Report

August 2021

NIGERIA

National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey

small arms survey

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

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Cover photo
A hunter armed with a locally made gun in Yola city, Adamawa state, on his way to the border region with Cameroon to support the Nigerian army fighting Boko Haram on 6 December 2014.
Source: Mohammed Elshamy/Anadolu Agency via AFP

About PRESCOM

The Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM) is the multi-agency government body tasked with stemming the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in Nigeria. It was inaugurated in 2013 in compliance with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, which came into force in 2009. It comprises Members drawn from Nigeria's security agencies and the military, as well as relevant ministries, departments, and agencies. In addition to managing and overseeing the national survey project, PRESCOM's other major activities have focused on the following:

- **Legislative reform**. PRESCOM has proposed an entirely new firearms bill and a bill to establish a National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
- **Marking of arms**. Following a sensitization programme, some security agencies have volunteered to take part in a forthcoming pilot marking project.
- **Weapons armouries**. A total of 24 armouries have been delivered and eight refurbished for security agencies to secure surrendered weapons.
- **Training and capacity building**. Training programmes have been conducted for a variety of stakeholder organizations on topics relevant to illicit weapons prevention, including border security management, physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), and arms destruction techniques, among others.
- **Sensitization, advocacy, and confidence building**. PRESCOM has focused on a range of areas, including the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, citizen participation in small arms control, the Arms Trade Treaty, civilian disarmament, arms marking, improving border security, and the prevention of armed violence during elections (the 'Ballot without Bullets' project).
- **Surrender and destruction of weapons**. A total of 7,221 firearms (700 in Benue, 416 in Katsina, 5,870 in Zamfara, and 235 in Akwa Ibom) have been surrendered by armed

non-state actors and destroyed as part of an ECOWAS–European Union Small Arms Project.

Looking ahead, priorities for PRESCOM will include the development of a crucial National Action Plan or strategy on combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; the expansion of existing disarmament projects to new states, with PRESCOM providing technical support to state-level interventions; more training on PSSM and record keeping for security agencies; and more strategic disarmament programmes at the national level.

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

CPED	Centre for Population and Environmental Development
CSO	Civil society organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FGD	Focus group discussion
HH	Household
KII	Key informant interview
LEA	Law enforcement agency
LGA	Local government area
NAP	National Action Plan
NATCOM	National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NIPSS	National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NSALWS	National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey
NSCDC	Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps
PCRC	Police Community Relations Committee
PRESCOM	Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons
PSSM	Physical security and stockpile management
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

Foreword

Insecurity and violence are increasingly linked to the proliferation of deadly weapons. Concerns about the harmful role such weapons play in fuelling global insecurity and violence are evident in the existence of a multiplicity of regional and international instruments that aim to stem the tide. In the West African region, the prevailing instrument is the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials of 2006 (ECOWAS, 2006), under which ECOWAS states undertake to establish National Commissions on Small Arms and Light Weapons as part of their institutional frameworks for combating small arms and light weapons proliferation. The Convention also mandates ECOWAS countries, for example through their National Commissions, to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) to tackle small arms proliferation. As an input to these NAPs, the Convention calls for an information-gathering process, the essence of which is to ensure that the interventions that are adopted are tailored to the problem.

In Nigeria, researchers and commentators lack agreement as to the extent of the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation, with assessments ranging from the conservative to the outright alarmist. If the need for a reliable evidence base has been clear all along, until now there has been no successful attempt to conduct a small arms survey in Nigeria. In the hope of advancing on this, Nigeria's Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM) made preliminary enquiries with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in New York shortly after PRESCOM's establishment in 2013. Discussions with Daniel Prins, at that time Head of the Conventional Arms Branch of UNODA, led to a meeting in Togo with Marco Kalbusch of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. Subsequently, PRESCOM established contact with the Small Arms Survey, based in Geneva.

The Small Arms Survey is the foremost global authority on the subject of national small arms surveys. It is an associated research programme of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Consultations with the Small Arms Survey took place in both Geneva and Abuja, culminating in the signing of an agreement on

27 May 2015 in which the Small Arms Survey agreed to partner with PRESCOM to undertake a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS) in Nigeria. To underscore the sense of national ownership of the project, Nigeria's government covered the total cost of the project through the PRESCOM budget.

Research bodies engaged as partners for the survey included the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in Kuru, the Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED), an independent think-tank based in Benin City, and Maxpre Consulting, a private sector statistical research service based in Lagos.

The core objective of the NSALWS was to determine the extent of small arms prevalence and proliferation in Nigeria. Ancillary objectives aimed to determine and document illicit arms-trafficking routes and arms flows affecting Nigeria; the capacity of governmental and international actors to control and prevent small arms proliferation and trafficking; perceptions of security provision and small arms control in Nigeria among civilians, government officials, and state security providers; the factors that influence these perceptions; and other views on how to combat small arms proliferation in Nigeria.

As best we can recollect, no comprehensive survey of this nature has ever been undertaken in Nigeria. It is therefore significant that the exercise seeks to obviate the absence of Nigeria-specific, evidence-based estimations both in the literature and in reports on firearms in civilian hands in the country. The evidence base that the survey provides is captured in Section 3.2.1 of the report, which estimates that in 2016 approximately 6.4–6.5 million firearms may have been in civilian hands in Nigeria. While this figure is significant and to some extent reflects militancy in the Niger Delta, extremist violence by Boko Haram, violence between herders and farmers, and an upsurge in violent criminal activity, it is a far cry from some much higher and unverified estimates sometimes ascribed to Nigeria by unreliable sources. Ultimately, the significance of this survey resides, in part, in its robust, evidence-based estimation of the number of weapons in circulation in Nigeria (as opposed to educated guesses). The challenge now is to put the information presented in the survey to good use in developing an NAP for Nigeria. It is also hoped that a national small arms survey can be carried out on a periodic basis, perhaps every five years, in order to ensure that policy continues to keep pace with changing dynamics in the country.

At this juncture, it is fit and proper to extend PRESCOM's deep appreciation and praise to our partners on this project, namely: our sponsors, the Federal Government of Nigeria, for funding the project; the Small Arms Survey, especially Eric Berman, Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Gergely Hideg, Ferenc Dávid Markó, Claire Mc Evoy, Glenn McDonald, and Matthias Nowak for their general supervision, data analysis, and preparation of the report; and the NIPSS and CPED, including Professors Habu Galadima and Augustine Ikelegbe and their respective teams, for their work in the field. We were deeply saddened to learn of Professor Galadima's passing in December 2020. We convey our deepest condolences to his beloved family and to the NIPSS where he was Director-General at the time of his

passing. We also wish to thank Maxpre Consulting, including Mr Chukwudi Arum and his team, for the data entry and collation, and finally the members of PRESCOM, especially Ambassadors T. D. Hart, E. E. Onobu, B. G. Wakil, and Ghali Umar, as well as N. Dickson Orji and Ere Raphael Whyte for jointly exercising PRESCOM's overarching responsibility for the project with great care and thoroughness. We remain grateful for the invaluable contributions of each, without which this project would not have come to fruition.

—**Ambassador EE Imohe, OFR, mni**
Chairman, PRESCOM
April 2021

Acknowledgements

Nigeria's Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM) wishes to acknowledge the goodwill of the Federal Government of Nigeria in the funding of this survey, without which it could not have been conducted. We also acknowledge the invaluable contributions and input of the following organizations and agencies, in the realization of this project: the ECOWAS Commission, especially the Small Arms Division, for their encouragement and information sharing; and the Nigerian security agencies, especially the Nigeria Police Force, for providing security cover for the survey. PRESCOM is grateful for the contributions of all the service personnel who participated in the key informant interviews and focus group discussions, drawn from the Military, Police, Immigration, Customs, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, Department of State Services, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, and Federal Road Safety Corps. We are equally indebted to our project partner, the Small Arms Survey, and the team of project consultants, namely, the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, the Centre for Population and Environmental Development, and Maxpre Consulting, and to the various enumerators, supervisors, and zonal coordinators who participated in the conduct of this survey. Furthermore, we place on record our sincere gratitude to the National Bureau of Statistics for providing information on the population sample. Finally, we acknowledge the contributions of various traditional rulers, local government chairpersons and their staff, and civil society organizations (notably the West African Action Network on Small Arms) for their cooperation and support during the fieldwork, especially in remote and rural areas.

Executive summary

The National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS) was planned and implemented by Nigeria's Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM). Conducted in 2016, it used both qualitative and quantitative research methods. A nationwide household survey constituted the core of the survey, assessing public attitudes to and experiences of armed violence in Nigeria, while additional semi-structured interviews, expert key informant interviews, and focus group discussions complemented the household survey by drawing on the views of representatives of and experts from civil society organizations (CSOs) and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). The Small Arms Survey lent support in the areas of methodology, data analysis, and training.

As for its findings, the NSALWS clearly reveals that Nigerians feel that armed violence is a significant problem. Violence of all types affects the lives of an estimated 8 million Nigerians annually (while this may have been correct as at 2016, when the survey was conducted, the figure may have to be reviewed upwards, given the escalation in violence and insecurity in several parts of the country about five years after the conduct of the survey). Although firearms are a concern for communities nationwide, some regions[1] and communities are more affected than others. While Nigerians' attitudes to firearms are shaped by their personal experiences and local security environments, most do not feel the need to own weapons, nor report owning a firearm. Nigerians claim that acquiring a firearm is difficult, yet also say that they do not own a firearm because they do not want one, even though they do not always feel well protected in their communities. Both the general public and CSO respondents expect stronger efforts at arms control on the part of government, including through civilian disarmament programmes, in order to improve community security overall; but they also fear that civilian disarmament could destabilize local security. Most Nigerians assert that the most effective way to limit arms proliferation is to address structural conditions of poverty and insecurity—for example, by creating youth employment and improving general security.

At present, Nigerians rely on both formal and informal security providers to respond to violence in almost equal proportions. At the same time, however, 13 per cent report lacking access to any type of organized security provision, whether formal or informal, in their community. The vast majority of respondents state that they would report a crime to authorities—most often the police—yet a significant number say they told no one of a violent incident that they had experienced. Regardless of who crime victims reported to, only a small minority of those who reported such cases say that the perpetrator was identified and punished, and a large proportion of the population wish to see the quality of policing improved. While many of those who do own firearms in Nigeria say that they would comply with civilian disarmament efforts, they state that this would be conditional on the removal of threats to life and property through improved safety and security.

Key findings

- **The National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS) clearly reveals that Nigerians feel armed violence to be a significant problem**. Armed violence ranked third among local civil society organization and law enforcement agency representatives as the most pressing problem in their communities. While the population in general expressed some optimism about the future based on recent improvements in local security, a majority of Nigerians expressed concern for the future security of themselves and their families.
- **Violence of all types affects the lives of an estimated 8 million Nigerians annually**. The report shows that violence typically involves threats and intimidation, often occurs in the home, and in the vast majority of cases involves a weapon. The presence of a firearm in the home proves to be a significant risk factor in people's becoming victims of violence and often results in death.
- **Although firearms are a concern for communities nationwide, variations in threat perceptions show that some regions and communities are more affected than others**. Nationwide, 17 per cent of survey respondents agreed that firearms had caused 'many deaths' in their area, 18 per cent thought that trading in firearms occurred in their community, while 19 per cent believed that firearms facilitated conflict there. South South was the region with the highest reported rates of firearms violence. Displacement due to armed violence and cattle rustling were the security concerns that mostly affected North East and North West (reasons for variations in threat perceptions are provided in several sections of this report).
- **About 14 per cent of Nigerian households possessed at least one firearm at the time the study was conducted, leading to an estimate of some 17 firearms per 100 persons nationwide**. Taking into account population growth since the survey was conducted, the results indicate that approximately 6.4–6.5 million firearms may be in civilian hands in Nigeria.
- **Nigerians' attitudes towards firearms are shaped by their personal experiences and local security environments, yet most do not feel the need to own weapons**. Sixty-one per cent of respondents rejected the idea of owning a weapon and most people did not believe that others in their communities owned weapons, although differences in response rates reveal the sensitivity of the question and regional variations.
- **The report shows that people think that bladed weapons are more common in their communities than firearms; most Nigerian households do not report owning a firearm**. Only 14 per cent of households reported owning a firearm, and among them the vast majority owned only one firearm. Firearm owners tend to be older men living in rural areas. Defence of person and property (self-defence) were the principal reasons cited for owning a firearm, followed closely by hunting.

- **Nigerians believe that acquiring a firearm is difficult**. Direct purchase was the most common source of firearms according to those who own them, but diversion and illicit supply, as well as craft production, also appeared to be important. For the most part, members of the general public did not know where firearms came from, but believed that unlicensed dealers and cross-border trade, particularly across land borders, as well as local or craft production were important sources of such weapons. Most respondents believed that efforts to control arms trade should be strengthened.
- **Most Nigerians say that they do not own a firearm because they do not want one, even though security in their communities is poor**. Most respondents reported a wish to obey the law (61 per cent) and a smaller proportion expressed a moral aversion to firearms (18 per cent). Only a small number of respondents felt that owning a firearm was unnecessary because of good security provision.
- **Both the general public and civil society respondents expect stronger efforts at arms control, including through civilian disarmament, in order to improve community security overall; but they also fear that civilian disarmament could destabilize local security, at least in the short term**. A large proportion of respondents who possessed firearms (43 per cent) stated that they would be prepared to give them up, but many indicated that this was conditional on the removal of threats to life and property through improved safety and security.
- **Most Nigerians assert that the most effective way to limit arms proliferation is to address structural conditions that cause poverty and insecurity**. Creating youth employment and improving general security were seen nationwide as the best ways of reducing the number of civilian firearms.
- **Nigerians rely on both formal and informal security providers to respond to violence**. Approximately one-half of all Nigerians turn to formal security providers, most often the police, to report violent incidents, while a similar proportion look to informal or traditional security providers. Thirteen per cent of Nigerians, however, reported lacking access to any type of organized security provision, either formal or informal, in their community. A significant number of respondents had told no one of a violent incident they had experienced.
- **Regardless of to whom crime victims reported their experience, only a small minority reported seeing their assailant identified and punished**. Regional variations in security and justice provision showed that satisfaction with the law enforcement and criminal justice system was lower in the northern regions than the southern ones. The vast majority of Nigerians stated that they would report a crime if they witnessed one, and most would report it to the police; yet less than half felt satisfied with the quality of policing currently provided, pointing to a significant gap in state security provision.

“Understanding the prevalence, proliferation, perception, and use of the small arms that fuel violence is a core security concern for the country.”

1. Introduction

Map 1 Nigeria's states and geopolitical zones (inset map)

Base map data source: OpenStreetMap


Lake
Chad
YOBE
Damaturu
BORNO
Maiduguri
CHAD
GOMBE
Bauchi
Gombe
ADAMAWA
Yola
Jalingo
TARABA
CAMEROON
NORTH WEST
NORTH EAST
NORTH CENTRAL
FEDERAL
CAPITAL
TERRITORY
SOUTH WEST
SOUTH
EAST
SOUTH SOUTH

1.1 The National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey

Nigeria's recent history has been marked by violence in which small arms proliferation played a pivotal role. Understanding the prevalence, proliferation, perception, and use of the small arms that fuel violence is thus a core security concern for the country. It was in response to this imperative—and in fulfilment of its mandate to stem the proliferation of illicit small arms in Nigeria—that the Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM) planned the NSALWS and implemented it in 2016. This report presents the findings and results of that survey.

On the recommendations of a consultative meeting held in Abuja in 2014 attended by PRESCOM, relevant stakeholders, and representatives of the Small Arms Division of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Nigeria survey was conceived by PRESCOM as a baseline study to 'ascertain the true situation' of small arms proliferation in Nigeria and the reasons behind it (PRESCOM, 2014a, paras. 6.v, 7.ix; 2014b). To achieve this purpose PRESCOM established a relationship with the Small Arms Survey with the aim of obtaining its support in the areas of survey methodology and analysis, and the provision of training on survey methods specific to small arms.

The survey's core objectives were to determine and document:

- the extent of small arms prevalence and proliferation in Nigeria;
- arms flows and illicit arms-trafficking routes affecting Nigeria;
- the capacity of government and international actors to control and prevent small arms proliferation and illicit trafficking;
- perceptions of security provision in Nigeria among civilians, government officials, and state security providers, including factors that influence these perceptions; and
- independent opinions on ways of combating the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria.

The nationally representative survey covered all 36 states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Abuja. It was managed by PRESCOM in partnership with the Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED) and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), as well as Maxpre Consulting, a private firm specializing in statistical research.

