community conflicts, for example in Coast, the Wardei conflict with the Orma over community grazing blocks and boundaries. Communities in North Rift accuse each other of expansionism, such as the Samburu, who consider the Pokot as expansionist. The Maasai, Kisii, and Kuria are in conflict over boundaries in Nyanza, while the Sabaot have grievances over land issues in Western Province. The conflict between the Tharaka and Igembe of Meru is also caused by boundaries. All these conflicts, including post-election violence, are resource based.[91]

Thus, it is observable that the facilitating conditions for small arms demand still exist. Specifically, the recurrent cycles of politically motivated clashes escalated by the 2007/08 post-election violence have created a new demand for small arms, especially in central Rift Valley. A reduction of cattle rustling in West Pokot around this period was linked to the lucrative arms-trafficking trade due to heightened demand in central Rift Valley (UNDP/OCHA, 2008, p. 1). In this region, arms demand is said to be a function of two

broad factors. Firstly, the government is viewed as having failed to provide adequate security. Secondly, communities feel increasingly vulnerable to attacks from neighbours, emergent criminal gangs, and armed youths.

It is useful to re-emphasize an important fact: that in order for the government to accurately diagnose the small arms problem, it should recognize that small arms acquisition by groups is as much a response to threats as it is an attempt to gain offensive capability. Further, dialogical approaches, such as mediation by government and local civil society actors, remain crucial to armed violence reduction and, eventually, the alleviation and/or erasure of small arms demand (Bevan, 2007, p. 7).

This survey also found that most households feel the most insecure during electioneering periods. The peaceful management of Kenya's elections is therefore important for reducing the demand for small arms.

In handling ongoing reforms, emphasis should be put on strengthening the public's confidence in law enforcement agencies, improving the efficiency and accountability of the security forces, and strengthening institutional frameworks for government–civic partnership in security management. The victimization part in this survey revealed a considerable amount of lack of confidence in the security forces.

Therefore, efforts are also needed to connect national-level institutional reforms with local-level peace and security initiatives. District task forces on small arms and light weapons and district peace committees are structures that should be sustained. In addition, policy frameworks, such as the KNFP-formulated National Policy on SALW and the NSC-formulated Peace Policy need to be adopted by the government. These policies will effectively help bridge the gap between national- and local-level initiatives. Also, the responsive capacities of the security forces should be boosted through the provision of sufficient resources and the adequate deployment of law enforcers in all areas.

Although the gains made in bottom-up approaches, such as the use of local peace structures, have been replicated countrywide (through the formation of peace committees and DTFs), the ingraining of lessons learned in successful armed violence and gun reduction practices has been slow. For instance, although the government showed progress by infusing varied

confidence-building measures in Operation Dumisha Amani, local and regional security complexes, among other internal challenges, undermined security forces' efforts. Thus, while the disarmament programme targeted several districts simultaneously, rival communities felt unfairly targeted, in part due to the suspicion that neighbours were not disarmed as extensively. In effect, disarmed groups developed even greater demand for arms, as local conflicts escalated in some areas. This fact is particularly observable in Isiolo. It is apparent that the quick-fix solution has often been forceful disarmament. It has been trickier to integrate peace-building approaches into disarmament initiatives, regardless of existing local peace and arms reduction structures.

But bottom-up approaches are just one piece in a complex jigsaw puzzle. The present study has shown that multiple arms sources and movements, and widespread prevalence call for robust regionalized mechanisms that include border control, joint inter-state initiatives, and proper and efficient internal surveillance and enforcement machinery.

These demand and supply anti-arms instruments should in part be dependent on a strengthened early warning and response mechanism that integrates the monitoring and reporting of arms-related dynamics. The KNFP's sister unit, the NSC, runs an early warning platform that should be tapped for pre-emptive measures against emergent arms problems. This is as much an inter-unit and inter-agency coordination concern as it is a warning against the temptation to duplicate efforts rather than to harmonize them.

This study has not only pinpointed new arms trends—such as perceptions on increased arms prevalence in western Kenya, including Rift Valley—but it also serves as a basis for early warning and early response. In this regard, coordinated action among constituent members of the KNFP, the NSC, the police, the intelligence service, and other law enforcement agencies would have a more sustainable impact.

To some extent, this survey has demonstrated the negative impact of small arms-fuelled insecurity on human security. In just less than one-third of cases, respondents generally felt that there has been increased armed violence, more deaths and injuries, more frequent cattle raids, and greater food insecurity, among other impacts. It cannot be gainsaid that small arms have

indirect impacts on health, access to education, and underdevelopment, among other human development indicators. In this regard, more focused studies on the link between small arms and topical human security and/or development issues are a key gap that has to be filled.

Importantly, this study is the first comprehensive arms mapping in the region since the formulation of the RECSA Best Practice Guidelines. In these guidelines, a baseline study of the arms situation should precede any arms collection exercise. The example of Kenya, through this study and the 2003 KNFP mapping, should serve to guide the fine tuning of appropriate small arms research approaches and methodologies. This will require skilling up the research capacities of RECSA member states' small arms and light weapons focal points.

Recommendations

Based on the survey findings, a number of recommendations can be formulated. They originate from the perceptions of LEAs and respondents from HHs, CSOs, and FGDs, and have been grouped according to emerging main issues.

