

Report

February 2019



THIRD MPOME REGIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT

Making Peace Operations More Effective

Edited by Claire Mc Evoy



MAKING PEACE
OPERATIONS
MORE EFFECTIVE



Small Arms Survey

Maison de la Paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E
1202 Geneva
Switzerland

t +41 22 908 5777

f +41 22 732 2738

e info@smallarmssurvey.org

About the Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policymakers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org

Canada



A publication of the Small Arms Survey's Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project, with support from the Governments of Canada, Uruguay, and the United States

THIRD MPOME REGIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT

Making Peace Operations More Effective

National Peace Operations Training Center of Uruguay (ENOPU)
Montevideo, Uruguay · 23–25 October 2018

Edited by Claire Mc Evoy

Canada



MAKING PEACE
OPERATIONS
MORE EFFECTIVE



A publication of the Small Arms Survey's Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project, with support from the Governments of Canada, Uruguay, and the United States

Credits

Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

© Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2018

First published in February 2019

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Coordinator, Small Arms Survey, at the address below.

Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E
1202 Geneva, Switzerland

Edited by Claire Mc Evoy
Production coordinated by Rebecca Bradshaw with Olivia Denonville
Fact-checked by Tim Jolin (timjolin@hotmail.com)
Copy-edited by Alex Potter (alex.potter@mweb.co.za)
Proofread by Stephanie Huitson (readstephanie@gmail.com)
Typeset in Meta by Frank Benno Junghanns (fbj@raumfisch.de)
Communications coordinated by Emilia Dungal

Printed by Gonnet in France
ISBN 978-2-940548-63-7

Cover photo: A Uruguayan battalion of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) on patrol in Ituri Province, DRC, 23 May 2016.
Source: MONUSCO/Force

About the MPOME project

The Small Arms Survey's Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project contributes to the reduction of violence and insecurity due to illicit arms proliferation in conflict zones. Towards that end, the project is working to build a collaborative agenda—with the United Nations, regional organizations, and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs)—to reduce the diversion of arms and ammunition from peace operations. The focus is to improve practices to manage both contingent-owned equipment and recovered materiel.

Phase 1 of the MPOME project (through March 2019) has worked to:

- produce cutting-edge, peer-reviewed research on arms management and losses in peace operations and establish the Survey's Peace Operations Data Set (PODS);
- support regional organizations to operationalize existing (but unimplemented) commitments on the management of arms and ammunition in peace operations;
- develop and implement a new policy for the African Union to manage recovered weapons in its authorized peace operations;
- consolidate understanding of existing TCC/PCC practices—in particular, good practices—and training needs through a series of regional workshops in partnership with regional organizations that field peace operations and regional training institutions whose mission is to enhance their effectiveness;
- develop training modules for strengthening TCC/PCC practices; and
- promote a gender perspective in arms control initiatives in peace operations to strengthen the effectiveness of those efforts.

Phase 2 of MPOME (from April 2019) will further strengthen the sustainability of Phase 1 activities and expand the scope of this work by:

- expanding PODS—including its methodology and web-based interactive map—to enhance the evidence-base for reform efforts, and to help assess the efficacy of improved practice;
- supporting existing partners and reaching out to new TCCs and PCCs as well as regional organizations authorizing peace operations;
- supporting reform and accountability initiatives in peace operations to enhance performance, with an emphasis on applying a gender lens and promoting the women, peace, and security agenda;
- delivering the training and capacity-building efforts promoting arms and ammunition management in peace operations developed in Phase 1 and evolving norms;
- enhancing peacekeepers' participation in illicit arms flows reduction efforts in conflict zones, in line with recent UN directives; and
- identifying practical measures to strengthen the collection and sharing of information and technical weapons intelligence and analysis in peace support operations.

The MPOME project is supported by the Governments of Australia, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay, as well as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States Commission, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

For more information, please visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/mpome or contact:

Emile LeBrun, MPOME Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey
emile.lebrun@smallarmssurvey.org

About the editor

Claire Mc Evoy is a projects editor with the Small Arms Survey, authoring and content editing Survey publications on conflict and violence.

About the partners

The National Support System for Peace Operations (SINOMAPA)

Historical overview

SINOMAPA was created on 21 December 1994 by Decree No. 560/994 to operate within the scope of the Uruguayan Ministry of National Defense. Its operating procedures were readjusted on 16 August 1995 in accordance with Decree No. 317/995. As stated in the National Defense Framework Law No. 18650 (promulgated on 19 February 2010), it is subordinate to the National Defense Joint Staff. The same law states that the participation of national contingents in peace missions constitutes a sovereign decision determined by the foreign policy of the state. SINOMAPA's current organization and mode of operations are detailed in Decree No. 103/017 of 17 April 2017.

Competencies

SINOMAPA's responsibilities are to coordinate with state and international organizations regarding the participation of contingents in peacekeeping operations; to plan such operations; to advise the executive branch in this regard; and to exercise supervisory authority over doctrine and training for personnel participating in approved missions.

SINOMAPA comprises the following: a General Directorate, General Staff, a National Support Board for Peace Operations, an administrative secretary, the National Peace Operations Training Center of Uruguay (ENOPU), and liaison officers to the United Nations (UN) and the coordination centres of the armed forces and national police.

Its main functional organ is the National Support Board for Peace Operations, which is made up of delegates from the ministries of foreign affairs, economy and finance,

the interior, and national defence, along with representatives of the National Health Directorate of the armed forces, the National Defense Joint Staff, the General Commands of the army, navy, and air force, and ENOPU. In special circumstances it incorporates delegates from other public bodies, as necessary. Among its functions are:

- the coordination of the efforts of all state agencies in support of peace operations and the determination of the feasibility of participating in such operations;
- the determination of available support (human, material, and financial resources) for peace operations, as well as the needs and limitations of each state agency with regard to its participation;
- the periodic evaluation of relevant agreements and accords with the UN or other international organizations;
- the evaluation of contingents' participation in peace operations;
- the planning of the country's participation in such operations;
- the preparation of financial and logistical plans;
- the preparation of instruction and training directives for participants;
- the planning of procedures to allow rapid deployment; and
- the evaluation of the viability of the country's participation in new peace missions with reference to Uruguay's national interests, the state's foreign policy, the military capabilities required, and any other relevant considerations.

The National Peace Operations Training Center of Uruguay (ENOPU)

Historical overview

In 1982 Uruguay decided to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers being deployed on the border between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai Peninsula, as part of the implementation of the Camp David Agreement. For this reason and in accordance with Decree No. 5/982 of the Ministry of National Defense, a Special Transport and Engineers Unit was formed, and for the purposes of the selection and preliminary instruction of participating contingents, a Special Transport and Engineers Training Group was created. This constituted the first army instruction centre dedicated to peace operations. Uruguayan battalions were initially deployed in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Angola. Since 1992 Uruguay has intensified its participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

By December 1994, in accordance with Decree No. 560/994, SINOMAPA was created. In 1995, and as part of the implementation of the decree, the Army Center for Instruction for Peace Operations was formed; its organization and mode of operation were published in *Ministry of Defense Bulletin* No. 9527.

On 22 December 1998 Decree No. 377/98 was issued creating the Uruguayan Army School of Peace Operations (EOPE), which was named after Major Juan Sosa Machado to honour the first officer to sacrifice his life while taking part in a peace operation. This new school was integrated into the Military Institute of Branches and Specialties. The EOPE prepared personnel deploying in Sinai, and almost immediately afterwards redoubled its efforts by assuming training responsibilities for contingents deploying to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999) and Haiti (2004).

In August 2008 the EOPE became ENOPU, initially falling under the Army Peace Operations Command, and later under SINOMAPA.

Mission

ENOPU's mission is to train personnel designated for deployment abroad in peace missions as members of UN or other forces; and provide guidance on measures to improve the system of selection, instruction, and evaluation of peacekeeping personnel, in accordance with the needs of the various operations.

Modalities of instruction and other roles and activities

ENOPU organizes and carries out its activities in accordance with regulations issued by the Integrated Training Service of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its counterpart from the Multinational Force and Observers, a peacekeeping operation deployed along the Israel–Egypt border since 1982.

All of its training courses require the attendance of participants, and the activities include theoretical and practical sessions, as well as practical exercises and evaluations in the field. ENOPU also provides ‘train-the-trainer’ instruction for personnel who train their subordinates in their respective fields.

A large number of international students participate in ENOPU activities. Its national instructors are also invited to take part in multiple international courses in various parts of the world.

Since 2008 ENOPU has been a founding member of the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centers, and also participates in the activities of the International Association of Peace Operations Training Centers.

The Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

Small Arms Survey

Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E
1202 Geneva, Switzerland

t +41 22 908 5777

f +41 22 732 2738

e sas@smallarmssurvey.org

w www.smallarmssurvey.org

Foreword

We are pleased to present this Workshop Report, which includes both the rich formal presentations of numerous subject matter experts and summaries of the spirited discussions these presentations elicited. The participants were mostly from Latin America, but the expertise that was shared was based on the experiences of and lessons learned from peace support operations across the globe. We are confident that policy-makers and practitioners who read these proceedings will take away many facts and observations that will be relevant to their work and help them to address the challenges and opportunities facing today's peacekeepers.

From the Survey's perspective, it was a pleasure to work with the National Peace Operations Training Center of Uruguay (ENOPU). Uruguay was the first country to formally partner with the Survey as part of its Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project. The expansive, introductory three-day meeting we had in Montevideo in December 2017 was both refreshing and productive. It set the tone for planning a more ambitious workshop than initially envisaged. The Survey feels privileged to have been afforded the opportunity to learn from the experts at ENOPU and from Uruguayan peacekeepers more broadly. We appreciate the introductions you made linking us to other peacekeeping training centres in Latin America and we look forward to developing our partnership.

Historically, ENOPU did not have a great deal of experience of engaging civil society organizations such as the Small Arms Survey. The present undertaking opened our eyes to opportunities for collaboration that we did not know were possible. We welcomed the chance to have members of the Survey team join us in Montevideo to share international good practices such as the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, and we are pleased to contribute to the development of the Survey's course on weapons and ammunition management in peace support operations and its methodology for estimating losses resulting from attacks on peacekeepers. We have agreed to send one

of our officials to the Survey's offices in the Maison de la Paix in Geneva to promote our work on women, peace, and security, and look forward to hosting the Survey at our offices here in Montevideo when we assume the chair of the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centers in 2020.

Finally, we would both like to acknowledge the contributions of Cols. (rtd.) Roberto Gil and Gonzalo Mila, as well as Emile LeBrun and Dr Sigrid Lipott for their help in organizing and running the workshop, and Claire Mc Evoy for coordinating and editing the report. The financial support that the Governments of Canada and the United States provided is most appreciated.



Eric G. Berman

Director, Small Arms Survey
Geneva, Switzerland
January 2019



Col. Pablo Caubarrere

Director, ENOPU
Montevideo, Uruguay
January 2019

Contents

List of abbreviations and acronyms	14
Final workshop agenda	18
Opening statements	21
Maj. Gen. Marcelo M. Montaner, Director, SINOMAPA	22
Eric G. Berman, Director, Small Arms Survey	23
Amb. Joanne Frappier, Embassy of Canada to Uruguay	25
Session summaries	27
Session 1: Research update	28
Session 2: Administrative controls of arms, ammunition, and depots in peace support operations	31
Session 3: Weapons and ammunition management and contingent-owned equipment	33
Session 4: Weapons and ammunition management and recovered weapons (in and out of DDR)	35
Session 5: Weapons and ammunition management and force protection mandates	37
Session 6: Weapons and ammunition management and the disarmament process in the UN Mission in Colombia	40
Session 7: Update from the UN working groups on weapons and ammunition management in peace operations	42

Session 8: Developing weapons and ammunition training modules for pre-deployment	44
Session 9: Gender dimensions of weapons and ammunition management	46
Session 10: Estimating losses of arms and ammunition in peace support operations	48
Session 11: Review of workshop contributions	50
Concluding remarks	53
Subject matter expert background papers	57
Arms and ammunition losses from peace support operations: global research findings and prevention strategies, by Emile LeBrun	58
Control of armament, ammunition, and stockpiles in peace support operations, by Col. Diego Iribarne	66
Contingent-owned equipment and weapons and ammunition management: the Uruguayan experience, by Col. Pablo Caubarrere	73
WAM in peacekeeping operations: URUBAT's DRRR experience in the DRC, 2014–15, by Col. (rtd.) Rivera Elgue and Col. (rtd.) Roberto Pereira	81
Weapons and ammunition management and force protection: some reflections on converging agendas, by Lt. Gen. (rtd.) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz	87
Laying down of arms in the UN Mission in Colombia, by Col. Juan Acuña and Col. Gustavo García	95
Building partner-nation training capacity for weapons and ammunition management: the applicability of US Global Peace Operations Initiative training models, by Paul R. Yorio	103
Gender perspectives in the control and management of unregulated weapons and ammunition in UN peace support operations, by Cpt. Dr Carina de los Santos Gilomén	111
Participants	119
List of participants	120
Official workshop photo	122

List of abbreviations and acronyms

ALCOPAZ	Asociación Latinoamericana de Centros de Entrenamiento para Operaciones de Paz/ Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centers
APC	Armoured personnel carrier
ATO	Ammunition technical officer
AU	African Union
CMMRB	Contingent-owned equipment/memorandum of understanding management review board
COE	Contingent-owned equipment
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion/reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement
DoD	Department of Defense (United States)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENOPU	Escuela Nacional de Operaciones de Paz del Uruguay/National Peace Operations Training Center of Uruguay
EU	European Union
FARC-EP	Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo/ Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army
FDLR	Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda/Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
IATA	International Air Transport Association
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
MARMIN	Misión de Asistencia a la Remoción de Minas/Mission for Mine Clearance Assistance

MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MIDERMIN	Misión de Remoción de Campos Minados en Nicaragua/Mission of Removal of Mined Fields in Nicaragua
MINUCI	Mission des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire/United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINUGUA	Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala/United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCAT	Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad/United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	Mission des Nations unies pour l'organisation d'un référendum au Sahara occidental/United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique/United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali/United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti/United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MONUA	Mission d'observation des Nations unies en Angola/United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo/United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo/United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
MPOME	Making Peace Operations More Effective
MTT	Mobile training team
MVM	Monitoring and Verification Mission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NIO	National investigation officer
OMA	Office of Military Affairs
ONUB	Opération des Nations unies au Burundi/United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUCI	Opération des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire/ United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

ONUMOZ	Opération des Nations unies au Mozambique/United Nations Operations in Mozambique
PCC	Police-contributing country
PoC	Protection of civilians
PODS	Peace Operations Data Set
PSO	Peace support operation
PSSM	Physical security and stockpile management
PTN	Puntos Transitorios de Normalización/Transitional local point (Colombia)
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade
SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse
SINOMAPA	Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a las Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz/ National Support System for Peace Operations
SOP	Standard operating procedure
T3	Train-the-trainer
TCC	Troop-contributing country
TOP	Technical operating procedure
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
UNDFS	United Nations Department of Field Support
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs (now UNDP/PA)
UNDP/PA	United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (former UNDP/PA)
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (now UNDP/PO)
UNDP/PO	United Nations Department of Peace Operations (former UNDP/PO)
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission
UNIPEP	Unidad Policial para la Edificación de la Paz/Police Unit for the Construction of Peace (Colombia)
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMC	United Nations Mission in Colombia
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNSRSG	United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNVMC	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
URUBAT	Uruguayan battalion
US	United States
WAM	Weapons and ammunition management
WPS	Women, peace, and security
ZVTN	Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización/Transitional local zone for normalization (Colombia)

Final workshop agenda

Third MPOME Regional Workshop

National Peace Operations Training Center of Uruguay (ENOPU)
Montevideo, Uruguay, 23–25 October 2018

Monday 22 October

19:00–22:00 **'Icebreaker' and dinner**

Tuesday 23 October

08:00–08:30 **Registration**

08:30–09:30 **Welcome and overview**

Maj. Gen. Marcelo M. Montaner, Director, SINOMAPA
Eric G. Berman, Director, Small Arms Survey
Amb. Joanne Frappier, Embassy of Canada to Uruguay

Group photo

09:30–10:30 **Session 1: Research update**

Moderator: Eric G. Berman
Presenters: Emile LeBrun, MPOME Project Coordinator
Maj. Gen. Marcelo M. Montaner

10:30–10:45 **Coffee break**

- 10:45–12:00 **Session 2: Administrative control of arms, ammunition, and depots in peace support operations**
Moderator: Emile LeBrun
Presenter: Col. Diego Iribarne, Deputy Director, SINOMAPA
- 12:00–13:00 **Lunch**
- 13:00–14:00 **Session 3: Weapons and ammunition management and contingent-owned equipment**
Moderator: Col. (rtd.) Gonzalo Mila, Advisor, SINOMAPA
Presenter: Col. Pablo Caubarrere
- 14:00–14:15 **Coffee break**
- 14:15–15:30 **Session 4: Weapons and ammunition management and recovered weapons (in and out of DDR)**
Moderator: Col. (rtd.) Roberto Gil, Advisor, SINOMAPA
Presenters: Col. (rtd.) Roberto Pereira and Col. (rtd.) Rivera Elgue, Advisor of the Army Commander
Interactive session on DDR and weapons collected outside the process
- 15:30–16:00 **Day 1 wrap-up**
Presenter: Emile LeBrun

Wednesday 24 October

- 08:00–09:30 **Session 5: Weapons and ammunition management and force protection mandates**
Moderator: Col. (rtd.) Gonzalo Mila
Presenter: Lt. Gen. (rtd.) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz
- 09:30–10:30 **Session 6: Weapons and ammunition management and the disarmament process in the UN Mission in Colombia**
Moderator: Col. Diego Iribarne
Presenters: Col. Gustavo García and Col. Juan Acuña, UNVMC
- 10:30–10:45 **Coffee break**

- 10:45–12:00 **Session 7: Update from the UN working groups on weapons and ammunition management in peace operations**
Moderator: Emile LeBrun
Presenter: Wing Com. Samatha Gomani, UNDPKO-OMA
- 12:00–13:00 **Lunch**
- 13:00–14:00 **Session 8: Developing weapons and ammunition management training modules for pre-deployment**
Moderator: Col. Pablo Caubarrere
Presenter: Paul R. Yorio, Programme Manager, GPOI, US Southern Command
- 14:00–15:00 **Session 9: Gender dimensions of weapons and ammunition management**
Moderator: Dr Sigrid Lipott, Associate Researcher, Small Arms Survey
Presenter: Capt. Dr Carina de los Santos Gilomén, Advisor, SINOMAPA
- 15:00–15:15 **Coffee break**
- 15:15–16:00 **Day 2 wrap-up**
Presenter: Col. Diego Iribarne

Thursday 25 October

- 08:00–09:30 **Session 10: Estimating losses of arms and ammunition in peace support operations**
Moderators: Col. (rtd.) Roberto Gil and Col. (rtd.) Gonzalo Mila
Presenter: Eric G. Berman
Breakout sessions and feedback
- 09:30–09:45 **Coffee break**
- 9:45–10:30 **Session 11: Review of workshop contributions**
Presenters: Emile LeBrun and Col. Diego Iribarne
- 10:30–11:00 **Closing ceremony and remarks**
Minister Jorge Menéndez, Uruguayan Minister of Defense

Opening statements

Maj. Gen. Marcelo M. Montaner

Director, SINOMAPA

I am very pleased to welcome you on behalf of the National Support System for Peace Operations (SINOMAPA) and the whole team at the National Peace Operations Training Center of Uruguay (ENOPU).

It is a great honour for our institution to receive you and to share experiences and work together on the issue of the management and control of small arms and ammunition, addressing such a significant agenda on which we can exchange points of view and promote the sharing of information among participants.

Knowledge must be present to face threats successfully. This is why your efforts are very important, because capacity building and training are vital for every peace operator deployed in difficult missions in support of peace processes.

We deeply appreciate your presence and support.

Eric G. Berman

Director, Small Arms Survey

I am very pleased to be here in Montevideo with you for this third workshop of the Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project. At the outset I wish to acknowledge the excellent assistance we have received from Uruguay's National System to Support Peacekeeping Operations (SINOMAPA) and the National Peace Operations Training Center of Uruguay (ENOPU) to convene this important meeting.

I am personally familiar with Uruguay's peacekeeping experience, because 25 years ago I served with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia's peacekeeping mission and visited the Uruguayan battalion (URUBAT) in Ratanakiri. URUBAT had a well-earned reputation for excellence.

The Small Arms Survey is fortunate that the Government of Uruguay decided to support the MPOME project as a partner and to share its experiences and expertise with us. Maj. Gen. Montaner and Col. Caubarrere, thank you and your colleagues—especially Cols. Iribarne, Gil, and Mila—for the long-standing support you have provided to the Survey that has brought us to this day, and which I know will continue in the future.

My appreciation also goes to Canada and the United States for their generous funding for this workshop, and more generally for their support to the MPOME project. The US Department of State was associated with our initial study—*Under Attack and Above Scrutiny?*—on arms and ammunition losses during peace operations in South Sudan and Sudan, and then funded our expanded study—*Making a Tough Job More Difficult*—that showed that weapons and ammunition management concerns in peace operations were not limited to the situation in Darfur. We are pleased that we can now explore how we can put the knowledge gained from these studies toward training initiatives with the assistance of the US Global Peace Operations Initiative.

Ambassador Frappier, while more than a dozen countries and regional organizations are partners with the MPOME project, this initiative would not have been possible without the very generous funding and ambitious vision that your colleagues at Global Affairs Canada have provided. We have achieved a great deal over the past 22 months, and the Survey looks forward to fulfilling our existing commitments and exploring new ones with you.

Let me also use this occasion to express my gratitude to the subject matter experts and participants of this workshop. You have given us your valuable time, and travelled from across the country, continent, and hemisphere to be here.

MPOME regional workshops are designed to bring together both practitioners in peace support operations and officials from regional bodies authorizing or planning

such operations. The workshop participants represent a tremendous resource, and this week, here at SINOMAPA–ENOPU, we have an excellent opportunity to address important issues and make important progress.