The division of labour for the survey was as follows:

- **PRESCOM**: project ownership; funding; overarching responsibility; and finalizing (together with the Small Arms Survey) the survey instrument and final report, and its publication and dissemination;

- **Small Arms Survey**: interpreting and analysing the data generated in the course of the survey; providing training and capacity building for enumerators; proposing the survey instrument; and finalizing and publishing the survey report in collaboration with PRESCOM;
- **NIPSS**: conducting the interviews with local civil society organization (CSO) and law enforcement agency (LEA) respondents, the expert key informant interviews (KIIs), and the focus group discussions (FGDs);
- **CPED**: quantitative data collection among the general population through the household survey; and
- **Maxpre Consulting:** data entry and collation.

As Nigeria seeks to create an appropriate institutional framework in its fight against illicit small arms and light weapons proliferation, this report presents the survey findings in support of future work on the subject. The data will provide a basis for the development of appropriate evidence-based interventions, including new policies and programmes for firearms control (PRESCOM, 2014a, para. 7.ix; Krause and Alvazzi del Frate, 2014, slide 3).[2]

This report discusses the survey findings in the following order:

- safety and security (Section 2);
- small arms possession and sources (Section 3);
- attitudes to disarmament and firearms control (Section 4);
- violence and victimization (Section 5);
- perceptions of security provision (Section 6); and
- conclusion and recommendations (Section 7).

The Annexe to this report offers an overview of the survey methodology, including a description of the respondents and the challenges involved in conducting the survey. Key aspects of the survey methodology are outlined in Box 1.

1.2 The small arms challenge in Nigeria

The NSALWS was born of a need to better understand the small arms problem in Nigeria, given its contribution to insecurity in the country over the past several decades.[3] High-profile eruptions of conflict during this period include violence in Plateau state in the 1990s and 2000s; youth violence and increased crime in Rivers and Delta states in the late 1990s; religious violence and insurgency in Kaduna, Borno, and Adamawa states since the early years of the first decade of the 21st century (Abdu, 2013); and more recent violence between herders and farmers that has spread from the country's

Box 1 Introduction to the survey's methodology

The NSALWS covered all of Nigeria's 36 states plus the FCT using a mixed-methods survey design comprising both quantitative and qualitative data components.

The **quantitative** component consisted of:

- 8,548 detailed questionnaires administered to a random sample of the general population, which is also referred to as the 'household survey'; and
- interviews with 546 representatives of LEAs and 105 representatives of local CSOs at the locations sampled for the household survey (referred to as 'local CSO and LEA respondents').

Note: When quantitative results are presented in tabular or graphic form, totals may not add up due to rounding.

The **qualitative** analysis builds on:

- in-depth KIIs with 216 LEA and 101 CSO experts (also referred to as 'expert interviews'); and
- 73 FGDs with LEA and CSO representatives.

The survey was initially scheduled to conclude in 2016, but an administrative delay led to the dataset only being finalized in 2018, following which the Small Arms Survey conducted its analysis. The Small Arms Survey carried out case-by-case logical editing and weighting of the household survey data to improve its internal consistency.

The administration of a household survey on the scale undertaken for the Nigeria study is extremely challenging. This report nevertheless provides the best available information on which to base small arms programming and planning. The methodological and analytical caveats outlined in this report also lay the groundwork for future iterations of similar surveys.

Further details of the survey methodology and associated challenges can be found in the Annexe to this report.

Middle Belt to southern states (ACLED, 2017; 2018a; 2018b). Numerous authorities have linked these cycles of armed violence to electoral rivalry, competition for natural resources, the politicization of ethnicity and religion, and in some places the emergence of terrorist insurgency against the Nigerian state.[4] Fuelled by the proliferation of small arms, these tensions have manifested themselves in a variety of different—sometimes overlapping—types of violence, including politically motivated violence, criminality and kidnapping, gang violence, armed banditry, cattle rustling, piracy, and insurgent and extremist violence, all of which feature in the results of the NSALWS, as described below (see Section 5.2 on 'Characteristics of violence'). While leading to great loss of life[5] and fuelling community tensions, the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria has also

discouraged investment (especially in agriculture) and tourism, adversely affecting the country's economic development (PRESCOM, 2014a, para. 6.ii). Poverty and unemployment, in turn, stimulate the demand for weapons and aggravate insecurity as people seek to sustain themselves through illicit sources of income (PRESCOM, 2014a, para. 6.iii). As outlined in Section 4, which presents public and expert attitudes to civilian disarmament, a majority of Nigerians consider massive investments in youth employment as the best way to address the problem of small arms proliferation. Poverty, high levels of unemployment, social deprivation, extremist ideologies, violent contests for political power, and intolerance reinforce one another, facilitating the emergence of non-state armed groups, organized crime, and small arms proliferation (PRESCOM, 2014a, para. 6.iii).

Nigeria's geographical position in West Africa, straddling the Sahel and Central African regions, exposes it to regional patterns of insecurity. At the same time, with its geographical size, resources, and population, Nigeria strongly influences regional security dynamics, including small arms trading and trafficking patterns (Onuoha, 2011, p. 50; Ikelegbe, 2014, p. 112; GRIP and Small Arms Survey, 2016, pp. 26, 34). The NSALWS backs the conclusions of other reports that have stressed the importance of the cross-border trade as a source of illicit weapons (see Section 3). For example, these reports have found that looted firearms have flowed from Libyan stockpiles to Nigerian armed groups, including Boko Haram,[6] across the northern 1,500 km borders with Niger and Chad (Olawale, 2011; Charbonneau, 2012; Ikelegbe, 2014, p. 112). Recent Small Arms Survey reports suggest that Niger also serves as a transit route for small arms within the Sahel, with weapons regularly crossing the border from Nigeria into Niger, and vice versa (de Tessières, 2017, p. 6; 2018, pp. 46, 55–57).

Against this backdrop, scholars have identified the following domestic factors to explain the proliferation of small arms within Nigeria, many of which reflect the perceptions and experiences expressed in the NSALWS:

- increased conflict between armed herdsmen and sedentary populations (ACLED, 2018b; Hassan, 2018; ICG, 2017);
- 'self-help' groups seeking armed protection for themselves and their communities in the absence of state-provided security, particularly in rural areas;[7]
- an increase in the number of politically motivated non-state armed groups (IEP, 2017, p. 24; ACLED, 2017; Nowak and Gsell, 2018, pp. 7–8);
- inflows of firearms into Nigeria through porous borders exploited by traffickers (Onuoha, 2013; Ikelegbe, 2014, p. 112; PRESCOM, 2014a, para. 6.iv);
- increased demand for firearms for use in violent crime, such as armed home invasions, violent robberies, kidnapping for ransom, car jacking, mugging, homicides, and sexual and other violence targeting women;[8]

- the diversion of legal firearms from state armouries and private holdings into the black market (ICG, 2016, p. 13; PRESCOM, 2014a, para. 6.vi); and
- the widespread, unauthorized craft production of small arms (Nowak and Gsell, 2018).

While this report does not examine illicit arms or armed violence in Nigeria in general, these well-documented trends help to explain the policy significance of the NSALWS findings.

“Firearms featured prominently in local perceptions of insecurity.”

2. Safety and security

2.1 The threat of armed violence

Armed violence ranked third among local CSO and LEA respondents[9] as the most pressing problem in their local environment. Figure 1 presents the mean ranking for each concern presented—the lower the score, the higher the ranking of the problem. While armed violence came ahead of infrastructure problems, general lawlessness,[10] lack of access to clean water, food, and health, unemployment was considered the single most important problem. Overall, more than one-third of respondents in both groups (CSO respondents: 38 per cent; LEA respondents: 35 per cent) put employment as the most pressing problem. Lack of access to proper education was ranked second most important by approximately a quarter of the same groups (CSO respondents: 23 per cent; LEA respondents: 25 per cent), making it the second most important issue of all tested.

A total of 15 per cent of CSO respondents and 17 per cent of LEA respondents considered armed violence to be the primary concern in their local area. CSO respondents were more likely to pick the related issue of lawlessness as their most pressing problem (18 per cent), while only 6 per cent of LEA respondents felt that this was the most important problem in their area.

Figure 1 shows the relative importance of the eight possible problems that local CSO and LEA respondents were asked to rank in order of importance. Asking respondents

Figure 1 Most important problems

Question: Please look at this list of problems that people in your area may be facing. Which one do you think is the most important? The second most important? The third? Etc.

Mean rankings, between 1 and 8. 1st choice = 1; 2nd choice = 2; etc. (the lower the value, the higher the priority)



Base: Local CSO and LEA respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

to rank their problems in this way accentuates differences among them, but it does not mean that problems that were ranked lower are considered to be unimportant. Problems ranked lower on the list are perceived as relatively less important than others, but may still be of grave concern for many households.

2.2 Public concerns about safety and security

At the time of the NSALWS (2016) more than half of the general population and local CSO respondents surveyed (54 per cent in both groups) as well as more than two-thirds of local LEA respondents (70 per cent) regarded the security dynamics in their local area as 'improving' compared with the previous year. Only 12 per cent among the general population and 11 per cent among LEA personnel said that security was getting worse. CSO respondents saw the situation differently, however: among CSO representatives the proportion of those who felt that the security situation had deteriorated 'compared to one year ago' was significantly higher (29 per cent). Still, the overall picture was generally positive, with the vast majority in each group feeling that security had either improved or at least not deteriorated during the year preceding the data collection period (household survey respondents: 85 per cent; local LEA respondents: 88 per cent; local CSO respondents: 71 per cent).

Despite this relatively optimistic outlook, less than half of Nigerians (42 per cent) felt that encountering violence was 'not likely at all'. The majority of Nigerians were still concerned about their own and their family's safety, although, of the 55 per cent who thought it was possible that a family member could encounter violence, 30 per cent did not feel this was very likely. Figure 2 shows that a quarter of respondents (25 per cent) thought it very or somewhat likely that they or someone in their household would encounter violence, meaning that they would become the target of some kind of attack. Of these, 9 per cent thought that it was 'very likely', while 16 per cent said that it was 'likely'.

The expectation of future violence was strongest among those who had already experienced violence: 59 per cent of those who had previously experienced violence, either personally or as a result of its having been inflicted on a family member, expected to fall victim to violence again (Figure 2). Nearly half of firearm-owning households (49 per cent) anticipated they might experience violence in the future. Socio-demographic factors had a limited influence on this result. There was no difference among urban and rural residents, and variations according to other criteria were insignificant. Fear of a violent encounter was of greatest concern in North Central (31 per cent) and of least concern in South West (18 per cent). Because the survey question did not offer a time frame for concerns around such incidents, responses are better interpreted as rates of general anxiety rather than current estimations of actual risks.

Figure 2 Concerns about the safety of the family

Question: How likely is it that you or a member of your household may become victim of a violent crime or violent encounter?

Percentage of respondents who indicated that they are (or a member of their household is) 'very likely' or 'likely' to encounter violence



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Figure 3 Perception of local area safety

Question: How safe do you feel walking in your area after dark?

Percentage of respondents who indicated that they feel 'very unsafe' or 'somewhat unsafe' walking in their area after dark



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

A separate question on perceptions of the safety of the streets after dark (Figure 3) offered another gauge of the immediate threats survey respondents perceived in their local areas. Respondents were asked how safe they felt walking in their local area after dark: nationwide, nearly a quarter (24 per cent) responded that it was 'unsafe' to walk in their neighbourhood or village. Results varied only slightly across social segments. Urban dwellers and better educated Nigerians felt somewhat less safe than others, although the differences between groups were minimal. Citizens who reported possessing a firearm (44 per cent) and especially those coming from a family that had previously experienced violence (53 per cent) expressed these concerns in much higher proportions than others in the survey sample.

There was a much sharper difference in assessments of local safety among regions. Approximately one-third of respondents felt unsafe walking after dark in North Central, South East, and South South, while only about one-fifth said that they were afraid to walk after dark in North East, North West, and South West.

During qualitative KIIs, perceptions of safety were negatively influenced by the presence of small arms. While 10 per cent talked 'very positively' about safety with reference to small arms and light weapons in their state, 31 per cent of respondents were only 'somewhat positive' in this respect. Fifty-nine per cent of the respondents spoke 'very negatively' or 'negatively' about the influence of small arms on security in the state in which they operated. One of the most frequently expressed concerns was the role of political actors in distributing weapons, especially during election campaigns. As one high-ranking military official from South South explained: 'What I have seen—especially regarding the security situation—most of the weapons come in during election campaigns when politicians wants [sic] to mobilize supporters. In doing that they will bring weapons from neighbouring states.'

2.3 Safety and security from a local perspective

Nationally, firearms featured prominently in local perceptions of insecurity: 17 per cent of respondents from the general population agreed that firearms had caused 'many deaths' in their area (Figure 4). A similar proportion of respondents throughout the country (18 per cent) thought that trading in firearms occurred in their local area, or believed that firearms facilitated conflict in their area (19 per cent). Many more respondents (37 per cent) agreed that attacks on their communities by 'herdsmen' was a 'big' or 'frequent' concern in their area, while 23 per cent—mostly rural respondents—said cattle rustling was a problem. Armed robberies were also a frequent concern (24 per cent), and somewhat more among urban dwellers.

Smaller proportions of people expressed concern over kidnapping (14 per cent), sexual assault (13 per cent), or displacement of people (12 per cent) in their local area, but these concerns were nevertheless widespread.

Figure 4 Security characteristics of the local area

Question: I will now read out several statements. Please respond by indicating if you agree or disagree with each item. Please feel free to tell me if any of these do not apply to your area.

Percentage of respondents who agreed with the following statements



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

The most localized security concerns included attacks from neighbouring communities, which only 8 per cent of respondents considered a problem in their locality, while sea piracy was a significant issue only for those in the South South region (38 per cent in South South, compared to 7 per cent nationwide).

Firearms featured prominently in the security concerns of people in South South, where especially high proportions of respondents (71 per cent) expressed apprehension around issues related to the firearms trade, as well as conflict facilitated by firearms (58 per cent), armed robberies (37 per cent), kidnapping (44 per cent), and sexual assault (22 per cent).

Of all of the regions, South South included the highest proportion of respondents who agreed that firearm violence led to many fatalities in their local area (35 per cent).

In contrast, displacement due to armed violence and cattle rustling were of greatest concern to the people of North East and North West. Twenty-one per cent of respondents in North East expressed concern over displacement, while cattle rustling worried 38 per cent of respondents in North West and 30 per cent in North East.

The assessment of local security presented by local CSO and LEA respondents differed significantly from that of household respondents. Indeed, the only areas where CSO respondents had similar opinions to household respondents was with regard to attacks by herdsmen and sea piracy, which both groups rated at similar levels of concern. In every other dimension CSO and LEA respondents[11] reported that the events in question both were happening in their area of activity and were an important concern for the local population in much higher proportions than for household respondents.

This difference in opinion is not surprising: local CSO and LEA respondents tend to have a broader perspective and are typically aware of more incidents than an average citizen, who may not always look beyond family or the immediate neighbourhood when responding to such questions. Yet the differences revealed in the NSALWS were rather extreme relative to other national survey results of this kind.[12] This is attributable to the fact that the household (HH) survey reflects a much more variegated sample, with perceptions specifically and spatially rooted in household members' communal and regional experiences, as opposed to LEA and CSO respondents, who have broad, panoramic, and largely urban-based perceptions. In fact, the proportion confirming a particular security concern was sometimes four or five times higher among CSO and LEA respondents than among the general population. For example, 75 per cent of CSO respondents indicated that firearms caused many deaths in their area of activity, compared to 17 per cent of the general population (Table 1). The opinions of CSO and LEA respondents largely converged, pointing to a somewhat shared understanding of security problems among those who represent or help people through CSOs and those who are mandated by law to protect them (LEAs). There were also some differences, however. For example, only half of LEA respondents (50 per cent) felt that armed robberies were a problem, as opposed to 69 per cent of CSO respondents.