Monitoring and understanding the nature of the problem

In line with Kenyan civil society commitments to creating a community of practice on armed violence and development, this study has highlighted the importance of regularly measuring and monitoring (gender disaggregated) the incidence and impact of armed violence locally and nationally, and developing a set of specific and measurable indicators to assess progress in efforts to reduce armed violence and arms prevalence. In particular, monitoring should include the following:

- generating, computerizing, integrating, and creating a data- and information-sharing platform on small arms and light weapons management;
- establishing a broad-based reporting and cooperation framework for early warning and early response that should maximize public participation and multi-stakeholder engagement. Further, there is need to engage community

leaders in curbing illicit arms trafficking through the identification of gun-runners, trafficking routes, and gun markets;
- expediting the process of marking government and civilian licensed firearms;
- upgrading the Kenyan forensic laboratory and acquiring new technological equipment;[92]
- test firing all state- and civilian-owned firearms and collecting their ballistic information. This information should be kept in a national firearms database to aid in any investigations of gun-related incidents and reduce the misuse of government and licensed firearms; and[93]
- requiring any future procurement of firearms to be supplied with their ballistic information.

Institutional environment

Improving policing capacities should involve:

- increasing law enforcement agencies' presence and visibility in affected areas. In many of the pastoralist areas, communities' interaction with formal government institutions and law enforcement agencies is minimal, and this reinforces the need for self-help security arrangements. Specifically, the dispatch of law enforcers to different areas should be tied to the strategic needs of these places. In frontier areas, the foremost concerns are managing border security, cattle rustling, and arms trafficking. In urban areas, the challenges of robbery and carjacking, among other crimes, are the priority security issues;
- adequately equipping law enforcement agencies, including the provision of transport and communication equipment, with priority given to borderland regions (northern Kenya);
- strengthening law enforcement agency–public information sharing in security management using initiatives such as community-based policing, DTFs, district peace committees, and any other relevant structures. This will also improve public confidence in law enforcement agencies;
- strengthening the investigative and prosecutorial roles of the law enforcement agencies and the Directorate of Public Prosecution, including

magistrates, especially in relation to combating small arms and light weapons-related crime;
- improving the country's intelligence capacity, specifically in relation to curbing small arms and light weapons proliferation;
- establishing a specialized police unit to deal with small arms;
- streamlining the management of KPRs with a view to ensuring greater KPR discipline and accountability in their use of firearms;
- overhauling the KPR approach to security provision through increasing the deployment of police officers; and
- acknowledging Western Province and South Rift as emerging small arms demand zones. There is a need to strengthen small arms surveillance in these areas and resolve conflicts, manage emerging security threats, and curb all contributing causes to arms demand.

Targeting arms-trafficking and border control issues should involve:

- enhancing border control mechanisms through regular border patrols, strengthening border check points, establishing more border posts, and strengthening border surveillance systems;
- deploying rapid response forces in border areas to curtail the influx of illicit small arms and curb cattle-rustling raids/attacks;
- strengthening the role of traffic police and the CID in detecting gun trafficking and curbing this, and investing in gun detection equipment for these officers;
- strengthening the accountability of law enforcement agencies involved in the surveillance of entry points and trafficking routes through clamping down on corruption in these areas and through stricter supervision and vetting of these officers; and
- improving the terms of service for LEAs to curb corruption and improve their motivation.

Improving policy frameworks should involve:

- lobbying for the adoption and implementation of small arms and peace policies. These policies need to be audited for their relevance in comprehensively

addressing the different social, economic, political and security dimensions of the small arms, disarmament, and community safety problems;
- reviewing the Firearms Act with a view to introducing stringent measures against illicit small arms possession and ownership; and
- incorporating best practices on small arms management into the discourse and efforts taking place in the security sector reform process in Kenya, e.g. the RECSA Best Practice Guidelines.

Measures to reduce access to firearms

These measures would involve:

- particularly among pastoralists, implementing cultural awareness programmes that dissuade communities from gun cultures and negative cultural practices. An example is a Catholic Justice and Peace Commission's integrated peace and livelihoods initiative in greater Samburu that has infused conflict sensitivity into its activities to encourage cooperation and dialogue among rival Samburu, Pokot, and Turkana (Wepundi, 2011). While it has made some gains, these can be sustained only if similar efforts are more broadly implemented. Such efforts should also have components of cultural exchange programmes to strengthen value coexistence and support cultural institutions, e.g. elders, in order to have local community capacities for maintaining social order;
- undertaking comprehensive disarmament measures targeting all groups guided by the RECSA Best Practice Guidelines and the government's disarmament and development approach. These should also be tied to other relevant peace and development initiatives;
- engaging communities in peaceful conflict resolution with a view to reducing the demand for small arms; and
- undertaking regional approaches to disarmament such as the joint disarmament exercises particularly within the Karamoja and Somali cluster areas.

Measures dealing with victims

These measures should involve:

- addressing the plight of violence- and arms-induced displacements. The government has often focused on IDPs in hotspots of electoral violence such as central Rift Valley. While there has not been a complete solution to this group of IDPs, resettlement and compensation efforts for displaced persons should also target this cluster in pastoralist areas. Displacements resulting from cattle rustling and pastoral community conflicts are the most ignored humanitarian problem in the country; and
- the government improving the facilities in hospitals and boosting their capacity to handle patients with gun-inflicted wounds, many of which are complex.