The discussion of weapons and ammunition management—including less-than-best-practice—is not a ‘naming and shaming exercise’. Only by talking about current challenges can we identify shortcomings, propose solutions, and then act on them.

To conclude, the Survey looks forward to building on its engagement with Uruguay and the Government of Canada. The directors of SINOMAPA and ENOPU can count on our continued support. We also hope to work with the experts here with us—as well as with your colleagues back home and those deployed in peace support operations—for many years to come. Together we can improve on present practice, thereby helping to make peace support operations more effective.

Amb. Joanne Frappier

Embassy of Canada to Uruguay

Good day to everyone. Distinguished colleagues, ladies, gentlemen, it is a real pleasure for me to be here today, since I'm discovering another way in which Canada and Uruguay can work together.

Canada's Peace Operations Strategy aims to provide critical support to UN peacekeeping operations, thereby actively supporting actions for peace and promoting the reform of UN peacekeeping operations.

Canada is proud of making a clear commitment to this and of renewing its engagement with multilateral peace operations, with the ultimate aim of building a more peaceful and prosperous world.

This renewed engagement has taken on multiple forms, not least the hosting of the 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial, in which Canada announced the following contributions to UN peacekeeping missions:

- the launch of the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and Preventing the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers;
- the launch of the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations;
- Smart Pledges regarding high-value military capabilities, which include an Aviation Task Force, tactical airlift support, and a Quick Reaction Force; and
- support to innovative training initiatives.

Canada also confirmed its intention to deploy Canadian police forces to new UN missions.

The new Canadian approach to peacekeeping missions invites us to do things differently. Canada hopes to contribute to a transformation of peacekeeping missions, and the prevention of the diversion of firearms and ammunition within such missions.

This is an important issue. Particular causes for concern are the ease with which portable guns and small arms proliferate from one conflict to another and the way in which they are increasingly falling into the hands of violent non-governmental actors who are also involved in firearms trafficking in border areas.

This frustrates peace efforts and development, contributes to gender-based violence, and exacerbates the structural inequalities that affect women and adolescents.

Canada has recently contributed to a series of projects related to small arms. We have provided funding through the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation and the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

We have also supported the Small Arms Survey's Security Assessment in North Africa project, which tracks illicit firearm movement activities in North Africa.

In November 2017 Canada launched its National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security. The plan reflects Canada's feminist foreign policy with regard to international aid and its support for the UN Security Council's Women, Peace, and Security programme.

I'm especially happy about the fact that Canada and Uruguay will co-chair the Women, Peace, and Security Focal Points Network in 2020. It seems to me that countries like ours, with values such as peace, democracy, and equality, can make our world a better and safer place to live in.

The Canadian Action Plan is a commitment to promoting a change in perspectives about gender and matters of non-proliferation within the UN. As such, I'm also happy to see that there is a session on gender and the management of arms and ammunition. Thanks to the Small Arms Survey for addressing such an important issue.

I hope that you have fruitful conversations in the next two days and that our world is a safer place for all of us because of it. ●

Session summaries

The sessions were conducted under the Chatham House Rule to encourage a frank exchange of views. Therefore the names of speakers from outside the Small Arms Survey have been removed from the discussion summaries.

Please refer to the subject matter expert background papers for more information about the topic under discussion.

Session 1: Research update

Emile LeBrun opened the first session by posing two research questions that have underpinned the MPOME project:

- What is the scale and scope of diversion within peace support operations (PSOs)?
- Are losses just part of the cost of doing business?

He noted that MPOME publications such as *Under Attack and Above Scrutiny? Arms and Ammunition Diversion from Peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002–14* (2015) have shown that losses are neither infrequent nor negligible. Indeed, the losses recorded in the study significantly underestimate the true scale and scope of the problem, in part due to imperfect reporting and record keeping. Political sensitivities among troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) continue to make losses a difficult topic to discuss, while also affecting the non-reporting of incidents.

Mr LeBrun reminded workshop participants that while the MPOME project focuses on contingent-owned equipment (COE) that may be lost as a result of attacks or due to contingents' poor performance, a second pool of weapons should also be considered—those that peacekeepers capture and seize. Their quantities can be very significant and the management of such weapons is a 'grey area'. Meanwhile, there is no standard practice to prescribe how COE should be managed. Even within a particular mission, different contingents may follow different practices.

He explained that while the MPOME project has documented losses from at least 20 PSOs, it does more than just analyse data: it also focuses on other key areas:

- **Development of best practice.** The Small Arms Survey has collaborated extensively with the African Union (AU) to develop policies to prevent losses. Following the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in 2015, the AU requested technical assistance in March 2016 on weapons management in PSOs. The AU, with support from the Survey, held an inception meeting to develop policy guidance in October 2017. This was followed by an expert workshop in April 2018, and the resulting draft policy document was to be validated in November 2018.
- **Capacity building.** The MPOME project has assisted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to develop reporting templates for weapons recovered in PSOs, in line with Article 11 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2006), which is legally binding. It is also in the process of developing a partnership with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to assist it in developing a similar record-keeping template in line with Article 22 of the Kinshasa Convention (which is ECCAS's convention on small arms (2010)). This convention became operational in 2017 and is politically binding for its ten member states.

- **Training.** The project has developed a pre-deployment weapons and ammunition management (WAM) and counter-diversion course comprising seven modules. The Survey expects to have this course validated for piloting by March 2019.

Maj. Gen. Marcelo M. Montaner reminded participants that PSO contingents need to consider their obligations—including national legal responsibilities—*before* being deployed on a mission. He recognized that while every country has its own culture with regard to firearms management, international norms and practices must also be internalized. He said that specific legal obligations are relevant for Uruguay and Latin America more broadly, such as the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, which covers illicit arms trafficking, crime, weapons marking, and record-keeping. Uruguay also complies with the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the Arms Trade Treaty.

Discussion

Mr LeBrun informed participants that the MPOME project initially focused on UN operations because more information was available about them. He acknowledged that the Survey's current dataset is not representative, nor is yet able to be used to assess which missions (UN versus non-UN) are performing better.

The following salient points were made during the plenary discussion:

- Normative frameworks are important, but in some countries (such as Colombia) the problem is not the control of legal firearms, but rather *illegal* firearms, which are much more difficult to control.
- There is a necessary balance between saving weapons and saving lives in PSOs. It is also true that missions are primarily peace support operations, not arms control operations.
- It may be possible to recover lost or abandoned weapons and ammunition after conditions in an operational environment improve. This requires the ability to manage the unexpected, act creatively, and use materiel and human resources in an appropriate way.
- Understanding that the United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur was not always able to respond to attacks targeting it in Sudan, the UN decided to repatriate soldiers from three or four sections that were unwilling to take risks and were not performing as expected.
- The loss of arms and ammunition from contingents has often resulted from a lack of intelligence: while plenty of intelligence may be available on illicit weapons in

conflict areas, this information is not always communicated due to the absence of appropriate information channels.

Eric Berman rounded off the session by noting a general move towards a better understanding of the importance of intelligence gathering and information sharing within PSOs.

Session 2: Administrative controls of arms, ammunition, and depots in peace support operations

Col. Diego Iribarne opened the session with a presentation on administrative controls of weapons in PSOs. He reminded participants that the control of weapons in UN missions has been regulated by the organization's COE Manual since 1996. He explained, however, that the manual is oriented towards the regulation of reimbursements that the UN makes to TCCs, and that more specific procedures governing the management of arms and ammunition are needed to fill important guideline gaps. He added that the culture of a particular country's army is the essential factor defining how its troops manage their weapons and ammunition in PSOs, and that different countries apply different rules.

Col. Iribarne highlighted two related challenges:

- **Shortcomings of MoUs.** The MoU is a binding agreement between the UN and each contingent that stipulates the obligations of each party with regard to a mission's mandate, equipment, investigations of incidents in the field, and budget. Crew-served weapons are identified in MoUs as major equipment, whereas individual weapons are not mentioned specifically. MoUs also refer to the type of ammunition to be used (both training and operational), but not the *quantity*.
- **Lack of clarity regarding the storage of ammunition.** There is no mention in the UN COE Manual of how to provide storage facilities for ammunition at temporary operating bases when there is a lack of capacity—not to mention budget—and a lack of clarity regarding who is responsible for this.

He said that by the time Uruguayan peace support actors were operating in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) they had learned hard-earned lessons from other arenas and were able to take their strict national WAM culture and regulations on inspections and controls with them. As a direct result, few weapons were lost and the circumstances of any losses were investigated, with disciplinary measures (applying either military or civilian justice, depending on the case) being taken as appropriate.

Col. Iribarne emphasized that, in his experience, when ammunition expires or is in bad condition during an operation, it is because the relevant TCCs do not have appropriate 'expeditionary' logistics systems in place. He added that for the UN, ammunition is the responsibility of the TCC, which does not necessarily have to report on its status.

His recommendations to the UN were the following:

- **Acceptance of responsibility.** The UN should move away from placing all of the responsibility for the housing of ammunition on TCCs by including provisions in

annual budgets for the construction of or improvements to ammunition storage facilities.

- **Provision of guidance.** When the UN selects a peace support contingent from a country that has no legislation on arms control, it should provide relevant guidance in order to pre-empt the problems that will inevitably arise when a contingent deploys. This would require improvements to and the standardization of UN controls in all PSOs, including with reference to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).

Discussion

The ensuing discussion focused on the following questions:

- Are there sanctions for contingents that lose weapons and ammunition?
- How are recovered weapons managed in the absence of UN guidance on this issue?
- TCCs are responsible for managing arms and ammunition, but why does the UN not include a dedicated module on WAM in its pre-deployment training?

Col. Iribarne informed participants that the UN can and does impose sanctions: it has repatriated contingents that gave weapons away to avoid fighting and also for underperforming. Lessons have been learned from early missions and the UN is improving its standards and practice. It is providing guidance on ammunition management (based on the IATG); the COE Manual is being revised periodically; and the UN (and partners) has created 12 separate manuals for different types of units. When missions are explicitly mandated to recover weapons—such as those in Angola or Cambodia—standard operating procedures (SOPs) are put in place outlining the procedures for disposing of such weapons. When the mandate does not explicitly cover recovered weapons, however, managing them can become a problem.

He added that currently no specific modules on WAM form part of pre-deployment training, because the UN assumes that relevant standards are already in place. He said that a WAM training module could be included, but would not change behaviour significantly, because what is important is the national military organizational culture. Pre-deployment training will not change that culture, although it can improve practice somewhat.

Session 3: Weapons and ammunition management and contingent-owned equipment

Col. Pablo Caubarrere opened the session with a presentation on Uruguay's experience of WAM. He reminded participants that Uruguay was involved in PSOs in the 1930s, even before the UN existed. Almost 50,000 military, police, and air force personnel from Uruguay have participated in PSOs, of whom 35 lost their lives. A total of 75 per cent of officers and 66 per cent of more junior staff have participated in at least one such mission.

In fulfilment of the relevant peacekeeping mandates, the UN requires TCCs to deploy their personnel, equipment, and logistical support on the ground. The MoU facilitates this, establishing the administrative, logistical, and financial terms and conditions governing the contribution of personnel, equipment, and services provided in support of a PSO. Col. Caubarrere explained that the function of the COE office is to review compliance with the MoU. It also reviews the application of relevant SOPs, oversees the optimal use of resources, reviews the results of operational readiness inspections, analyses any deficiencies, and suggests corrective actions.

In compliance with the MoU, both civilians and army personnel carry out COE inspections of weapons and ammunition. Internal inspections are ongoing and occur at various intervals during the mission, including pre-deployment, upon entry to a mission area, before repatriation, and on an ad hoc basis, as required by the head of mission or UN headquarters. Contingents are required to produce weekly and monthly reports on their inspections.

Col. Caubarrere observed that Uruguay has a great deal of experience with WAM, but that the cost of obtaining this experience has been high. In an incident in Haiti in December 2006, for example, Uruguayan soldiers were part of a multinational force. Relevant intelligence was not available and during an ambush Uruguayan armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were repeatedly fired on. The commander of a particular unit decided to protect his men. The unit's APC was abandoned and the weapons it carried were lost, although they were recovered in a subsequent operation.

He reminded participants that it is imperative that controls are in place for the management of weapons and ammunition. Applying these controls must be an ongoing activity, undertaken in compliance with updated COE requirements. The weather and soil conditions of an operational area also need to be considered, because PSO participants may not be familiar with them, and this can result in the deterioration of COE.

Discussion

Workshop participants discussed national controls in various Latin American countries and how these controls are implemented in practice. It emerged that WAM control

procedures are very similar in a number of countries and that contingents from these countries bring this experience to peacekeeping arenas.

Other salient points were the following:

- While internal inspections by mechanical or ammunition experts are key, external inspections are also important to guarantee transparency.
- In order to facilitate the transport of weapons, links between a mission and relevant customs offices are key. Centres such as SINOMAPA have facilitated such links.
- It is essential to check the *condition* of weapons during inspections to ensure safety, not just their number.
- In some TCCs (such as Mexico and Brazil) weapons are counted and checked daily.
- When arms are found to be missing during COE inspections, the relevant information should be reported within the UN system. Serious measures should be taken in such cases, including sanctions by the UN against relevant countries.
- The UN should focus on the inspection system already in place in particular contingents. What is important is finding out *when* arms go missing and *to whom* they are given or sold (if that is the case).
- While WAM controls in place at the national level differ from country to country, there are also many similarities on which to build best practice.

Session 4: Weapons and ammunition management and recovered weapons (in and out of DDR)

In this session **Col. Roberto Pereira** and **Col. Rivera Elgue** gave a two-part presentation on weapons management practice and challenges as part of disarmament programmes in the DRC, based on URUBAT's experience there in 2014–15.

Col. Elgue opened the session by remarking that relevant programmes were people-focused, flexible, well planned, nationally owned, and integrated into security sector reform efforts at the national level. He noted that peace support actors involved in disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) programmes for the voluntary disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups in the DRC tended to focus on the disarmament part of the programme.

Once these armed groups' weapons and ammunition were collected, it became the responsibility of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to store them until the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) destroyed them. A tailored weapons register form was filled out and storage areas were kept under lock and key. Various methods were employed to destroy weapons. Some weapons were burned, which has a strong symbolic value, while others were cut up to make them inoperable, which is slow but relatively simple. Grenades were detonated and ammunition burned.

Col. Elgue went on to describe a host of challenges encountered in the DRC:

- **The proliferation of armed groups.** These included the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); the Allied Democratic Forces militia; the Lord's Resistance Army; Mai-Mai groups; self-defence militias that would disappear and then reappear; and ex-M23.
- **Demand for weapons.** The demand for weapons was such that they could always be sold. There was, therefore, a lack motivation to surrender them to PSO forces.
- **Armed groups' use of discipline and fear.** Armed groups had strict rules and sanctions to avoid the surrender of people and weapons.
- **Porous borders.** Porous borders with neighbouring conflict-affected countries (such as the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan) made it impossible to stop flows of weapons and armed actors carrying weapons.
- **Diversion.** Weapons and ammunition were being diverted from the DRC army.

Col. Elgue discussed the importance of tracking arms and ammunition using serial numbers and other markings. He concluded by remarking that the only solution to the problem of illicit weapons flows was to stop these flows, and that the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups was the key to achieving this.

Col. Pereira led the second half of the presentation by describing URUBAT's roles in the DRC mission. These included:

- the protection of civilians;
- the neutralization of armed groups present in URUBAT's area of operations;
- monitoring the application of the arms embargo;
- providing support to national and international judicial processes; and
- providing support to DDRRR and disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion/reintegration (DDR) programmes.

Whereas MONUSCO was tasked with supporting DDRRR for foreign armed groups, it was not *directly* involved with DDR programmes, which focused on national armed groups. Support was provided in a number of ways, including via:

- disarmament processes and the storage of weapons and ammunition;
- the temporary disabling of weapons and ammunition in line with relevant SOPs;
- the transporting and escorting of personnel, weapons, and ammunition involved in DDRRR programmes;
- providing escorts to facilitate sensitization on DDR and the extraction or transfer of combatants; and
- providing technical and logistical support to the DDR field team.

He emphasized that intelligence was key to planning missions, including to understanding armed actors' locations, motivations, alliances, economic interests, and needs. In order to avoid losses of materiel, he underlined the need for operational readiness, continuous control of weapons and ammunition, effective weapons and ammunition destruction programmes, inventory controls, and regular inspections.

To conclude Day 1 of the workshop, participants took part in a group exercise on weapons recovered outside of DDR processes. They confirmed that even after technical guidelines had been followed, there are a number of 'grey areas' related to the management of such weapons that need to be decided on, such as:

- which storage facilities to use;
- which physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) system to adopt;
- which oversight system to use; and
- which method to use to destroy such weapons.

They stressed the need for the ongoing collection of relevant data.

Session 5: Weapons and ammunition management and force protection mandates

Lt. Gen. Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz led the session with a presentation on the management and control of weapons and ammunition in PSOs. In the context of a wider discussion of the need to ‘reform peacekeeping’ and make it more effective, Lt. Gen. dos Santos Cruz presented his views on areas where improvements are needed.

He opened the session by emphasizing the importance of understanding the *complexity* of the operational environments in which the UN deploys PSOs. A comprehensive approach to WAM is required that is grounded in realistic expectations of what results can be achieved. Part of this process involves adapting relevant mandates and MoUs to the reality on the ground.

Lt. Gen. dos Santos Cruz went on to address the need to reduce the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in areas of conflict. He noted that arms and ammunition in PSO arenas come from many different sources, including:

- military, police, and security personnel operating under the UN flag (formed units, staff officers, and security personnel);
- UN military and police who seize materiel during their regular duties;
- national security forces, which have an inventory of their own weapons and ammunition and seize additional materiel;
- DDR programmes that collect weapons and ammunition;
- rebel groups, street gangs, militias, criminals, and other actors; and
- neighbouring countries with interests in a conflict, which may facilitate and provide support for armed groups in a conflict zone.

He then outlined some key challenges in managing such weapons and ammunition:

- **Lack of the appropriate projection of force.** When appropriate force is not used or offensive action not taken, it can have a direct impact on the chances of a contingent being attacked, with the resulting loss of lives and arms.
- **Lack of acceptance of responsibility for losses.** Who is responsible when soldiers are sent on mission without adequate equipment and are ambushed—the commander or the relevant government? In some cases soldiers have not received salaries for months or even years, and cannot be expected to ‘act properly’.
- **Inadequate DDR programmes.** One of the most important challenges is finding funding for comprehensive DDR programmes and related follow-up. In the DRC,

USD 80 million were needed for this purpose, but funding was not made available: 'If there is no budget, it's not going to work.'

- **Lack of capacity to investigate.** When weapons are lost, investigations must be carried out, although some countries have no controls in place and little capacity to carry out such investigations. The selection of TCCs is, therefore, crucial.
- **Lack of accountability.** A better and more effective UN system is needed in which there is more accountability, and losses of arms and ammunition have legal consequences.
- **Porous borders in conflict areas.** In the DRC the most dangerous armed groups are all located in border areas where access to arms is easy. Neighbouring countries also facilitate the flow of weapons across borders.

Lt. Gen. dos Santos Cruz reminded participants that troops must be appropriately trained and properly equipped, and that both TCCs/PCCs and the UN must share responsibility in these areas. He recommended that the selection of TCCs/PCCs should be appropriate for a given context and that the UN should be co-responsible for contingents' training and performance.

He concluded by saying that independent entities were best placed to investigate losses in the field, because the UN system was too politicized. Independent entities are more credible and investigations are therefore more serious and comprehensive. He stressed the need for clear conclusions at the end of investigations and the use of solid, cross-national intelligence. He added that *political solutions* to the flows of weapons were needed, as well as accountability.

Discussion

During the plenary discussion a number of pertinent questions were asked, including:

- What is the legal framework supporting PSOs?
- How can we obtain a better understanding of the small arms situation in an operational area?
- Why do Latin American countries not send more troops to PSOs?

Lt. Gen. dos Santos Cruz responded that the legal framework comprises a mission's mandate, together with relevant legislation and decisions made on the ground by force commanders. Even without relevant SOPs in place, decisions have to be taken regarding the use of resources and investigation of incidents.

He noted that a focus on border areas was key in the DRC and that most armed groups in these areas operated as a sort of mafia—with a host of informers—that controlled the smuggling of various commodities, including weapons. He said that

solid intelligence and an understanding of the local context are more important than troop numbers, but must always be followed up with adequate reporting.

Finally, Lt. Gen. dos Santos Cruz noted that decisions to participate in PSOs are a consequence of political interests and are often taken to enhance a country's reputation.

Session 6: Weapons and ammunition management and the disarmament process in the UN Mission in Colombia

Col. Gustavo García and **Col. Juan Acuña** provided a detailed overview of the ‘laying down of arms’ process in Colombia in this session, including many technical aspects related to the challenges of recovering, transporting, storing, and destroying nearly 9,000 weapons and more than one million rounds of ammunition, among other arms, as part of a peace process between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP). Their presentation detailed the complexity and uniqueness of the operation, its fundamentally political nature, its short timeline, and its overall success.

The UN Mission in Colombia (UNMC) was established after the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 2261 on 25 January 2016, and the signing of a peace agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP that ended 53 years of internal armed conflict. The peace agreement established a tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) comprising the UNMC, the Government of Colombia, and the FARC-EP that was unique in the history of UN missions. It operated at multiple levels: at national headquarters, regional headquarters (eight), and local sites (26). An international component comprised 450 unarmed international observers.

The process resulted in the laying down of 8,994 weapons and the destruction of 1,765,862 rounds of ammunition, 38,255 kg of diverse explosives, 51,911 m of detonating cord and fuses, 11,015 grenades (both hand and 40 mm grenades), 3,528 anti-personnel mines, 46,288 initiators, and 4,370 mortar rounds. By August 2017 all of the armaments had been extracted and destroyed and in September 2017 the mission ended.

