When civil war broke out in South Sudan in December 2013, thousands of soldiers defected from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and joined the opposition. In response, elites loyal to Kiir’s government mobilized fighters to bolster depleted SPLA forces. One of these groups was known as the Mathiang Anyoor, originally an informal northern-border defence force that would later integrate into the SPLA where its alleged role in some of the conflict’s worst atrocities would unfold.

In 2018, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoSS), the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). As part of the transitional security arrangements within the R-ARCSS framework, all warring parties agreed to assemble combatants in designated cantonment sites to facilitate their training, and later, integration into a new ‘unity’ army or other national security services.

In October 2017 the United States lifted three of the most significant components of its sanctions regime against Sudan as part of a shift in bilateral relations with Khartoum.

The conflict between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) in Sudan’s Blue Nile state erupted in September 2011—extending from ongoing combat in South Kordofan, in Jibal El Nouba state. Fighting continued until mid-2016 when both parties declared unilateral cessations of hostilities.

In response to wider economic decline and uneven development, youth-led protests broke out in Khartoum in December 2018. Following this, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) brought together political parties and armed groups to form the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), committed to removing Omar al-Bashir from power.

Darfur’s fade-out from international headlines and Western interests over the past several years has fostered a false narrative that the conflict there is over, despite stark evidence to the contrary. Linked to this narrative, the paralysis of internal and international engagement on Darfur  has compelled Darfurians—civilians and combatants alike—to increase their outward mobility in search of safety and livelihood opportunities in neighbouring African countries or further afield into Europe.

The Nile River bears considerably on inter-state relations among the countries through which it flows; with struggles over control of its waters driving the political undercurrents of the region. Ethiopia and Sudan exemplify such relations, shaped as much by the ebb and flow of the Nile as the rise and fall of the regimes that have governed them. This Briefing Paper by the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project analyzes this relationship and its place in a politically dynamic and evolving region.

Southern Libya after the fall of Qaddafi has become synonymous with lawlessness. For centuries, the area has been home to a shifting sea of ethnic groups who see the border as an imposition but not a barrier. The Tubu (or Teda) are one such group, whose presence stretches across southern Libya, Chad, and Niger. 

UN peace operations are uniquely positioned—and mandated—to collect and monitor data on conflict-related casualties. Through the collection and analysis of this type of data, UN missions can both improve the effectiveness of peace operations and assist the international effort among UN Member States to achieve progress towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16—particularly Indicator 16.1.2 on conflict-related deaths.