Results from the qualitative KIIs with informed CSO and LEA experts painted a somewhat different picture of risks to local security than those for the general population. The concern most frequently mentioned among these experts was armed robbery (25 per cent), followed by kidnapping (18 per cent) and smuggling (16 per cent). Cattle rustling and banditry were less of a concern compared to responses from either the general population or local CSO and LEA respondents, as only 9 per cent of experts mentioned these crimes. Sexual assault, sea piracy, and political or electoral violence were mentioned in insignificant numbers. Drug-related crime (often linked to the use of firearms) was one type of crime that neither the household survey respondents nor the local CSO and LEA

Table 1 Local area security issues

	Percentage of respondents who agree		
	HH	CSO	LEA
Firearms trade still persists in this area	18%	50%	46%
Firearms have caused many deaths in this area	17%	75%	68%
Conflict facilitated by firearms exists in this area	19%	45%	48%
There have been displacements of people in this area due to armed violence	12%	48%	–
Kidnapping is frequent or a big concern here	14%	42%	38%
Attacks from neighbouring communities are frequent or a big concern here	8%	40%	–
Cattle/livestock rustling is frequent or a big concern here	23%	51%	63%
Attacks on communities by herdsmen are frequent or a big concern here	37%	48%	–
Armed robbery is frequent or a big concern here	24%	69%	50%
Sexual assault by armed individuals or groups is frequent or a big concern here	13%	54%	–
Sea piracy is frequent or a big concern here	7%	10%	–

Base: Household survey and local CSO and LEA respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

respondents mentioned, but that featured frequently among FGD participants, more than 10 per cent of whom mentioned this type of crime as a concern. As one air force officer from North West said: 'An increasing problem is the higher rate of illicit drugs-consumption in the society'. If you 'combine drugs with the widespread availability of firearms you will see clearly the rate of crime will be increasing', he added. A CSO FGD participant from South South reinforced this opinion, stating that: 'the issues of unemployment, education and the usage of illicit drugs are interwoven' and 'lead [. . .] into increased criminal activity and firearms accidents.'

The results of the survey present an aggregate national picture of security in Nigeria, but they are also shaped by the security characteristics of each area where the survey data was collected. An accurate analysis of the survey results therefore depends on a careful interpretation of the various characteristics of local security across Nigeria's diverse regions. From this perspective a defining feature of the NSALWS was the fact that

insecurity prevented data collection in some localities with regard to certain aspects of the exercise. The conflict with Boko Haram, for example, was declining in 2016 when the NSALWS was carried out. Nevertheless, the survey teams had to avoid some areas because the minimum threshold for enumerator safety could not be met. The NSALWS results should therefore be interpreted in light of the fact that some areas were excluded during the fieldwork due to the local security situation and the effects of ongoing conflict, particularly in the North East region of the country.

> “The creation of an evidence base to understand the rates and risks of small arms possession and proliferation in Nigeria is a key contribution of the NSALWS.”

3. Small arms possession and sources

The creation of an evidence base to understand the rates and risks of small arms possession and proliferation in Nigeria is a key contribution of the NSALWS. The survey's findings depend on self-reported data sourced from individuals who took part voluntarily in the data collection process; however, admitting to ownership of an illegal small arm or light weapon is a potentially self-incriminating act. This risk could in turn influence response rates and ultimately bias survey results. In order to protect the data collection process from this risk, the survey team took every measure to assure participants of the confidentiality of their responses. Research from other contexts suggests that the findings may nevertheless be affected by an under-reporting bias or an unwillingness to divulge detailed information. The survey results should therefore be interpreted with caution.

3.1 Public perceptions of small arms

3.1.1 Attitudes to weapons[13]

Most Nigerians felt that it was unnecessary to own weapons. Asked whether having a weapon in their area was a necessity, 48 per cent 'strongly' disagreed, while another 13 per cent disagreed to some extent, giving a total of 61 per cent of people who rejected the idea of having weapons as being necessary (Figure 5).

Approximately one in three respondents saw the issue of weapons differently, agreeing either 'strongly' (18 per cent) or 'fairly [strongly]' (16 per cent) that owning a weapon might be necessary. More people in North West and South East felt that weapons were a necessity, with 46 per cent and 42 per cent, respectively, confirming this. This stands in stark contrast to the perceptions in other southern regions, where only 25 per cent of respondents in South South and 26 per cent in South West saw weapons as necessary.

Figure 5 Weapons seen as a necessity?

Question: Some people think that having weapons in this area is a necessity, others disagree. How about you? You . . .



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Opinions on weapons ownership varied somewhat across socio-economic segments of the sample. Men more often saw owning a weapon as a necessity than did women (38 per cent compared to 29 per cent, respectively). Rural dwellers in general considered having a weapon as a necessity more often than urban dwellers, but by only a small margin (36 per cent compared to 32 per cent, respectively). A significant proportion of those with an agrarian occupation (38 per cent) saw weapons as being necessary. Education had only a slight effect on attitudes to weapons ownership: 36 per cent of those without formal education felt that it was necessary to own weapons, while 33 per cent of those who had completed secondary education held the view that it was necessary to own weapons.

The results also showed that attitudes to weapons ownership did not necessarily align with rates of reported households containing guns. For example, only three-quarters (75 per cent) of those living in armed households (that is, those who said that their household had at least one firearm) thought that having a weapon was necessary. At the same time, 34 per cent of those living in households reporting no firearms felt that it was necessary to have a weapon of some sort. In households where someone had been a victim of violence in the recent past, 58 per cent of respondents considered having weapons as a necessity, compared to only 30 per cent in households without any direct recent experience of violence.

Differences in attitudes to weapons ownership were more pronounced between local CSO respondents and members of the general population. In spite of their more pessimistic view of the security environment, CSO respondents were less likely than the general public to see weapons ownership as a necessity (27 per cent compared to 34 per cent) (Table 2). A clear majority of CSO respondents (71 per cent) felt that weapons were not needed for household members to live safely in their localities, compared to a somewhat smaller proportion of the general population (61 per cent).

Table 2 Weapons a necessity?

Question: Some people think that having weapons in this area is a necessity. How about you? You . . .

	HH	CSO
Strongly agree	18%	9%
Fairly agree	16%	18%
Fairly disagree	13%	16%
Strongly disagree	48%	55%
Do not know	4%	2%
Refuse to answer	1%	0%

Base: Household survey and local CSO respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

3.1.2 Perceptions of firearms presence in local areas

Those people who expressed clear views on whether it was necessary to own a weapon were nevertheless hesitant to estimate how many weapons were held in the area where they lived. Nearly half of all survey respondents (49 per cent) said they

Figure 6 Firearms in the local area

Question: How many households do you think have guns/firearms in this area?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

did not know how many households in their area had firearms, while over a quarter (28 per cent) claimed that no one in the locality had firearms. The sensitivity of the question is revealed by the fact that 5 per cent of respondents refused to answer it (Figure 6).

Overall, about one in five respondents (18 per cent) believed that firearms were present in their local areas, but for the most part in only a small number of households: only 2 per cent of all respondents said that 'many' households possessed firearms in their local area, while 6 per cent said that 'some' did and 10 per cent thought that only 'very few' households in their area had firearms. Virtually no one claimed that 'almost all' households possessed firearms.

Excluding from the sample those who said they did not know and those who refused to answer, the analysis focuses on the answers of those who felt some degree of confidence, willingness, or competence to answer the question. Of this group, 58 per cent of respondents said there were no firearms in their local area, while 42 per cent said that there were. Five per cent of the latter subset thought 'many' households possessed firearms in their local area, while 13 per cent and 23 per cent thought firearms were held by only 'some' or 'very few' households, respectively.

Perceptions about rates of firearms possession varied greatly across regions. The highest proportion of respondents who believed that civilians in their vicinity possessed firearms were found in South East. Although this figure reached 77 per cent of those who gave either a 'Yes' or 'No, none' response, this relatively high number must be read against the fact that nearly seven out of ten respondents in the same area avoided the question by answering that they did not know or by refusing to answer (Table 3).

Four out of ten respondents in South West, North West, and North East indicated that nobody in their local area had firearms. Discarding non-responses in these regions, the proportion of respondents who thought that somebody in their area had firearms was approximately one-third.

Table 3 Firearms in the local area

Question: How many people in your local area have firearms?

	Nigeria					
	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
No, none	18%	40%	36%	7%	16%	38%
Yes, very few	8%	14%	10%	11%	12%	9%
Yes, some	7%	3%	3%	12%	7%	5%
Yes, many	2%	2%	3%	1%	3%	1%
Yes, almost all	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	60%	37%	44%	63%	48%	44%
Refuse to answer	5%	5%	3%	6%	13%	2%
Total for combined 'Yes' as a percentage of all 7 possible responses	**17%**	**19%**	**17%**	**24%**	**22%**	**16%**
Total for combined 'Yes' as a percentage of those who responded 'Yes' and 'No, none'	**49%**	**33%**	**32%**	**77%**	**58%**	**29%**

Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

During qualitative KIIs, experts were more forthcoming in their opinions about local rates of weapons possession, with 'do not know' accounting for less than 20 per cent of all answers.

The highest proportion of experts to report the presence of firearms in households in their local area was in South South, at 58 per cent. In contrast, 63 per cent of experts from South West, North West, and North East felt that there were no or very few households with firearms in their vicinity. Quite a few experts contrasted the firearms stockpiles of criminals with those of the armed forces, with one immigration official from South West, for example, saying: 'in the hands of the civilians we have too many firearms, but when you talk of those who are supposed to use them, like the military and paramilitary, they don't have enough'.

Both local CSO and LEA respondents were more confident than household survey respondents about giving an estimate of the proportion of households with firearms in their area (Table 4); however, even among these respondents, 24 per cent of CSO and 32 per cent of LEA respondents did not reply to this question.

Table 4 Households with firearms

	HH	CSO	LEA
No, none	28%	12%	11%
Yes, very few	10%	28%	30%
Yes, some	6%	24%	18%
Yes, many	2%	10%	8%
Yes, almost all	0%	1%	1%
Do not know	49%	24%	32%
Refuse to answer	5%	1%	0%
Total for combined 'Yes' as a percentage of all 7 possible responses	**18%**	**63%**	**57%**
Total for combined 'Yes' as a percentage of those who responded 'Yes' and 'No, none'	**39%**	**84%**	**84%**

Base: Household survey and local CSO and LEA respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Overall, 10 per cent of local CSO respondents and 8 per cent of local LEA respondents indicated that 'many' households in their local area had firearms—a significantly higher proportion than the 2 per cent sharing this opinion among the general public. Just over one in ten of both CSO and LEA respondents said that nobody in their community had firearms (12 per cent for CSO and 11 per cent for LEA respondents). This is well below the level recorded among household respondents (28 per cent), a difference that is only accentuated when the different levels of non-response answers are factored in. Excluding those who refused to answer or said they did not know in each group, 58 per cent of household survey respondents—but only 16 per cent of CSO and LEA respondents—thought that there were no civilian-owned firearms in households in their area.

When asked about recent increases in firearms availability, a significant proportion of CSO representatives had no clear opinion to share: 19 per cent did not answer the question, choosing either 'do not know' or 'refuse to answer' (Table 5). Among those who did share their opinion, those who felt that the quantity of firearms had decreased in their area (37 per cent) clearly outnumbered those who felt that the quantity of firearms had increased (24 per cent).

CSO respondents were also asked whether they felt that there were too many firearms in their area. Their responses were equally split: 44 per cent agreed and 44 per cent disagreed, whereas 12 per cent expressed no opinion on the matter.

Table 5 Quantity of firearms in the local area

Question: In your opinion, how has the quantity of firearms in your area changed as compared to one year ago?

	CSO
Decreased	37%
Remained the same	19%
Increased	24%
Do not know	18%
Refuse to answer	1%

Base: Local CSO respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

3.1.3 Types of weapons reported in local areas

Household survey respondents reported that bladed weapons such as axes, knives, or machetes were most commonly used in their local areas (with 64 per cent confirming their 'frequent use'), followed by long-barrel guns, such as rifles and shotguns (which are typically kept for hunting purposes), and handguns (both confirmed by 11 per cent) (Figure 7). Frequent usage of crude or traditional weapons (such as stones, fire, sticks, bows/arrows, or spears) was confirmed by 10 per cent of respondents. Military grade weaponry was less likely to be used regularly: only 6 per cent of respondents said that automatic or semi-

Figure 7 Types of weapons in the local area

Question: What types of weapons are frequently used in this area?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

automatic rifles were frequently used in their vicinity, while only 2 per cent said that 'military equipment' was frequently used, and nobody confirmed the frequent use of grenades or explosives. About a quarter of respondents did not answer the question, with 25 per cent choosing 'do not know' and only 1 per cent refusing to answer.

Overall, taking all three types of firearms together (long guns, handguns, and automatic weapons),[14] 20 per cent of respondents reported that one or more were frequently used in their local area. This was most often confirmed by those living in South South (31 per cent) and North Central (25 per cent), in contrast to North West (13 per cent) or South West (16 per cent). The use of the three types of firearms was reported by the highest proportion of respondents in South South, where about one in five people said handguns and rifles were used most frequently (21 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively), while 11 per cent confirmed the use of automatic or semi-automatic weapons. The widespread use of firearms in local areas was reported at rates close to the national average in North East (18 per cent) and South East (20 per cent).

Local CSO respondents were far more likely to confirm the frequent use of firearms in their area than members of the general population, and much more so than other weapons. A total of 73 per cent of respondents in this group said that long-barrel guns were frequently used, compared to only 11 per cent among household survey respondents. Local CSO respondents considered long-barrel guns to be the most used weapons in their local area, followed by bladed weapons. The contrast in opinions between CSO representatives and the general population is similarly stark with regard to the use of automatic or semi-automatic weapons. Thirty-two per cent of CSO respondents thought they were frequently used locally, as opposed to only 6 per cent among the general population. Similarly, 26 per cent of CSO members thought that handguns were used frequently, more than twice as many as among the general population (11 per cent). They also reported more frequent use of military-grade weaponry than did the general population. Thirty-one per cent thought that 'explosives' (such as grenades) were frequently used, while 32 per cent thought the same of military equipment. CSO respondents ranked crude weapons in last place, with only 3 per cent confirming their frequent use.

In conclusion, local CSO respondents—who typically work in the peacebuilding or humanitarian fields—tended to perceive their area as relatively full of firearms and even some heavier weaponry. Yet this was not confirmed by the household survey, which indicated that simple and much more accessible bladed weapons were most frequently used.

3.2 Firearms in civilian hands

According to available data, about 14 per cent of Nigerian households contained a firearm at the time the NSALWS was conducted.[15] Only a handful of respondents—about 6 per

Table 6 Self-reported household firearms possession, by region

	Has firearm	Does not have firearm	Doesn't know	Refused to answer
Nigeria	**13.7%**	**80.1%**	**5.0%**	**1.2%**
North Central	11.9%	81.0%	5.2%	1.9%
North East	14.6%	81.5%	3.2%	0.7%
North West	9.5%	85.5%	5.0%	0.0%
South East	37.7%	48.5%	12.2%	1.6%
South South	15.3%	80.3%	2.9%	1.6%
South West	5.1%	89.8%	3.7%	1.4%

Base: Subsample of household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

cent—avoided answering this question (Table 6). A total of 80 per cent of respondents stated that nobody in their household possessed a firearm.[16] Reported prevalence rates varied significantly across regions, with respondents in South East reporting by far the highest levels of firearm possession (38 per cent). The extrapolation of the average rate of firearms possession among all surveyed households (14 per cent) to estimates of the national population as registered by the 2006 census yields an estimate of 4.4 million households with at least one firearm in Nigeria (NBS, n.d.). Because the population has grown rapidly since the last census—according to the UN *World Population Prospects* report (UNDESA, 2017) the Nigerian population was projected to have grown by 31 per cent to 187 million in 2017—it is probable that at least 5 million households in Nigeria have a firearm or firearms (including locally fabricated weapons).

The survey treated firearms as household property, as opposed to the property of an individual within the household. This means that most of the individual socio-demographic characteristics of respondents should not normally have a major effect on the results. There was one clear differentiating factor, however: rural households were much more inclined to report possession of firearms (16 per cent), and correspondingly, 18 per cent of respondents with an agrarian profession said they lived in an armed household (Figure 8). Where a male respondent was selected to answer the survey questions, the possession rate was also higher compared with female respondents (16 per cent versus 12 per cent, respectively). It is also noteworthy that households that had experienced violence were significantly more inclined to declare having a firearm (31 per cent) than households that had never encountered violence (9 per cent).

Figure 8 Firearms possession

Question: Do you, or anybody in your household, have any firearms?

Percentage of respondents who stated that they have a firearm in the household



Base: Subsample of household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

3.2.1 Numbers and types of firearms in civilian possession

On average, the vast majority of respondents in households with arms reported having only a single firearm (89 per cent). A total of 6 per cent said they had two firearms and 5 per cent reported having three or more firearms, thus bringing the average number of firearms in armed households in Nigeria to 1.24.