Systemic development-oriented measures

These measures should involve:

- promoting alternative livelihoods in northern Kenya, such as exploiting the huge potential in minerals extraction and processing, tourist attraction centres, the livestock industry, and agriculture. Similarly, community empowerment programmes should be designed that engage the youth in income-generating activities to reduce the allure of banditry and gun-related violence;
- improving infrastructure in northern Kenya to unlock the entire region's immense potential. Most of northern Kenya lacks paved roads, while communication infrastructure is underdeveloped. This has security implications – for instance, in Parkati village in Samburu North, a recent raid left several dead. But the community could not relay information on the attack early enough because of a lack of mobile phone network coverage. But even if such a report were given in good time, it is a five-hour drive from Baragoi (the main town) to Parkati. Infrastructure development would also curb highway banditry (Wepundi, 2011, p. 20);
- undertaking further research, particularly among pastoralist communities and in urban areas, to identify the relationships between incidents of crime, the use of small arms, and socio-economic factors;

- incorporating armed violence prevention and reduction strategies in development programming, in line with Kenyan civil society commitments to creating a community of practice on armed violence and development;
- assessing the movement of small arms in and out of the country. Although the present study looked at trends, cross-border volumes should be studied to authoritatively determine key players, sources, and destinations of arms, both licit and illicit. Failure to do this was one of the limitations of this study; and
- assessing gendered responses in terms of themes and specific perspectives. Data used in this study and future research can be used to disaggregate gendered views on various concerns regarding small arms.

V. Methodology

Introduction

The largest component of this survey is an HH survey attached to a geographical location. An HH frame exists from the Kenya National Population and Housing Census. A summary of population counts and corresponding HHs is available in various census publications. The data is broken down to the lowest administrative areas used during the census. These are referred to as sub-locations, which is the smallest administrative unit in Kenya. These units are used in census taking, and tabulations are basically based on them. In an actual census, the sub-location is divided into enumeration areas for ease of enumeration. Each enumeration area is supposed to have on average 100 households. A collection of sub-locations forms a location, which in turn forms a division. Several divisions form a district.

Kenya is made up of 287 districts (PAIS, n.d.), most of which have been created over the years, since there were 41 districts at independence. Several of the current districts are grouped together to form a county. These correspond to the original 41 districts, except for the districts that were too big in area or in which the population has outstripped resources, necessitating a split to form a county of their own. This affected six counties, and since the promulgation of the new constitution, Kenya is now made up of 47 counties. The counties represent the sub-national units that form the basis of this mapping exercise.

Sampling

Sampling frame for the HH survey

Population data was retrieved from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, which included population size and number of HHs. It was calculated that a population of 38,610,997 inhabitants with 8,767,954 HHs of our target area

would indicate an average HH size of 4.65 (see below for information regarding the target area). As the unit of measurement desired in this survey was the HH, a sampling strategy was calculated around the number of HHs in Kenya. Using a confidence level of 95 per cent and a confidence interval of 2, a two-stage sample size calculation produced a sample size of 2,400 HHs. A detailed breakdown of this calculation is as follows:

$$(1) \quad \text{ss\_indefinite} = \frac{Z2 * (p) * (1 - p)}{C2}$$

Where:
ss_indefinite = sample size for an indefinite sample size
Z = Z value (e.g. 1.96 for 95 per cent confidence level)
p = percentage making a choice, expressed as a decimal
(0.5 used for sample size needed[94])
C = confidence interval, expressed as a decimal
(e.g. 0.02 = ±2)

$$(2) \quad \text{ss\_definite} = \frac{\text{ss\_indefinite}}{1 + \frac{\text{ss\_indefinite} - 1}{\text{Pop}}}$$

Where:
ss_definite = sample size for an definite sample size (final sample size)
Pop = population size (e.g. number of households)

Sampling for CSO and LEA interviews

In order to conduct CSO interviews, supervisors and enumerators were instructed to randomly select nine CSO personnel per county, provided they conformed to pre-designated profiles identifying a CSO (i.e. NGOs working within the county). These groups were sampled conveniently (i.e. as they were available).

In order to conduct LEA interviews, supervisors and enumerators were instructed to randomly select 25 law enforcement agency personnel per

county, provided they conformed to pre-designated profiles identifying a local law enforcement agency (e.g. provincial administration, police, KWS, KFS, customs, etc.)

Sampling for FGDs

FGDs were conducted in the areas that are generally known for illicit arms problems, such as parts of western Kenya, North Rift, Upper Eastern Province, North Eastern Province, and three major urban cities of Nairobi, Mombasa, and Nakuru.

FGD participants were purposively selected from the relevant provincial administration, security personnel (i.e. police), NGO representatives, and village elders. The district administration staff, informed by the KNFP director, selected actual FGD participants from each of these groups.

Target area

Counties were stratified by HH size and were then further stratified using known information about security.

Counties were, therefore, stratified into the following four categories:

- Twenty counties with fewer than 150,000 HHs constituted stratum I.
- Twenty-three counties with 150,001–300,000 HHs constituted stratum II.
- Three counties with 300,001–500,000 HHs constituted stratum III.
- One county with over half a million HHs constituted stratum IV.

A level of security was assigned to the counties on the basis of the experience of the researchers. The following three sets of counties were identified:

- Fourteen highly volatile counties were selected where arms and crime are common and insecurity very high. Each of these 14 counties was selected purposively (see Table 5.1).
- Four additional counties from strata III and IV were also purposively selected due to their large HH population.
- The remaining 13 counties were randomly selected.