Participants were informed of the many challenges that the mission faced in facilitating the transfers of weapons from the FARC-EP in a multi-stage process involving registration, identification, monitoring and verification, collection, storage, extraction, and final disposal. These included the following:

- **Housing the former combatants.** Camps had to be built to house FARC-EP members surrendering their individual weapons with their ammunition. The ex-combatants’ move to the camps should have taken place without their bringing with them any unstable materiel, although some arrived with mines and explosives. The government also delayed in providing the UN sufficient support and there were delays in building the necessary infrastructure.
- **Geographical complexity.** Some containers had to be transported by river; weather conditions were problematic; and weapons caches had to be located in difficult terrain. FARC-EP members provided the locations of arms caches to the UN, but

without GPS coordinates and in areas where criminals and other former paramilitaries were operating.

- **Transporting the weapons.** Weapons and ammunition had to be packaged and transported in pieces by land and air to an arms depot in Bogotá for destruction. At the depot the arms were disabled using a cutting method, with support from a German company, Technisches Hilfswerk.
- **Time pressure.** The operation had to be concluded in accordance with a timeline laid down in the peace agreement. This timeline had to be subsequently extended.
- **Strategic communications.** The number of arms surrendered was smaller than what was expected, which led to bargaining about the numbers. There was also the challenge of communicating information on related activities to Colombian society, which was generally sceptical about the peace process. Little by little, what was initially secret information was made public and disseminated, not only via reports, but also by using images, to strengthen the credibility of the process.

Workshop participants were informed of the technical innovations that were part of the operation, involving the use of bar codes to identify and register individual weapons, smart phones with apps to scan and read the bar codes, and encrypted laptops and flash drives. The use of a digital database that was crucial to the recording of relevant data on the progress being made was problematic for FARC-EP members, who wanted to maintain secrecy.

A number of key lessons were learned from the process, including the following:

- The tripartite monitoring mechanism was a unique entity and could be replicated in other peace processes.
- Building trust among the parties was key, while disagreements between them influenced the pace of progress.
- Logistics presented a critical challenge. The completion of the disarmament process within 180 days, as required by the peace agreement, would have required logistical arrangements to be in place from the outset, which did not happen.
- During the implementation of the peace process there were differences between what was agreed and what actually took place. However, the broad UN Security Council mandate for the mission was fulfilled.
- The mandate was announced even before the peace agreement was finalized. This was a brave decision on the part of the Security Council.
- The willingness of the parties to fulfil the mandate was crucial. Ultimately, this was one of the most successful peace processes in the UN's history.

Session 7: Update from the UN working groups on weapons and ammunition management in peace operations

This session highlighted the UN's changing role in expanding guidance on WAM in PSOs by describing the efforts of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations-Office of Military Affairs (UNDPKO-OMA) to lead a multi-agency project to develop a WAM policy, to set standards for ammunition levels for TCCs based on various threat environments, and to develop SOPs for the prevention of losses of materiel.¹

Wing Com. Samatha Gomani opened the session by noting the extent to which PSOs have evolved over the years, being increasingly deployed in hostile and unstable environments and having to deal with attacks targeting UN personnel as they carry out their mandates. In response to these developments, UNDPKO-OMA is spearheading a number of efforts to improve and enhance the safety and security of peacekeepers' weapons and ammunition in the field.

Two inter-departmental working groups are currently focusing on three streams of work, with the principal objective of developing guidance on WAM for COE, UN-owned equipment, and weapons and ammunition seized during field missions. The working groups include personnel from UNDPKO (and OMA), the UN Department of Field Support (UNDFS), the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDP), the UN Department of Safety and Security, UNMAS, and subject matter experts.

Wing Com. Gomani indicated that an overarching draft WAM policy providing a conceptual and operational framework to ensure the effectiveness and coherence of UN WAM has been developed and is being shared with UN member states. The draft policy covers COE, weapons owned by the UN, and seized and captured weapons and ammunition. The policy is to be 'owned' by TCCs/PCCs, whose responsibility will begin in the pre-deployment phase and end after redeployment from a PSO. Two further key documents are being developed as part of the policy:

- a UN Manual on Ammunition Management; and
- SOPs on the loss of weapons and ammunition.

The manual is being developed in light of the principle that TCCs/PCCs are responsible for the safe storage of ammunition used in PSOs. The guidance being provided is in line with the IATG and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) safety guidance in order to standardize good practice in field missions. The manual will comprise five chapters.

The SOPs will set out measures for preventing and addressing the loss of weapons in UN PSOs and special political missions. They will usefully address both COE and recovered weapons, which have long inhabited a 'grey area' in both UN and other missions.

A further sub-project is an online registration tool that records losses, thereby increasing accountability among TCCs/PCCs. UN missions are already contributing data to this tool. Missions that have no losses to report are also required to communicate relevant information.

Wing Com. Gomani finished by underlining OMA's commitment to deploying the most appropriate and effective military capability in PSOs, improving the performance of PSO troops, and providing expertise to military components of PSOs.

Discussion

During the discussion the following additional points were raised:

- The draft SOPs have not yet been shared with field missions, but have been sent to the UN's DDR section.
- The data recorded in the registration tool is to be used to improve the picture of losses from UN field missions.
- A recommendation from the floor that the UN and TCCs/PCCs should share responsibility for ammunition and that this should not be the sole obligation of personnel-contributing countries needs to be discussed in the UN working groups.
- The developments discussed in the session are recognized as a possible 'game changer' insofar as they indicate a move towards setting standards for operations in this area and developing relevant pre-deployment training programmes.
- It is important that the UN member-state TCCs/PCCs that contribute the largest contingents to PSOs have the opportunity to review and provide inputs into the draft UN WAM policies and SOPs that they will be obligated to conform to. The review process is currently unclear: for example, Uruguay was unaware that this policy development process was under way.

Endnote

- 1 No corresponding subject matter expert background paper is available for this session.

Session 8: Developing weapons and ammunition training modules for pre-deployment

This session provided an analysis of Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) training methods and the challenges that should be considered in the development and diffusion of training programmes on WAM in peace operations.

Paul Yorio led the session with a presentation on the GPOI programme, which was launched in 2005 as the US contribution to the G8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations adopted in 2004. This is a US Department of State security assistance programme managed and executed by the US Department of Defense (DoD). It focuses primarily on developing military capacity, with only limited support for formed police units. In the western hemisphere the US Southern Command manages and executes the programme.

The GPOI has eight active partner nations, including Uruguay. The programme's objectives are the following (although not all of them apply to all partner countries):

- building self-sufficient PSO training capacity;
- supporting the development and employment of critical enabling capabilities;
- enhancing operational readiness and sustainment capabilities;
- strengthening rapid deployment capabilities;
- expanding the role of women and enhancing gender integration in PSOs; and
- building UN and regional organizations' capabilities.

All of these objectives either directly or indirectly support the Small Arms Survey's goal of reducing the diversion of weapons from PSOs and improving the ability of TTCs to manage and account for their weapons and ammunition.

Mr Yorio went on to describe the GPOI's three training models:

- **Traditional three-phase train-the-trainer (T3) mobile training team (MTT) model.** The oldest GPOI-funded training capacity-building initiative supports gender integration in contingents' MTTs for UN PSOs. The key to this model is that the partner should take full ownership of the MTT, including by providing funding, administrative, and logistical support. The final stage in the programme is the deployment of the MTT with limited or no mentorship.
- **Multi-phase T3 MTT model.** This more technical model focuses on using behaviour in a complex peacekeeping environment to identify potential threats to peacekeepers and local populations. The tactics, techniques, and procedures are more sophisticated and require a formal 'certification' by the developer, who then owns the relevant intellectual property. The advantage of the multi-phase model is that it works well for training programmes that have a formal certification process or requirement. The multiple phases make the initial time

and financial investment more costly for the donor or capacity-building provider nation, however. Ultimately the partner becomes fully responsible for sustaining the programme.

- **Hybrid model.** This focuses on the training of a national investigation officer (NIO) at the contingent level to analyse and document any allegations of illegal activities committed by contingent personnel, with a focus on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Mr Yorio went on to discuss the impediments to or challenges facing the building of training capacities for PSOs, including the following:

- obtaining buy-in at the right decision-making level;
- obtaining timely and proper exemptions or waivers for taxes, tariffs, and fees from the partner for donations in order to expand the resources available to build capacity;
- sustaining training capacities, which requires sustained political will at the national level;
- the high turnover and lack of continuity of training staff and support personnel at peace operations training centres; and
- inadequate human resources management tools for tracking personnel who have received training.

Mr Yorio concluded by suggesting that an innovative approach to the GPOI models could incorporate pre-deployment training on WAM in a two-track approach:

- **Track one** would focus on the role of armourers, ammunition technicians, and logisticians in the management of field armouries and field ammunition supply points in an expeditionary environment during a UN PSO mission.
- **Track two** would focus on the role of officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) leadership in the contingent in terms of their authority, accountability, and responsibility, as well as the enforcement of internal management control procedures and an operational risk assessment methodology that is pertinent to WAM.

He suggested that the two tracks could leverage Latin American TCC experience in PSO missions and the ability of the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centers (ALCOPAZ) to facilitate the interchange of both instructors and students. All of these efforts could be facilitated by the US Southern Command's GPOI programme.

Session 9: Gender dimensions of weapons and ammunition management

This session focused on opportunities for women in PSOs and the control of illicit arms in conflict areas more generally, with a view to the more effective implementation of mission mandates.

Capt. Dr Carina de los Santos Gilomén gave a presentation on the various aspects of the gender dimension of both WAM and PSOs. She began by referencing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security (WPS). This was the starting point for the introduction of policies and practices designed to incorporate a gender perspective in PSOs. The agenda encourages member states to increase the participation of women in all decision-making positions in national, regional, and international institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. It also calls for consideration of the special needs of women and girls and the role of women in armed conflict and post-conflict situations. Over the 18 years since Resolution 1325 was adopted, it has been enhanced with seven other related Security Council resolutions,¹ which together constitute the WPS Agenda.

Capt. Dr Gilomén went on to describe the role of gender mainstreaming in PSOs. She provided the example of participation by female personnel in missions. Currently just 4 per cent of deployed military personnel in UN missions are female, and 11 per cent of police personnel. Uruguay has performed somewhat better, with 6 per cent female military personnel. Overall, however, the participation of women in PSOs remains a major challenge. To counter this, UNDPKO is in the process of implementing a compulsory requirement for TCCs to deploy a minimum of 15 per cent female personnel in PSOs.

Incorporating a gender perspective into missions also means recognizing the different ways in which conflicts affect males and females. Differences include:

- women and girls constituting a majority of survivors of sexual violence and being particularly affected by displacement;
- girls and adolescents (male and female) being particularly vulnerable to forced recruitment; and
- women's and girls' special needs when reintegrating back into post-conflict settings, especially in unequal societies.

Gender mainstreaming also means recognizing how PSOs impact the lives of males and females differently.

Capt. Dr Gilomén explained how female peacekeepers can become role models for local women in mission areas, and that this can assist in countering weapons and ammunition proliferation. In particular they can liaise with communities, help raise

awareness of the presence of unregulated arms and ammunition in conflict areas, and play an important role in patrolling activities and carrying out searches in local communities. Local women are often more likely to speak with female rather than male peacekeepers. This gendered approach to information gathering can yield valuable information that can be used to better understand operational environments and even to develop early warning systems.

Ultimately, the incorporation of a gender perspective leads to enhanced situational awareness and operational effectiveness, both of which facilitate the fulfilment of a mission's mandate. This benefits both the military operation and the local population in peacekeeping arenas.

Discussion

Participants and the moderator, **Dr Sigrid Lipott**, provided a number of reflections:

- Female engagement teams have shown certain advantages, such as by having a de-escalating effect on local conflict dynamics. They are viewed as a kind of 'third gender' by communities and have been used in a variety of disparate activities, even though they are part of a TCC military unit. They receive training in cultural skills, but overall their functions are varied. Despite this, there has been limited formal assessment of their impact and effectiveness.
- In principle there are no restrictions on female peacekeepers' work within a mission, although cultural and religious considerations can act as limiting obstacles.
- It is crucial to understand gender relations in host communities in conflict-affected areas. Some local men may prefer to speak to female peacekeepers (as in Afghanistan), whereas other men may not (as in many communities in Africa).
- Incorporating a gender perspective into the staffing of PSOs is a matter not only of numbers, but also of *quality* in terms of appointing women to senior positions, reaching out to and communicating with local women, and recognizing that armed conflict affects women and girls in a wide variety of ways.
- Whatever policies on gender mainstreaming are laid down on paper, a mission's force commander plays a crucial role in setting the tone for fully implementing these policies.

Endnote

- 1 These are UN Security Council resolutions 1820 (2008); 1888 and 1889 (2009); 1960 (2010); 2106 and 2122 (2013); and 2242 (2015).

Session 10: Estimating losses of arms and ammunition in peace support operations

Eric Berman opened the session by remarking that there is a great desire within the UN and elsewhere to obtain a big-picture overview of the scale of weapons and ammunition losses from PSOs, including quantities and types of materiel. A second area of interest is how UN missions are faring in this regard compared to missions deployed by the AU, ECOWAS, the European Union (EU), NATO, or other actors. He noted that currently there are insufficient answers to these questions.


With the aid of a handout (see Annexe 1), Mr Berman went on to present the Survey's methodology for estimating the losses of arms and ammunition in PSOs. He focused on personal and crew-served weapons, discussing the assumptions that the Survey makes when estimating minimum, average, and maximum ranges for individuals, squads, sections, platoons, and companies. He emphasized that currently only partial data is available.

Moderators **Col. Roberto Gil** and **Col. Gonzalo Mila** then divided participants into two groups to discuss the Survey's assumptions and reflect on the following key questions:

- How many light, medium, and heavy mortar systems does a typical mortar section deploy with?
- How many mortar rounds are typically provided per mortar system? What is the typical distribution of light, medium, and—when applicable—heavy mortar rounds?
- How many under-barrel, hand-held, and automatic grenade launchers are typically provided per company, platoon, and section? Roughly how many rounds per type of grenade launcher are typically provided?
- Data on typical deployment rates per company for anti-tank weapons does not disaggregate single-shot, disposable rocket-propelled grenades (such as RPG-18), and light anti-tank weapons fired from reloadable launchers (such as RPG-7-pattern launchers). What are the typical deployment rates for the two types of anti-tank weapons (per company, platoon, and section)? How many rounds of ammunition for reloadable launchers are typically provided?
- What types of vehicles are typically deployed with a transport section? How many of each type of vehicle are typically deployed?
- Are there any notable differences between UN and non-UN PSOs regarding the number of personnel, or type or quantity of weapons, ammunition, or vehicles that are typically deployed at each unit level?

Participants reflected on the Survey's assumptions and questions, based on national arrangements in their home countries, and provided comments to the group. The Survey's methodology will be refined in accordance with this feedback.

Annexe 1 Selected notable incidents of weapons and ammunition losses in peace operations (1990–2018)



Session 11: Review of workshop contributions

At the end of the workshop presenters **Emile LeBrun** and **Col. Diego Iribarne** summarized for workshop participants the following key take-home messages from the previous two days.

General

- The loss of arms and ammunition from contingents is more common than was previously known and, in terms of ammunition, represents millions of rounds in aggregate.
- Authoritative data and analysis are difficult to obtain and official reports reflect only a fraction of the real losses.
- The management of recovered weapons (collected outside of DDR programmes) can be a significant challenge, but their oversight is a ‘grey area’.
- Why losses occur can be difficult to nail down. But the more we know about the details of such incidents, the better we can develop measures to prevent them from happening.

Uruguayan experience

- Uruguayan forces experienced a learning curve in terms of COE management in early deployments that was applied to later missions (such as in Haiti and the DRC).
- Uruguay’s related national policies, organizational culture, and mentality have been applied to aspects of COE management that are not addressed in UN policies, which currently are focused on reimbursements. This illustrates the importance of strong national practices and frameworks.
- Many Latin American TCCs have similarly developed their own national practices.

Lessons from MONUSCO

- The context of a multitude of active armed groups, the support some governments give to some of these groups, and groups’ ability to cross borders more or less at will were important factors leading to the proliferation of weapons throughout the mission area.
- Intelligence about armed groups and their relationships is key for protecting PSO personnel and addressing small arms and light weapons proliferation.

Force protection and arms losses

- Contingents that do not project appropriate force or take offensive action when necessary can become targets of attack, risking the loss of both lives and equipment.
- TCCs must understand the operational environment in which their forces will be operating before deploying personnel to any mission; pre-deployment training alone is not enough to ensure good performance.
- The UN mandate, the concept of operations, and the MoU are there to provide *guidance* and should not become obstacles that prevent peacekeepers from performing adequately in field operations.
- The leadership and commitment of national TCC authorities (civilian and military) are fundamental to the good performance of the contingents sent to PSOs. It is imperative that they provide political support, adequate equipment, and good and timely salaries to personnel.
- TCCs/PCCs and the UN must share responsibility in certain areas. The selection of TCCs/PCCs should be appropriate to the operational context, and the UN should be co-responsible for contingents' training and performance.

Lessons from the UNMC

- The many lessons learned, including those related to technical innovations, as part of the challenge of recovering, transporting, storing, and ultimately destroying nearly 9,000 weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition (among other arms) in Colombia has wider relevance for stockpile security practices dealing with recovered weapons.

UN working groups on WAM in PSOs

- UNDPKO-OMA's efforts to develop SOPs on the management of COE and the loss of arms and ammunition, as well as to set standards for ammunition levels for TCCs to deploy with, constitute a serious and welcome effort to address an important guidance gap.
- Eventual standards for operations in this area, pre-deployment training programmes, and even certification before deployment would be welcome.
- Inputs for consideration to this process include a proposal to have shared UN–TCC responsibility for ammunition (with the TCC providing training and minimum operational stockpiles and the UN resupplying the bulk of operational ammunition).

GPOI lessons for WAM training

- The GPOI's extensive training experience should be considered in the development and diffusion of training programmes on WAM in PSOs when these programmes are ready for implementation in Latin America, if feasible through ALCOPAZ.

Gender dimensions of WAM in PSOs

- Women already play vital roles in peacekeeping in general and in areas of illicit arms proliferation control, but these can and should be expanded. These include liaison roles with communities and information gathering as part of efforts to understand arms proliferation and develop 'early warning' functions.
- Cultural attitudes at home in national capitals may need to be addressed to make the much-needed improvements in this area. The 'top-down' nature of missions can also mean that if the right tone is set by a force commander, this can have an important effect on gender balance in a PSO and an appreciation of the roles that both genders can play in peacekeeping. ●

Concluding remarks

Dr Jorge Menéndez

Minister of National Defense, Uruguay

As Minister of National Defense, I am pleased to welcome and express my thanks for the presence of and support from the Ambassador of Canada to Uruguay, Mrs Joanne Frappier; the Director of the Small Arms Survey, Mr Eric Berman; the SINOMAPA Director, General Marcelo Montaner; embassy representatives from the United States; and delegates of the ministries of foreign affairs, national defence, and the interior.

We also extend this special greeting to all the participants in this event, who come from many countries in the region.

At the outset, we wish to emphasize that peacekeepers have a decisive role to play in efforts to reduce illicit arms flows in the areas of conflict in which they operate. Part of this effort is to ensure that the weapons deployed by peacekeepers, as well as those recovered during the course of their duties, are well managed and not recycled to unauthorized parties.

By addressing the proliferation of illicit weapons, peacekeepers can more effectively achieve their mandates, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and improve security—including their own.

Because of its focus on this issue, we have partnered with the Small Arms Survey, which has experience on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. Being a centre of excellence, it generates knowledge and evidence-based analysis that are impartial and relevant for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society.

The MPOME project—Making Peace Operations More Effective—contributes to the reduction of violence and insecurity due to the illegal proliferation of weapons in conflict zones. It has support from Canada and the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, NATO, the Economic Community of West Africa, the African Union, and now also from Uruguay.

The development of this workshop here in our country is a unique event for the region. We appreciate it as a recognition of the extensive and productive work of our personnel who have contributed to peace operations uninterrupted for almost seven decades now, who have a history of very strong performance in the field.

We are also pioneers in Latin America in support of efforts to control arms and ammunition, both nationally and internationally.

We are motivated by the prestige gained in the academic field on this subject and the proactive attitudes, interest in, and receptivity to a discussion of this topic, all of which have been verified during the course of this event.

We know that the outcomes of this event will be numerous and varied, reflecting the quality and intensity of the work carried out.

Undoubtedly the lessons learned in this workshop will include the consolidation of our knowledge and a reflection on the importance of this topic.

As an issue of global importance for international actors and all concerned parties, this subject clearly reveals the importance of national responsibilities regarding legislation and controls, particularly in the case of preparation for peace operations.

We support the inclusion of this topic in training for security and armed forces and we encourage the initiative of conveying this instruction to all personnel participating in peace operations, with emphasis on the command and staff levels of national contingents.

I conclude this message by reaffirming my gratitude to the friendly nations and institutions that made this workshop possible, and to all the distinguished participants. ●

Subject matter expert background papers

Arms and ammunition losses from peace support operations: global research findings and prevention strategies

Emile LeBrun

MPOME Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey

Background

Until recently the issue of the management and loss of arms and ammunition in PSOs did not draw much attention. There has been a widespread presumption that troops contributing to PSOs exercise uniformly high levels of control over their own lethal and non-lethal equipment, and that when losses occur they are most likely inevitable. A related belief is that some (mostly small) losses are probably simply ‘the cost of doing business’.

These assumptions were, however, untested and unsupported by empirical research or rigorous investigations. Problematically, the whole subject of arms losses and any control measures that might be in place was and remains sensitive and subject to a lack of transparency that makes conducting investigations difficult. Internal assessments that are conducted—through, for example, after-incident reporting and inquiries—are generally not made publicly available. However, a number of large-scale incidents were so significant, and were accompanied by so much loss of life, that they broke through the curtain of obscurity to provide hints, at least, that the picture might not be as positive as it is generally assumed to be.