Rural arms-possessing households reported having a higher number of firearms (1.30 on average) compared to their urban counterparts (1.14). Also, better educated (and thus presumably more affluent) armed households tended to have more firearms (1.32) compared to those with no formal education (1.15). Finally, those armed households where someone had fallen victim to violence in the past also had more firearms than the average (1.34).

Based on the reported number of firearms per household, there are an estimated 17 firearms per 100 persons in Nigeria. This figure is calculated based on the presence of firearms in approximately 14 per cent of Nigerian households ('firearm penetration rate') and slightly more than one firearm per armed household. The firearm penetration rate ranges from only 6 per cent in South West to 42 per cent in South East (Table 7). The extrapolation of this average to the entire country (using the 2006 population census data) yields an estimated civilian arsenal of at least 5.4 million firearms in Nigeria, without taking population growth since the last census into account. When the estimated 20 per cent growth in the number of households in the 2006–16 period is taken into account—the population increased by just over 30 per cent over the same period (UNDESA, 2017)—the survey results indicate that approximately 6.4–6.5 million firearms may be

Table 7 Firearms per 100 population, by region

	Subsample size	Firearms per owner	Number of firearms per 100 population
Nigeria	**2,874**	**1.24**	**17**
North Central	658	1.29	15
North East	568	1.10	16
North West	383	1.03	10
South East	316	1.12	42
South South	292	1.91	29
South West	657	1.25	6

Base: Household survey respondents living in an armed household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

in civilian hands in Nigeria. Although these findings should be read in conjunction with the methodological notes outlined in Box 1, they are in line with reputable expert estimates (see Karp, 2018, p. 4).

Most firearm owners did not specify the types of weapons they possessed. Based on the responses from those who shared relevant information it seems that the most widespread types are handguns (with 16 per cent of all firearm owners confirming this) and rifles or shotguns (14 per cent). The possession of automatic or semi-automatic weapons was only confirmed by 3 per cent of firearm owners.

3.2.2 Owners of firearms

With very few exceptions, respondents from armed households indicated that the primary owner(s) of firearms are males, typically in their thirties or early forties (34 per cent) or older (41 per cent) (Figure 9). None of the respondent households reported that children aged 17 or below (of any gender) owned any of the household's firearms.

The survey found that in 55 per cent of cases only males owned the firearm(s) in the household, whereas in 1 per cent of cases exclusively female owners were reported. In 20 per cent of cases respondents said that household firearms had both male and female owners (including cases where the firearm was considered household property,

Figure 9 Owners of firearms

Question: Please explain who are the owners of the firearms in your household, according to gender and age only.

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents possessing a firearm, from a subsample

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Box 2 Firearm accidents

Local LEA respondents were asked whether or not they or their colleagues had been injured or killed because of accidents related to the careless handling of firearms or due to faulty weapons ('Have you or any of your colleagues been injured or killed by an accidental firearm shooting in the past one year?'). Nearly one in five respondents (17 per cent) confirmed that such accidents had caused injuries or deaths in their group, while 3 per cent said they had suffered injuries themselves. Such accidents were most widely reported by police (26 per cent said this had happened in their group, but only 1 per cent confirmed that it had happened personally), followed by the military (23 per cent said it affected the group and 3 per cent said it affected them personally) and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (21 per cent said it had affected the group and 4 per cent said it affected them personally). The lowest frequency of such incidents was reported in the Department of State Services, where none confirmed that a colleague had been affected and only 1 per cent said that it had happened to them personally.

meaning that both male and female members could be considered to be owners). In the remaining cases, no information was given about who owned firearms in the household.

Box 2 presents an overview of reported firearm accidents involving owners.

3.2.3 Motivation for the bearing of firearms

When asked why people possessed firearms, Nigerians who participated in the survey most often described their motivation in terms of the need to protect their person or property—in other words, as a means of self-defence. These motivations were cited by more than half of firearm owners (52 per cent) (Table 8). Hunting was the second most widely cited reason for owning a firearm, with more than four out of ten owners saying they kept their arms for this purpose.

More specifically, 49 per cent of firearm owners said that they kept firearms for 'personal protection', while 28 per cent indicated they had arms for 'protection of

Table 8 Purpose of firearms

	Nigeria
Self-defence	52%
Personal protection	49%
Protection of property (incl. livestock)	28%
Part of work equipment	10%
Fear of future conflict, instability, war	24%
For hunting	43%
Part of tradition	20%

Note: Multiple answers were allowed.

Base: Household survey respondents living in an armed household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

property, including livestock'. Most people who considered firearms important for keeping their property safe also felt that they contributed to their personal safety. A total of 43 per cent said they kept firearms for hunting.

Nearly a quarter of firearm owners (24 per cent) said they kept them as a means of security in case of future 'conflict, instability, war'. One in five (20 per cent) described having a firearm as being part of their 'tradition'. Finally, 10 per cent of those who possessed firearms held them as part of their work equipment.

Responses obtained from CSO respondents confirmed the above patterns: the overwhelming majority of such respondents agreed that people kept their firearms primarily for purposes of self-defence. Sixty-seven per cent referred to personal protection and 30 per cent to the protection of property. One-third of CSO respondents (33 per cent) thought that firearms were kept in their area for hunting. A quarter (25 per cent) considered keeping arms as a safeguard in case of a future conflict or social instability, almost the same percentage as actual firearm owners (24 per cent). Nearly as many civil society representatives thought that firearms were kept as part of work equipment (23 per cent), while among firearm owners this figure was only 10 per cent. Eight per cent of CSO respondents thought that arms bearers in Nigeria kept their firearms as a matter of 'tradition'—in contrast to the 20 per cent of households who said they kept firearms for this reason.

3.3 Characteristics of firearm supply

3.3.1 Ease of acquisition

In general, Nigerians felt it was difficult for civilians to access firearms. As Figure 10 indicates, a clear majority of household survey respondents thought that acquiring a firearm in their local area was either 'impossible' (26 per cent) or 'very difficult' (31 per cent). A sizable minority (25 per cent) of respondents did not know how easy it was to obtain a firearm in their area. Seventeen per cent of respondents thought that people had a realistic chance of acquiring a firearm for themselves, but only 4 per cent felt it was 'fairly easy' to acquire one, while 13 per cent thought it was 'complicated, but possible'. The proportion of respondents who felt it was 'fairly easy' and 'complicated, but possible' to access firearms was highest in the North Central region (26 per cent) and lowest in North East (11 per cent) and South East (12 per cent). The fact that respondents in South East felt access to firearms was especially difficult is of interest because the same region also contains the highest proportion of armed households (see Section 3.2).

Socio-economic factors did not appear to influence how easy or how difficult people felt it was to access firearms in their area.

Local LEA and CSO respondents had a different view on this question. About one-fifth in both groups thought that access to firearms was 'fairly/rather easy' in the areas where

Figure 10 Acquisition of firearms

Question: How easy do you think it is to acquire a firearm around here?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

they operated (19 per cent among CSO respondents and 20 per cent among their LEA counterparts). Overall, nearly two-thirds felt that acquiring a firearm was either 'fairly/rather easy' or 'complicated, but possible'. In both groups only about one in 20 respondents thought that it was 'impossible' for a civilian to acquire a firearm (Table 9).

3.3.2 Reported sources of civilian firearms

Weapons are most often acquired through direct purchase, but social networks, craft production, and state authorities (military, police, and chiefs and other local authorities) also appear to be sources.

Table 9 Acquisition of firearms for civilians is . . .

	HH	CSO	LEA
Impossible	26%	4%	5%
Very difficult	31%	17%	25%
Complicated, but possible	13%	44%	43%
Fairly/rather easy	4%	19%	20%
Do not know	25%	15%	7%
Refuse to answer	2%	1%	0%
Total for 'Fairly/rather easy' and 'Complicated, but possible'	**17%**	**63%**	**63%**

Base: Household survey and local CSO and LEA respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Figure 11 Sources of civilian weapons

Question: How did you or your household member(s) obtain this firearm (or these firearms)?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents possessing a firearm, from a subsample

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Among firearm owners questioned about the source of their weapons, a slim majority (52 per cent) reported that they had purchased their household's firearm(s) (see Figure 11). Although many weapons were acquired by other means, direct purchase was the single most important source of weapons.

Family and close social networks are also relatively important sources of firearms. Fourteen per cent of armed households reported that they had obtained at least one of their firearms from a friend or family member. Homemade craft weapons constituted an equally important source of household firearms: 14 per cent of household survey respondents said they owned craft firearms that 'they had produced themselves'. In contrast, very few firearms were taken from a 'rival community during a raid' or found 'lying around'—in each case barely 1 per cent.

Based on the reports from armed households, firearms are sometimes provided to households for personal or community protection by various agents of the state: 2 per cent reported that they were provided with weapons by the military, 3 per cent by the police, and 4 per cent by their local authority, while 10 per cent reported that vigilante groups had supplied them with weapons (Figure 11).

Table 10 Access to firearms from police or military is . . .

	CSO	LEA
Impossible	14%	25%
Somewhat difficult	44%	54%
Fairly easy	19%	8%
Very easy	8%	2%
Do not know/Refuse to answer	14%	10%
Total for 'Fairly easy' and 'Very easy'	**27%**	**11%**

Base: Local CSO and LEA respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

In an attempt to clarify the role of Nigeria's armed forces and police in the illicit provision of firearms to civilians, the survey asked local LEA and CSO respondents the following question: 'In your opinion, how easy is it for a civilian to access firearms from the police or the military in your area?' Respondents in both groups confirmed that it was possible for civilians to acquire firearms from the military or police, with only 14 per cent of community leaders and 25 per cent of the law enforcement respondents believing it impossible (Table 10). In contrast, 27 per cent of CSO and 11 per cent of LEA respondents suggested that obtaining a firearm from the military or the police was 'fairly easy' or 'very easy'.

3.3.3 Points of purchase

While the majority of people in firearm-bearing households reported purchasing their weapons, almost half of the general public (45 per cent) did not know where firearms are obtained or could be purchased (Figure 12). Local CSO and LEA respondents were more confident in their opinions about where firearms could be acquired, with only 13 per cent in both groups declining to answer the question or stating that they did not know (Table 11).

Among all respondents, the most frequent reply was that people purchased their firearms from unlicensed sources; however, CSO and LEA respondents mostly thought that such purchases took place surreptitiously through the black market, not as part of an open illegal transaction. Fifty-six per cent of CSO respondents and 60 per cent of LEA respondents affirmed this view, compared to only 16 per cent of household survey respondents. 'Open markets' were named most frequently by the general population as places where firearms could be acquired (26 per cent of all respondents and 33 per cent of those who could name at least one source). In contrast, CSO and LEA respondents

Figure 12 Where can firearms be acquired?

Question: Where do you think people obtain or purchase their firearms from?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

rarely believed that the purchase of unlicensed firearms took place in open markets: only 10 per cent of CSO respondents and 7 per cent in the LEA sample affirmed that open markets provided citizens with firearms.

All categories of respondents (household, local CSO and LEA) considered craft production to be a prominent source of civilian armament. The general public named open markets as the most important source of weapons, with craft production rated second

Table 11 Where can firearms be acquired?

	HH	CSO	LEA
Licensed firearms dealer	6%	26%	25%
Black market	16%	56%	60%
Open market	26%	10%	7%
Local manufacturers/gunsmith	20%	56%	63%
Political leaders	7%	39%	19%
Police/arm-bearing law enforcement	3%	32%	12%
Other	1%	5%	6%
Do not know/Refuse to answer	46%	13%	13%

Base: Household survey and local CSO and LEA respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

most important at 20 per cent. A clear majority of LEA respondents (63 per cent) thought craft production was the most important source, while a similar proportion of CSO respondents (56 per cent) thought that craft production and the black market were the principal sources of civilian firearms. The prevalence of craft production as a source of firearms was confirmed during the analysis of the sources of firearms reportedly kept in households: 14 per cent reported possessing craft firearms that were produced within their household (see Section 3.3.2).[17]

Local CSO and LEA respondents' views tended to differ from those of the general public regarding the question of outlets where firearms could be purchased, compared to other means of supply. CSO and LEA respondents said that licensed firearms dealers were a significant source of civilian armament: about a quarter in each group thought that citizens bought firearms from this legitimate source. Few among the general public shared this view, with only 6 per cent indicating that licensed dealers supplied civilians with firearms in their area. CSO respondents ascribed greater importance to political leaders and the police (or other law enforcement agencies) as sources of firearms (39 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively). By comparison, only 7 per cent of household survey respondents believed that political leaders were a source of firearms, and only 3 per cent believed that firearms could be obtained from the police or other law enforcement agencies (Table 11).

3.3.4 Cross-border trade

Local CSO and LEA respondents were of the opinion that the control of arms passing through Nigeria's borders could be significantly improved. About two in five (41 per cent) CSO respondents and nearly one-third (32 per cent) of LEA respondents said that control mechanisms were 'very weak' (Table 12). Altogether, almost three-quarters of interviewed

Table 12 Effectiveness of border control mechanisms

Question: How would you rate the current border control mechanisms at stopping the flow of illegal weapons across them?

	CSO	LEA
Very weak	41%	32%
Weak	32%	41%
Effective	21%	20%
Very effective	1%	3%
Do not know/Refuse to answer	5%	4%

Base: Local CSO and LEA respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

CSO and LEA respondents felt that arms controls at the borders were 'weak' or 'very weak' (73 per cent in both groups). About one in five thought that border control mechanisms were 'effective' (with an almost equal number among CSO and LEA respondents at 21 and 20 per cent, respectively). Only a tiny minority considered border control mechanisms to be 'very effective' at controlling the flow of illegal weapons: 1 per cent among CSO and 3 per cent among LEA respondents.

When asked how firearms and ammunition enter the country in the first place, most household survey respondents (51 per cent) could not say (Figure 13). Among those who did offer a response, neighbouring countries were believed to be the single most important source (15 per cent), suggesting an inflow of firearms across uncontrolled land borders. Entry by air and sea were considered less prevalent sources, with seaports cited more often (11 per cent) than airports (6 per cent) as likely entry points for firearms into the country. Private traffic by sea and air featured in only a marginal number of responses, with water traffic to private jetties at 4 per cent and flights to private airstrips and the use of aircraft at only 2 per cent.

The differences in opinion and response rates between the general public, on the one hand, and local CSO and LEA respondents, on the other, were pronounced on the question of the sources of the firearms that entered Nigeria. Only 13 per cent of CSO respondents and 10 per cent of LEA respondents said they did not know the places from where firearms usually entered Nigeria (Table 13). Among these groups, seaports were believed to be the most prominent site of firearm inflows (52 per cent of CSO and

Figure 13 Where do firearms enter the country?

Question: Where from or how do you think firearms and ammunition enter the country?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Table 13 Where do firearms enter the country?

	HH	CSO	LEA
Nearby or neighbouring country	15%	42%	18%
Seaport	11%	52%	57%
Airports	6%	22%	37%
Private jetties	4%	21%	30%
Private airstrips/aircraft	2%	19%	21%
Corporate import	5%	23%	27%
Other	3%	11%	16%
Do not know	51%	13%	10%
Refuse to answer	1%	–	–

Note: Multiple answers were allowed.

Base: Household survey and local CSO and LEA respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

57 per cent of LEA respondents). Similarly, both groups assumed a much greater role for private air traffic than the general population. LEA respondents were less inclined (18 per cent) than CSO respondents (42 per cent) to believe that firearms made their way into the country from neighbouring countries, whether by land, sea, or air. When asked which neighbouring countries were the sources of firearms shipments, these respondents mentioned Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in about equal measure.

FGD participants also cited neighbouring countries and porous borders as the most probable sources of and points of entry for the firearms held in civilian hands: 59 per cent of them mentioned porous borders, while seaports were mentioned by 28 per cent and airports by 5 per cent. The FGD participants aligned with the general public in their belief that the neighbouring countries of Niger (27 per cent), Cameroon (20 per cent), and Benin (13 per cent) were important sources of weapons, yet also added Libya (23 per cent) and Mali (6 per cent) to this list. In contrast to the general public, they did not consider Chad to be an important source of firearms.

> “A majority of respondents asserted that the most effective way to limit the proliferation of illicit arms in local communities was to address the structural conditions of poverty and insecurity.”

4. Attitudes to disarmament and firearms control

4.1 Disincentives for keeping firearms

Most household survey respondents who did not report having a firearm in their home said it was because owning a firearm is illegal (61 per cent) (Figure 14). A smaller proportion of the same sample expressed an aversion to firearms in general, either because they considered them to be dangerous (18 per cent) or because they simply did not like them (14 per cent). Only a small proportion of respondents stated that there was no firearm in the household because they did not need one; for example, because there was 'adequate protection' where they lived (6 per cent) or because there were 'no security problems' in their area (11 per cent).