Table 5.1 Designation of high-, medium-, and low-volatility counties across Kenya for this study

High volatility	Medium volatility	Low volatility (others)	
1. Tana River	15. Mombasa	25. Kilifi	39. Kakamega
2. Garissa	16. Kwale	26. Lamu	40. Vihiga
3. Wajir	17. Kirinyaga	27. Taita Taveta	41. Bungoma
4. Mandera	18. Murang'a	28. Meru	42. Busia
5. Marsabit	19. Kiambu	29. Tharaka Nithi	43. Siaya
6. Isiolo	20. Uasin Gishu	30. Embu	44. Homa Bay
7. Turkana	21. Nakuru	31. Kitui	45. Migori
8. West Pokot	22. Narok	32. Machakos	46. Kisii
9. Samburu	23. Bomet	33. Makueni	47. Nyamira
10. Trans-Nzoia	24. Kisumu	34. Nyandarua	
11. Elgeyo-Marakwet		35. Nyeri	
12. Baringo		36. Nandi	
13. Laikipia		37. Kajiado	
14. Nairobi		38. Kericho	

As a subsequent sampling step, sub-location HH size was divided by 100 HHs (taken as one measure of size) to give equality to all units. These were numbered sequentially in the county. If a sub-location had 2,000 HHs, which translates to 20 measures of size, these would be numbered from 1 to 20 from the previous highest number. This means that in a county of N households there were N/100 measures of size from which the required number of clusters (represented here by sub-locations) were systematically selected with a random start to represent counties. These would correspond to sub-locations, which are our primary sampling units. Even in cases where a sub-location had more than one measure of size, the number(s) selected would represent the sub-location. In every unit so selected, ten households would be selected systematically to represent all 100 HHs in the sub-location (cluster).

Since it was further decided that stratum I should be allocated half of the number of households allocated to stratum II, with the other strata varying in size, the result was to interview 700 HHs in the first stratum, 1,300 in the second, 360 in the third, and 260 in the last. The sample is presented in Appendix 1.

Table 5.2 Distribution of sample HHs in strata and counties

Stratum	Sample counties	Stratum HHs (N)	Sample stratum HHs	Sample HHs (n)
I	14	1,773,160	1,237,287	700
II	13	4,769,735	2,657,354	1,300
III	3	1,240,053	1,240,053	360
IV	1	985,016	985,016	260
Total	**31**	**8,767,964**	**6,119,710**	**2,620**

The final distribution of the filled questionnaires across Kenya is presented in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 Distribution of sample HHs

Provincial administrative unit	County (number of HHs sampled)		Total HHs sampled
Nairobi	Nairobi		264
Central	Kirinyaga (43) Murang'a (68)	Kiambu (132)	243
Coast	Mombasa (58) Kilifi (71)	Kwale (41) Tana River (14)	184
Eastern	Meru (117) Machakos (81)	Marsabit (19) Isiolo (10)	227
North Eastern	Garissa (39) Wajir (39)	Mandera (59)	137
Nyanza	Kisumu (66)	Migori (56)	122
Rift Valley	Turkana (56) West Pokot (30) Baringo (36) Samburu (13) Laikipia (28) Keiyo Marakwet (24)	Narok (51) Trans-Nzoia (52) Uasin Gishu (63) Nandi (50) Bomet (58) Nakuru (113)	574
Western	Busia (47)	Bungoma (86)	133
Total			**1,884**

Cleaning, validating, and weighting data

In order to ensure the validity, reliability, and ethical scoring of the data, a rigorous cleaning and validation procedure was executed prior to analysis.[95] A total of 2,633 collected questionnaires from the entire nationwide sample of HHs were entered into the preliminary database. During the cleaning and validation process, 750 questionnaires were removed, leaving a final total of 1,883 questionnaires. For the LEA questionnaires, a total of 710 questionnaires were entered into the preliminary database and 374 were discarded due to either high error or high non-response, leaving a total of 336 LEA questionnaires. For the CSO questionnaires, a total of 255 questionnaires were entered into the preliminary database. Subsequent to the cleaning process, 77 questionnaires were discarded due to high error and high non-response, leaving a total of 178 questionnaires.

Once the data was deemed cleaned and validated, weights were applied to individual cases in order to create a representative proportion of the entire population. The weights, applied only to the HH survey, take into account county location and gender ratio per county. One case was missing location information and was thus given a weight of one, making the final weighted number of HHs covered N = 1,884.

In addition to 2,620 HH questionnaires, the data was to be supplemented by about 775 LEA questionnaires, 279 CSO questionnaires, and 18 FGDs. The first three were analysed in the same way as the HH data sets. Owing to logistical handicaps, the targets were not met. It is notable that a level of response in excess of 90 per cent was attained, which should provide reasonable support to the rest of data (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.4 Outcome of data collection for three sample populations

Survey	Target sample	Original response rate	Final number of filled questionnaires	Measurement error
HHs	2,620	99.5%	1,884	1.56%
LEAs	775	N/A	710	2.69%
CSOs	336	N/A	255	1.60%

Instrument

Three types of questionnaire were administered targeting HHs, LEAs, and members of CSOs. Data collection instruments for the HH, LEA, and CSO surveys were very similar to each other. The FGDs were facilitated by the use of specific guidelines aimed at supporting the large-scale surveys with more qualitative information based on the same themes present in the survey questionnaires.