From 2011 onwards the Small Arms Survey began to study this phenomenon in increasing detail, first by collecting publicly available information about incidents of losses of arms and ammunition. Since UN reporting was more readily available than for other PSOs, and because the Survey is particularly active in Africa, early data collection focused on UN operations in Africa. In parallel, the Survey began to assess what measures were in place to manage arms and ammunition in PSOs and among troop contributors, as well as policy and procedural gaps.

This focus falls under the Survey’s areas of concern because weapons moving out of peacekeepers’ control into conflict zones pose threats not only to local communities, but to peacekeepers themselves. This, in turn, negatively affects popular perceptions of the peacekeeping forces’ effectiveness. The Survey’s project to understand and address arms losses is aimed at supporting and enhancing mandate implementation and force protection rather than naming and shaming particular TCCs/PCCs for the under-performance of their personnel.

With the establishment of the MPOME project in December 2016, whose first phase runs through March 2019, our research effort made significant progress in terms of

securing both resources and political support from a range of governments and regional organizations. Over the course of the last two years the project has expanded its focus beyond African PSOs to non-UN missions such as those led by NATO, the EU, and other regional organizations. As the information base for understanding the phenomenon has grown, the project has also been able to move from performing a purely documentary function to a capacity-building role.

This paper briefly reviews the MPOME project's research findings with regard to the loss of arms and ammunition from PSOs to date, and its growing efforts to support TCCs/PCCs and regional organizations to improve practice in this regard and reduce future losses of materiel. The Survey sees this area as increasingly intertwined with other parallel reform efforts, such as the force protection agenda, efforts by the UN and regional organizations to reduce illicit small arms proliferation in conflict and post-conflict zones, and other international peace and security initiatives.

Documenting losses

The Survey determined that the best way to introduce the issue of arms and ammunition losses in PSOs was through a combined country case study. We chose Sudan and South Sudan because of the Survey's long-standing existing research initiative in those countries (known as the Human Security Baseline Assessment, launched in 2006) and the fact that this theatre has been the site of a long sequence of PSOs for more than a decade, including those fielded by the AU, the UN, and the current joint UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Sudan, as well as multinational intervention forces in South Sudan.

The Survey's findings from this initial study are documented in the report *Under Attack and Above Scrutiny? Arms and Ammunition Diversion from Peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002–14* (Berman and Racovita, 2015), which identified more than a hundred attacks on peacekeepers over the period 2005–14, at least half of which resulted in weapons losses. At least 20 of these attacks were 'notable' in terms of the quantities of ammunition lost, which together totalled at least 750,000 rounds. These incidents alone were also responsible for the loss of at least 500 weapons, among them pistols, assault rifles, machine guns (including heavy machine guns), grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons, and mortars. Due to the lack of transparency around reporting on such incidents, as well as the Survey's very conservative approach to estimating losses, these findings have to be regarded as a very partial estimate of what truly occurred.

Perhaps even more significant were the findings about the overall context and situations that give rise to weapons and ammunition losses. We found that losses are not rare events—and that sometimes they are large in scale. Reporting and record-keeping are imperfect, at best, and political sensitivities affect non-reporting.

Importantly, diversion is clearly not always due to peacekeepers being in the ‘wrong place at the wrong time’.

Finally, apart from these findings about the loss of COE, the study drew attention to an associated area that had not received much attention: the management of arms and ammunition that peacekeepers recover or seize from negative forces or capture through disarmament exercises. The message from the initial study in Sudan and South Sudan was clear that oversight of such weapons was a significant ‘grey area’ and likely to be subject to under-performance and corruption.

These initial findings indicated that the issue of weapons and ammunition losses from PSOs deserved further study. For one thing, the possible objection that Sudan and South Sudan presented a ‘special case’ needed to be addressed. After all, it might be thought that materiel losses there are due to particularly poorly trained PSO personnel; the particular obstructiveness of the host countries; or the low morale of the mission and the reluctance of some contingents to deter, through active engagement, potentially hostile forces. The only way to answer these and related questions was to expand the research base and draw on information from as many PSOs as possible.

In 2016 the Survey established the Peace Operations Data Set (PODS), the only repository of global data on losses of arms, ammunition, and materiel from both UN and non-UN PSOs. Since then, PODS has been populated with information from UN and other reports, press releases, key informant interviews, and articles from reputable media outlets, focusing primarily on ‘notable’ incidents (that is, events that include the loss of ten or more weapons or 500 or more rounds of ammunition) that occurred during missions.

In October 2017 the Survey published its first study based on this expanded effort (Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder, 2017). It found that the Sudan–South Sudan case study significantly underestimated the true scale and scope of losses; that globally, although a small percentage of deployed equipment is lost, stolen, or seized by armed groups and criminals, this likely comprises thousands of weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition; and that even the UN has no institutionalized procedures for managing arms and ammunition recovered outside of formal recovery programmes—despite the fact that the scale of this materiel can be sizeable.

Here too the numbers are only part of the story. Analysis of incidents recorded in PODS provides insights into the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of losses, showing that:

- losses are a global and pervasive problem, affecting missions across geographical regions, operating in different threat environments, and involving contingents from many different countries;

- peacekeepers are susceptible to losing equipment during the course of everyday activities, such as patrols and escort duties, but also during resupply operations, troop rotations, and repatriation; and
- the loss of arms and ammunition is not limited to military missions. Armed guards deployed as part of unarmed civilian missions have also lost weapons and other materiel, underscoring the importance of establishing rigorous safeguards in all missions.

The Survey is continuing to expand PODS to include smaller-scale losses and the seizure of vehicles equipped with weapons. In future the database may also capture data on the loss of non-lethal equipment.

Not all of what has been learned about weapons losses and arms management is drawn from official reports. An integral part of our understanding of the dynamics of losses, current management practices, and possible gaps and needs is achieved through consultations with TCCs/PCCs and regional organizations that field PSOs. Through a series of regional workshops, the Survey has improved its understanding of the realities of practices on the ground in a variety of different contexts. Former and current force commanders, sector commanders, heads of missions, and other technical personnel have contributed to these conversations, and helped to identify gaps in both knowledge and the implementation of existing policies, as well as key challenges and the need for specialized training. They have also helped to bridge the gap between what is officially reported and what really happens on the ground—an essential distinction if sound policies and mechanisms are to be developed and implemented.

Improving WAM in PSOs

Implementing existing and emerging standards

In parallel to the documentation of losses from PSOs, the Survey has assessed the state of the policy and procedural landscape with regard to WAM in PSOs, based on publicly available information.

At the global level, the UN has developed detailed policies, procedures, and guidelines on securing arms and ammunition during PSOs. These safeguards are elaborated in numerous documents, many of which are not publicly available. Nevertheless, although the system through which the UN manages COE provides a framework for the establishment of rigorous mission-level stockpile security systems, in reality stockpile security, record-keeping, and reporting practices can vary significantly from mission to mission, and even within the same mission. Some less-than-ideal practices are common, such as the long-term use of ‘temporary’ small arms storage structures (Schroeder, 2016).

As already noted, the UN does not provide standard guidance on the management of weapons recovered by PSOs, but in early 2018 two inter-agency working groups were established under the UNDPKO chief of staff to review current practices and develop guidance on WAM for COE, UN-owned equipment, and weapons and ammunition seized in field missions. The working groups comprise representatives from UNDPKO, UNDFS, UNDP, and UNMAS, as well as subject matter experts (UN, 2018).

Arguably, improving practices in PSOs fielded by regional and subregional organizations is as important as in those fielded by the UN, given that some of the most dangerous deployments—and contexts in which sizeable volumes of weapons and ammunition are recovered from negative forces—are led by organizations other than the UN. Two notable examples are the AU Mission in Somalia and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin.

At the regional level the AU launched a process in 2017 linked to its Silencing the Guns by 2020 initiative that will generate a policy on the management of recovered weapons in all AU-mandated peace operations. The Survey has been an active partner in this process, supporting the AU to convene its member states, regional economic communities, and regional mechanisms in a consultative process that generated a policy draft that was validated on 5 November 2018 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Now that the draft policy has been validated, the Survey hopes to work with the AU to disseminate the policy and hold a series of briefings and training sessions for key mission personnel. This will help to kick start the policy's implementation in addition to setting up systems to monitor its uptake.

Notably, two subregional organizations have made more progress than the AU, insofar as they have already committed—at least on paper—to establishing mechanisms to improve controls over weapons that peacekeepers from their member states deploy with, or recover, during peace operations:

- **ECOWAS.** The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2006), which came into force in 2009, is a legally binding instrument that requires the organization's 15 members to provide the ECOWAS Secretariat with data on weapons deployed to and repatriated from mission areas, and on the destruction of any weapons they recover. The ECOWAS Commission is currently engaged in a consultative process with its missions and troop contributors to establish the standardized reporting mechanisms needed to operationalize these obligations. A number of technical problems must be addressed before the required databases can be established.
- **ECCAS.** The Kinshasa Convention (2010), which is the small arms convention agreed by ECCAS member states, became operational in 2017, and among other things addresses the management of COE in PSOs. It is politically binding and requires the ECCAS secretary-general to establish a subregional electronic data-

base of weapons used in PSOs. It also obliges ECCAS member states to report on the weapons and ammunition used in PSOs, as well as the establishment of national registers. As in the case of the ECOWAS Convention, the operationalization of these requirements has not yet occurred. But at the first ECCAS Convention of States Parties in June 2018 the organization committed itself to full implementation. Cameroon will lead this initiative, which will have implications not only for the MNJTF, but also for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), to which Cameroon is a significant troop contributor.

Because of the infancy of these initiatives, many TCCs from ECOWAS and ECCAS are not yet aware of the obligations and expectations imposed on them by the above instruments. The policies and procedures that they currently implement—which vary significantly from mission to mission and sector to sector—remain largely ad hoc. The extent to which international good practice guidelines are adhered to, such as those related to record-keeping, PSSM, and the IATG, is unknown.

Capacity building: tools and training

It will take time for the new and improved policies, procedures, and practices described above to be developed and operationalized. In the meantime, steps should be taken to improve current practice and best practice guidelines on which to draw. But these good practices and lessons learned need to be consolidated and offered as part of training programmes to TCCs/PCCs and the political and military heads of missions. In regional consultations with TCCs/PCCs, mission officials, and others, this ‘training gap’ was repeatedly noted.

In response to this need the Survey is developing a three-day training course on WAM and counter-diversion in PSOs that will cover:

- existing normative and legal frameworks;
- what is known about high-risk environments and activities in which losses can occur;
- best practices in PSSM;
- situational awareness and intelligence gathering;
- intra-mission coordination;
- checks and balances; and
- building integrity and preventing corruption (MPOME, 2018).

The initial course will be finalized for use before the end of March 2019 and the Survey envisions holding the first training sessions thereafter in cooperation with one or more regional training centres of excellence. In parallel with this training course, the Survey is also developing associated tools, such as model reporting templates for arms recovered during PSOs.

As recognition of the importance of WAM in PSOs has grown, a number of governments have signalled their intention to play an active role by reviewing current practices and supporting a forward-looking policy agenda. The Government of Uruguay was the first to join the MPOME project as a bilateral partner, and it has been followed recently by Senegal and Indonesia. These partnerships provide the foundation to dig deeper and learn more about current practices around WAM, training, and support needs, and to work closely together to support excellence and leadership in this area.

The future: converging agendas and integrating practices

As the first phase of the MPOME project draws to a close, its second phase (from April 2019) is coming into clearer view. Looking ahead, it is important that a number of initiatives continue to gather momentum:

- Existing policy development and implementation processes need to move forward at the global, regional, and subregional levels and secure the necessary political and donor support.
- The MPOME training modules developed in Phase 1 need to be fielded and tested, and related learning evaluated to measure its positive impact on practice.
- Large TCCs/PCCs also need to review their WAM practices and align them, as necessary, with emerging norms and relevant legal and political agreements.

In parallel, the WAM in PSOs agenda should begin to be connected more explicitly with other reform and accountability initiatives designed to enhance the performance of PSOs. Whether this will lead to a ‘performance criteria’ system is not yet clear. But given that COE losses and the mismanagement of recovered materiel negatively impact credibility and pose significant safety and strategic risks to both troops and civilians, WAM considerations should at least be part of that conversation.

Finally, WAM in PSOs is one piece of a larger effort to prevent the illicit proliferation of weapons in conflict zones—an effort that at the moment is distinctly fragmented and separated among a variety of actors who rarely communicate or collaborate with one another. As the WAM agenda moves ahead, we should look to strengthen coordination and collaboration between peacekeepers’ arms control efforts and other illicit arms flows reduction initiatives, building a more comprehensive approach to reducing negative impacts in conflict zones. As part of this effort, the MPOME project will seek to identify practical measures to strengthen the collection and sharing of information, including on technical weapons intelligence, in PSOs.

Conclusion

Since the MPOME project was launched in December 2016 the general level of knowledge on the loss of arms and ammunition in PSOs and the management of recovered weapons has grown significantly. Whereas the subject was considered ‘taboo’ in some quarters two years ago, it is now widely accepted to be worthy of both attention and the commitment of resources.

In fact, the issue has gone from an outside concern to one with important linkages with other peacekeeping agendas that are gathering momentum. The UN and AU are both taking important steps forward by reviewing practices and instituting new policies. The MPOME project now counts the AU, Canada, ECOWAS, Germany, Indonesia, NATO, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay as supporters. Five of these—Canada, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have committed both financial resources and political support.

This represents significant progress in a very short time. Nevertheless, we are some way away from being able to demonstrate widespread commitments to improved practices, let alone the reduction of weapons and ammunition losses. This is the ultimate goal of the initiative, which can only have positive ripple effects for blue and green helmets in terms of mandate implementation and force protection.

References

- Berman, Eric G. and Mihaela Racovita. 2015. *Under Attack and Above Scrutiny? Arms and Ammunition Diversion from Peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002–14*. HSBA Working Paper No. 37. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. July.
- Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita, and Matt Schroeder. 2017. *Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations*. MPOME Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. October.
- MPOME (Making Peace Operations More Effective). 2018. ‘Training to Address Losses of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations.’ Handout. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. May.
- Schroeder, Matt. 2016. *Checks and Balances: Securing Small Arms during Peace Operations*. Issue Brief No. 16. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. February.
- UN (United Nations). 2018. ‘United Nations Working Groups on Weapons and Ammunition Management.’ UNDPKO Factsheet. New York: UN.

Control of armament, ammunition, and stockpiles in peace support operations

Col. Diego Iribarne

SINOMAPA Deputy Director · Uruguay

Introduction

In all scenarios or ‘areas of operation’ where PSOs are deployed it is possible to classify weapons and ammunition according to who owns them. Such owners include peacekeepers; the UN; host governments; third countries; and, in the case of illegal weapons and ammunition, gangs and criminal organizations.

A COE Manual has regulated the control of equipment and weapons belonging to TCCs/PCCs since 1996 (see UNGA, 2017). However, the manual regulates the reimbursements that the UN makes to TCCs/PCCs and not the control of weapons losses, or the prevention of the diversion of weapons and ammunition to third parties. Neither does it establish the levels of ammunition holdings that contingents require.

Such issues are largely left to the internal guidance of the contingents themselves, based on their national rules and regulations. TCCs/PCCs have some flexibility when determining the ammunition-holding levels for their contingents. Holdings are based on the *Guidelines on Levels of Ammunition for Peacekeeping Operations* issued by UNDPKO in 2002 (UNDPKO, 2002), and in the case of MONUSCO (which operates in the DRC) this is complemented by SOPs on ‘Force Ammunition Levels and Stockpile Management’, which the mission issued in December 2012 (MONUSCO, 2012).

In recent years UN peacekeeping headquarters have been increasing internal controls governing the armed forces operating in PSOs, based on emerging needs, existing international guidelines, and national regulations. Missions themselves have also been generating new procedures, recommending the creation of new control bodies, and assigning new tasks and responsibilities to existing offices and personnel in both their own forces and mission support organizations.

A key element in the area of arms control is, without a doubt, the organizational culture within TCCs/PCCs, which is normally reflected in national legislation. When a military unit comes from a country without this type of organizational culture and legislation, it is very difficult for members to acquire the necessary mentality in the short period of a PSO, and the probability that unjustified (and unreported) losses of arms or diversion of ammunition may occur increases.

Many challenges still have to be overcome in order to prevent such losses. This paper seeks to provide an overview of some of the most pressing issues.

Binding agreement with the UN

A troop or police contributor to a PSO must sign a binding agreement with the UN prior to deployment called an MoU, which stipulates the obligations of each party with regard to personnel, major equipment, and self-sustainment. It is important to note that no limits or minimum ammunition-holding levels are mentioned in this document.

As discussed above, the COE Manual determines arms and ammunition verification and control procedures (UNGA, 2017). These controls basically consist of an ‘arrival inspection’ when the contingent arrives in the mission area, ‘operational inspections’ to be carried out at least every six months during the deployment of the unit in the mission area, and a ‘repatriation inspection’ before the return of the unit to its country of origin. These inspections are intended to ensure that both parties meet the terms of the MoU between the UN and the various TTCs/PCCs throughout the entire deployment period. They also generate baseline data for calculating the UN’s reimbursements to the respective TTCs/PCCs.

In recent years UNDPKO-OMA has ordered all missions to undertake operational readiness inspections. Military staff officers conduct these inspections, which are designed to complement the COE inspections (which focus only on equipment) and provide an operational readiness assessment of all military units in the peacekeeping contingent.

Types of weapons and ammunition

For the UN there are two types of weapons: crew-served and personal weapons. Crew-served weapons are defined as any weapon operated by more than one designated soldier, and are considered to be major equipment. They are included in the MoU. On the other hand, personal weapons are assumed to be part of the individual equipment of each soldier, which includes the helmet, clothing, and vest. These are not mentioned in the MoU specifically, and the relevant reimbursement falls under reimbursements for ‘personnel’.

The UN also recognizes two types of ammunition in the COE Manual:

- *training ammunition* (for sighting, calibration, test-firing, and training), which is considered to be consumable, is included in the wet lease maintenance rate, and is therefore considered a national responsibility (UNGA, 2017, ch. 3, para. 28); and
- *operational ammunition*, which ‘the United Nations and TTCs/PCCs agree to deploy to the mission area so that it is readily available for use in the event of need’ (UNGA, 2017, ch. 2, para. 28).

Control of ammunition

Ammunition holdings

The only UNDPKO document dealing with quantities and types of ammunition and later mentioned in subsequent manuals is the *Guidelines on Levels of Ammunition for Peacekeeping Operations* from 2002 (UNDPKO, 2002). These guidelines are only indicative and their purpose is to advise with a view to proper planning prior to deployments. They do *not* determine the amount of operational ammunition that military or police units must deploy for a PSO, nor do they try to influence related TCC/PCC doctrines or tactics.

In 2012 MONUSCO issued SOPs on ‘Force Ammunition Levels and Stockpile Management’ in order to have a better view of and control a contingent’s ammunition holdings, in addition to the security and safety of its ammunition storage facilities (MONUSCO, 2012). Currently the UN is also working on a WAM policy that will provide a much-needed framework for, and clear guidance on, WAM in PSOs.

Ammunition storage

Ammunition storage facilities in PSOs should be in line with the guidance contained within the IATG. This does not always happen, however, either due to budgetary constraints or the continuous movement of military units, particularly to temporary operational bases. The construction, maintenance, and improvement of ammunition storage facilities are normally the contingents’ responsibility, but are coordinated with the relevant administration and the force’s engineers to reinforce safety and ensure the performance of any other major engineering tasks.

The force’s ammunition technical officers (ATOs) should be responsible for inspecting storage facilities and making recommendations to correct possibly dangerous situations.

Ammunition resupply

The resupply of ammunition is a responsibility of TCCs/PCCs, even when the UN will reimburse the costs of some of this ammunition when a claim is made through the appropriate channels for ‘operational ammunition’.

This decentralized system was based on the assumption that TCCs/PCCs have a major interest in keeping and taking care of ammunition holdings for their own contingents. It has two main disadvantages: it creates several supply lines that increase the possibility of undesired losses or diversion; and it ensures increased ammunition holdings (as compared to a centralized stockpile system).

Uruguay's experience

Importance of national-level controls

When Uruguay began sending military units to UN PSOs (such as those in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Angola in the 1990s), an earlier system governed inspections and there was neither a COE manual nor an infantry battalion manual as a guide.¹ The IATG did not even exist at that time.

Resupplies for these contingents were not problematic, mainly because the missions lasted less than two years. But they provided good learning scenarios for the more prolonged later missions such as MONUSCO (operating in the DRC) and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which required a completely new approach to logistics, training, and troop rotations.

In the absence of guidance from the UN system, relevant Uruguayan contingents controlled their weapons and ammunition by applying national Uruguayan laws, decrees, and regulations. This continues to be the case where guidance is not available.

In Uruguay, all military units carry out weekly controls of their weapons, and then inform their superiors on a monthly basis or when they have been ordered to do so. Weapons are checked every time somebody removes a weapon from the armoury and when they return it. Specific controls are also carried out on weapons and ammunition stockpiles every time there is a handover of officers in charge, and also during the handover of unit commanders. Weapons warehouses also have physical and electronic security measures, in addition to strict entry control procedures.

When a weapon is damaged, disabled, or lost, 'summary information' is compiled and an officer designated for each case conducts a full investigation, part of which involves exploring the circumstances of the incident and determining whether those involved were responsible for any action or omission that led to the loss, or whether it was an accident for which no one was responsible. In cases where responsibility is attributed, disciplinary measures are implemented, and if a crime is suspected, the case is transferred to the military justice system.

The same procedure is used in units deployed in PSOs, which has allowed Uruguay to maintain very strict control of its peacekeepers' weapons. If a weapon is lost or stolen, this is also communicated to the National Registry of Arms, which is in charge of directing and coordinating activities related to the control and registration of weapons, ammunition, explosives, gunpowder, and pyrotechnic material, and the reception, depositing, delivery, and disposal of arms and ammunition remitted by the civil justice system—and to the authorities of the relevant mission.

In 2014 the Uruguayan government also approved Law No. 19.247 on the possession, carrying, commercialization, and trafficking of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, which updated relevant civil and criminal legislation.