Few people cited practical barriers to keeping a firearm in the household. For example, only 9 per cent said that they did not have one because they were too expensive; 9 per cent also said it was too difficult to acquire one. Similarly, only 10 per cent of respondents said that they do not have a firearm in the household because they are 'difficult to keep', and even fewer people—only 7 per cent—said that there were no firearms in their household because they did not know how to use them.

Figure 14 Reasons for not having firearms

Question asked if respondent states that he/she does not have a firearm: Why not?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents living in unarmed household, from a subsample

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

4.2 Attitudes to the disarmament of civilians

Both household and CSO respondents felt that a future civilian disarmament effort or programme in their area would contribute to the security of their household, or more broadly to the security of the area. Yet many were also worried that such efforts could also cause security to deteriorate. Despite these concerns, a large proportion of Nigerians (43 per cent) stated they would be prepared to give up their homes' (hypothetical) firearms if there were a government programme to collect them. Respondents who reported having firearms in their homes were more reluctant to support such a programme, however, fearing deceased public security as a potential result of future civilian disarmament efforts.

Local CSO representatives were more optimistic than the general population about the prospects of civilian disarmament efforts, with 61 per cent anticipating at least some improvement in local security as a result of such efforts, compared to only 41 per cent of the general population (Table 14); however, the vast majority of CSO respondents (85 per cent) saw no steps being taken to disarm civilians in their area. Only 8 per cent of local CSO respondents said they were aware of any ongoing or planned civilian disarmament efforts in their area, while only 6 per cent thought that a programme was being planned.

Although 41 per cent of household survey respondents thought that local area security would increase 'somewhat' or 'very much' as a result of civilian disarmament efforts,

Table 14 Impact of potential disarmament initiatives on security

Question: If, in the future, there was disarmament in your area, how would this affect the collective security in your area or in your household?

	Local area security		Household security
	CSO	HH	HH
It would very much decrease security	7%	12%	11%
It would somewhat decrease security	8%	11%	10%
It would not make a difference	5%	21%	26%
It would somewhat increase security	29%	23%	18%
It would very much increase security	32%	18%	19%
Do not know	17%	13%	13%
Refuse to answer	2%	2%	2%

Base: Household survey and local CSO respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

slightly fewer of them (38 per cent) thought that civilian disarmament efforts would improve the security of their household—as opposed to that of the local area—with 21 per cent fearing negative consequences and 26 per cent asserting that attempts to disarm civilians would have no effect on household security, whether positive or negative.

The views of participants in FGDs organized by the researchers diverged sharply from those of household respondents. The overwhelming majority in these focus groups—which also included people from security and law enforcement services—supported the idea of future disarmament initiatives without expressing the concerns that had been articulated by the public and some experts. Furthermore, as one key informant interviewee from South East explained:

> If the government do [sic] not want to see our youths carrying weapons, what they should do is put more pressure on people to disarm them. It will be effective if government assures them that they will be protected. If there is no such assurance, people will definitely look for a way to protect themselves.

The survey sought to gauge public attitudes towards a hypothetical future disarmament campaign. For this reason, all respondents were asked to imagine how they would respond to a future civilian disarmament effort, irrespective of whether they reported currently having a firearm in their household or not. This approach reflected the expectation that a certain number of respondents would not admit to having a firearm in their households; thus, the question was designed to allow a broader investigation of attitudes towards a hypothetical future disarmament campaign without restricting respondents to only those currently willing to speak openly about firearms in their own households.

Because this question deals with hypothetical future scenarios, it is important to understand that the responses do not predict or forecast the results of any future attempt to disarm civilians. If future disarmament efforts lead to decreased firearm ownership combined with increased security in disarmed areas, this will depend on a wide range of factors, including the approach taken to disarmament, the political and security context, geographical coverage, the dynamics of related incentive schemes, and the type and level of force or coercion used.

When asked to predict how they might react to future disarmament efforts, respondents were presented with various responses to choose from. The options were developed from an analysis of previous studies in comparable settings and included (Figure 15):

- compliance ('give up all firearm(s)');
- outright resistance or non-compliance ('hide firearm(s)', 'fight to defend the right to keep firearm(s)', or 'give up one firearm and hide rest');
- avoidance ('relocate my household');

Figure 15 Reaction to future disarmament

Question: Supposing that you had guns in your household, how would you (or the members of your household) react if the government tries to disarm your household?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

- seeking compensation ('I would seek compensation'); and
- 'other' miscellaneous responses to government attempts to disarm civilians.

Across the full distribution of responses, a large proportion of the general population (43 per cent) said they would 'give up all firearm(s)' to the authorities in the context of government-led disarmament efforts. Small proportions of respondents chose other answers. For example, 7 per cent said they would hide all their firearms, while 3 per cent said they would seek compensation for giving up their weapons.

An answer category was also provided for those who insisted that they were unable to answer the question because they did not have any firearms, and 31 per cent of respondents selected this answer.[18] A further 12 per cent selected the non-response variables of 'do not know' and 'refuse to answer'.

To facilitate analysis, a civilian disarmament indicator was created that was comparable across regions and socio-economic strata. The indicator was constructed based on the responses indicating full compliance, on the one hand, and explicit resistance, on the other. This leaves out all other responses from the equation and focuses on the two types of anticipated behaviour that dominated the responses of those who felt they were able to answer the question. Based on this indicator, the rate of non-compliance with any future government disarmament effort is estimated at 20 per cent.

In the general sample, non-compliance rates were found to be highest in the youngest age group (25 per cent among those aged 21 or younger), in North Central (29 per cent) and South East (40 per cent), among those with agrarian occupations (22 per cent), and those who were previously victims of violence (37 per cent).

Worryingly, 74 per cent of armed households said they would not comply with the hypothetical government-led disarmament efforts. These respondents were further questioned in order to explore the underlying motivations for their opposition to being disarmed, even though they make up only a small subset of the total survey sample population (10 per cent, or 876 respondents). Of this small subset who said they would not give up their firearms, a total of 39 per cent said that nothing could convince them to do so (Figure 16). In contrast, 36 per cent said they would give up firearms if 'threats to life and property were removed', revealing that increased safety and security was the single most important precondition for compliance.

A sizable proportion of respondents (23 per cent) in this subset said that they might consider complying if rival neighbouring communities were disarmed *simultaneously*, with the same proportion indicating that they might give up their firearms if appropriate financial compensation was offered. A disarmament campaign led by a local NGO or

Figure 16 What could increase compliance with disarmament efforts?

Question: What would persuade you and your household members to give up all firearms?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents who said they would resist disarmament

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

other international organization would not increase compliance by much: only 8 per cent and 6 per cent of respondents, respectively, said that this would encourage them to comply.

4.3 Control of illicit firearms

Opinions on the effectiveness of efforts to control firearms over the past five years varied significantly among local CSO representatives.[19] Their responses were almost evenly split between favourable and unfavourable assessments (50 and 46 per cent, respectively), while 4 per cent offered no opinion. Among unfavourable opinions, more than a quarter of CSO respondents were very critical of official firearms control efforts. Twenty-seven per cent thought that efforts were 'very unsuccessful', with another 19 per cent saying they were 'slightly unsuccessful'. Among the 50 per cent who offered a favourable assessment of firearms control efforts, nearly two in five CSO respondents (39 per cent) felt that the government had had some success in arms control, while only 11 per cent characterized these efforts as 'very successful'.

A majority of all segments of survey respondents asserted that the most effective way to limit the proliferation of illicit arms in local communities was to address the structural conditions of poverty and insecurity. When asked to rank five different approaches to illicit arms control according to how important they thought they were in reducing the number of firearms held by civilians, creating youth employment and improving general security were the most popular responses nationwide (Figure 17).

Figure 17 How to better control illicit firearms?

Question: Please look at this card with some proposals to better control illicit firearms in your area. Which one do you think is the most important to reduce the number of civilian-held firearms in this area? The second most important? The third? Etc.

Average ranking, inverted



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Respondents tended to rank structural issues in first place, finding more immediate solutions less important, or perhaps less effective. The creation of more employment opportunities for youths was considered a key precursor to better firearms control. Forty-eight per cent of respondents nationwide selected this as the top priority of any efforts to achieve better firearms control—with each socio-economic segment of the sample choosing this option as the most important. In North East, however, respondents felt that improving the general security situation would be a better way of controlling illicit firearms. Generally, this proposal was the second most popular across Nigeria (25 per cent ranked it first), as well as among most socio-economic segments. Peace-building efforts among communities were considered less effective or important (11 per cent ranked this option as most important). Finally, better enforcement of 'punitive laws' banning illicit firearms and buy-back schemes ('pay for turning in illicit weapons') were deemed least likely to achieve the goal of civilian disarmament. Only 6 per cent of survey respondents felt that either of these two options was the most important.

“Firearms featured more commonly than any other type of weapon in violent incidents, and 43 per cent of violent encounters involved at least one firearm.”

5. Violence and victimization

5.1 Experiences of violence

About one in eight (12 per cent) of those who took part in the household survey reported that they themselves or someone in their household had been a victim of some form of violence in the 'last one year' (Figure 18). A total of 6 per cent of these incidents happened to the respondents themselves (either alone or together with other household members), while 6 per cent reported that someone else in their household had experienced violence.

Thirty-eight per cent of those who suffered violence—either themselves or a member of their household—were confronted with violence multiple times. While 36 per cent of respondents indicated that their household was victimized only once in the past year, 16 per cent said that their household had been exposed to two incidents of violence, 11 per cent reported three incidents of violence, and a further 11 per cent reported suffering more than three such incidents. On average, a household that suffered violence was attacked 2.3 times over the one-year period.

These figures put the household-level rate of violent incidents at 215 per 1,000 households in Nigeria,[20] and the individual-level incidence rate at 42 per 1,000 people over the period 2015–16 (Table 15).[21]

Assuming an increase of approximately 20 per cent in the number of households in the decade between the last population census and the survey date, based on a population growth rate of 31 per cent (UNDESA, 2017), the estimated annual number of violent incidents would surpass 8 million. The removal of incidents involving only threats and intimidation from the dataset leads to only a modest drop in the victimization rate (from 12.5 per cent to 11.5 per cent at the household level); the overwhelming majority of the incidents described by NSALWS household respondents involved physical violence.

Figure 18 Experience of violence

Question: Have you or any member of your household been a victim of a violent crime or violent encounter in the last year?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Table 15 Prevalence and incidence rates of violence

	Nigeria
Individual prevalence (per cent)	6.3
Household-level prevalence (per cent)	12.5
Household-level incidence rate of violence (per 1,000 households)	215
Estimated individual-level incidence rate of violence (per 1,000 individuals of all ages, including infants, etc.)	42

Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Looking at the various socio-economic segments of the sample, several important observations can be made:

- Urban areas are marginally safer than rural areas according to most indicators of exposure to violence. Rural residents had a higher likelihood of being victimized personally (6.8 per cent, versus 5.7 per cent for urban areas), while the household-level incidence rate in rural areas throughout Nigeria (246 incidents per 1,000 households) was also higher than in urban areas (183 per 1,000 households).
- Men are reportedly more often victims of violence than women, but women are more likely to face violence in the home. Overall, males were more likely to be personally affected by violence than females (6.8 per cent versus 5.8 per cent, respectively). The members of female-only households,[22] however, face a victimization rate (7.2 per cent) that is higher than the national—male or female—average (6.5 per cent).
- Younger people face the greatest risk of violence: 8.3 per cent of those aged 21 or younger had been targets of violence in the year prior to the survey, with household-level incidence rates also highest in families represented by respondents aged 21 or below (projected at 312 annual incidents per 1,000 households). The second most likely age group to encounter violence comprised those aged between 40 and 59 years, 7.5 per cent of whom had been personally targeted by violence.
- The presence of a firearm in the home is associated with an increased risk of violence. The prevalence rate for violence among individuals with firearms in the home was 19.6 per cent, versus 5.4 per cent among those who did not have a firearm in the home. The household-level incidence rate was also higher among this group. Just over one-third (33.4 per cent) of households with firearms reported at least one incident of violence targeting a household member, translating to a projected total of 568 violent incidents per 1,000 households with firearms, compared to 177 per 1,000 households without firearms. Both indicators (household-level prevalence and incidence rates) are approximately three times as high as in households without firearms.

5.2 Characteristics of violence

5.2.1 Violence by type

The most common form of violence described by victims involved threats or intimidation, and for 38 per cent of survey respondents this was part of the most recent episode of violence that they or a household member had experienced. This figure may seem to indicate that a large proportion of violence experienced in Nigeria was not physical in nature, yet the stand-alone occurrence of reported threats and intimidation was in fact very low (Figure 19). Even if cases of intimidation are removed from the dataset, the national victimization rate (12.5 per cent) declines only modestly, and 11.5 per cent of households in Nigeria still encounter violence annually.[23]

Figure 19 Type of violence encountered

Question: Still speaking of the most recent violent crime or violent encounter that happened to you or one of your household members, how would you describe what happened?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in the household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

The second most common description respondents gave about the violent incident they or their household member had experienced was 'robbery' (34 per cent). For one in five (21 per cent) the violence was also accompanied by a shooting—indicating not just the presence, but the actual use of a firearm during the incident in question. 'Land dispute' was also frequently cited, with more than one in seven (15 per cent) of households reporting such a dispute in relation to violent incidents. Figure 19 shows the wide variety of other forms of violence respondents had experienced, including 'political/electoral violence' (13 per cent), 'communal violence' (13 per cent), 'rape/sexual assault' (13 per cent), 'domestic violence' (13 per cent), 'livestock theft' (9 per cent), and 'intentional killing' (9 per cent).

Violence that resulted in the loss of life (a killing of any sort) was a relatively frequent experience among household members interviewed about their exposure to violence. From 2 to 9 per cent of victimized households reported a specific type of death due to violence, whether an 'intentional killing' (9 per cent), 'revenge killing' (4 per cent), or 'unintentional killing' (2 per cent) (Figure 19). It is important to note that this relatively high rate of exposure to violent deaths is based only on the most recent incident of violence experienced by each household. Since households experienced more than two violent incidents on average, the reported—already high—rate of victimization leading to death is most probably a significant underestimate of the real incidence of violent death affecting Nigerian homes.

In order to streamline the analysis, the categories of violence were collapsed from the full list into eight different types of violence (Table 16). The corresponding results were then interpolated to the total survey population to identify the prevalence of various types of violence occurring nationwide in Nigeria. This analysis shows that a fairly high number of families (nearly 7 per cent) were confronted with violence related to 'property crime', while 4.6 per cent were exposed to threats or intimidation, 2.8 per cent to violence against women or children, 2.6 per cent to political violence, and 2.3 per cent to 'unspecified armed violence'. Finally, 1.7 per cent of Nigerian households said that they had experienced an incident involving 'murder, homicide, or manslaughter' within the one-year reporting period.

Table 16 Types of violence, total sample

	Nigeria
Murder, homicide, or manslaughter	1.7%
Unspecified armed violence	2.3%
Violent property crime	6.7%
Kidnapping	0.6%
Gang violence	1.0%
Political violence	2.6%
Threat/intimidation	4.6%
Violence against women and children	2.8%

Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

5.2.2 Violence by location

When asked where the most recent violent incident that they had experienced had taken place, most respondents indicated that this was the home (40 per cent), with only 29 per cent reporting violence occurring 'on the road/in the street' (Figure 20). A smaller proportion of people said they had experienced violence 'on private land' (10 per cent) and 'at a place for public gatherings' (6 per cent). Very few incidents took place 'at the market' (3 per cent), 'at the workplace' (3 per cent), or at a 'place of worship' such as a church or mosque (1 per cent).

Violent property crimes (typically robberies), kidnappings, and gang violence were committed on the streets in higher proportions than other types of violence. Thirty-two per cent of violent property crimes, 35 per cent of kidnappings, and 48 per cent of gang violence happened in the street—compared with an average of only 29 per cent for all types of violence combined. Intimidation, violence affecting women and children, and lethal violence took place in higher proportions at home (48 per cent, 52 per cent, and 53 per cent, respectively). Political violence was more prevalent than other types 'at a place for public gatherings' (15 per cent). Shootings occurred at above-average rates 'at the market' (6 per cent) and 'at the workplace' (5 per cent).