Training and data collection

A total of 64 enumerators and 15 supervisors were employed to administer the questionnaires. Supervisors and enumerators were trained in survey methodology and administration of the questionnaire. This training covered research objective, research ethics, questionnaire content and administration procedure, geographical scope, research protocol, and quality control mechanisms. The HH survey questionnaire was also pre-tested in Nairobi, and based on this experience the instrument was reviewed to address issues emerging from the pilot.

Interviewing method

For the HH survey, data was collected from respondents in sample HHs on the basis of the plan provided. Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis with each respondent. Fieldwork was facilitated by the assistance of a village elder. The elder showed the enumerator the boundaries of the sub-location and an approximate area on the ground hosting about 100 HHs. The enumerator was instructed to choose a good starting point and select an HH by choosing a number between one and ten (say X). The enumerator would then identify this HH on the ground and embark on the interview. This was designated the first HH to be interviewed. After the first HH, the enumerator had to count and skip ten HHs to identify the second one for an interview. The process was systematically repeated until the cluster was fully covered. In each HH, the enumerator was instructed to identify one respondent above the age of 16, trying to alternate males and females to the extent possible.

All completed questionnaires were handed over to the supervisors for checking and safe custody at the end of each day. Supervisors were instructed to pay particular attention to completeness, legibility, validity, clarity of writing, and consistency in answers. To ensure the safety of data, supervisors were to keep all data collected and bring it to the office personally, without using a courier service. Hence the confidentiality and safety of data were maintained.

Data entry and cleaning

Data entry and analysis of all questionnaires was centrally conducted in Nairobi. CSPro software was used in data entry, while SPSS was used in data analysis. Data cleaning and validation were systematically done to ensure the reliability of the data used for analysis. A team of highly experienced data operators was recruited to enter data in computers using the CSPro package. The team was led by an IT expert who designed the data entry package in consultation with the Small Arms Survey to accommodate the three questionnaires used in the survey. The IT expert trained and monitored the data entrants, assisting them where necessary. The project statistician also sat through the data entry process to ensure that no wrong or unclear data found its way into the computer. Any unclear data was referred to the statistician for clarification. Analysis was to be undertaken using SPSS together with Microsoft Excel packages. After all the data was entered, it was sent to the Small Arms Survey in Geneva for archiving and validity tests. Errors detected were then sent back to Nairobi for confirmation with the original questionnaires. After several iterations of this kind, the data can be considered clean and validated. The open-ended questions were collapsed to provide a basis for common analysis. The analysis of free text responses provided an additional wealth of information.

Demographic findings

Gender representation

The HH survey had a fairly balanced male/female representation. A conscious effort was made to ensure this gender balance. However, among the LEAs, the proportion of males was higher than females, arising from the reality that more men are engaged in security agencies. Among HHs, female respondents comprised 49.9 per cent (n = 935) and males comprised 50.1 per cent (n = 940)[96] (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Gender distribution of respondents, by groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)



Figure 5.2 Level of education of respondents (HHs and CSOs)



Age of respondents

At the HH level (see Figure 5.3), the majority age was 30–39 years, comprising 28.0 per cent of the respondents. Similarly, among the LEAs and CSO respondents, the majority of respondents were 30–39 years, comprising 39 per cent and 34 per cent of their totals, respectively.

The lowest representation was of respondents aged 16–19, representing 4.6 per cent of the HH sample, with the figure more than doubling for ages 60 years and above, or 11.1 per cent. However, CSO interviewees aged 16 to 19 represented 1% of the total sample, while respondents 60 years and older represented 5% (see Figure 5.5).

Education

In both the HH and the CSO survey, approximately one-third of the respondents had attained a secondary school level of education. Among HH respondents, 23.2 per cent had not completed primary education, while 29.6 per cent had primary education. Higher education was much less frequent among HHs, while for CSO respondents, those with post-secondary and university education combined formed 59.5 per cent (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.3
HH sample distribution by age



Figure 5.4
LEA sample distribution by age



Figure 5.5
CSO sample distribution by age



Appendix 1: Sample distribution by county

Table A1 Sample distribution by county

County name	Count
Baringo	36
Bomet	58
Bungoma	86
Busia	47
Garissa	39
Isiolo	10
Keiyo Marakwet	24
Kiambu	132
Kilifi	71
Kirinyaga	43
Kisumu	66
Kwale	41
Laikipia	28
Machakos	81
Mandera	59
Marsabit	19
Meru	117
Migori	56
Mombasa	58
Muranga	68
Nairobi	264
Nakuru	113
Nandi	50
Narok	51
Samburu	13
Tana River	14
Trans-Nzoia	52
Turkana	56
Uasin Gishu	63
Wajir	39
West Pokot	30

Appendix 2: Methodology on firearm possession estimates in Table 2.3

Firearm possession estimates were calculated based on two survey questions, self-reports, and perceptions of ownership, providing a lower and higher figure estimate, respectively. In the self-report estimate, the figure that was produced derived from the direct question addressed to HH respondents, asking if their HH owned a firearm. While this would be expected to represent the more reliable figure, we recognize the presence of significant under-reporting, as is typical for such sensitive questions. Sensitivity to this question may be higher or lower in different contexts and at different times, which may explain any discrepancy between results expected and obtained in some counties.