As the above clearly illustrates, there is an ‘organizational culture’ within the Uruguayan Armed Forces that governs the control and possession of arms, and when troops deploy in PSOs they carry this culture or mentality with them. On many occasions they have incorporated relevant internal controls and procedures into PSOs (see Box 1) in the same manner as other contingents and staff officers who come from countries with a similar organizational culture.

One of the major barriers to PSOs’ operational effectiveness is the widespread tendency of:

- field support personnel to make decisions based exclusively on the mission’s budget; and
- their counterparts at the contingent level to make decisions based on reimbursement considerations.

Both tendencies are problematic, adversely affecting not only the effectiveness of military operations, but also the establishment of effective and responsible arms and ammunition controls.

Conclusion

The main responsibility for arms and ammunition in PSOs rests with TCCs. This is as it should be, because they are the owners of the materiel and the main people with an interest in having their weapons used in an appropriate manner and for the intended purpose.

However, PSOs must have control procedures in place that function as a security system so that they may warn the force commander in a timely manner when a contingent is not performing optimally, thus allowing them to take the necessary corrective measures.

The possibility of having shared UN–TCC responsibility for ammunition in some PSOs should be considered (the COE Manual does not reject this option). The TCCs could deploy with their own ammunition for training and to ensure a pre-determined minimum operational stockpile, and the UN could take care of the bulk stockpile of operational ammunition. This system would minimize ammunition supply lines, reduce the number of ammunition storage facilities, increase security, and reduce costs. UN missions could manage the procurement, storage, and transportation of operational ammunition, supplying contingents based on their requirements and in accordance with the security situation in their respective operational areas.

It is important to include estimates of the construction costs of ammunition and weapons storage facilities in PSO budgets, especially when they exceed the capabilities of the military units deployed in the field.

When selecting armed contingents to participate in PSOs, it is necessary, among other things, to take into account what their national legislation prescribes in terms of arms and ammunition control. This is because contingents naturally tend to replicate their national ‘organizational culture’ when they are in the field.

A complete list of weapons, including their serial numbers, could be attached to the relevant MoU as an annexe to facilitate controls. In the same way, an annexe with the ammunition levels agreed by both parties could also be attached.

Box 1 Case study: MONUSCO SOPs on force ammunition levels and stockpile management

In 2012 a military uprising led by the M23 non-state group took place in eastern DRC, which took over the city of Goma, making MONUSCO operations more difficult. In particular, operations to supply MONUSCO bases in the province of North Kivu were adversely affected.

At the beginning of this uprising there was a need to implement a daily reporting system on these bases’ supply status. Previously this had been done on a weekly basis. The only item that needed special attention was ammunition, which—because it was a national responsibility—had not been clearly established as forming part of a periodic report.

To resolve this deficiency in the short term immediate orders were issued that each base should report on the status of its ammunition supplies and in some cases its resupply needs. Also, in order to resolve the administrative gap in the medium and long term, a document was drafted containing SOPs on the level of ammunition and the type of stockpile management required (MONUSCO, 2012). This document, based on the recently published IATG,² provided a regulatory framework that allowed better control of weapons and ammunition. In a single document it provided a series of guidelines on the management of armaments based on input from various mission offices, together with guidance on the transport, storage, and destruction of ammunition. It also established a reporting channel, and determined responsibilities for inspections and the construction of ammunition storage facilities. UNDPKO-OMA subsequently sent it to other missions, and it came to serve as a guide for other similar SOPs.

This is just one case among thousands of how the initiatives of staff officers can gradually build up regulatory frameworks in the field by drawing on their own experiences at the national level (and from peacekeeping arenas) to improve the efficiency of their missions.

Endnotes

- 1 The COE Manual replaced the previous methodology ‘whereby troop/police contributors were reimbursed based on in and out surveys and the depreciation of equipment’ (UNGA, 2017, ch. 1, para. 1).
- 2 See UNODA (2015). The IATG were first published in 2012, but were updated in 2015, and the first edition is no longer available, hence the dating of this reference.

References

- MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 2012. ‘Force Ammunition Levels and Stockpile Management.’ Unpublished document. December.
- UNDPKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations). 2002. *Guidelines on Levels of Ammunition for Peacekeeping Operations*. September.
- UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 2017. *Manual on Policies and Procedures concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions*. A/72/288 of 4 August.
- UNODA (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs). 2015. *International Ammunition Technical Guidelines*. New York: UNODA.

Contingent-owned equipment and weapons and ammunition management: the Uruguayan experience

Col. Pablo Caubarrere

Director, ENOPU · Uruguay

Introduction

In fulfilment of relevant peacekeeping mandates, UNDPKO requires contributing countries to deploy their personnel, equipment, and logistical support on the ground. This is facilitated by an MoU, which is an agreement between the UN and a member state to establish the administrative, logistical, and financial terms and conditions governing the contribution of personnel, equipment, and services provided in support of PSOs. It also details the UN's standards of conduct for personnel provided by the contributing government.

As a nation state, Uruguay has been involved in PSOs since before the existence of the UN. Its involvement in the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia in the 1930s is just one example (see Annexe 1). Once the Second World War ended and the UN—of which Uruguay is a founding member—was established, the country immediately began to actively participate in PSOs.

This paper covers two main topics:

- the role of COE/MoU management review boards (CMMRBs); and
- Uruguay's participation in and contribution to PSOs.

COE/MoU management review boards

Most PSOs have CMMRBs in place to oversee the implementation of a mission's COE programme and to ensure that the MoU remains aligned with the requirements of the mission.

A CMMRB comprises senior representatives of the mission's military, police, and mission support components. Some of its main responsibilities are the following:

- to review the the contingents' and mission's compliance with the terms of the relevant MoU;
- to review adherence to the established COE verification and reporting procedures (and mission SOPs) for COE;
- to identify the optimal utilization of military, police, and civilian resources in support of the mission, and to review and recommend cost-effective support measures;

- to review the results of operational readiness inspections; analyse shortfalls, surpluses, and deficiencies; and recommend appropriate remedial actions;
- to recommend amendments to the relevant MoU resulting from changes in operational and logistical support requirements and contingent performance, including reinforcements, the repatriation of surplus equipment, and the transfer of responsibilities to ensure self-sustainment;
- to review mission-specific requirements, standards, and scales of issues concerning facilities, equipment, and supplies associated with self-sustainment categories such as accommodation, communications, observation, and identification; and
- to review requirements and solutions for the disposal of COE in a mission area as an alternative to repatriation when a contingent leaves the mission area (UNDPKO, n.d.).

UNDPKO and UNDFS receive CMMRB reports and take action based on the reports' findings and recommendations. This may involve making contact and coordinating with permanent missions to resolve surpluses and deficiencies in major equipment, or other issues related to the provision of self-sustainment services and logistical support or operational capabilities.

Verification and control procedures are based on various types of inspections:

- **Arrival inspection.** The arrival inspection should take place immediately on a contingent's arrival in the mission area and should be completed within a month. If contingent equipment and personnel are already in the mission area when the MoU is concluded, the first inspection occurs on a date jointly determined by the mission and contingent authorities, and should be completed within a month of that date.
- **Operational readiness inspection.** An operational readiness inspection must be carried out at least once in every six-month period of a unit's deployment in a mission area, and whenever the mission believes that equipment or services do not meet the required standards. The unit's major equipment and self-sustainment capacity are inspected in order to assess whether the relevant capabilities are sufficient and satisfactory.
- **Repatriation inspection.** The repatriation inspection should assess all the major equipment belonging to the TCC/PCC that is to be repatriated and should verify the status of the major equipment provided under a 'dry lease' arrangement. The inspection should also ensure that no UN-owned equipment is repatriated to the TCC/PCC.

- **Other verifications or inspections.** Other verifications or inspections that the head of mission or UN headquarters consider to be necessary may also be carried out (UNGA, 2017, ch. 2, para. 24).

The main purpose of inspections is to ‘verify that the terms and conditions of the memorandum of understanding have been met, and to take corrective action when required’ (UNGA, 2017, ch. 2, para. 25). At every stage of a mission, ‘time and human resources are short, and excessive time cannot be spent beyond that required to determine that the minimum requirements have been met by the troop/police contributor or the United Nations in each area’ (UNGA, 2017, ch. 2, para. 25).

Uruguay’s participation in and contribution to PSOs

Overview of Uruguay’s participation in PSOs

Uruguay’s contribution to PSOs dates back to the very beginning of such operations. This participation has developed based on the principles enshrined in the country’s foreign policy. These are the following:

- non-interventionism;
- the peaceful resolution of disputes;
- the free determination of people and equal rights; and
- cooperation among states, in accordance with the UN Charter.

Uruguay engages in various PSOs through its contingents, military observers, staff officers, police, and civilian personnel. Table 1 provides a list of current missions. (For a list of completed missions, see Annexe 1.)

Table 1 Uruguay’s ongoing PSOs

Start date	Mission	Country
1952	UNMOGIP	India–Pakistan
1982	MFO	Egypt
1993	UNHQ	UN headquarters
2010	MONUSCO	DRC
2016	UNMC/UNVMC	Colombia

Throughout the history of its PSO contributions, Uruguay has deployed almost 50,000 members of its army, navy, air force, and police force, in addition to civilians. In total, 35 of these personnel have died in the line of duty.

A total of 75 per cent of officers and 66 per cent of NCOs have participated at least once in a PSO. Some have participated in two or three missions, while others have been deployed more than ten times.

Uruguay's experience of COE losses in PSOs

On several occasions Uruguayan soldiers have had to face hostile forces during PSOs. In general, equipment losses have been minimal or non-existent, but there have been some exceptions. One of the most significant cases occurred in December 2006 during an operation in urban terrain in Haiti, as part of a multinational task force that included URUBAT APCs. Hostile forces had ambushed the task force, leading to combat, during which the Uruguayan APCs were fired on repeatedly. One APC was immobilized and due to the firepower of the attacking forces, the company commander determined that it was impossible to rescue it, deciding instead to preserve the lives of the personnel inside.

An extraction operation was successfully carried out to remove the soldiers in the vehicle without any loss of life. Although the APC was lost, in addition to two machine guns and a sniper's rifle, the materiel was recovered the next day in a follow-up operation.

Development of Uruguay's COE management policies and procedures

Just as COE procedures and controls have evolved, training in Uruguay and procedures in the field have also done so. The author of this paper was a COE inspector in 2005–06, for example. At that time the focus was concentrated on collective armament (such as machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and anti-tank armament), while individual armament and any kind of ammunition were only superficially controlled. A few years later this changed when an ATO was added to the inspection personnel, who began to monitor the state of contingents' ammunition.

Leadership, discipline, attitudes, policies, and procedures

Although it is not appropriate to suggest that the leadership system and the way in which discipline is handled in Uruguay can be projected to other countries, this paper briefly explains the importance attached to these areas in our country.

From the moment a person in a leadership position enters the army, whether as an officer or an NCO, the first thing that is inculcated is the need to care for weapons and ammunition. This is approached from both a positive viewpoint (involving positive assessments for good care) and a negative one (the imposition of severe sanctions for a lack of care). This focus continues as each person progresses in their career and takes on new responsibilities. The first priority for any platoon leader, company commander, or battalion commander is always weapons and their ammunition.

Controls are conducted before, during, and after operations. Each unit has routine weekly and monthly inspections. In addition, an office in the Ordnance Service (which is part of the army) conducts inspections. In practice, the military justice system always deals with the loss of arms and ammunition, whether it occurs on national territory or abroad.

As the above illustrates, the focus on discipline and inspections begins on national territory and is then transferred to PSOs. It is worth highlighting the case of MONUSCO where, in the absence of SOPs for the control of weapons and ammunition, a Uruguayan officer who held the position of G-4 (a logistics officer) produced SOPs in line with national practice in Uruguay.

Finally, experience serves to reinforce good practice. As a result of the number of missions, which are often to the same PSO, each time a contingent is deployed sergeants, lieutenants, and captains are able to draw on their experiences in Uruguay itself, as well as in Haiti, the DRC, and other arenas.

How Uruguayans are trained in good COE practice

Over time Uruguay has developed and perfected its pre-deployment training procedures, which are implemented at different times and levels. As mentioned above, emphasis is routinely placed on reinforcing the importance of good practice in the care of weapons and ammunition.

Relevant instruction is provided in the following sequence:



ENOPU participates at the first stage, as part of which staff officers who have most recently returned from deployment to a mission communicate the latest information from the field to the members of the contingent that is about to be deployed. Additionally, logistics courses are provided for relevant personnel in PSOs.

To conclude, the maintenance of good practice in arms and ammunition management is reinforced by the following three factors:

- **Constant care.** Care of weapons and ammunition is emphasized as being crucial, even before contingents' participation in PSOs.
- **Regular inspection and reporting.** Company, brigade, battalion, and divisional commanders are required to send weekly and monthly reports in addition to ad hoc reports after operations.
- **Dissemination of knowledge.** Knowledge of how to care for weapons and ammunition is reinforced by the large number of personnel involved in PSOs who become 'knowledge multipliers' when they return.

Gaps in practice or training in COE management that could be improved on

Despite efforts to keep up to date, there are always margins of error when contingents are operating in conflict-affected areas in compliance with robust mandates and with a requirement to enter into combat to protect civilians. More robust mandates often lead to a greater probability of confrontations, which, in turn, often lead to a greater chance of losing equipment. In order to stem these losses, the controls and verification measures described above will always be necessary, at all levels of command.

Another problem that occurs is the deterioration of ammunition due to the climatic conditions of the operational area. The expiry date for ammunition reduces in environments of high humidity and heat, for example. Transporting ammunition, in particular, can be a challenge. It is important to make ammunition replacement forecasts well in advance due to the complicated and restrictive standards required by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) when ammunition is transported by air. Local authorities also generally make the transportation of ammunition more complex due to their lack of collaboration with missions.

Conclusion

- The verification and control of weapons and ammunition is a constant activity; in Uruguay it is practised from entry into military service throughout each soldier's entire career and among all ranks.
- Keeping up to date with the requirements of the COE and ATO not only allows personnel to adapt to UN requirements, but also improves efficiency.
- Beyond normal military training, regardless of their rank, and before being deployed, personnel should receive additional, specialized training (such as a course on logistics in PSOs, including on IATA standards).
- Training is enhanced when instructors are staff officers who have returned from a mission and have direct experience of the issues being discussed.
- Arrangements for ammunition resupply must be made well ahead of time, due to the difficulty of transporting dangerous cargoes and having to obey the host country's customs regulations.

References

- ENOPU (National Peace Operations Training Institute of Uruguay). n.d. 'Fulfilled Missions.'
- UNDPKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations). n.d. 'Deployment and Reimbursement.'

UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 2017. *Manual on Policies and Procedures concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions*. A/72/288 of 4 August.

Annexe 1 PSOs in which Uruguayan personnel have served, 1930–2017

Start and end dates		Mission	Country
2004	2017	ONUCI	Côte d'Ivoire
2004	2017	MINUSTAH	Haiti
2013	2015	MINUSMA	Mali
2009	2010	MINURCAT	Central African Republic
2007	2011	UNMIN	Nepal
2006	2012	UNMIT	East Timor
2005	2008	UNMISS	Sudan
2004	2006	UNFICYP	Cyprus
2004	2006	ONUB	Burundi
2003	2011	UNAMA	Afghanistan
2003	2004	MINUCI	Côte d'Ivoire
2003	2015	UNMIL	Liberia
2002	2005	UNMISSET	East Timor
2000	2008	UNMEE	Ethiopia–Eritrea
1999	2005	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone
1999	2004	UNTAET	East Timor
1999	2010	MONUC	DRC
1998	1999	UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone
1997	1999	MONUA	Angola
1995	2002	MINUGUA	Guatemala
1995	1997	UNAVEM III	Angola
1994	2006	UNOMIG	Georgia
1994	2008	MINURSO	Western Sahara
1994	2000	UNMOT	Tajikistan

1993	1996	UNAMIR	Rwanda
1993	1997	UNOMIL	Liberia
1992	1994	ONUMOZ	Mozambique
1992	2003	UNIKOM	Iraq–Kuwait
1992	1993	UNTAC	Cambodia
1991	1993	MIDERMIN	Honduras–Nicaragua
1988	1991	UNIIMOG	Iran–Iraq
1988	1988	MARMIN	Honduras–Nicaragua
1935	1937	Military Commission	Bolivia–Paraguay
1930	1930	Military Commission	Bolivia–Paraguay

Source: ENOPU (n.d.)

WAM in peacekeeping operations: URUBAT's DDRRR experience in the DRC, 2014–15

Col. (rtd.) Rivera Elgue and Col. (rtd.) Roberto Pereira

Uruguay

Introduction

Upon arrival in the DRC, members of the MONUSCO DDRRR section are deployed almost immediately. To carry out their work efficiently it is important for members of the section to understand the *context* in which they are working, including:

- the challenges faced by and concerns of the various armed groups;
- persons of consequence in the communities in which the section is working (such as religious leaders, tribal leaders, etc.);
- the local authorities (who can help to sensitize community members about disarmament);
- appropriate messages to use to convince combatants and their families to participate in a DDRRR programme; and
- the most appropriate means of communication to transmit relevant messages.

Proficiency in the above areas is achieved through experience.

Once disarmament has been completed, the arms and ammunition are delivered directly to the DDRRR section or to another armed contingent,¹ which then forwards them to the section or some other final destination. This paper discusses the procedures for handling the weapons and ammunition received as part of DDRRR programmes in the DRC, and takes a detailed look at URUBAT's involvement and its WAM procedures.

URUBAT's mandate

URUBAT's main tasks were laid down in the mission's mandate. These were:

- to protect civilians;
- to neutralize armed groups present in its area of operations;
- to monitor the application of the arms embargo;
- to provide support to national and international judicial processes (UNSC, 2014, para. 4); and
- to support DDRRR/DDR programmes (UNSC, 2014, para. 5(g)).

As a reserve force battalion, URUBAT had to be able to operate day and night and deploy within a short time frame from its base in Goma, North Kivu province. It was also deployed in two contingency operating bases in Pinga and Kitchanga villages in North Kivu.

For the fulfilment of its mission and assigned tasks, URUBAT was made up of a battalion, four mobile infantry companies, and a support company of 750 troops (approximately 44 women and 706 men).² The overall numbers remain the same today, but the ratio of men and women changes with every contingent deployed.

Handling of weapons and ammunition during the disarmament process

Peace support actors involved in DDRRR programmes for the voluntary disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups in the DRC focused on the disarmament part of the programme.³ Once the weapons and ammunition were collected, it became MONUSCO's responsibility to store them until UNMAS destroyed them.

Once a weapon was received, the marking(s), model, calibre, serial number, armed group of origin (if it was possible to identify this), name or registration number of the combatant, and the location where it was received were registered. After the weapon arrived at the final DDRRR deposit area, if possible the procedure was to register:

- the country of manufacture (or most recent importing country if the weapon carried a relevant marking);
- year of manufacture;
- other markings (including their location on the weapon);
- its storage code (or location);
- its DDRRR label number;
- previous transfers (including dates and responsibility for custody); and
- its destruction details (the date, location, method, entity that performed the destruction, and the entity that verified the destruction) or its delivery to national security forces.

Similar procedures were followed for ammunition and explosive materials. The category (whether ammunition or an explosive), type, quantity, calibre, name or registration number of the combatant from which it was obtained, armed group of origin (if known), and the location where it was received were all recorded. In the DDRRR deposit area other details were also recorded, such as the markings of small arms and machine guns, the lot number, the manufacturer, country of origin, its condition (whether in a good or bad state), storage code (or location), previous transfers (dates

and custody), and destruction details (the date, location, method used, and the entities that performed and verified the destruction).

Weapons and ammunition were stored separately and organized for transport in accordance with instructions and guidance from a WAM expert. In practice, in the DRC the weapons that were received were destroyed when they were not in good condition. In certain periods those found to be in acceptable condition were handed over to the new Congolese army.

Ammunition that presented an immediate risk or was considered to be unfit to be transported was destroyed on site by qualified specialists. Simultaneously, the DDRRR weapons registration database was updated.

Tracing of weapons and ammunition

While disarming ex-combatants and conducting and verifying arms and ammunition procedures are essential, stopping the flow of arms and ammunition to a conflict zone is an equally important task. DDRRR officers collaborated in this process by documenting information about the factories that produced the weapons and ammunition that were collected, thereby helping to identify their origin as quickly as possible. For this task they needed relevant instructions and a guide to factory and associated marks. In addition to producing practical results, this type of monitoring from the first step of disarmament helped to put psychological pressure on individuals linked to the trafficking and use of illicit weapons, ammunition, and explosives.

Contributing to the detection of small arms and light weapons that were illicitly manufactured or trafficked, the DDRRR section found that some weapons recovered as part of DDRRR programmes were from different factories and had the same identification numbers, while others that had matching numbers were from the same factory.⁴

Procedures for the reception and disposal of weapons recovered from illegal armed groups

For the purposes of DDRRR, a member of an armed group was defined as follows:

It is not only a person carrying weapons, but also defined as: a person who is part of an armed group with support capacity and who acts as a messenger, servant, spy, bodyguard, or sexual slave, etc (MONUSCO, 2012).

This determined that not all those who were part of DDR processes delivered weapons and ammunition.

The armed groups present in the area of operations in North Kivu province were both foreigners (Rwandans and Ugandans) and people of different local ethnicities (Nyangas,

Hundes, and Hutus). Normal disarmament procedures materialized as a result of small groups volunteering to participate, or as part of a negotiation process on disarmament, as was the case with the FDLR.

URUBAT worked on disarmament both independently of and together with the MONUSCO DDR section. Working independently⁵ and despite a host of challenges (see Box 1), it carried out the following tasks in its contingency operating bases:

- disarming and storing weapons of former fighters;
- temporarily disabling and registering weapons and ammunition in accordance with SOPs;
- detailed reporting to the MONUSCO DDRRR section;
- transporting and escorting personnel, weapons, and ammunition to the MONUSCO DDRRR section; and
- formally delivering weapons.