5.2.3 Weapons used in violent incidents

In the vast majority of cases, when people were confronted with violence, perpetrators used or displayed a weapon of some sort. Firearms were used in 43 per cent of violent

Figure 20 Location of violence

Question: Still speaking of the most recent incident: can you tell me where it happened?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Figure 21 Weapons used against victims of violence

Question: What type of weapon was used during this incident?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in the household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

encounters. Only about one out of six attacks (16 per cent) occurred without the presence of some kind of weapon (Figure 21).

It is important to note that the questionnaire did not actually specify that using a weapon meant firing that weapon. Instead, weapons were often used in violent situations to increase the threat level or the seriousness of an attack. They were not always fired or used in some other way.

On the basis of the categories used in the survey, which divided weapons into several distinct groups, bladed weapons were the most common type of weapon used in violent encounters. Thirty-six per cent of respondents reported that the perpetrators of violence in an incident were armed with weapons such as axes, knives, or machetes. The next most common types of weapons used in violent incidents (29 per cent) were 'crude/traditional' weapons such as stones, fire, or sticks.

Nevertheless, when the separate firearms categories are combined, firearms featured more commonly than any other type of weapon in violent incidents, and 43 per cent of violent encounters involved at least one firearm. The most common types of firearms used in these incidents were handguns (28 per cent) and automatic weapons (23 per

Table 17 Type of weapons used against violence victims, by type of violence

	Threat/ intimidation	Violent property crime	Political violence
Unspecified weapon was used	5%	8%	6%
No weapon was used	18%	11%	3%
Only firearm was used	13%	17%	12%
Firearm and non-firearm were used	28%	29%	45%
Only non-firearm was used	36%	35%	34%
Firearm used, total	**40%**	**46%**	**56%**

Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in their household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

cent). Rifles or shotguns were used in only 14 per cent of violent crimes. Ten per cent of victims indicated that bows, arrows, or spears were used when they were attacked.

The use of weapons varied according to the nature of the crime. Incidents involving threats or intimidation were sometimes carried out without a weapon (18 per cent of cases), as was violence targeting women and children (22 per cent of cases) (Table 17). Yet even in these incidents, where the use of a firearm was less likely than in other types of incidents, firearms featured in almost half (40 per cent) of reported cases. Crimes where firearms played a particularly important role were 'kidnapping' (77 per cent of incidents involved firearms), 'murder, homicide, or manslaughter' (79 per cent), and 'unspecified armed violence' (82 per cent).

Table 18 Type of weapons used against violence victims, by region

	Nigeria	North Central	North East
Unspecified weapon was used	9%	7%	13%
No weapon was used	16%	12%	2%
Only firearm was used	18%	21%	49%
Firearm and non-firearm were used	25%	33%	12%
Only non-firearm was used	32%	28%	24%
Firearm used, total	**43%**	**54%**	**62%**

Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in their household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Kidnapping	Violence against women and children	Gang violence	Murder, homicide, or manslaughter	Unspecified armed violence
11%	5%	5%	8%	9%
7%	22%	7%	1%	1%
36%	8%	9%	32%	35%
41%	31%	40%	47%	47%
6%	33%	39%	12%	8%
77%	**40%**	**49%**	**79%**	**82%**

Firearms played the greatest role in violent incidents in North East (where 62 per cent of victims reported their presence), in North Central (54 per cent), and in South South (53 per cent) (Table 18). In South East, where this survey detected the highest rate of armed households, the use of firearms was, relatively speaking, the lowest among all of the regions, with only about a fifth of violent incidents involving a firearm (21 per cent).

Nationally, 43 per cent of violent incidents reportedly involved the use of a firearm. This is a higher percentage than local CSO representatives assumed. Most CSO respondents estimated that firearms were only used 'sometimes' or 'hardly ever' (55 per cent), while a smaller number thought that they were used 'often' (34 per cent) or 'very often' (12 per cent) when a violent incident occurs.

North West	South East	South South	South West
13%	2%	11%	8%
9%	37%	14%	21%
15%	3%	21%	13%
27%	17%	31%	16%
36%	40%	22%	42%
42%	**21%**	**53%**	**28%**

5.2.4 Results of violence

Almost half (46 per cent) of violence-affected households suffered an injury or death in the most recent incident of violence that they had experienced, with fatalities reported in 29 per cent of these incidents. Fifty-four per cent of the most recent incidents of violence left everyone in the respondent's household physically unharmed (Table 19).

Table 19 Injury and death caused by violence

	Nigeria
No injury or death	54%
Only injury	17%
Death and injury	9%
Only death	20%
Per cent of incidents resulting in fatalities from the household	**29%**

Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in their household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Fifty-one per cent of the incidents involving 'murder, homicide, or manslaughter' resulted in death; only 22 per cent of the people involved in these situations escaped without physical injuries.[24] Kidnapping (40 per cent of incidents) and 'unspecified armed violence' (46 per cent) also tended to be lethal for someone from the respondent's household.

Yet even the least deadly forms of violence frequently led to injury or death. Twenty-seven per cent of incidents involving threats or intimidation resulted in a death, with this happening in 31 per cent and 30 per cent of the cases of violent property crime and violence against women and children, respectively (Table 20).

Incidents where attackers used weapons were more likely to result in death or injury than weaponless attacks, which led to injuries or death in only 5 and 9 per cent of cases, respectively (Table 21).

Table 20 Injury and death caused by violence, by violence type

	Threat or intimidation	Violent property crime	Political violence
No injury or death	61%	57%	40%
Only injury	11%	12%	23%
Death and injury	11%	8%	15%
Only death	16%	23%	21%
Per cent of incidents resulting in fatalities from the household	**27%**	**31%**	**37%**

Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in their household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Table 21 Injury and death caused by violence, by type of weapon used

	No weapon was used	Only firearm was used	Firearm and non-firearm were used	Only non-firearm was used
No injury or death	84%	41%	39%	58%
Only injury	5%	23%	15%	15%
Death and injury	1%	18%	18%	3%
Only death	9%	17%	27%	24%
Per cent of incidents resulting in fatalities from the household	**11%**	**35%**	**45%**	**27%**

Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in their household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

The most violent encounters were those where perpetrators were armed with one or more firearms in addition to other weapons (perhaps due to the presence of more than one perpetrator, although this question was not asked in the survey). In such cases the likelihood of a fatality in the respondent's household rose to 45 per cent of all cases, with only 39 per cent of people escaping physical injury altogether (Table 21).

Nationwide, 5.5 per cent of households (more than one in 20) experienced violence-related death and injury in the year preceding the survey (Figure 22).[25]

Kidnapping	Violence against women and children	Gang violence	Murder, homicide, or manslaughter	Unspecified armed violence
36%	55%	51%	22%	28%
24%	14%	21%	27%	26%
26%	13%	11%	31%	25%
14%	17%	17%	20%	20%
40%	**30%**	**29%**	**51%**	**46%**

Figure 22 Violence-related deaths and injuries (total sample)

Question: Have you or any member of your household been a victim of a violent crime or violent encounter in the last year? [If 'Yes'] How many of your household members, including you, have been injured in the most recent incident? How many were killed (if any)?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

5.3 Reporting and prosecution of violence

5.3.1 Reporting violent incidents

In 16 per cent of cases victims of violence did not tell anyone about the violent incident they had experienced (Figure 23). When victims did make others aware of their experience, they typically turned to those they perceived as being able to take action to redress the situation. When asked 'who was/were made aware of this incident?' 'police' was by far the most frequent response (49 per cent), followed by 'traditional leaders' (33 per cent) and 'vigilantes' (17 per cent), who may also be considered as agents responsible for upholding law and order, although in a non-statutory capacity (see Section 6.1). The military also seems to play a non-negligible, if unofficial, role in law enforcement in Nigeria, with 9 per cent of victims notifying 'military/paramilitary' members about the violence they had experienced.

Social networks were only infrequently informed of experiences of violent victimization: 17 per cent of victims told a family member, 12 per cent their neighbours, and 12 per cent their friends (multiple responses were permitted). Almost nobody (1 per cent) brought their case to the attention of a 'private security provider'.

The study further examined the reporting of violence to people who could in an official or semi-official capacity respond to the incident, including by starting an investigation, punishing the perpetrator(s), or otherwise preventing such incidents from recurring. This analysis distinguished between official reporting to formal, state-operated or state-sanctioned security providers (that is, informing the police or the military/paramilitary about an incident) and reporting only to informal or private agents involved in

Figure 23 Who was informed about the violence?

Question: Who was made aware of this incident?

Multiple answers allowed



Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in the household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

the provision of local security (such as traditional or religious leaders, vigilantes, or private security providers) (see Section 6.1 for a more detailed discussion of the formal and informal provision of security in Nigeria).

Those who may only have told someone in their social network—such as a family member, neighbour, or friend—about a violent incident, or did not tell anybody at all about it, were considered not to have reported the incident to any formal or informal law enforcement agent. In addition to the 16 per cent of respondents from victimized families who said that they did not inform anybody about the incident, another 8 per cent told only a friend or family member about it. This means that 24 per cent of violent incidents were not reported to any formal or informal agent or organization that might have been expected to provide redress for the victim(s).[26] Overall, 54 per cent of all incidents were reported to formal law enforcement agents, while 23 per cent were brought to the attention of informal security providers only (Figure 24).

Formal and informal security providers play different roles in facilitating redress for victims of violence. People turned most often to informal security providers in less severe cases of violence. For example, victims were more than twice as likely to report an attack without weapons to informal security providers than to formal ones (37 per cent

Figure 24 Reporting rates of violence

Question: Who was informed?



Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in the household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

of victims compared to 17 per cent, respectively). Although informal security providers were most often called on to deal with unarmed violence, this type of violence most often went completely unreported. Almost half (47 per cent) of attacks without weapons were never reported, compared to only 13 per cent of kidnappings and 6 per cent of killings. Formal law enforcement actors were most often called on to deal with the most violent types of crimes. The vast majority of kidnappings (81 per cent) and killings (82 per cent) were reported to formal security providers. The presence of a firearm also increased the overall likelihood of an incident being reported and, within this category, being reported to a formal security provider. Notwithstanding these patterns, nationwide rates of reporting to formal security providers remained relatively low. Seventy-two per cent of incidents in which a fatality/fatalities occurred were reported to them, compared to 19 per cent that were reported to informal security providers and 9 per cent that were never reported.

The survey results also reveal regional variations in reporting. South South had the highest rate of official reporting, with 66 per cent of violent incidents being reported to official law enforcement actors and only 17 per cent reported to informal security providers (Table 22). Together with North Central, South South also had the lowest rates

Table 22 Official reporting of violence to formal and informal security providers, by region

	Nigeria	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Reported to formal security service	54%	60%	52%	58%	21%	66%	53%
Reported to informal security service	23%	23%	20%	16%	50%	17%	15%
Did not officially report	24%	17%	28%	26%	29%	17%	31%

Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in their household

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

of unreported cases: 17 per cent in both regions. At the other end of the spectrum, only 21 per cent of incidents in South East were brought to the attention of formal law enforcement actors, with half of all cases (50 per cent) channelled through informal security providers. Yet patterns of reporting in South East are not typical of the national experience. In all other regions, Nigerians were much more likely to report to formal security providers than to informal ones.

5.3.2 Follow-up to reports of violence

Most respondents from households affected by violence (30 per cent) said that the perpetrator(s) of the attack they had reported were not identified and prosecuted (Figure 25). In only 16 per cent of reported cases was the perpetrator 'identified and punished formally' by the courts. In another 9 per cent of cases the perpetrator was punished outside of the formal justice system ('identified and punished informally' or, in a small number of cases, by 'mob action').

In almost half of all cases (45 per cent), law enforcement agencies failed to identify and bring a perpetrator of a reported violent incident to justice (Table 23). This was sometimes because victims said the law enforcement agency was too slow to respond (6 per cent) or did not respond at all (9 per cent) (Figure 25). A total of 14 per cent of cases were pending at the time the survey was conducted.

Justice was served (formally or informally) most frequently in South East, where 41 per cent of household survey respondents said that the perpetrator(s) was/were identified and punished in some way. In contrast, the perpetrator(s) escaped justice—whether formal or informal—in 61 per cent of the incidents reported in North East. Throughout the country many more people said that the perpetrator(s) had escaped justice (45 per

Figure 25 Follow-up of reports of violent incidents

Question: What happened afterwards?



Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in the household who reported the incident

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Table 23 Outcome of reports of violence

	Justice was served (formally or informally)	Perpetrator(s) escaped justice
Nigeria	**25%**	**45%**
By region		
North Central	18%	42%
North East	12%	61%
North West	32%	42%
South East	41%	21%
South South	21%	55%
South West	22%	50%
By type of agency		
Reported to formal security provider (police, military)	23%	52%
Reported only to informal security provider	33%	34%

Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in their household who reported the incident

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Figure 26 Reasons for violent incidents going unreported

Question: Why was nobody informed?



Base: Household survey respondents with a victim of violence in the household who didn't report the incident

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

cent) than said that the perpetrator(s) had been caught and punished, whether formally or informally (25 per cent).

Overall, alleged perpetrators were caught more frequently when official law enforcement agencies were not involved. Thirty-three per cent of perpetrators of incidents that were only reported to informal security providers (such as vigilantes or village chiefs) were identified, caught, and punished in some way, compared to only 23 per cent when the incident was reported to formal security providers (such as the police or military) (Table 23).

Among the reasons for not informing anyone of a violent incident, most respondents explained that they did not have enough confidence in the authorities to report the violence they had experienced (31 per cent). Many also said that the police were not accessible in their area; 23 per cent felt they were 'far or non-existent' (Figure 26). About one in five respondents said they 'solved' the problem themselves and 12 per cent cited 'other' reasons for not informing anyone, including in some cases the belief that the incident was too trivial to be reported to any authority.

“While a majority of people feel relatively satisfied with the quality of policing in their area, a significant minority of Nigerians are dissatisfied with the quality of police service available to them.”

6. Perceptions of security provision

6.1 Reported presence of security providers

Nationwide, 83 per cent of household survey respondents confirmed that there was an institution or group in their local area that was supposed to provide security for local residents (Figure 27). About one in eight Nigerians (13 per cent), however, said there was no organized security provision in the area where they lived.

At the regional level, South East and North Central were the regions where the greatest proportion of respondents felt that security was being provided, but even in these regions, respectively 7 and 9 per cent of those interviewed said there was no institutionalized security provision in their area. The reported rates of security provision varied across Nigeria, but all but one region reported rates above 80 per cent. Yet the gap between the lowest and highest results was over 26 percentage points, with North West being the region reporting the lowest rates of security provision: only 66 per cent of respondents there thought that any group or institution was present to provide security (Table 24).

While rates of reported security provision were relatively high across the country, the nature of the security that was provided varied considerably, with the presence of a diverse range of security providers reported across all regions. Vigilantes were identified as playing a role in security provision by 64 per cent of respondents nationwide on average, with the highest rate (76 per cent) reported in North Central. Traditional leaders were identified as security providers by 36 per cent of respondents nationwide, with the highest proportion of people looking to them for security in North East (43 per cent) and the lowest in South West (24 per cent). In contrast to traditional leaders, religious leaders were considered security providers by only 9 per cent of respondents nationwide (Table 24).

In terms of formal security providers, only 53 per cent in North West and 68 per cent in South East reported a police presence in their region. These were also the regions with the lowest rates of support for possible civilian disarmament efforts. A police presence

Box 3 Defining security providers

A variety of actors have a role to play in security provision and small arms control in Nigeria, and the NSALWS sought to capture public attitudes to all of them. Respondents were asked to comment on categories of both formal and informal security providers across different segments of the survey. The category of formal security providers combines Nigeria's statutory security institutions—the Armed Forces of Nigeria, Nigeria Police Force, Police Community Relations Committees (PCRCs), and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). Informal security providers are community-based groups who take it upon themselves to provide security within the bounds of their own community and may or may not directly cooperate with formal security providers in doing so, for example, vigilante groups or village chiefs.