In the high estimate, the figure that was produced derived from the indirect question asking all survey respondents (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs) their perception of HH firearm ownership in their local area. Given that this is the mere perception of the respondents, we note that this figure may not be based on any facts and is more likely to be inflated. In order to produce a higher limit, we chose the highest estimate out of the three groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs). To provide a moderate figure, taking into account both extremes, both high and low figures were then averaged to provide an average estimate of HH firearm ownership.

In Table 2.3 the three groups of respondents were categorized according to the designated level of volatility of the county in which they lived (high, medium, and low). Percentages were extracted for each volatility category and were then multiplied against the total number of HHs within the sampled counties of the respective volatility category. In this sample, all counties designated as high-volatility regions were included, while 16 counties from medium-/low-volatility regions were not. Therefore, we created a dummy variable, dichotomizing the sample into high volatility and medium/low volatility, then we extracted firearm possession percentages based on the

responses of our three groups. The medium-/low-volatility percentage for each group was then used as an extrapolation figure to estimate the firearm possession in the remaining 16 counties. The resulting firearm possession figure estimates were then added to those of our sample, equalling the total of 47 counties accounted for in Table 2.3.

Computation

Not surveyed

Generating a representative sample in a survey statistically attributes sample characteristics to non-surveyed regions that share similar demographic or contextual characteristics. Therefore, findings retrieved in medium-/low-volatility counties from the current survey sample may be attributed to non-surveyed counties of medium and low volatility, owing to statistical measures implemented to ensure that the sample represents the entire nation of Kenya as a representative whole.

To account for the counties that were not surveyed, an overall average percentage was calculated using the percentage retrieved from the medium- and low-volatility areas. This percentage was then weighted according to the number of HHs within each volatility area (medium: 2,389,231; low: 1,571,364). This percentage was then multiplied against the number of remaining households in the non-surveyed area. The calculations used to retrieve the high and average percentages for each volatility area are given below.

Calculation of non-surveyed percentage:

([Medium HH x low %] + [Low HH x low %]) / (Medium HH + low HH)

([2,389,231 x 1.0%] + [1,571,364 x 2.4%]) / (2,389,231 + 1,571,364) = 1.6%

1.6% x 2,648,244 = 42,371.9 ⟶ 40,000

Calculation of high percentage:

Question: 'In your opinion, how many households own guns/ firearms in this area?':

Response options: (1) Very few (2) Quite a few
(3) Majority (4) Most/almost all

1 = 0%, 2 = 25%, 3 = 50%, 4 = 75%

(Average of all % for this specific question for each volatility area) x (area HH)

E.g., high volatility: 20.9% x 2,159,115 = 450,000

Calculation of average percentage:

(High % + low %) / 2

E.g., high volatility: (20.9% + 4.7%) / 2 = 12.8

Appendix 3: Arms recovered in 2010

Table A2 Arms recovered in 2010

	Make/type of weapon	Total
1.	AK-47 rifle	481
2.	Revolver	16
3.	Pistol	60
4.	Home-made gun	25
5.	HK21	4
6.	Toy gun	105
7.	Carbine	266
8.	Mark 4	52
9.	G3 rifle	138
10.	M16	43
11.	Air gun	11
12.	MG3	1
13.	Mark I	57
14.	Liai rifle	35
15.	Sub-machine gun	6
16.	Beretta rifle	45
17.	Rocket launcher	6
18.	Suez	2
19.	Mark 3	3
20.	SHE Carbine	2
21.	Stun gun	14
22.	FN	7
23.	Tranquillizer gun	3
24.	Heckler & Koch	9
25.	Chemical Mace	5
26.	FN heavy-barrelled rifle	2
27.	Bren gun	2
28.	HK4	1
29.	Fishing gun	1
30.	Patchet/Sterling	1
Total	**17,997 rounds of ammunition (assorted)**	**1,411 weapons**

Source: Unpublished document provided by Central Firearms Bureau during an author interview, Nairobi, 18 August 2011; used with permission

Endnotes

1 There is no universally accepted definition of small arms and light weapons. This report uses a list developed by the 1997 United Nations Panel of Experts. The panel lists small arms as including '[r]evolvers and self-loading pistols; [r]ifles and carbines; [s]ub-machine guns; [a]ssault rifles; [and] [l]ight machine guns'. It lists light weapons to include 'heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; [p]ortable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles; [p]ortable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; [p]ortable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; [and] [m]ortars of calibres of less than 100 mm' (UNGA, 1997, para. 26). Generally speaking, this report uses the terms 'small arms' to refer to both small arms and light weapons, unless otherwise stated.

2 For example, Kamenju, Singo, and Wairagu (2003, pp. 47–52) cite security, competition for shrinking natural resources, cattle raids, poverty, and corruption among the security forces as root causes of arms prevalence in the North Rift area.

3 A consortium of agencies forming the Continental Advisory Research Team as a result warned that, unless the comprehensive reform agenda is implemented, freedom of movement in the Rift Valley would be affected in future elections (CART, 2010, pp. 8–9).

4 According to media reports, there were more than 28,000 rounds of 9 mm ammunition and slightly fewer than 2,500 rounds of assorted other small arms ammunition of various calibres (see, for example, *Daily Nation*, 2010a).

5 There has been speculation that arms and ammunition like that found in Narok may be used to re-arm militias in the Rift Valley and elsewhere (Citizen TV, 2010).