Using these procedures, in the period June 2014–April 2015, 62 members of armed groups were demobilized and 13 weapons (AK-47s) were recovered.

Working in support of the DDRRR section, URUBAT also provided transport and escorts for ex-combatants and their relatives, weapons, and ammunition; supported the extraction and transfer of combatants; and provided technical and logistical support to DDRRR field teams. In November 2014 in Villa Bulyausa, a sub-province of North Kivu, 87 FDLR members and 67 of their relatives were demobilized, resulting in 40 rifles, two machine guns, one mortar, and one RPG-7 being recovered. All of the weapons and ammunition were delivered to the MONUSCO DDRRR section based

Box 1 Unpredictable challenges: weather and terrain

The terrain in North Kivu province, where URUBAT carried out operations, is unfavourable and very restrictive for the deployment of troops, due to the combination of mountains, jungle, and roads in very poor condition. In urban areas there are also restrictions on movement, the use of force, and surveillance due to high population density and narrow streets, which are generally also in poor condition. Weather conditions (temperature, humidity, and rainfall) hindered the performance of MONUSCO troops and their mobility, thereby affecting military operations. The rapidly changing nature of the weather led to the cancellation of air operations with little notice, for example. Such operations can be decisive in terms of providing support or reinforcing troops in the field. In general, however, during the rainy season armed groups reduced the number and intensity of their operations (although their military capacity was not reduced).

in Goma city, which destroyed them in a series of ceremonies in coordination with UNMAS.

URUBAT's weapons and ammunition controls and procedures

The Uruguayan army (and URUBAT) keeps a detailed inventory of all of its weapons and ammunition, including the batch identification and expiry dates. During annual rotations weapons and ammunition remain in the mission area.

In addition to periodic inspections of COE by the inventory control teams and the operational readiness inspection, in accordance with Uruguayan army regulations, weekly inspections of a unit's armament and ammunition are also carried out. These inspections document when and by whom inspections are performed, which weapons were not inspected, and any related causes. A report on the status of the arms and ammunition is sent to Uruguay on a monthly basis, including data on updating relevant stocks and replenishment forecasts, in accordance with availability and future operational needs.

All weapons and ammunition that are not being used in operations are stored in containers that are subject to security measures specifically designed for this purpose. Surprise inspections of accommodation and facilities are also carried out to check for the presence of alcohol, drugs, and other prohibited substances, as part of which any violations of directives on the proper management of armaments and ammunition are addressed, and sanctions imposed if necessary. Sensitization on the sanctions imposed on those who fail to comply with relevant orders is also conducted regularly.

URUBAT's national procedures before departure, in addition to the UN's military police, combined with Uruguayan customs controls, ensure that any possibility of arms trafficking from the mission area to Uruguay is severely restricted or eliminated.

From an operational point of view, an ongoing evaluation of risks and threats to determine the type of operations and the level of force to be employed, as well as the capacity for immediate reinforcement or extraction, is essential to avoid situations where troops find themselves at a disadvantage, which could lead to the loss of weapons.

A final aspect to highlight is the complexity of replenishing ammunition in a mission area, particularly for armed forces who must acquire it on the international market, which necessitates negotiation, appropriate timing, and—above all—coordination.

During the period under discussion (2014–15), URUBAT reported no losses of weapons or ammunition.

Endnotes

- 1 In addition to their own functions, other armed contingents often temporarily assume the tasks of the DDRRR section by guarding weapons, ammunition, and explosives, and assisting in their destruction.
- 2 URUBAT is part of the Uruguayan contribution to MONUSCO. The total number of Uruguayans taking part in MONUSCO is currently 937 (UN, n.d.).
- 3 Whereas MONUSCO was tasked with supporting DDRRR for foreign armed groups, it was not *directly* involved with DDR programmes, which focused on national armed groups.
- 4 These irregularities fall under Article 7 of the Nairobi Protocol (2004), under which the DRC committed to placing a unique marking on each weapon at the time of manufacture or import.
- 5 When URUBAT worked independently of the DDRRR section, all technical DDRRR duties (such as keeping a disarmament registry and temporarily storing recovered weapons and ammunition) were its responsibility, in addition to providing transport and escorts. When it provided support to the MONUSCO DDRRR section, URUBAT provided technical and logistical support in the deactivation of specialized weaponry or ammunition, but the DDRRR section was responsible for technical duties.

References

- MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 2012. 'DDRRR Standard Operation Procedure (SOP).' Unpublished document. July.
- Nairobi Protocol (Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States). 2004. Nairobi, 21 April.
- UN (United Nations). n.d. 'MONUSCO Fact Sheet.'
- UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2014. Resolution 2147 (2014). S/RES/2147 of 28 March.

Weapons and ammunition management and force protection: some reflections on converging agendas

Lt. Gen. (rtd.) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz

Brazil

Introduction

Reducing the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in areas of conflict is an ambitious and challenging objective. Clearly, this goal cannot be accomplished without the effective management and control of and accountability for small arms and ammunition in the PSOs that deploy in conflict zones. If we think about what it means for PSOs to be 'effective', this must be one aspect of their work. By the same token, only forces that operate effectively in this way can hope to fulfil the tasks listed in relevant UN Security Council mandates with regard to the control and reduction of illicit weapons and ammunitions in conflict zones.

The environments where the UN deploys PSOs are very complex, and it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive approach to WAM in order to have realistic expectations and achieve results. A better and more effective UN system could play a key role in reducing violence and the flow of illicit weapons, ammunition, and other war equipment into conflict areas. But the effectiveness of UN missions cannot be sufficiently improved from inside alone; it also requires external support. The UN system is also hampered by its very nature: as a political and diplomatic organization, very often the UN finds it difficult to make public the flaws and failures of its member states and PSOs.

The observations in this paper are based on almost five years spent in a number of UN peace operations, including MINUSTAH (Haiti) and MONUSCO (DRC) as a force commander, as well as MINUSCA (Central African Republic) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (Mali). The two last missions were undertaken during the writing of the UN's 2017 report, *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business* (dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, and Cusimano, 2017).

The following reflections are relevant not only for UN PSOs, but also for those authorized and fielded by regional and subregional organizations.

Clearly, each mission has its own particular history and set of problems. Each is unique. Haiti and the DRC are very different countries, for example, with huge differences in terms of territorial coverage and populations. But they also have many similarities, including histories of colonial exploitation and external interference. Both countries have experienced weak governance, corruption, and persistent conflicts; have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and families; experience

a proliferation of armed groups, street gangs, and organized crime; and have a majority of their populations living in chronic poverty.

When considering the issue of managing arms and ammunition in conflict zones, it is important to consider all the various actors and sources of weapons in the field. These include:

- military and police personnel operating under the UN flag (formed units and staff officers), who are responsible for COE;
- materiel seized by the UN (troops and police) and national security forces during their regular duties;
- weapons and ammunition collected as part of DDR programmes;
- arms held by rebel groups, street gangs, militias, and members of organized crime groups;
- neighbouring countries with an interest in the conflict, which sometimes facilitate and provide support for armed groups in the conflict zone; and
- the weapons and ammunition of national security forces.

Within the UN system it is very important to establish and follow standard operational and administrative procedures in PSOs in order to have effective, practical, and transparent control of COE (including pistols, rifles, machine guns, ammunition, and grenades). The system should serve as a tool to prevent losses, illegal activities, and the mismanagement of weapons and ammunition.

Losses can, of course, occur during attacks on troops or bases and due to the inattention of staff officers. Since the loss of a weapon by a soldier is considered shameful, some TCCs may be not comfortable reporting such incidents, which hinders our understanding of the true scope of weapons and ammunition losses and diversion. Nevertheless, it should be mandatory to put systems in place for the regular and timely reporting of such losses, in addition to information sharing, investigations, inquiries, and follow-up.

Small Arms Survey research has made clear that arms and ammunition losses are a serious challenge for many missions, and that the lack of clear guidelines on the management of recovered weapons leaves open many opportunities for less-than-ideal practice. The quantities of weapons recovered from negative forces can also be quite significant in some contexts. Because there can be ineffective lines of authority between the mission command and the sector or TCC command, reporting about what is captured from—and even given away to—third parties may not always be transparent. Large, valuable weapons systems that troops from some TCCs recover may even be transported back to their capital cities as ‘prizes’ without the head of mission or force commander even being informed.

The development of uniform policies and procedures designed to prevent the mismanagement of arms and ammunition in PSOs is clearly essential. The emphasis in this paper is, however, on some important areas of change that are needed within the system to ensure that policies are fully implemented. This has less to do with arms management policies as such—which were considered in more detail by other qualified experts at the workshop—and more to do with mindsets, attitudes, and related behaviours.

My central point throughout this paper is that the UN system as a whole needs to change to become more effective. Such a shift not only will yield benefits in terms of reduced COE losses, the better management of recovered weapons, and more effective efforts to reduce illicit arms proliferation in conflict zones, but will also alleviate a number of other important safety and professionalism concerns affecting PSOs.

In this regard, a number of observations are provided below for making PSOs and the UN peacekeeping system more effective, with the final goals of reducing violence, creating a safe environment for UN personnel, and protecting civilians in conflict zones. Conclusions and suggestions are provided at the end, with an understanding that it is not easy to change systems in the short term in an organization with the dimensions and complexity of the UN.

Posture and mindset

Various motivations—whether political, financial, or other—drive civilians and TCCs/PCCs to participate in UN PSOs. Unfortunately, many such contingents simply do not wish to face the risks inherent to such PSOs. As a result, over the long term, in its role as a treaty supervisor or as a trusted witness to peace agreements, the UN has developed a ‘classic peacekeeping’ posture that resists change. Looking ahead, it is crucial for the UN to adopt a new posture in this regard based not only on observation, deterrence, and reporting, but also on taking action.

Building an appropriate mindset is the first step in such a process of change. While mandates, statements of unit requirement, MoUs, and rules of engagement are important in terms of providing administrative and legal definitions of tasks and related legal support, they are not enough to guarantee a PSO’s performance. Mindset change would require the UN to issue clear guidance about expectations regarding the operational and administrative behaviour of contingents in a PSO. For example, the importance of contingents’ taking the initiative when necessary; demonstrating by their actions a robust and responsive UN; developing military tactics to engage illegal forces and protect UN bases and civilians; collecting intelligence; and taking all possible legal steps to bring to justice criminals who attack peacekeepers should be included in a detailed written TCC/PCC commitment from the outset. Timely action

and reaction in situations in which peacekeeping troops should act with proportionate (and overwhelming) force should also be emphasized.

Capacities, experience, training, and standards

We must also accept that not all TCCs/PCCs have the right profile to participate in all UN PSOs. Training is fundamental, but it must also be accompanied by, and based on, the appropriate profile and experience.

Pre-deployment training undertaken at UN headquarters is crucial and should be of an appropriately high standard. It should focus on the operational domain and include information on both legislative and administrative requirements. It is also important to introduce the standards required for the control of weapons, ammunition, and related items at this stage.

At the end of such training the UN and TCC/PCC should jointly certify that the contingent is ready for deployment, is well trained and well equipped, and has the appropriate structures in place to successfully carry out the mission.

Based on lessons learned from past missions, the UN should clarify to TCCs/PCCs from the highest to the lowest levels (from the permanent mission to the UN to the troop level) what its expectations are regarding contingents' operational and administrative behaviour. Such guidance should also be provided to civilian members of missions, as well as to relevant agencies, funds, and programmes.

To make this happen, the UN needs to identify appropriate profiles for UN Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (UNSRSGs), force commanders, police commissioners and their deputies, sector commanders, commanders of battalions and companies, and even for the rank and file involved in missions.

Better intelligence

By and large, UN missions have very weak intelligence-gathering capacities. While attention is paid to hi-tech intelligence, for example, the basics may be neglected. Many units have only a small number of intelligence specialists. In the field units are often fragmented and deployed at three, four, or more different bases, without intelligence cells in each company and detachment. The integration of military, police, and other sectors into PSOs can also be complicated by the sheer number of actors involved. These may include the force itself; a joint mission analysis centre; police, civil affairs, DDR, and human rights personnel; a political affairs division; and groups of experts.

Sometimes mandates or terms of reference can also become blurred or be misinterpreted. Political affairs divisions, for instance, are dedicated almost exclusively to

elections and politics in host countries, often forgetting that they should also analyse and interpret the political objectives of armed groups and their supporters (both internal and external). It is fundamental, therefore, to develop a combination of hi-tech intelligence and operational intelligence, based mainly on human sources.

The UN's field administration, under UNDFS, does not have an operational mindset. This is understandable because of the bureaucracy involved, but the problem could be resolved if administration in the field were subordinated to the SRSO instead. For instance, it is neither efficient nor sensible to wait almost a year to negotiate a bid to hire a boat to patrol a lake while a riverine unit waits for suitable conditions to carry out its work, as happened in MONUSCO. This kind of mismanagement imposes huge financial and operational costs on a mission. Similarly, upwards of half of all patrols are undertaken without interpreters due to cost-cutting measures, because the budget for operational intelligence is negligible. Patrols without interpreters are unable to interact with local populations to gather intelligence.

To be more effective, PSOs need not just better intelligence, but also to use it to take appropriate action. This is in order to protect civilians from violence; restrict freedom of movement to legal forces (including the UN); and prevent armed groups, street gangs, militias, rebels, and other criminal groups from accessing arms and weapons.

Limitations to possible reforms

Efforts to improve the effectiveness of PSOs, including their WAM procedures, face a number of challenges, including the following:

- **Weak control of weapons and obstruction by the host country.** Due to member states' sovereignty, the UN has no influence on a host country's control of its own forces' weapons and ammunition. This is aggravated when a host government is a source of illegal activities and violence against its own population, or has connections with illegal armed groups either internally or abroad. Indeed, in some countries that host UN PSOs, not only do host country armed forces not have structures to control their own materiel, but they may also have elements of rebel movements inside their structures.

Furthermore, some host governments fail to cooperate with UN PSOs and impose travel restrictions on peacekeepers. There are also many cases of attacks targeting UN forces that are likely supported by local troops. It is a fact that governments often accept the presence of UN peacekeepers simply because they profit from the situation, mainly financially, and do not want to suffer sanctions by refusing the peacekeepers' presence.

- **Porous borders and interference from surrounding states.** It is impossible for the UN to control a country's borders and prevent or reduce the flow of goods across

them, including weapons and ammunition, without the engagement of both local and neighbouring governments. Host states may also not be able to do this effectively.

In both Haiti and the DRC huge financial resources were spent on related efforts without any results and without creating local structures to control the porosity of these countries' respective borders. In the DRC, almost all the armed groups are located near surrounding country borders that are accessible by land and water, including via hundreds of kilometres of lakes in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

Solutions need to be based on practice, not theory. In the DRC, two radar stations were installed close to the lakes, which was a good idea in principle. But they were operated by UN military observers without any specialization in this field, including the ability to interpret radar images, and without any connection to an intervention system or integration with other intelligence sources. In such cases, financial resources are spent with no effective results.

The easy circulation and illegal trade of weapons and ammunition are common in many conflict zones. There are about 50 armed groups in the DRC, each with its own strengths, interests, and structures. All of them have easy access to weapons and ammunition, which are paid for by the smuggling of minerals, illegally harvested timber, and goods across land borders and lakes bordering neighbouring countries. Clearly some neighbouring countries are not interested in joining efforts to prevent illegal activities from crossing their borders. Some even benefit from not doing so and are protected from being held accountable. In the fight against M23, for example, many people died—civilians, Congolese troops, peacekeepers, and M23 combatants, with most of the latter being young boys and men co-opted by criminal leaders living out their irresponsible political adventures. After the group's defeat no attempts were made to sanction its leaders or their supporters. We must conclude that in the international political arena such decisions are political and not people-centred, despite the rhetoric to the contrary.

- **High-risk missions.** While all missions should receive the same attention, there are a small number in which the risks are very high and where troops and bases are more likely to experience attacks and, consequently, suffer more casualties and losses of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment. Practically all cases of attacks against UN peacekeepers occur in Africa currently and African TCCs are paying a heavy price in terms of lives lost. The UN needs to pay due attention to this problem. Take, for example, the attack on the Simulik Bridge combat base in North Kivu, DRC, in December 2017, when 15 Tanzanian peacekeepers were killed (*Daily Nation*, 2017). Almost a year later the UN is unable to make public a report clarifying these events and defining who was responsible for them. It is hard to understand how the UN, MONUSCO, and Tanzania might be

unaware of what happened in this incident. The delay in releasing the report is, in fact, a reflection of the lack of political will needed to identify those who were responsible. Ascertaining the truth is not only important for learning lessons from such an incident, but is also a question of consideration for the soldiers (and their families) who sacrificed their lives.

Conclusion

The UN has experienced and highly qualified personnel, and should use this capacity to refine regulations on and the supervision of the quality of COE inspections, paying special attention to small arms and ammunition. This should occur mainly after specific events take place.

Before setting up a PSO, it is important to negotiate the possibility of establishing a joint administrative system with the host country for the control of weapons, ammunition, and national borders. In some cases it may also be important to negotiate with neighbouring countries as well, when they form part of a mission's wider context.

It is essential for the UN to share responsibility with TCCs for pre-deployment training, as well as the appraisal and certification of contingents before deployment. The quality of pre-deployment training is the starting point for achieving the mission's objectives, and must be emphasized for all operational and administrative procedures. Supplementary in-mission training may also be important for a TCC's troops, civilians, and administrators.

Special attention should be paid to supporting African TCCs/PCCs that take on practically all the high-risk operations within that continent. They are excellent and willing combatants, even in the most dangerous missions. As a consequence, it is important to pay attention to their training and to change the reimbursement system in order to anticipate the financial resources required to improve their training and acquire the necessary equipment.

Contingents and the UN administration should also pay attention to reinforcing force protection by paying equal attention to both basic needs and high-level technology. Fences, gates, walls, sensors, cameras, and drones all have the same importance. Furthermore, field administration should be subordinated to the SRSG, not to UNDFS.

Overall, the adoption of a strong posture is safest for missions, one that is based on overt action and not just deterrence. This prevents attacks against UN bases and troops and better protects local civilians. UN missions should not give criminal groups the opportunity to obtain weapons and ammunition by force or due to mismanagement. If rebel groups, militias, and organized criminal groups are given the opportunity to take weapons and ammunition from UN personnel, they will try to do so.

Furthermore, the UN should not permit perpetrators to enjoy impunity after attacks on civilians, UN bases, and personnel; assassinations of peacekeepers; and the theft of weapons and other UN equipment.

Currently, in some missions the development of integrated intelligence-gathering capacity is proving vital. But let us not forget that the ultimate goal of intelligence gathering is not only to obtain information, but also to use it as the basis for action. Similarly, in some PSO contexts police action against drug trafficking should receive greater attention due to its association with the illegal trade of weapons and ammunition.

Finally, it is understandable that it is difficult for the UN system to be transparent and courageous enough to assign political accountability and apply appropriate sanctions. However, because it deploys personnel in high-risk contexts where they may be killed or injured and is responsible for protecting civilians, it is not unreasonable to expect the UN to have the courage to hold countries, authorities, and individuals providing or facilitating access to illicit arms and ammunition accountable, and to impose sanctions on individuals and governments stimulating or feeding conflicts and violence.

PSOs may receive assistance from independent experts and institutions to assess illicit flows of weapons and ammunition, to refine regulations and procedures to deal with them, and to propose solutions to challenges related to WAM. These external actors are less restricted in terms of investigating and monitoring situations characterized by illicit arms flows and elaborating related proposals to deal with such situations than UN personnel. However, peacekeepers should also strive to improve their performance and not be afraid to use force to protect both themselves and civilians.

References

- Daily Nation* (Nairobi). 2017. 'Magafuli "Shocked" by Killings of Tanzanian Soldiers in DRC.' 9 December.
- dos Santos Cruz, Carlos Alberto, William R. Phillips, and Salvator Cusimano. 2017. *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business*. 19 December.

Laying down of arms in the UN Mission in Colombia

Col. Juan Acuña (Uruguay) and Col. Gustavo García (Argentina)

UN Mission in Colombia

What were the UN Mission in Colombia and the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism?

The UN Mission in Colombia (UNMC) was established after the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 2261 on 25 January 2016 (UNSC, 2016) and the signing of the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace on 24 November 2016 between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP, ending 53 years of internal armed conflict in Colombia (GoC and FARC-EP, 2016). Peace negotiations had begun in Havana, Cuba, four years before the agreement was reached. The FARC-EP was the most powerful guerrilla group not only in Colombia, but in all of Latin America.

The peace agreement established a tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) comprising the UNMC, the Government of Colombia, and the FARC-EP that was unique in the history of UN missions. The MVM was organized into a national headquarters, eight regional headquarters, and 26 local sites known as the transitional local zones for normalization (ZVTNs) and transitional local points (PTNs). The MVM was responsible for ensuring compliance with the ceasefire agreement, including the protocols and procedures established in Chapter 3.1 on the 'laying down of arms'. The international component of the MVM comprised 450 international observers, who were unarmed and without uniforms, and mostly came from countries in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Its members were commissioned officers and NCOs of the armed and police forces of their respective countries. They were responsible for monitoring the ceasefire and the disarmament process.

Jean Arnault, the UNSRSG, led the UNMC. A UN substantive component was also established comprising civilians responsible for providing political and logistical support to the UNMC.

Within the international component a commanding officer in the national headquarters and in each regional headquarters, and two in each local headquarters, were responsible for disarmament. A team of three worked on disarmament in the national headquarters, assisted by two part-time specialists from the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The FARC-EP also had its own disarmament officers at various levels. Although some international observers were directly responsible for disarmament, all other observers were also involved in related tasks. A mission support team in the UN's substantive component also played an important role in acquiring equipment (such as

tents, containers, wire, etc.), providing contracts, and supporting the mobility of UN personnel and weapons.

The Colombian government created a Police Unit for the Construction of Peace (UNIPPEP) within the national police. This unit was directly responsible for the security of the international observers and FARC-EP personnel, in addition to all other activities related to the peace process. A separate Strategic Transition Command in the army was in charge of all military personnel affected by the peace process. At the political level the highest body involved in relevant negotiations was the Commission for Follow-up, Impulse and Verification of the Implementation of Peace Agreements.