Figure 27 Security provision in the local area

Question: Are there institutions or groups that are supposed to provide security to your area?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

was reported at much higher rates in other areas, such as South South (81 per cent), North East (77 per cent), and South West (77 per cent). Nationwide, 71 per cent of respondents reported that police were available where they lived, while a slightly smaller proportion (64 per cent) indicated that vigilantes were there to provide security. Despite relatively high levels of reported police presence, very few Nigerians perceived PCRCs as security

Table 24 Presence of institutions or groups that provide security, by region

	Nigeria	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Any institution or group	**83%**	**92%**	**85%**	**66%**	**92%**	**87%**	**84%**
Police	71%	70%	77%	53%	68%	81%	77%
Military	15%	12%	38%	8%	11%	16%	5%
NSCDC	12%	12%	24%	6%	9%	13%	5%
PCRC	3%	2%	1%	1%	8%	5%	1%
Traditional leaders (chief)	36%	41%	43%	41%	34%	32%	24%
Religious leaders	9%	12%	10%	9%	16%	2%	3%
Vigilantes	64%	76%	74%	44%	69%	58%	58%
Private security providers	4%	5%	3%	0%	10%	4%	4%

Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

Figure 28 Availability of formal/informal security provision

Question: Are there institutions or groups that are supposed to provide security to your area? [If 'Yes'] Who are these institutions or groups?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

providers. Only 3 per cent of respondents on average mentioned them, with this rate rising to only 8 per cent in South East. In North East the military, as well as the NSCDC, appear to play an important role in security provision, with 38 per cent and 24 per cent of respondents, respectively, identifying these forces as security providers. Significantly lower proportions of people mentioned either of these actors in this regard in Nigeria's other regions (Table 24).

Combining the police, military, PCRCs, and NSCDC into a single general category, 61 per cent of interviewees reported that some form of formal, government-sanctioned security provision was available in their area (Figure 28). Across Nigeria, approximately one in five people (22 per cent) lived in areas where they reported that only informal (not government-operated or -sanctioned) security services were available, while 17 per cent did not confirm the presence of any organized security provision in their locality.[27]

Local CSO respondents were more likely to confirm the presence of formal security providers: 90 per cent of civil society respondents said there was formal security provision in their area, while only 5 per cent confirmed the presence of informal security providers and 6 per cent said there was no organized security provision at all. These reporting rates may have been influenced by the fact that these respondents were typically interviewed about the urban centres in which they were active.

Formal security provision was unevenly perceived across socio-economic strata. The findings show a relatively stark difference between urban and rural residents; for example, formal security provision was much more frequently reported by urban dwellers (69 per cent) compared to rural Nigerians (54 per cent). In rural areas the role of informal security provision (organized by vigilantes or traditional leaders) was more prominent, but even so, one out of five rural residents felt that there was no organized security provision in their area, whether formal or informal. Correspondingly, those with agrarian occupations were among those who felt that formal security was least available in their area; only 50 per cent reported that such services were accessible in their locations (Figure 28).

The perceived presence of formal security providers also increased with the level of completed education (and possibly related affluence) among respondents. While nearly seven out of ten of those educated to secondary school level or higher said that formal security was available in their area, less than half (45 per cent) of those without any formal education thought the same (Figure 28).

6.2 Reporting of crimes and violence

Most of the violence experienced by household survey respondents (77 per cent) was reported to someone, whether formal or informal security and justice providers (see

Section 5.3). In line with this finding, 90 per cent of general survey respondents, irrespective of their background and socio-economic status, said that they would report a crime if they witnessed one (Figure 29).

Nearly half (49 per cent) of those surveyed who said that they would report a crime said they would do so to the police, indicating that, despite the apparent gaps in coverage,

Figure 29 Reporting of crimes and violence

Question: Would you inform anyone or report anywhere if you saw or experienced any crime or violence? [If 'Yes'] Which of the following institutions or groups would you inform in the first place?

Would you report a crime or violence?



Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

If yes, to whom?



Base: Household survey respondents who answered 'Yes' to previous question

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

the police force remains the security provider on which the greatest proportion of people rely. Nevertheless, the fact that 28 per cent would first report crimes and violence to traditional leaders or clan elders and 16 per cent to vigilantes reinforces the conclusion that, at least in some areas of Nigeria, effective state-mandated security and law enforcement services fail to reach a relatively large number of citizens. These findings align with the rates of reporting of violent incidents by victims (see Section 5.3).

6.3 Satisfaction with police and crime control

Assessments of the levels of public satisfaction with policing and crime control showed that two-thirds (63 per cent) of household survey respondents viewed physical access to the police, or the ability to call for their assistance easily, as satisfactory: just over half (53 per cent) felt that the police would respond to calls 'very fast' or 'quite fast', and six in ten people regarded crime control in their area as 'very effective' or 'quite effective' (62 per cent). While these results show that a majority of people feel relatively satisfied with the quality of policing in their area, they also reveal that a significant minority of Nigerians are dissatisfied with the quality of police service available to them (Figure 30).

Local CSO respondents were also asked about the quality of policing. When asked about police response times, they were even more critical than the general population of the services that police offered: the majority (73 per cent) of CSO respondents found the response times of local police to be either 'quite slow' or 'very slow'. Yet, overall, CSO respondents were quite positive about the quality of policing. They felt that the police were doing relatively well at controlling crime: 65 per cent stated that they were doing a 'fairly good job' and an additional 6 per cent that they were doing a 'very good job' in preventing and controlling crime in their areas. Thus, 71 per cent of CSO respondents had a positive view of the police.

These high rates of approval of policing among CSO respondents were accompanied by a dominant perception that local crime control over the year preceding the survey had improved (49 per cent) rather than deteriorated (12 per cent). Broadly speaking, this positive sentiment was shared by household survey respondents. Nationwide, 52 per cent felt that the quality of policing had improved recently in their area, while only 9 per cent said it had deteriorated. One-third (33 per cent) felt that the quality of policing had not changed significantly (Table 25).

The positive sentiment regarding policing was not found in all parts of the country, however. The highest proportion of respondents who felt that policing and crime control had improved was in North East (a region affected by Boko Haram terrorism and claiming the second highest presence of formal security provision of all regions of Nigeria;

Figure 30 Quality of policing and crime control

Questions: 1. If you faced imminent risk, or had become the victim of a crime, how easy would it be for you to call the police/army to help? 2. How fast does the police/army react in this area when they're informed about an ongoing incident? 3. How effective are law enforcement or security services to control crime in this area?

1. Access to crime control



Legend

Very difficult	11%
Quite difficult	18%
Quite easy	33%
Very easy	30%
Do not know + refuse to answer	8%

2. Response time to distress calls

Legend

Very slow	15%
Quite slow	21%
Quite fast	29%
Very fast	24%
Do not know + refuse to answer	12%

3. Crime control performance



Legend

Very ineffective	10%
Quite ineffective	17%
Quite effective	37%
Very effective	25%
Do not know + refuse to answer	11%

Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

see Table 24). In this region 81 per cent of respondents thought—in 2016—that police performance had improved recently (Table 25). Conversely, the same impression was shared by only 40 per cent of respondents in South East and 42 per cent in South South. Significantly, both of these regions—but especially South East—scored relatively higher on household firearms possession and, according to the survey, would be among the least compliant with any future disarmament programme. The belief that law enforcement had improved was also the exception in South West, with 41 per cent of respondents holding this view. Yet even in places where lower percentages of respondents saw progress in policing and crime control, those who reported an improvement outnumbered those who reported a deterioration by a factor of about three to one.

Combining the percentage responses of those who felt that police were (relatively) accessible, that they responded to distress calls (relatively) quickly, and that they did a (relatively) good job in controlling crime and violence yields a composite figure measuring 'public perception of good quality policing' (Table 25). Among those respondents who viewed all three aspects of policing positively, satisfaction was highest in North East (68 per cent) and South West (52 per cent). In contrast, only 35 per cent of respondents in South East and 36 per cent in South South were consistently satisfied with the three key aspects of policing (accessibility, response time, and crime prevention/control).

While perceptions of the quality of policing differed across regions, there was less variance across socio-economic segments of the sample. Urban respondents, for example, were only slightly more positive than rural respondents nationwide (49 per cent, as opposed to 45 per cent). Possession of a firearm also made little difference to rates of

Table 25 Policing and crime control, by region

	Nigeria	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Improved*	52%	54%	81%	54%	40%	42%	41%
Stayed the same*	33%	35%	13%	28%	41%	34%	44%
Got worse*	9%	6%	3%	6%	10%	17%	10%
Do not know + refuse to answer	7%	4%	3%	12%	10%	7%	4%
Public perception of good quality policing	**47%**	**47%**	**68%**	**47%**	**35%**	**36%**	**52%**

Note: * In 2016 compared to 2015.

Base: Household survey respondents

Source: PRESCOM (2016)

satisfaction with policing: 43 per cent of those owning a firearm viewed policing favourably, compared to 50 per cent of those who did not own a firearm. A clear difference was found among those who lived in households that had experienced violence, however, where satisfaction with the perceived quality of policing stood at just 31 per cent, compared to 50 per cent in households that had not experienced violence.

“This study can be used to develop a National Action Plan that moves to address the arms- and security-related challenges it has identified.”

7. Conclusion

This study provides a comprehensive overview of arms- and security-related questions in Nigeria, offering new information on the availability of small arms, experiences of violence, and public attitudes towards formal and informal security provision. Its comprehensive geographical coverage and use of mixed methodologies have allowed the study to capture the experience and perceptions of a large sample of civilians, government officials, and state security providers.

The high degree of government–civil society cooperation that accompanied the study, specifically among PRESCOM, the Small Arms Survey, and the Nigeria-based institutions that carried out the survey, was instrumental to its success, and also lays the groundwork for practical follow-up. This report makes the survey information available to a wide range of actors and readers, including the public, media, CSOs, and relevant state actors, allowing it to 'stimulate debate among the public and between all key stakeholders regarding appropriate responses' (UN, 2018, p. 28).

In the first instance, this study can be used to develop a National Action Plan that moves to address the arms- and security-related challenges it has identified. It also establishes a baseline against which the success of such future initiatives in addressing the challenges can be assessed. The methodological challenges that arose during the conduct of the present survey would also need to be addressed in any future iteration of the research.

As indicated earlier, most survey respondents expect the state to accelerate its efforts to improve community security, and to do so in a tangible and visible way. A number of specific suggestions made in the course of FGDs and KIIs appear in Box 4. Although not always consonant with the main findings of this report, they complement the information and analysis the rest of the report provides—offering the Government of Nigeria additional food for thought as it considers how to harness the survey findings in tackling the country's diverse arms and security challenges.

Box 4 The view from the ground

The experts interviewed for the study and FGD participants offered a number of concrete suggestions for PRESCOM, the Nigerian federal and state governments, and LEAs. These have been grouped under a number of thematic headings below.

Strengthening knowledge

- Undertake periodic surveys on firearms-related issues, including violent acts and perceptions of violence.
- Make police and customs statistics on firearms-related crime and weapons seizures publicly available.
- Do more to gather intelligence on firearms from within communities, including by engaging more effectively with traditional leaders and former militants and criminals.
- Ensure that members of the public who provide LEAs with information on criminal or other firearms-related activity (that is, whistle-blowers) are protected, including by developing systems for anonymous reporting.
- Improve relations between LEAs and the public to facilitate and strengthen cooperation and the exchange of information.

Providing security

- Increase the presence, effectiveness, and reach of local security provision to counter people's perceived need for firearms for protection.
- Reduce the risk of violence by managing conflict and preventing disagreements from escalating at the local level.

Strengthening law enforcement

- Give relevant LEAs the legal authority to engage more effectively on small arms control and provide them with the resources needed to carry out this new mandate.
- Ensure that LEA officers enjoy adequate salaries and working conditions, and are given increased training and support for their firearms-related work (including appropriate technology and equipment).
- Ensure independent oversight of LEAs in order to ensure accountability and force discipline.
- Strengthen recruitment standards for LEAs (most notably, improved vetting and merit-based selection).
- Strengthen information sharing and operational cooperation among LEAs that work on firearms-related issues.
- Encourage cooperation between the public and LEAs (for example, through community policing and neighbourhood watch schemes).

Public education

- Develop, implement, and publicly disseminate a national policy on arms control.

- Raise the awareness of the public and CSOs, including faith-based organizations, of the importance of arms control, and encourage them to report illicit firearms-related activity.

Strengthening the legal framework and criminal justice system

- Reform/update relevant legislation governing firearms.
- Strengthen and enforce criminal sanctions for firearms-related crimes.
- Ensure judicial independence in prosecuting firearms-related crimes.

Border management

- Strengthen arms control efforts in border areas (by increasing the numbers of border staff and strengthening the inspection and control of trans-border trade, including through the use of modern technology).
- Strengthen border cooperation with LEAs in neighbouring countries.

Disarmament

- Develop and publicly disseminate a nationwide disarmament policy.
- Accompany any disarmament initiatives with public awareness-raising campaigns and incentives for the voluntary surrender of firearms, including amnesties.
- Destroy all seized weapons and involve the public in this process by implementing highly visible media campaigns.

Reforming the political system

- Ban politicians' use of private armed forces.
- Prosecute politicians and aspiring politicians who distribute weapons and promote violence, especially during elections.

Weapons marking and tracing

- Increase the marking, recording, and licensing of firearms so as to ensure that all weapons are included in a national database and can be traced back to their owners.
- Prevent the diversion of weapons from LEA stockpiles, including through comprehensive stockpile monitoring.
- When LEA personnel retire or leave the agency, collect weapons previously issued to them.
- Systematically trace illicit weapons in order to better understand their origins and transfer routes.

Regulating craft production

- Register and regulate traditional blacksmiths and other actors who produce artisanal weapons.

Unemployment and criminality

- Recognize and address the links between unemployment, poverty, and criminality, in particular through the promotion of alternative, non-criminal livelihoods for youth in both rural and urban areas.

Annexe: Survey methodology and sample characteristics

Overview

The Small Arms Survey was contracted to provide an analysis of a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS) in Nigeria that was commissioned by the Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM) and carried out by two other entities:

- The Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED) was responsible for quantitative data collection among the general population as part of a household survey.
- The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) was responsible for conducting the interviews with local civil society organization (CSO) and law enforcement agency (LEA) respondents, key informant interviews (KIIs), and focus group discussions (FGDs).

For the general population survey, a random respondent in each household was recruited for an interview using a deterministic selection scheme. Interviews were also conducted with local CSO and LEA respondents. Additionally, in-depth KIIs were conducted with knowledgeable experts. FGDs with civil society and law enforcement representatives, some of whom were experts, were used to validate and triangulate the estimates from the general population survey.

Sample sizes for the analysis:[28]

general population/household interviews	8,548
local LEA representative interviews	546
local CSO representative interviews	105
CSO expert KIIs	101
LEA expert KIIs	216
FGDs	73

The general population/household survey was carried out between 10 February and 14 April 2016. The questionnaire responses were collected on paper (written on the questionnaires), sent to PRESCOM in Abuja for verification, and then handed over for data entry to Maxpre Consulting. The qualitative data was collected during the same period.

Sampling and coverage

The CPED selected the sample for the general population survey, with a view to providing appropriate geographic coverage within the country's regions and a balance of urban

and rural residents.[29] The selection was stratified geographically: in each state, all the senatorial districts (three) were sampled. Then five local government areas (LGAs) were randomly sampled from all the senatorial districts. In each sampled LGA an urban and a rural community[30] were selected randomly as the primary sampling units for the survey. Any selected community within an LGA that was inaccessible due to insecurity at the time of the survey was immediately replaced by another randomly selected community. Relying on information provided by the National Population Commission, a list of enumeration areas within sampled communities was developed for each of the selected communities. Enumeration areas were then randomly selected from urban and rural communities (one enumeration area per selected community). A sample of two communities per LGA yielded a total of ten enumeration areas per state. While the sampling techniques adopted were deemed to be scientific and effective, some of the sampled enumeration areas in some rural settings had an insufficient number of households.

In each enumeration area enumerator teams used a random route method to make a random selection of 25 households. A deterministic sampling scheme based on the size and gender composition of the household served to designate an eligible survey respondent aged 18 or over.

Samples for the local CSO and LEA interviews were based on purposeful sampling techniques in all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The final number of interviews undertaken was fewer than projected for in the sample design, which aimed for interviews with 300 CSO and 900 LEA representatives.[31] Two FGDs were held in each of the 36 states surveyed and an additional FGD in FCT to complement the KIIs and local CSO and LEA interviews.

The NSALWS was designed to cover the sedentary population of Nigeria or those living in permanent dwellings in both urban and rural settings. The survey enumerators did not make any systematic effort to reach out to and include internally displaced persons living in designated quarters and camps, or nomadic populations (although one may assume that some members of this segment were reached through the rural segment of the sample).

The challenge of undertaking household surveys[32]

Research assistants (or enumerators) worked in pairs for the duration of the survey. One coordinator was designated for each state and was charged with ensuring the implementation of relevant research protocols by following up with the assistants via telephone calls, electronic messages, and on-site visits. Supervisors and coordinators were asked to submit reports on their observations and how they overcame any challenges that they faced.