6 For a fuller historical analysis of the British pacification and conquest in East Africa, see Collins (2006, pp. 16–22).

7 The East African Community (EAC) consists of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda (EAC, n.d.a). The Republic of South Sudan applied to join the EAC on 11 November 2011; the application is currently pending (EAC, n.d.b).

8 Cock (2000, pp. 78–79) argues that as a result the AK-47 has contested social meanings and identities in South Africa, for example.

9 These include KNFP (2003), which contains small arms mapping findings on arms prevalence in the country, as well as Adan and Pkalya (2005) and Kamenju, Singo, and Wairagu (2003).

10 Operation Wajir is frequently referred to as the Wagalla Massacre. See, for example, ACORD (2010, p. 19).

11 The two Human Rights Watch reports capture human rights atrocities committed by security forces during the operations in Mt Elgon and Mandera (HRW, 2008; 2009).

12 Despite this achievement, it was still feared that the SLDF would regroup in Mt Elgon (Wachira, Muluka, and Wepundi, 2010, p. 43).

13 Author interview with ASTU commander, Gilgil, 19 August 2011.

14 Author informal interview with KNFP deputy director, Nairobi, July 2011.

15 Small Arms Survey interview with KNFP office, Nairobi, 20 March 2012.

16 The survey covered seven counties in North Rift, specifically Trans-Nzoia, West Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet, Baringo, Samburu, and Laikipia. The reports are awaiting publication.

17 These include RECSA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the ISS, Saferworld, Oxfam GB, the German Society for International Cooperation, and the EAC, among others.

18 Some of the most comprehensive studies on small arms in Kenya exclusively focus on the whole of or sections of northern Kenya (Mkutu, 2008; Adan and Pkalya, 2005; Kamenju, Singo, and Wairagu, 2003; Oxfam GB, 2003; Pkalya, Adan, and Masinde, 2003).

19 The RECSA/ISS study on practical disarmament remains unpublished. It focused on small arms and light weapons challenges in rural and urban areas, with proposals on practical disarmament measures. It was part of the RECSA/ISS research in the region that informed the development of the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament for the RECSA Region (see Wepundi, 2010).

20 The Security Research and Information Centre's annual crime surveys, dubbed the 'Kenya Crime Survey', were last published in 2003 and were perhaps the other civil society-engineered annual analysis of crime trends (SRIC, 2003). The annual police reports on crime, on the other hand, are essentially a statistical and narrative reporting of crime trends (Kenya Police, 2008; 2010).

21 These districts were Turkana, West Pokot, Wajir, Samburu, Marsabit, East Baringo, Tana River, Moyale, Trans-Nzoia, and Marakwet.

22 This figure does not include the 50,000 estimated guns in Moroto, which brought the total to 222,995 guns. These were said to cost KES 16.7 billion (or USD 223 million at the exchange rate then). The money was enough to fund free primary education in Kenya for two years and build 600,000 classrooms.

23 The estimation in Mkutu (2008, p. 4) could be erroneous, considering the referenced newspaper source talks of 5,000 illegal guns. The newspaper report cites Kizito Sabala (Mwaniki, 2000).

24 For example, a soldier was killed in November 2011 when a Kenyan military truck ran over an IED on a road in Mandera (Wabala, 2011).

25 Key informant interview (KII), Garissa, 23 April 2011

26 KII with law enforcement officer, Garissa, 23 April 2011.

27 Based on KIIs with law enforcement officers, Garissa, 23 April 2011 and Laini Saba, 27 April 2011.

28 The report includes findings based on both the perception and experience of respondents. Perception indicates the views of respondents, while experience indicates events actually experienced by them. Both indicators contribute to understanding, especially in situations in which respondents may not have revealed their own experience for fear of self-implication in illicit activities.

29 The phrases 'high-volatility areas' and 'hotspots' are used interchangeably.

30 Small Arms Survey FGD, Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011.

31 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011; Mandera, 19 July 2011; Kapedo, 27 July 2011.
32 Small Arms Survey FGD, Maralal, 27 July 2011.
33 Small Arms Survey FGD, Nakuru, 28 April 2011; KII, Laini Saba, 27 April 2011.
34 Small Arms Survey FGD, Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011.
35 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Mandera, 19 July 2011; Kapenguria, 20 July 2011.
36 Author interview at Central Firearms Bureau, Nairobi, 18 August 2011.
37 KII, Laini Saba, 27 April 2011.
38 Small Arms Survey FGD, Kimeu, 25 April 2011.
39 Small Arms Survey FGD, Nakuru, 28 April 2011.
40 Small Arms Survey FGD, Maralal, 27 July 2011.
41 Small Arms Survey FGD, Mandera, 19 July 2011.
42 Small Arms Survey FGD, Marsabit, 19 July 2011.
43 In an FGD discussion a participant observed that 'even seven year old boys have AK-47s. One came carrying one and I asked him how many bullets it had. He removed the magazine and counted the bullets. They were four' (Small Arms Survey FGD, Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011).
44 Small Arms Survey FGD, Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011.
45 Small Arms Survey FGD, Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011.
46 Small Arms Survey FGD, Migori, 14 July 2011.
47 Small Arms Survey FGD, Malindi, 23 April 2011; see also Otieno (2008).
48 Small Arms Survey FGD, Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011.
49 As indicated in section I, the survey intentionally included all hotspot counties, thus it can be assumed that all counties not covered by the survey were at a rate of firearm possession below the survey average of 2.7 per cent (medium or low volatility).
50 Total number of households obtained from the Kenya National Population and Housing census. See section V of this report for detailed information.
51 See section V of this report for a definition of sampling.
52 KII, Garissa, 23 April 2011.
53 Small Arms Survey FGD, Nakuru, 28 April 2011.
54 Small Arms Survey FGD, Nakuru, 28 April 2011.
55 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Nakuru, 28 April 2011; Trans-Nzoia, 4 June 2011.
56 Small Arms Survey FGD, Maralal, 27 July 2011.
57 KII with firearms licensing office; Small Arms Survey FGDs: Mandera, 19 July 2011; Trans-Nzoia, 4 June 2011.
58 The areas referred are the high-, medium- and low-volatility areas.
59 Small Arms Survey FGD, Mandera, 19 July 2011.
60 One account was given at Kapedo, where an FGD9 respondent narrated how a Turkana woman was shot by a Pokot. When asked he said his was a newly purchased firearm and he was testing whether it worked (Small Arms Survey FGD, Kapedo, 27 July 2011).
61 Small Arms Survey FGD, Marsabit, 19 July 2011.
62 For example, in June 2011 there was a raid in Kawap, Samburu North (Obwocha, 2011).
63 Small Arms Survey FGD, Maralal, 27 July 2011.
64 Small Arms Survey FGD, Tot, 27 July 2011.