Where did disarmament take place?

The Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP jointly defined, delimited, arranged, and carried out disarmament in the ZVTNs/PTNs.¹ The objective of focusing on these areas was to guarantee the ceasefire agreement and the disarmament process, and to begin preparations for the reincorporation of FARC-EP members into civilian life, as well as their accreditation and transition to a lawful status. The government built camps in the ZVTNs/PTNs as temporary accommodation for members of the group. Initially, the disarmament process was scheduled to last 180 days, from 2 December 2016 to 31 May 2017. As described below, this time line was pushed back for various political and logistical reasons.

In each ZVTN/PTN the UNMC installed a disarmament camp built by civilian contractors, which consisted of living quarters to house the international observers and two containers where weapons and ammunition were stored and marked. Security measures were applied in accordance with international standards. For logistical reasons no containers were installed in four ZVTNs/PTNs and temporary storage facilities had to be constructed. Metal boxes were also temporarily used in some cases.

In the vicinity of each ZVTN/PTN an MVM local headquarters was established and a camp for military and police was installed nearby. A security zone was established around the ZVTNs/PTNs that ranged between 0.5 and 1 km in width; Colombian security forces provided security in this zone.

How did disarmament proceed?

Disarmament was a technical and verifiable procedure through which the UNMC received the FARC-EP's arms. It occurred in a number of planning and execution stages and included the following technical procedures:

- registration;
- identification;

- monitoring and verification;
- collection;
- storage;
- extraction; and
- final disposal.

Planning for disarmament began before the peace agreement was signed. For this purpose the UNMC participated in the final phase of the so-called ‘Havana Agreements’. From the outset, the process of the laying down of arms was designed to receive significant financial and logistical support from the UN and the Government of Colombia—in accordance with the agreement—although this did not occur in practice due to a series of delays. Once the peace process began in December 2016, the disarmament process was planned in detail, including by creating the necessary tools to carry it out. This involved the drafting of SOPs, technical operating procedures (TOPs), and a guide for use by the international observers. Bar codes were developed to identify each weapon and facilitate its registration, for identification and control, and for reporting on related incidents and each weapon’s destruction. Once a weapon was identified and registered it received a bar code sticker, a copy of which was put in each weapon’s file.

It should be noted that during the implementation of the disarmament process it was necessary to make training videos for the international observers to help them to understand the tasks at hand and to standardize procedures. A UN media team made these videos.

Systems also had to be designed to manage information and data. This was one of the most complex tasks due to the confidentiality that was necessary during the entire process. The substantive component of the UNMC designed a programme to store information on each identified and registered weapon and its subsequent management in the local, regional, and national venues.

As laid down in the peace agreement, the FARC-EP had to deliver all of the information about its weapons holdings to the MVM so that it could plan the operation. This was done with extreme secrecy. The process was initially delayed due to disagreements between the parties. Finally, at the end of January 2017 FARC-EP members began to move to the ZVTNs/PTNs, bringing with them their individual weapons with their ammunition. Upon arrival, the UNMC–MVM identified and registered all the individual weapons and then monitored them in the camps in accordance with relevant procedures.

The peace agreement stipulated the following:

- that the storage of weapons, grenades, and ammunition should take place by D+60;²

- that between day D+10 and day D+60 the FARC-EP had to destroy any unstable materiel stored in its storage facilities, which was to be verified by the UNMC–MVM; and
- that the collection and storage of individual weapons that remained in the hands of the former combatants in the camps had to be done sequentially and in three phases. By D+90, 30 per cent of the total had to be stored, by D+120 another 30 per cent, and by D+150 the remaining 40 per cent.

The first to deliver their weapons were the FARC-EP members who were participating in the MVM and the peace process. The dates for the storage of weapons had to be readjusted in accordance with progress made in the peace process. On 29 May 2017—the day when the storage of weapons was to be completed—three new dates were established for the delivery of individual weapons. Delivery was to occur in percentages similar to those established in the agreement, leaving a minimum of 10 per cent in the hands of the FARC-EP to ensure the security of its camps. This last percentage was delivered the day before the extraction of the weapons (see the discussion of the extraction process, below) in accordance with a schedule agreed in each ZVTN/PTN. This process ended on 15 August 2017.

The destruction of unstable materiel and ammunition

The FARC-EP's move to the ZVTNs/PTNs should have taken place without any explosives or unstable materiel, which were supposed to have been destroyed before FARC-EP members entered the ZVTNs/PTNs. This did not happen in all cases, and these materiel had to be destroyed at the ZVTNs/PTNs, which was done between 1 and 28 July 2017. Between 11 and 28 July all the ammunition was incinerated, leaving a minimum percentage for the weapons retained by the FARC-EP to ensure the security of its camps (see above). The TOPs guided these activities. The FARC-EP destroyed the unstable materiel and the UNMC monitored the process, while the FARC-EP and UNMC jointly incinerated the ammunition.

Each person who handed over their weapons was given a certificate in order to facilitate their transition to civilian life. This was done in coordination with the government's Office of the High Commissioner for Peace.

The destruction of arms caches

In addition to the destruction of personal weapons, the peace process required that at the beginning of the implementation phase the FARC-EP should provide geo-referenced information on the location of all its other weapons, ammunition, and explosives (the so-called '*caletas*' or arms caches), whose extraction had to be completed before D+60. For various reasons there were significant delays in providing this information.

In total, more than 180 such extraction operations were conducted, reaching 750 out of almost a thousand arms caches that the FARC-EP had reported (the Colombian security forces extracted those that remained after the UNMC's mandate had ended) (UNMC, 2017b). Relevant operations required more than 280 UN helicopter flight hours, 210 government helicopter flight hours, 20 movements on rivers, and more than 120 movements over land, accounting for approximately 40,000 km travelled (UNMC, 2017b).

The procedure was as follows:

- The FARC-EP provided information on its caches, including the type of materiel they contained.
- The UNMC and FARC-EP planned the extraction process at the local level; the regional and national headquarters then approved these arrangements.
- National headquarters approved and coordinated the extraction with Colombian security forces.
- Colombian security forces secured the relevant area where the caches were located.
- Once the area was secured, FARC-EP and UNMC personnel approached the caches, accompanied by members of UNIPEP.
- FARC-EP personnel carried out the operation and the UNMC personnel monitored it.
- The personnel involved returned to the ZVTNs/PTNs with the weapons and ammunition scrap. Explosives were destroyed on site.

The UNMC's involvement in the extraction process ended on 15 September 2017.³

The weapons extraction process, disabling, and final disposal

The disabling of arms was originally planned for each ZVTN/PTN, but due to the logistical challenges involved it was undertaken in a centralized arms depot outside Bogotá. The arms had to be moved from the ZVTNs/PTNs to the central depot. They were grouped by type and size for the transfer, in packages of five, with the exception of grenade launchers (packed in twos due to their size) and those with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm (packed individually). Scrap ammunition and other supplies were placed in bags.

Detailed and careful coordination was necessary among the UNMC, the substantive component of the mission, the FARC-EP, UNIPEP (which provided security to each convoy), and the government security forces (which provided area security) to complete the task. The FARC-EP had organized the extraction in close coordination with the UNMC and the government using land and air transport. Each convoy consisted of a truck that transported the relevant container with the arms, magazines, and

ammunition scrap, accompanied by personnel from the UNMC, FARC-EP, UNIPEP, and the armed forces.

In some cases, the ZVTN/PTN did not have containers and the materiel was transported by river or, for security reasons, by UN helicopters. Two waves of extractions were conducted, involving 20 ground movements and 32 air-ground movements that involved 81 hours of flight in three helicopters and the use of 37 trucks, with a total of 26,000 km travelled. The operation ended on 15 August 2017. In total, 8,994 weapons, 1.3 million rounds of ammunition scrap, and 22 tons of magazines and other effects were transported to the Bogotá depot. Those responsible for the disarmament process personally delivered all the corresponding documentation to the depot.

It took some time to organize the depot and equip it to execute the task. Activities began on the site on 23 July 2017. Eleven international observers, a civilian specialist hired by the UN, and 13 members of the German company Technisches Hilfswerk were employed to disable the weapons, with 40 members of UNIPEP providing external security. Approximately 400 weapons were disabled per day. Technisches Hilfswerk personnel cut the weapons to permanently disable them and international observers verified the process before, during, and after the cutting had occurred.

Once this activity was completed, on 6 October 2017 all of the disabled weapons were delivered to the government for final disposal and for use in the construction of three monuments.

The final challenge was to inform Colombians, many of whom were sceptical about the peace process, of the progress that had been made. Little by little, information that was initially secret was disseminated, not only via reports and other forms of information, but also by using images to strengthen the credibility of the process.

Overview of the disarmament process

In September 2017 the UNMC certified the laying down of a total of 8,994 weapons, including the following:

- 6,177 assault rifles;
- 28 precision rifles;
- 6 shotguns;
- 229 grenade launchers;
- 1,817 pistols;
- 274 machine guns;
- 170 revolvers;
- 13 sub-machine guns;
- 12 rocket launchers; and
- 268 mortars.

In addition, the following were destroyed:

- 1,765,862 rounds of small arms ammunition;
- 38,255 kg of diverse explosives;
- 51,911 m of detonating cord and fuses;
- 11,015 grenades (both hand and 40 mm grenades);
- 3,528 anti-personnel mines;
- 46,288 initiators; and
- 4,370 mortar rounds (including 81 mm and 60 mm) and rockets (UNMC, 2017c).

Conclusion

The peace process in Colombia led to the establishment of an unprecedented tripartite MVM, which could be applicable to other peace processes. Its functioning was complex; however, the overall result was very positive.

Because the laying down of arms was subject to a road map that also covered other aspects of the peace agreement, disagreements between the parties led to non-compliance with the terms established for the reception of weaponry.

The completion of the disarmament process within 180 days would have required logistical arrangement to be in place from the outset. This did not happen, and overcoming logistical challenges was one of the greatest difficulties that the mission had to face.

During the implementation of the peace process several differences became apparent between what was agreed and what actually took place. However, the broad mandate was fulfilled.

Despite the difficulties experienced and the delays, in less than a year the UNMC—with the support of the FARC-EP, the Government of Colombia, and Colombian society as a whole—accomplished the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. This was, therefore, one of the most successful peace processes in the UN's history.

Endnotes

- 1 The Government of Colombia did not take part in the actual implementation of the disarmament process.
- 2 'D' refers to 1 December 2016, the day when the peace agreement was endorsed and the beginning of the process by which the FARC-EP would lay down its arms. D+60 refers to 60 days after 1 December 2016.
- 3 The UNMC completed its Security Council mandate on 26 September 2017. The UN continues to provide support to the Colombian peace process through the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, established by Security Council Resolution 2377 (2017) (UNMC, 2017a).

References

- GoC (Government of Colombia) and FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army). 2016. Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. 24 November.
- UNMC (United Nations Mission in Colombia). 2017a. 'Statement to the Security Council by Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia Jean Arnault.' UNMC Press Release. 11 September.
- . 2017b. 'UN Mission Finalises Extraction of Arms Caches and Laying Down of Weapons of the FARC-EP.' 15 September.
- . 2017c. 'The UN Mission Finalizes Activities of Neutralization of the FARC-EP Armament.' UNMC Press Release. 22 September.
- UNSC (United Nation Security Council). 2016. Resolution 2261 (2016). S/RES/2261 (2016) of 25 January.

Building partner-nation training capacity for weapons and ammunition management: the applicability of US Global Peace Operations Initiative training models

Paul R. Yorio

GPOI Programme Manager, US Southern Command · United States

Introduction

The US Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) supports training, equipping, and facility renovation projects related to peacekeeping throughout the world. The overarching objective of the GPOI is to assist partners who have the political will but lack some of the resources to deploy on UN PSOs. More specifically, in Latin America, GPOI training capacity-building projects have captured lessons learned and best practices in three distinct training models, depending on the depth and breadth of the training programme required by a specific partner nation. These models are applicable to the design and development of a training capacity-building programme for WAM.

This paper describes the GPOI's history and objectives; highlights the three training capacity-building models that it has employed, as well as impediments that have been experienced; and then draws on these observations to suggest a road map for building training capacity for WAM in Latin America.

What is the GPOI?¹

The GPOI programme was launched in 2005 as the US contribution to the G8's Action Plan for 'Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations', which was adopted in 2004. It is a US Department of State security assistance programme managed and executed by the US DoD. The GPOI focuses primarily on military capacity, with only limited support for formed police units. In the western hemisphere the US Southern Command manages and executes the GPOI programme. The command's cumulative budget of USD 110 million spanning fiscal years 2005–18 is focused on achieving six objectives in the following eight active GPOI partner nations: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay (not all the objectives are applicable to each partner):

The objectives are the following:

1. **Build self-sufficient peace operations training capacity.** We assist Latin American partners to establish or strengthen the institutional infrastructure required to self-sufficiently execute core PSO training for military personnel.

2. **Support the development and employment of critical enabling capabilities.** We provide training, equipment, and advisory assistance to Latin American partners with the political will to develop and deploy a critical enabling capability in areas such as engineering, aviation, medicine, logistics, signals, intelligence, or riverine operations. Political will must be demonstrated by the registration of the relevant enabling capability in the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System.
3. **Enhance operational readiness and sustainment capabilities.** We provide specialized or mission-specific pre-deployment training, technical and advisory assistance, strategic-level training, in-mission supplementary training, and training or deployment equipment to improve and maintain partners' operational readiness capabilities to deploy and sustain units participating in PSOs.
4. **Strengthen rapid deployment capabilities.** We assist select partners to strengthen and institutionalize capabilities and processes to rapidly deploy forces (in fewer than 60 days) to emerging crises.
5. **Expand the role of women and enhance gender integration.** We encourage women's participation, integration, and leadership in PSOs; train female peacekeepers; and integrate gender-related topics (such as preventing gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse) into training for all peacekeepers.
6. **Build UN and regional organization capabilities.** We provide assistance to regional peace operations training centres² by establishing and emphasizing individual and unit performance standards, tasks that are essential to the mission, and reference guides.

All of these objectives either directly or indirectly support the Small Arms Survey's goal of reducing the diversion of weapons from PSOs and improving the ability of each TCC to manage and account for its weapons and ammunition, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the overall mission and the protection of both the force in question and the local civilian population (Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder, 2017, p. 12).

GPOI training-capacity models

Three GPOI-funded models are used.

1. Traditional three-phase train-the-trainer (T₃) MTT model

The oldest GPOI-funded training capacity-building initiative supports gender integration in contingents' mobile training teams (MTTs) for UN PSOs. Due to the need to obtain buy-in at the ministry of defence level to institutionalize gender integration in deployed contingents, a methodical, three-phase, train-the-trainer (T₃) model was adopted. The need to disseminate this programme of instruction throughout the re-

gion required the formation of a mobile team that was able to deploy to each partner country to train there. This model is therefore referred to as the traditional three-phase T₃ MTT model. The graduation event is the deployment of the in-country trainers with limited or no mentorship.

The key to this model is that the partner should take full ownership of the MTT after the third phase, including the provision of funding, administrative, and logistical support. This means the partner must have the resources and institutional maturity and—more importantly—the national will to sustain the MTT over time. One unintended consequence of the implementation of this model is that regional partners may feel ‘slighted’ if they are not selected to form part of an MTT. This misperception can be mitigated by forming a combined or multinational MTT, but each member partner must be willing to share expenses, which can present a challenge.

2. Multi-phase T₃ MTT model

The second major GPOI-funded training capacity-building initiative focuses on using behaviour to identify threats to peacekeepers and the local population (Meehan, 2018). The model adapted to institutionalize and build this training capacity required a slight modification of the traditional three-phase T₃ MTT model because the tactics, techniques, and procedures were more sophisticated and required a formal ‘certification’ by the developer. A modified T₃ approach was therefore adopted to fulfil the requirement of providing a combination of trained and certified instructors and assistant instructors (referred to as ‘coaches’). The additional phases in this model are required to certify the partner instructor and coaches in each MTT and to incorporate feedback from the deployed contingent to improve the programme of instruction (Meehan, 2018).

The advantage of the multi-phase model is that it works well for training programmes that have a formal certification process or requirement, although ultimately—just like the traditional model—the partner must take full ownership of programme sustainment. Obviously, the multiple phases make the initial time and financial investment more costly for the donor or capacity-building provider nation. Again, the long-term success of this model is based on resources and the critical ability to track personnel due to the training investment in each MTT member.

Furthermore, the formal certification requirement eliminates the viability of a multinational MTT because of logistical constraints. This is because a single-nation MTT is easier and less costly to certify than a multinational MTT.

3. Hybrid model

The third GPOI-funded training capacity-building initiative is a clear departure from the two previously discussed initiatives and their associated models. This hybrid

model focuses on the training of a national investigation officer (NIO) at the contingent level to analyse and document any and all allegations of illegal activities committed by contingent personnel, with a focus on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The hybrid model was required due to the highly specialized and technical nature of the subject matter in question. Due to sovereignty concerns and other sensitivities surrounding this type of training, the curriculum and programme of instruction were developed through a unique partnership between the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (UNOIOS) and the US DoD's Institute for International Legal Studies (Dudley, 2018).

An unintended consequence of this partnership is the increased credibility and legitimacy that the presence of UNOIOS instructors has provided, in the view of participants. In fact, the course gained such high-level national support in TCCs such as Uruguay that the entire URUBAT staff (including the battalion commander and executive officer) attended the NIO training prior to the battalion's deployment to the DRC in May 2018. This 'show of force' emphasized the importance that the battalion's leadership attached to the role of the NIO in investigating illegal activities, and sent a strong message to all ranks.

The advantage of the hybrid model is that it works well when the personnel being trained are a homogeneous group of professionals such as lawyers, engineers, infantry battalion staff officers, or medical doctors, because there is no need for a three-phase T3 approach. These professionals can walk away from a single event and deliver the programme of instruction in their own nations. This reduces costs across the board, since it essentially amounts to a single training event. On the other hand, a major shortfall of the hybrid model is that it does not work well if the technical nature of the subject matter overwhelms the audience or 'goes over their heads'. In this instance a more traditional, methodical, phased T3 approach is required.

Impediments to successful training capacity building

It is safe to say that all TCCs (and PCCs, even though they are not the focus of this paper) are keen to create the best possible, self-sufficient indigenous training capacity for individual, staff, and unit training for their military personnel, but often lack the resources—human, financial, and institutional—to do so. Therefore, donor and capacity-building provider nations are crucial to complementing national efforts, although they can never be a substitute for national ownership. Simply stated, the largest impediment or risk to successful capacity building, including training capacity, is lack of national will to sustain it.

The challenge is to determine the optimal combination of national resources and reimbursements from the UN while minimizing the necessity for donor nation resources over time. The most effective way to do this is by:

- **obtaining political buy-in at the right decision-making level and within the right ministry** (such as the ministry of defence or ministry of foreign affairs) at the beginning of the partnership; and
- **identifying in advance the life-cycle costs for the particular training capacity** so that there are no surprises later regarding responsibility for paying the bill. Mature security sector institutions and inter-agency processes facilitate this process, which constitutes a real and formidable challenge for most developing nations, as the providers of the majority of peacekeepers.

Additional potential impediments to successfully building training capacity are the following:

1. **Delays in obtaining exemptions and waivers.** Obtaining proper exemptions or waivers for taxes, tariffs, and fees from the partner for donations is critical in order to expand the resources available to build capacity. Exemptions or waivers must be obtained in advance and—again—at the appropriate decision-making level within the right ministry or department responsible for granting them.
2. **Political interference.** Even though regional PSO centres of excellence are designed to reduce costs and eliminate duplicative training efforts, they can be an impediment if sovereign decisions or changes in political alignments negatively impact regional cooperation.
3. **Conditional deployment.** What does a donor nation do when facing the dilemma of a partner who has reservations about deploying its forces to a specific region or mission? Should it continue to help build capacity (which is a time-consuming process) while waiting for the political climate to change? The consensus at the implementer level (that is, US Southern Command) is to proceed with the capacity-building effort due to the associated lead time. But this consensus is not shared at all management levels. Clearly, it comes down to a question of ‘opportunity cost’.
4. **Staff turnover.** High turnover and lack of continuity of training staff and support personnel at peace operations training centres hamper progress in building true training capacity.
5. **Inadequate human resource management.** Inadequate human resource management tools for tracking trained personnel and an inability to establish and enforce service obligations (for example, an individual being obliged to serve for a certain number of years following an investment in his or her training) also hamper progress in building training capacity.

Road map for building WAM training capacity in Latin America

It is very clear that Latin American militaries have the discipline and internal management control procedures in place to account for their own weapons and ammunition, remnants of war, and weapons and ammunition confiscated during operations, as illustrated by the few losses reported from countries in this region (Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder, 2017, pp. 28–31). Any training capacity-building programme for WAM in the region must leverage and learn from the major contributions of Latin American TCCs to PSOs over the years.

Since 2005 the GPOI programme has assisted 13 partners in Latin America to build their organic or indigenous training capacity to execute UN PSOs throughout the world, thereby directly contributing to international peace and security. Based on this experience, three distinct models (described above) have emerged for building sustainable, self-sufficient training capacity. The choice of model depends on the type, certification requirements, and level of sophistication of the training capacity desired, coupled with the experience level of the target recipients and the resources available (including time, funds, and facilities). The majority of GPOI training capacity-building efforts follow the traditional three-phased T₃ model to build a self-sufficient MTT designed to maximize limited pre-deployment training contact time through the extensive use of practical applications, simulations, table-top exercises, and situational training exercises.

Given the depth and breadth of the existing experience of Latin American TCCs with respect to WAM and the maturity of the now ten-year-old ALCOPAZ, a more comprehensive approach could be taken when developing WAM modules. This approach would involve early UN and ministry of defence buy-in and exchanges of GPOI facilitating instructors and students among the various Latin American peace operations training centres via ALCOPAZ. The focus would be primarily on the role of the contingents' leadership (officers and NCOs), without neglecting the critical functional role of subject matter experts such as armourers, ammunition technicians, inventory managers, and logisticians, and their unique training requirements. This innovative and comprehensive approach would overcome and mitigate many of the abovementioned impediments to successfully building training capacity.