Numerous challenges were encountered in the course of the survey process. These are discussed below.

Lack of access to communities:

- Some of the contact persons who were expected to facilitate community access were absent, making entry difficult and necessitating repeated visits.
- The security agencies and political heads in the LGAs and communities were not briefed or notified about the project in advance, making the work of the research teams more difficult in most states, zones, and regions.
- The survey process did not involve the provision of letters of introduction for traditional rulers. In several states, such as Katsina, traditional leaders did not allow researchers into their communities until they had obtained clarification and specific approval from higher authorities. As a result, the research assistants were forced to return to some communities a number of times in order to administer the questionnaires.

Security challenges:

- In some survey locations there were instances in which the security of research assistants, research materials, and the conduct of the survey were threatened, most often by youths and sometimes the police. In some situations tensions were reduced with the intervention of elders or older members of the locality who played a mediating role and helped to facilitate the survey.

Logistical challenges:

- Some targeted households were located far from others, particularly in South East region, thereby creating logistical challenges and delays in the administration of the survey. In some geopolitical regions the sampled local government and enumeration areas were quite large, making access and logistics difficult. For example, in Gombe state, North East Nigeria, although Garin Bauchi and Zaune are in Dukku LGA, the two villages were found to be 180 km apart and were not connected by roads that allowed vehicular movement.
- Other communities and enumeration areas were also difficult to access due to poor roads and rain. Widespread fuel scarcity increased operational costs and hindered movement. In some instances research assistants were forced to undertake long and hazardous journeys and sleep in makeshift accommodation and local hotels because they could not return to base.
- As discussed above, research assistants had to make repeated visits to some areas or households to administer the survey. In some cases appointments were not kept due to personal engagements or suspicions about the survey (see below), while household members were often absent in rural areas because it was farming season.

Language barrier:

- A language barrier in some villages meant that ad-hoc local interpreters had to be used and in some cases remunerated.[33]
- In some cases a lack of literacy skills posed a challenge to the survey's completion.

Suspicions about the survey's subject matter:

- Many potential respondents viewed the subject matter of the survey with suspicion, making them reluctant to participate. Some feared that the research was a disguised attempt by the intelligence services to gather information that might subsequently be used against them. In some communities young people were particularly suspicious of and sometimes even hostile to the survey. The survey team was unable to allay such fears in certain cases. For example, even with the intervention of the Mai Unguwa of Ukpashi community in Niger state, sampled household members declined to take part because they feared the research was part of a government-led intelligence-gathering exercise.

Limits to female participation:

- In some sampled households male members did not allow female members to be interviewed, while in others female respondents deferred to a man in the household during the interview because of a claimed lack of knowledge about weapons. This attitude was prevalent in many of the communities that the researchers visited.

False expectations:

- Some respondents expected to be paid for taking part in the research and were frustrated when no remuneration was forthcoming. Some of these people then sought to discourage other potential respondents from participating.

Strategies deployed to address the challenges included the following:

- In rural settings where there was an insufficient number of households, research assistants were instructed to complete the sample number of 25 households by going to the next neighbouring enumeration area.
- In some states settlements were grouped in clusters rather than lined along roads, and research assistants had to be creative when implementing the random route protocol (for example, deciding whether to turn right or left).
- In situations where the respondent selected according to the household matrix was unavailable, refused to participate in the survey, or was not allowed by others in the household to do so, enumerators organized return visits or chose a replacement household (using the random route strategy).
- In areas with difficult terrain research assistants had to hire motorbikes. The teams also had to equip themselves with umbrellas and use improvised booths to hold the interviews.

- In locating the enumeration areas the teams sought the assistance of local people, including political authorities and traditional leaders. In some cases, district heads helped the research assistants to locate the enumeration areas and assisted with interpretation when there was a language barrier.
- Research assistants frequently worked with local people to overcome problems of language or illiteracy.
- Research assistants, state supervisors, and zone coordinators kept in close touch with traditional leaders and security agencies as a security measure. This proved helpful in areas where the teams encountered local resistance and/or harassment.
- In order to mitigate certain security risks, the research team members worked in groups. Coordinators and supervisors tracked research assistants' movements by monitoring their expected arrival and departure times in specific communities and staying in regular telephonic contact with them.

Weighting

The Small Arms Survey used population data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to carry out post-stratification weighting of the dataset. The CSO and LEA samples were not weighted. For the rest of the sample a statistical procedure called 'intercellular weighting' or 'raking' was used to adjust sample marginals to known population characteristics with the following parameters:

- a three-dimensional matrix composed of state X, sex X, and age bands; and
- urbanization level.

Population targets were defined primarily using data from the 2006 census (NBS, n.d.). Projections were made based on a population figure of 187 million drawn from the UN *World Population Prospects* report (UNDESA, 2017). In the absence of an official classification of urban/rural areas in Nigeria or new data from the NBS, the Small Arms Survey used estimates from the World Bank for 2017 (World Bank, n.d.). In cases where values were missing in the dataset, the mode values were imputed for weighting of age and sex.

As indicated in note 15, only a subsample of survey respondents answered the survey segment related to firearms possession. As a result, the subsample was assigned new post-stratification weights to control for the same basic demographic parameters as in the main sample (age, sex, geographic region, urbanization level). Due to decreased sample size, instead of states, the six geopolitical regions were used to control the regional distribution of the subsample.

Respondent characteristics

This section provides a short description of the socio-demographic composition of the survey sample, using unweighted counts for each parameter. As mentioned above, the state, age, sex, and urbanization level parameters were corrected by a procedure known as intercellular weighting, or raking, to achieve more accurate final estimates and to remove the sampling bias that resulted from the attempt to sample all states with equal weight.

States

States were explicit strata in the sampling plan. The target was to conduct 250 interviews in each, with the exception of the FCT, where the aim was to collect 100 responses. Table 26 indicates that these targets were not fully reached in the vast majority of Nigeria's states, partly due to sample loss, but mostly because questionnaires could not be entered, or needed to be discarded due to incompleteness or substandard data quality. Sample loss was highest in Gombe state, where only 167 cases could be included in the analysed dataset.

Table 26 Sample sizes by state

State	N	State	N
Abuja FCT	**82**	Kano	214
Abia	247	Katsina	222
Adamawa	218	Kebbi	235
Akwa Ibom	238	Kogi	248
Anambra	238	Kwara	243
Bauchi	247	Lagos	249
Bayelsa	224	Nasarawa	237
Benue	233	Niger	239
Borno	250	Ogun	248
Cross River	238	Ondo	234
Delta	245	Osun	246
Ebonyi	248	Oyo	249
Edo	234	Plateau	223
Ekiti	249	Rivers	238
Enugu	244	Sokoto	229
Gombe	167	Taraba	239
Imo	244	Yobe	212
Jigawa	250	Zamfara	236
Kaduna	247	**Total**	**8,584**

Gender distribution

The gender distribution of survey respondents was somewhat skewed towards male respondents (53 per cent, versus 47 per cent female respondents), while in 134 cases this parameter was not recorded on the questionnaire at all. Weighting was used to re-establish an equal distribution (50 per cent/50 per cent) among males and females based on NBS data.

Household size

Many respondents lived in very large households. Only 206 respondents lived in a single-person household, while 29 per cent lived in families with ten or more members (including children) (Table 27).

Table 27 Household size

Number of persons in HH	N	Per cent	Number of 18+ persons in HH	N	Per cent
1	206	2.4	1	341	4.0
2	260	3.0	2	1,600	18.7
3	443	5.2	3	1,335	15.6
4	694	8.1	4	1,528	17.9
5	928	10.8	5	1,249	14.6
6	1,063	12.4	6	836	9.8
7	925	10.8	7	475	5.6
8	826	9.6	8	397	4.6
9	681	7.9	9	244	2.9
10+	2,526	29.5	10+	550	6.4

The average size of households was 7.98 (5 per cent trimmed mean; extreme cases removed), and the average number of persons eligible to respond to the survey (aged 18 or over) was 4.46 persons.

Age

Information on age was missing for nearly 15 per cent of the sample. Where age information was available the distribution was relatively even, with about half of respondents aged below 40 (49 per cent) (Table 28).

Table 28 Age distribution

Age of respondent	Frequency	Per cent
Below 21	292	3.4
22–29	1,121	13.1
30–39	2,198	25.6
40–59	2,821	32.9
60 or older	892	10.4
Missing	1,260	14.7

Table 29 Education level of respondents

Highest level of completed education	Frequency	Per cent
None	1,957	22.8
Primary	1,819	21.2
Secondary	2,554	29.8
Post-secondary	1,781	20.7
Other	396	4.6
Do not know/Refuse to answer	77	0.9

Education level

About half of respondents (49 per cent) had only a primary school education or less (Table 29). This included those who described their type of education as 'other', which most often meant a Quranic school. In contrast, about one-fifth of respondents (21 per cent) were educated beyond secondary school level.

Table 30 Economic activity of respondents

Occupation of respondent	Frequency	Per cent
Farming	2,518	29.3
Business	1,954	22.8
Public service	903	10.5
Student	593	6.9
Unemployment	331	3.9
Private sector	244	2.8
Military/paramilitary/police, etc.	40	0.5
Working around the home	286	3.3
Retiree	995	11.6
Artisan	450	5.2
Other (specify)	224	2.6
No response	46	0.5

Occupation/employment

Most people in the survey sample had some form of employment, with the largest groups being active in farming (29 per cent) or private business (23 per cent) (Table 30). Only 4 per cent said they were unemployed and just 3 per cent indicated that they did unpaid work around the home.

Case counts

Table 31 provides a summary of the weighted and unweighted number of cases for the various analytical segments used throughout the data analysis. The counts are smaller for the parts of the analysis that focused on a subpopulation.

Table 31 Case counts—weighted and unweighted

		Unweighted count	Weighted count
Region	North Central	1,505	1,193
	North East	1,333	1,076
	North West	1,633	1,981
	South East	1,221	1,062
	South South	1,417	1,459
	South West	1,475	1,813
Level of urbanization	Urban	3,997	4,112
	Rural	4,453	4,323
Sex of respondent	Female	292	609
	Male	1,121	2,329
Age of respondent	Below 21	2,198	1,615
	22–29	2,821	2,525
	30–39	892	795
	40–59	4,005	4,162
	60 or older	4,565	4,412
Completed education	No formal education	2,353	1,980
	Completed primary	1,819	1,707
	Completed secondary or higher	4,335	4,833

		Unweighted count	Weighted count
Main occupation	Agrarian profession	2,518	2,057
	Self-employed	2,404	2,530
	Employee	1,147	985
	Armed profession	40	35
	Economically inactive	2,429	2,946
Firearm possession	Firearm in household	412	319
	No firearm in household	2,282	2,290
Victimization	Victim of violence in household	1,107	1,073
	Not a victim	7,239	7,288
Household composition	Female-only household	661	751
	At least one man in household	7,881	7,791

Endnotes

1 In this report, the term 'regions' refers to the country's six geopolitical zones.
2 The areas of action identified during a 2014 consultative meeting and in a PRESCOM priorities document recognize the need for a National Action Plan and long-term intervention strategy on firearms, based on the findings of a comprehensive national survey (PRESCOM, 2014a; 2014b).
3 See Onuoha (2011, p. 50); Ikelegbe (2014, pp. 95, 119); Malam (2014, p. 262); and Egwu (2015, pp. 45–47).
4 See Abdu (2013); Ayuba and Okafor (2015); Best and Von Kemedi (2005); Hazen and Horner (2007); Jackson (2007); Seiyefa (2017).
5 For example, the Small Arms Survey recorded 27,238 violent deaths in Nigeria in 2017, of which 4,850 were conflict deaths, 18,686 were intentional homicides, and the rest were unintentional homicides and killings during legal interventions (Small Arms Survey, n.d.).
6 Boko Haram, which means 'Western education is a sin', is an extremist group known for its acts of terrorist violence, especially in northern regions of Nigeria (Onuoha, 2011, p. 56).
7 See Onuoha (2011, p. 54); Nowak and Gsell (2018, p. 8); Kwaja and Hussaini (2015, paras. (d), (e)); Amnesty International (2017).
8 See OSAC (2016, p. 1); PSI (2012, slides 7–21); Mc Evoy and Hideg (2017, p. 67); Nwankwo and Okolie-Osemene (2016).
9 In the household survey, the general population was not asked to provide an opinion on 'most important problems'.
10 The wording for lawlessness used in the survey was 'laws are not effectively enforced by law enforcement agencies'.
11 Local LEA respondents were not asked all of the same questions that featured in the household survey, and as a result some comparisons are limited. The statements in this section refer only to those aspects where direct comparisons were available.
12 See, for example, UNDP and Small Arms Survey (2017); Carlson, Hideg, and Odawa (2017).
13 While the question was about 'weapons', the survey results suggest that most respondents actually meant firearms when they were speaking about weapons in general.
14 'Automatic weapons' also includes some kinds of semi-automatic assault rifles.
15 Due to an erroneous routing instruction in the questionnaire, data on the segment related to firearm possession originates from a subsample of the survey respondents (2,874, or 33 per cent of the original sample). In an attempt to improve the representativeness of the results,

the Small Arms Survey assigned separate post-stratification weights to the subsample that was presented with the battery of questions related to firearm possession. Despite these measures, the much-reduced pool of respondent data for this section presents a risk of bias for the results that cannot be corrected.

16 Note that the questionnaire asked about 'possession' and not about 'ownership' of firearms, as the latter may be unclear in settings where civilians or militias are armed by local authorities as a means of self-defence, or borrow or rent weapons from others—a fairly common phenomenon in many countries in the wider region.

17 See Nowak and Gsell (2018) for background on craft weapons.

18 Note that this response (or the inverse of it) is not considered a proxy indication of firearm possession, because the question encouraged respondents to imagine that they had a firearm, and were explicitly asked to reply accordingly.

19 Survey enumerators asked community leaders for their opinion of firearm control efforts: 'In general, how do you think the government has controlled or addressed the issues relating to small arms and light weapons over the past five years?'

20 In other words, 1,000 households suffered 215 incidents of violence over the one-year period directly preceding the survey, that is from February–April 2015 to February–April 2016.

21 Because the questionnaire asked only about the number of incidents at the household level, it was not possible to obtain an individual-level rate from the data. The reported number of attacks did provide data from which a rate for individuals' experience of violence could be calculated. To arrive at this figure, the average total number of attacks suffered by 1,000 Nigerian households within the one-year timespan prior to the interview was first calculated. The individual incidence rate of violence was then generated by dividing the number of experiences of violence at the household level by the number of household members.

22 Female-only households refers to households in which no adult male is living.

23 Respondents who had previously stated that they personally or someone else in their household had been a victim of violence were asked to describe the most recent incident that took place within the year prior to the survey. Interviewers coded relevant replies according to a number of categories that described the incident, such as the type of crime that occurred. The 'type[s] of violence' listed in Figure 19 cover crimes that were explicitly mentioned by respondents. The total sample size for this analysis is 1,107 persons.

24 It is not clear from the household survey data how some such incidents are not associated with deaths.

25 Technically this is to be considered a low estimate, because the questionnaire only asked about the most recent incidents. Some respondents indicated that they had suffered multiple attacks, which could have resulted in further injuries and deaths in the household.

26 This discounts cases that may have been taken care of by the wider family or social network as part of informal justice mechanisms.

27 This category combines those who either said that there were no such services or did not know if there were any.

28 See Box 1 for additional information.

29 The sample was designed to have a uniform size in each state (250 in each) in order to provide a basis for geographic comparison across the country. At the data-processing stage the data was weighted to restore the true proportions of the population across the states to ensure the national and regional representativeness of the results.

30 In Nigerian population statistics there is no official classification of 'urban' and 'rural' communities. The CPED developed an operational concept whereby 'urban' was defined as a community with over 5,000 inhabitants who have social amenities such as electricity, commercial activities such as markets and banks, and a reasonable level of involvement in the non-primary sector (such as public and private sector workers, business people/traders, and artisans). Based on this definition, the survey coordinators and research assistants used their practical knowledge, in addition to gaining clarification through interactions with state and local government authorities, to identify semi-urban and urban communities from within sampled communities.

31 The original sample design was based on a total of four CSO KIIs and semi-structured interviews per state plus in the FCT and a total of 24 LEA KIIs and semi-structured interviews per state plus in the FCT.

32 For further discussion, see CPED (2018).

33 In some states most of the questionnaires were administered in Hausa. Many survey respondents preferred this to English.

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