65 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011; Mandera, 19 July 2011.
66 Small Arms Survey FGD, Mandera, 19 July 2011.
67 This finding reaffirms earlier quoted studies by Bevan (2008) on the illicit ammunition problem in Turkana, as well as Kamenju, Singo, and Wairagu (2003) on insecurity in North Rift.
68 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011; Mandera, 19 July 2011; Migori, 14 July 2011.
69 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Maralal, 27 July 2011; Marsabit, 19 July 2011; Trans-Nzoia, 4 June 2011.
70 KII, Garissa, 23 April 2011.
71 Small Arms Survey FGD, Garissa, 23 April 2011.
72 Small Arms Survey FGD, Maralal, 27 July 2011.
73 Small Arms Survey FGD, Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011.
74 Interview at KFS headquarters, Nairobi, 23 August 2011.
75 Small Arms Survey FGD, Marsabit, 19 July 2011.
76 This was a common scenario across all areas where KPRs are provided.
77 A participant's informed opinion in Small Arms Survey FGD, Marsabit, 19 July 2011.
78 KII, Maralal, 17 July 2011.
79 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011; Maralal, 27 July 2011; Mandera, 19 July 2011; Marsabit, 19 July 2011; Kapedo, 27 July 2011; Tot, 27 July 2011.
80 Small Arms Survey FGD, Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011.
81 Small Arms Survey FGD, Nakuru, 28 April 2011.
82 For example, FGD participants explained that they were more concerned about the use of crude and bladed weapons in violence than they were about firearms (Small Arms Survey FGD, Kimeu, 25 April 2011).
83 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Nakuru, 28 April 2011; Trans-Nzoia, 4 June 2011; Garissa, 23 April 2011.
84 For example, this weakness led to the accusation that the failure of law enforcers to respond to early signs was a contributing factor to the escalation of the 2007/08 post-election violence (CIPEV, 2008, p. ix).
85 Small Arms Survey FGD, Maralal, 27 July 2011.
86 Small Arms Survey FGDs: Lokichoggio, 20 July 2011; Mandera, 19 July 2011; Kapedo, 27 July 2011.
87 Whereas the government has implemented various disarmament operations, such as the 2005 and 2010 Operation Dumisha Amani, and the 2008 Operation Chunga Mpaka and Operation Okoa Maisha, among others, there have been initiatives involving civil society such as the UNDP-funded Armed Violence Reduction project in Garissa.
88 For example, Chopra (2008a, pp. 15–16) demonstrates how the use of local peace structures eventually informed the evolution of local binding peace pacts, such as the Modogashe-Garissa Declaration.
89 In his analysis on the Wajir success story, Menkhaus (2008, pp. 25–29) observes that the WPDC has helped stabilize relations between the Ajuraan and Degodia clans since 1994 and introduced a hybrid form of state building in weak states that is different from the European model.

90 For example, in a recent incident, six people died from grenade attacks (Hussein, 2011).

91 For example, the NSC (2011, pp. 126–33) tabulated the structural and proximate causes of conflicts in different parts of the country.

92 Based on KII.

93 Based on KII.

94 Fifty per cent is based on the equal chance of responses for dichotomous questions. This is to suggest that responses are not expected to be systematic and that all responses have an equal likelihood of being selected.

95 Valid scoring refers to the quality, coherence, and appropriateness of the responses in the questionnaire, as transcribed by the enumerator. Thus, only responses that are legible, coherent, and in line with the parameters of the question are deemed valid. Reliable scoring, or reliable data in this case, refers to collected data that is free from logical inconsistencies. This means that, similar to a testimony or avowal, responses should not contradict one another. Finally, ethical scoring signifies that the enumerator has read the respondent the consent form prior to conducting the interview, that there is a clear indication on the questionnaire of the respondent's willingness to participate in the survey, and that the respondent's right to refuse to answer a question at any time was at all times respected.

96 Nine cases did not indicate the respondents' gender.

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