Specifically, GPOI lessons learned and best practice suggest that given the complexity and multiple levels of the WAM problem set (involving COE, confiscations, captures, recoveries, controlled disposals, destruction, and shelf-life management, among others), there should be a two-track approach to WAM training:

1. **Track one** would focus on the role of armourers, ammunition technicians, and logisticians in the management of field armouries and ammunition supply points in an expeditionary environment during a UN PSO mission.

2. **Track two** would focus on the role of officer and NCO leadership in the contingent with respect to their authority, accountability, and responsibility, as well as the enforcement of internal management control procedures and an operational risk assessment methodology that is pertinent to WAM.

Even though the emphasis in both tracks is on pre-deployment training for contingents, the establishment of an MTT would provide the flexibility to conduct refresher training courses either at home bases or during the mission for individuals, staff members, units, or even other partners.

Finally, it is fundamental that UNOIOS's recently developed NIO course incorporates aspects of WAM, since NIOs will become more and more involved in small arms and ammunition-related investigations. This could be done in the context of the current SEA situational training exercise conducted on the first day of the second week of training, without adding additional time to the current NIO programme of instruction (Dudley, 2018).

Conclusion

GPOI training-capacity models for building partner training capacity in Latin America are applicable to the development of WAM modules for TCCs deploying contingents in UN PSOs. More specifically, the traditional, three-phase T₃ MTT model could provide the basis for the first track of a WAM programme. This first track would focus on the role of technical experts in WAM in managing field armouries and ammunition supply points in the context of a UN PSO. The hybrid model used in the recently executed UNOIOS NIO course could provide the basis for track two of a two-track WAM programme. The second track would focus on officer and NCO leadership within the deploying contingent, and their role in WAM. The emphasis would be on the leadership triangle—authority, responsibility, and accountability—and its role in internal management control procedures and operational risk assessment methodology as it pertains to WAM and PSSM. The two tracks would leverage Latin American TCC experience in PSO missions and the ability of ALCOPAZ to facilitate the interchange of both instructors and students. All of these efforts could be facilitated by US Southern Command's GPOI programme.

This coordinated, comprehensive effort would involve the UN in its early stages and reduce training redundancies and the duplication of efforts. This would optimize the Small Arms Survey's goals of reducing the diversion of weapons from PSOs and improving the ability of each TCC to manage and account for its weapons, ammunition, and any recovered weapons. The knock-on effect would be to strengthen the legitimacy of the overall PSO mission, thereby protecting both the force in question and the local civilian population.

Endnotes

- 1 With the exception of the last paragraph in this section, the following material is from US DoS, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2018, pp. 1–2).
- 2 These are multinational centres in a specific region. In the DoD, in the US Southern Command's area of responsibility, the regions are as follows: Central America, the Caribbean, the Andean Ridge, and the Southern Cone.

References

- Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita, and Matt Schroeder. 2017. *Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations*. MPOME Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. October.
- Dudley, Michael. 2018. 'National Investigation Officer Course.' United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services. Montevideo, Uruguay, 5–17 May.
- Meehan, Nathan. 2018. 'Threat Assessment Training for Peacekeepers: A Proven Business Approach.' *Small Wars Journal*.
- US DoS (United States Department of State), Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. 2018. 'Fact Sheet: U.S. Peacekeeping Capacity Building Assistance.' Unpublished document.

Gender perspectives in the control and management of unregulated weapons and ammunition in UN peace support operations

Cpt. Dr Carina de los Santos Giloméñ

Uruguayan army/Advisor, SINOMAPA · Uruguay

Introduction

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security (WPS) represents a milestone in UN activities related to international peace and security (UNSC, 2000). It was the starting point of the WPS Agenda and the introduction of policies and practices aimed at incorporating a gender perspective not only within the UN itself and its member states, but also within PSOs. The WPS Agenda encourages member states to increase the participation of women in all decision-making positions in national, regional, and international institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. It also calls for consideration of the particular needs of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Against this backdrop, this paper discusses the integration of a gender perspective into the management and control of weapons and ammunition in PSOs, where the proliferation of small arms and light weapons remains a great challenge. It focuses on gender mainstreaming as a significant strategy—or tool—to implement relevant policies and practices in what can be extremely challenging environments.

Background

Gender mainstreaming is defined as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, at all levels:

It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes ... so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (UNESC, 1997, ch. IV, para. 4.IA).

Over the 18 years that have passed since Resolution 1325 was adopted the UN has stressed the relevance of women's active participation in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding, calling on its member states to promote equal conditions in international peace and security activities. Since 2000, Resolution 1325 has been enhanced with seven other Security Council resolutions, namely: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015).¹

Together they constitute the WPS Agenda, whose content can be divided into two main areas of focus:

- women's empowerment and active participation; and
- the prevention of and protection of women from conflict-related sexual violence.

The use of firearms negatively affects both areas.

Gender mainstreaming in PSOs

According to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, more than 80 per cent of the global ammunition trade goes unreported or is poorly documented (UNODA, n.d.). Arms and ammunition stockpiles and modes of transport are also frequently inappropriate for the preservation and safeguarding of such materials.

The UN has made great efforts in, and devoted considerable resources to, avoiding the loss of arms and ammunition in PSOs. This is a particularly challenging task in hostile environments where illegal activities may be rife and a volatile stability jeopardizes the lives of local civilians and UN personnel.

WAM in PSOs is necessary in order to ensure the three aspects of human security: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom from indignity (IAIHR, n.d.). The proliferation of illicit weapons and ammunition seriously affects all three areas, but most especially interferes with the freedom to live without fear. The WPS Agenda offers a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach to involving both female peacekeepers and local women in peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring freedom from fear.

Following Resolution 1325 (2000), Resolution 2122 (2013) encouraged TCCs/PCCs to increase the percentage of women in UN PSOs (UNSC, 2013b). This supports their inclusion as role models for women from conflict-affected communities, especially those characterized by dominant male supremacy and unequal conditions. Resolution 2122 also called for women's full participation and protection in political processes, DDR programmes, and security sector and judicial reforms (UNSC, 2013b, para. 4).

Aside from the inclusion of women in PSOs, gender mainstreaming in WAM in PSOs requires an assessment of how the proliferation of arms in conflicts affects women and men differently. The identification of vulnerable sub-groups is an essential part of this. Girls forced to become servants or 'wives' of combatants experience abuses and violence differently, for example, from young boys forced to join armed groups and use firearms, very often against their own families or community members. Gender mainstreaming also requires the ability to recognize the differential impact of peacekeepers and their security activities on males and females, when protecting communities in conflict-affected societies (see Box 1).

Box 1 Gender mainstreaming in URUBAT

Uruguay has been involved in UN PSOs since 1952. The first women were deployed in Uruguayan contingents in 1993. More than 2,000 Uruguayan women have deployed since then in increasingly senior positions, moving from administrative and logistical assignments in the early days, to more operational and tactical functions as part of battalion headquarter staff and other decision-making positions in deployed units. In 2017 Uruguay was ranked 11th globally in deploying female personnel to PSOs and is the premier source of female peacekeepers in Latin America (Barceló, 2017).

Uruguayan personnel have been deployed in the DRC since 1999, where female peacekeepers currently represent almost 6 per cent (5.4 per cent troops and police) of its personnel in MONUSCO (SINOMAPA, 2018). This is a significant number for a mission, although it can and should be improved on. Uruguayan female peacekeepers in URUBAT play a role in exchanging information with local people and providing humanitarian assistance to women and children in remote areas that are difficult to access. Cpt. Ana Lucas was a member of URUBAT deployed as part of MONUSCO in 2010. She had the remarkable experience of commanding 43 men in her DDR team, when she was deployed in operations in the Busurungi jungle in eastern DRC (de los Santos, 2015, p. 395).

UN guidance

The UNDPKO and UNDFS publication entitled *DPKO/DFS Guidelines: Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations* provides a series of tools to assist with the implementation of the various WPS mandates at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (UNDPKO and UNDFS, 2010). They provide peacekeepers with guidelines on protection of civilians (POC) activities, including by providing a verification list for each level and many examples of how to integrate a gender perspective into peacekeeping work. Suggestions include:

- employing joint assessment teams to define patrolling routes in consultation with local women;
- deploying female military personnel to support activities to protect women and girls;
- consulting and drawing on the perspectives of women and men to gain a comprehensive picture of the security environment; and
- incorporating provisions on strengthening the participation of local women in peacekeeping activities and enhancing the protection of women and girls in strategic planning documents (UNDPKO and UNDFS, 2010, pp. 15–17, 26–28, 36–38).

In recent years the UN has embraced the challenge of incorporating more women into the military component of PSOs. As discussed below, female peacekeepers are now recognized as being crucial at an operational level—for instance, during patrolling and reconnaissance activities, in gathering information, and in providing first-level assistance to victims.

Female peacekeepers and the protection of civilians

Gathering information is particularly relevant to fulfilling POC mandates. PSO field experience indicates that in certain male-dominated societies experiencing conflict, a local woman approaching a man to seek help or to provide him with information can be physically threatening to her. It can also jeopardize a male peacekeeper's safety and that of his team, in a cultural context where such an approach could be considered an intrusion. The presence of female peacekeepers has been proved to enhance the exchange of information and to generate an atmosphere of trust in PSOs (UNGA and UNSC, 2015, para. 212).

Processing information with a gender perspective also requires a deep understanding of the roles of both women and men in a society, as well as their specific safety concerns and vulnerabilities. The UN and TCCs have made great efforts to improve training on POC issues, and peacekeepers are now much better able to read relevant signs and respond to these, both proactively and preventatively. For example, internally displaced people may be fleeing from certain areas or women may be absent from markets or commonly used roads. When not linked to a specific hostile confrontation, such events provide clear evidence of civilian populations under threat.

Searching for illegal or lost weapons and ammunition in vehicles, on premises, and as part of body searches is another key activity associated with POC mandates. Cultural patterns often prevent men from searching women or from searching premises if there is a woman inside. Aware of this reality, local insurgents usually store their illegal arms and ammunition in civilians' homes. By taking part in search operations, women in patrols and search teams can have a direct impact on the chances of arms being recovered, while also discouraging illegal storage.

A gender perspective in DDR programmes

Women in insurgent groups can assume a variety of different roles. They sometimes obtain arms and ammunition, store them, or directly use them. In many cases they are forced to fulfil other 'support' roles such as servants, cooks, or even sexual slaves. Girls as young as eight years old may be forced to join armed groups. Today's DDR programmes are meant to be sensitive to, and provide for, girls and women's special needs, taking into account the discrimination they may face when reintegrating back into societies where traditional values systematically privilege males over females, depriving them of every dimension of their autonomy.

Both the DRC and Colombia DDR processes offer key lessons on how a successful process with a gender perspective considerably reduces the chances of a demobilized person taking up arms again. It is necessary to carefully assess the local context to identify the composition of groups taking part in such programmes (whether males, female, minors, or other vulnerable groups such as the disabled), as well as the types and numbers of weapons involved, and areas of return for resettlement and reintegration.

Furthermore, every DDR process is unique. Cultural and gender awareness are vital to the successful reintegration of men and women back into their communities, by providing them with alternatives other than taking up arms and joining armed groups (Idris, 2016, p. 2). DDR programmes that are understood as part of a process of *social reconciliation* aiming to achieve sustainable peace and involving both (ex-) combatants and non-combatants necessarily require a gender perspective. This is crucial to overcoming the major stigma experienced by women who have been part of armed groups, for example (Jiménez Sánchez, 2014, pp. 10–12). The roles of men and women in any demobilized group should be understood against the backdrop of the roles of men and women in the society into which they are being reintegrated. Failing to do so may end in frustration and the failure to create equal opportunities for both.

The role of women in countering weapons and ammunition proliferation

In one way or another, civilians often live hand in hand with weapons and their effects, as victims and perpetrators of or silent witnesses to violence. Social and cultural patterns in conflict-affected areas—which are most often moulded by the same conflicts—often determine that men leave their families and communities to join state armed forces or irregular armed groups, gaining access to firearms at a very early age. Many have been uprooted from their homes and forced to join gangs. The use of arms and violence becomes a part of their identity and social understanding of masculinity.

Women, on the other hand, usually stay at home to take care of children and the elderly, often in extremely poor conditions and facing real security risks.² They walk long distances to find wood, water, and food, becoming vulnerable to assaults by armed groups in the process. MONUSCO reported 804 cases of sexual violence in the DRC in 2017, for example, affecting 507 women, 256 girls, 30 men, and 2 boys. Approximately 72 per cent of these attacks were attributed to non-state armed groups (UNSG, 2018, para. 37).

Following UN Security Council resolutions 1820 (2008) (UNSC, 2008), 1888 (2009) (UNSC, 2009a), and 1889 (2009) (UNSC, 2009b), Resolution 2106 (2013) (UNSC,

2013a) recognizes that sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations disproportionately affects women and girls and leads to serious trauma among forced witnesses of such violence targeting family members. It further recalls that such situations impede the critical contributions of women to society and, by extension, to durable peace and security (UNSC, 2013a, para. 1).

Women as agents of change. Given the opportunity, women have a huge role to play in actively countering conflict and rebuilding their societies. Women in conflict-affected areas are essential actors in creating an environment for social reconstruction and for disarmament as a key component of physical security, and in guiding their children—particularly boys—into an adulthood that is free of violence. Bearing arms in communities in conflict is usually linked to a perception of power and domination over those who are unarmed. As discussed, the role of men may be strongly defined by the use of weapons, to the extent that the prestige of group members may often be associated with the level of violence they inflict on behalf of the group. Having a gender perspective on weapons and ammunition management implies deconstructing this cultural pattern to build societies where men are dissociated from arms. WAM programmes, including DDR programmes, have proved to be effective in this regard by reducing the perception that the use of firearms guarantees security. The empowerment of civilians in these programmes can deprive weapons and ammunition of their symbolic and economic value. The latter is essential in contexts where literally everything is given a monetary ‘value’—leading to exchanges of sex with armed actors for a bottle of water or food, for example—in order to satisfy basic human needs.

Developing early warning systems. A well-informed society is better prepared to develop and implement its own security strategies to counter the threat of weapons and ammunition proliferation. Policies and programmes aimed at eradicating illegal weapons and ammunition in conflict and post-conflict situations are more effective when civil society becomes involved. The development of early warning systems as instruments for conflict prevention and the protection of civilians can be an important step in the right direction, and female peacekeepers can be an integral part of these systems as the ‘face’ of a PSO. Such systems can offer valuable opportunities to gather and process information, leading to the avoidance of (an intensification of) local conflict. Peacekeepers on the ground can develop interactions with local populations by carrying out protection activities such as patrols, providing security, evacuating people under threat, or delivering humanitarian assistance. Community alert networks are examples of an effective UN early warning system to provide information about human rights violations or imminent threats. Every piece of information obtained from local villages is valuable when designing risk assessment tools or indicators to assess threats. Women within communities that peacekeepers are called on to protect are usually well informed because they stay in the villages with children and the elderly, who do not take part in the conflict.

TCC/PCC commitments to the WPS Agenda

The contribution of female peacekeepers to PSOs remains a major challenge for the UN and its member states. As of July 2018, just 4 per cent of deployed military personnel in UN missions are female (UNDPKO, n.d.a), and 11 per cent of police personnel (UNDPKO, n.d.b). To counter this, UNDPKO has identified increasing the participation of women in PSOs as a priority, and is in the process of implementing a compulsory requirement for TCCs to deploy a minimum of 15 per cent female personnel. TCCs have a significant role to play in achieving this, since the accomplishment of this goal is linked to the process of incorporating women into their respective armed forces.

Conclusion

The promotion of mechanisms for disarmament and countering weapons and ammunition proliferation is a key element of human security. Incorporating a gender perspective into WAM in peace operations contributes to the development of the human security concept by considering the differential impact of conflict and related peacekeeping activities on both males and females. In order to achieve this, contingents must be trained and prepared in military and policing activities, as well as cultural and gender awareness.

Female peacekeepers have an increasingly important role to play in PSOs, including as role models for local women in conflict-affected areas who wish to become involved in state security institutions, or to develop local capacities to prevent and eradicate the proliferation of weapons and ammunition. Irrespective of the percentage of female peacekeepers, however, it is essential for missions to be gender sensitive so that the needs of *all* members of the communities they are working with are recognized and supported.

Overall, gender mainstreaming in PSOs—including in WAM—should lead to the more effective implementation of a mission’s mandate, particularly in relation to the protection of civilians. Ultimately, this is what helps to reduce the possibility of attacks against peacekeepers and the loss of COE.

Endnotes

- 1 Respectively, UNSC (2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2010; 2013a; 2013b; 2015).
- 2 Women and children also make up the majority of internally displaced persons globally.

References

Barceló, Nastasia. 2017. ‘Women, Peace, and Security Course Held in Uruguayan Peacekeeping School.’ *Diálogo Digital Military Magazine*. 25 August.

- IAIHR (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights). n.d. 'What Is Human Security?'
- Ildris, Iffat. 2016. *Lessons from DDR Programmes*. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report No. 1368. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Jiménez Sánchez, Carolina. 2014. *Un acercamiento a las estrategias de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración de combatientes (DDR) desde la perspectiva de género*. Publication No. 117/2014. 20 October. Madrid: IEEE.
- de los Santos, Carina. 2015. 'Role of Women in the Armed Forces: The Republic of Uruguay.' In *The Role of Women in Armed Forces*. Washington, DC: Iberoamerican Association of Defense Colleges.
- SINOMAPA (National Support System for Peace Operations). 2018. *Situation Report*. Unpublished report. Montevideo: SINOMAPA. 30 October.
- UNDPKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations). n.d.a. 'Military.'
- . n.d.b. 'UN Police.'
- and UNDFS (United Nations Department of Field Support). 2010. *DPKO/DFS Guidelines: Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: UNDPKO and UNDFS. March.
- UNESCO (United Nations Economic and Social Council). 1997. *Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997*. A/52/3 of 18 September.
- UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) and UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2015. *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People*. A/70/95-S/2015/446 of 17 June.
- UNODA (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs). n.d. 'Poorly Managed Ammunition—a Key Driver of Conflict and Crime.'
- UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2000. Resolution 1325 (2000). S/RES/1325 of 31 October.
- . 2008. Resolution 1820 (2008). S/RES/1820 of 19 June.
- . 2009a. Resolution 1888 (2009). S/RES/1888 of 30 September.
- . 2009b. Resolution 1889 (2009). S/RES/1889 of 5 October.
- . 2010. Resolution 1960 (2010). S/RES/1960 of 16 December.
- . 2013a. Resolution 2106 (2013). S/RES/2106 of 24 June.
- . 2013b. Resolution 2122 (2013). S/RES/2122 of 18 October.
- . 2015. Resolution 2242 (2015). S/RES/2242 of 13 October.
- UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General). 2018. *Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-related Sexual Violence*. S/2018/250 of 23 March.

Participants

List of participants (in alphabetical order)

Col. Juan Acuña

Deputy Chief Security Officer
UNVMC

Com. Patty Ysabel Ayala Robles

Deputy Director
CECOPAZ
Peru

Maj. Carlos Alberto Castrillón

Colombia

Lt. Col. Carlos Cavalcanti

Doctrine Advisor
CCOPAB
Brazil

1st Lt. Eng. Esteban de los Santos Estigarribia

Paraguay

UN headquarters

Dr Juan Sebastián Jimenez

Colombia

Col. Mariano La Torre Padrón

Peru

Sgt. Amb. Edgar Lorenzo Morel Velázquez

Paraguay

Capt. Ana Danira Ramirez Vásquez

Guatemala

Col. Miguel Ángel Salguero

Director
CAECOPAZ
Argentina

Organizational partners

Col. Pablo Caubarrere

Director
ENOPU

Lt. Gen. (rtd.) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz

Brazil

Maj. Ernesto Domínguez Tenorio

Deputy Director
CENCOPAZ
Colombia

Maj. Cab. DEM Nery Lisandro Donis Calderón

Guatemala

2nd Lt. Jacqueline Katheryn Galarza López

Peru

Col. Gustavo García

Argentina

Wing Com. Samatha Gomani

Policy and Doctrine Officer
UNDPKO-OMA

Lt. Fernando Javier Sarceño Perla

Guatemala

Capt. Petterson Tupinambá da Silva

CCOPAB
Brazil

Capt. Durango Jorge Vázquez Macario

CECOPAM
Mexico

Mr Paul R. Yorio

Programme Manager, GPOI
US Southern Command

Capt. Dr Carina de los Santos Gilomén

Advisor
SINOMAPA

Col. (rtd.) Roberto Gil

Advisor
SINOMAPA

Col. Diego Iribarne

Deputy Director
SINOMAPA

Col. (rtd.) Gonzalo Mila

Advisor
SINOMAPA

Maj. Gen. Marcelo M. Montaner

Director
SINOMAPA

Small Arms Survey

Mr Eric G. Berman

Director
Small Arms Survey

Dr Sigrid Lipott

Associate Researcher
Small Arms Survey

Mr Emile LeBrun

MPOME Coordinator
Small Arms Survey

Uruguay

Col. Marcelo Cavalero

Air force

Amb. Juan Ojeda

Foreign Affairs

Col. (rtd.) Rivera Elgue

Advisor of the Army Commander

Col. Marcelo Orellana

Air force

Maj. Pablo Grignoli

WAM expert
Army

Col. (rtd.) Roberto Pereira

Army

Assistant Officer Jorge Leguizamón

National police

Com. Alejandro Pérez

Navy

Com. Jorge Lemos

Navy

Lt. Col. Claudio Suárez

WAM expert
Army

Mr José Nunes

Defense Ministry

Government/donor representatives

Ms Tabitha Fairclough

Political Officer
US Embassy

Lt. Com. Charles Rowland

Deputy Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation
US Embassy

Amb. Joanne Frappier

Canadian Ambassador to Uruguay

Official workshop photo





